

BT 65 .L55 1882
Litton, Edward Arthur, 1813-
1897.
Introduction to dogmatic
theology



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INTRODUCTION

TO

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

ON THE BASIS OF THE

XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

BY

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RULE OF FAITH.

CHRISTIAN THEISM, AND THE HOLY TRINITY.


MAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL. THE ANGELS.

PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST.

LONDON:

ELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1882.



P R E F A C E.

It has been subject of remark by one of our Bishops* that there exists no work from an English pen on Dogmatic Theology, which could be recommended to candidates for Holy Orders as an introduction to that study. The criticism is just. Our theology, copious and valuable on isolated topics, is singularly deficient in works corresponding to those of the great foreign theologians, Romish and Protestant, in which a systematic survey of the whole field is taken. Hence such treatises as those of Martensen and Van Oosterzee have been largely read by our students, and no doubt with profit. But independently of some graver defects, a translation seldom succeeds in fully conveying the sense of the original; and the original itself is commonly too racy of the soil whence it sprang to fall in readily with English habits of thought and expression. There seems room therefore for, at least, an attempt in this direction; and without professing to be a Manual for Candidates, for which perhaps it is hardly fitted, the following volume aims at being primarily a Compendium of Dogmatic Theology on the subjects treated of, and indirectly a doctrinal commentary on such of the Thirty-nine Articles as belong thereto; not, however, as is usual, on each Article separately, but on the Articles as grouped under the heads to which they may be referred; which, since several of them really present but different sides of the same subject, is the first step towards a clear view of the system on which they are founded.

A few words may be in place on the position which the writer occupies. It has been matter of debate whether or not the Anglican Church is a Protestant Church, and whether or not she possesses a theology of her own, neither that of Rome nor yet of Geneva, but occupying a midway position between the two. With all such questions the writer has no concern. Whatever may be the character of the Anglican Church as a whole, the Thirty-

* Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, Charge, 1867.

nine Articles, at any rate, admit of no doubt as to their parentage; at least as regards those points on which they differ from the Church of Rome. For, as is well known, they consist of two quite distinct portions, one of which contains the doctrines common to us and the Romish Communion, the fundamental doctrines of the Œcumenical Creeds which both accept, while the other has reference to the points of controversy between us and that Communion. There can be no question that on these latter points the Anglican Church, if she is to be judged by the statements of the Articles, must be ranked amongst the Protestant Churches of Europe; and of the two families of foreign Confessions, under that of the Reformed rather than that of the Lutheran type. And such she is generally considered to be. Yet it may be alleged that the character of the Anglican Church is not to be determined from the Articles alone, but from her formularies as a whole, and there may be some ground for this assertion. But whether such is the case or not, a discussion of this delicate topic is foreign to the purpose of the present work. It makes no pretensions to frame, or to represent, a theology of the Church of England, as an insular production; a task very difficult in itself, and doubtful in its results. In respect of the leading points of controversy alluded to, its aim is simply, from a comparison of the public Confessions of the Reformed Churches, amongst which, as far as the Articles are concerned, our own is to be ranked, to expound the dogmatical system which goes by the general name of Protestant as distinguished from that of Rome.

Independently of the difficulties attending an attempt to establish a special Anglican theology on such points, the writer must avow his conviction that, in a scientific point of view, all such attempts will probably end in failure; and that there are only two systems of Dogmatic Theology, coherent in structure and capable of scientific exposition, the Romish and the Protestant; these words being understood not in the popular sense, but of the principles of the respective systems, as they are found stated in the public Confessions of Faith, and elaborated in the works of the principal theologians, on either side, since the Reformation; a Bellarmine and a Möhler on the one, a Chemnitz, a J. Gerhard, and a Quenstedt, on the other; worthy successors, all of them, of the great scholastic divines of the middle ages. The experiment, in fact, of such a *Via Media* theology was made many years ago in one of our universities under the most favourable auspices; but it produced no permanent result. The golden mean, in its actual application, was found to involve as many difficulties as either extreme. An example may be, the subject of Scripture-interpretation. The Romish doctrine of a living, infallible ex-

positor in the person of the Pope is quite intelligible, has the merit of simplicity, and, *if only the fact could be proved*, removes many perplexities; the *genuine* Protestant doctrine, too, stands on its own ground, equally intelligible. The *Via Media* theology adopted neither the one nor the other, in its integrity. It admitted, in some sense, the right of private judgment, it denied the infallibility of the Pope; but its admission of the right of private judgment was accompanied with the proviso that the conclusions arrived at should always be in accordance with 'the voice of Catholic antiquity.' How or where the voice of Catholic antiquity, ruling disputed points of interpretation, was to be ascertained, could never be satisfactorily made out. In fact, the prime architect of this theology has himself demolished his building. We are told, on his plenary authority, that 'as a doctrine, it is wanting in simplicity, hard to master, indeterminate in its provisions, and without a substantive existence in any age or country.*' Or as he has tersely expressed it in another work. 'The *Via Media* was an impossible idea; it was what I had called standing on one leg; and it was necessary, if my old issue of the controversy was to be retained, to go further one way or the other.†' A writer may be pardoned who accepts the judgment of so great a master, and ventures to think that nothing in Dogmatic Theology that will satisfy the demands of consecutive thinkers is likely to be produced except on the lines either of genuine Romanism or of genuine Protestantism.

This does not imply but that within the main lines on either side subordinate differences have not always existed, and may always be expected to exist. The symbols of the Lutheran and the Swiss Churches are easily distinguishable, and the Sacramentarian controversy threatened at one time to produce a rupture between them; and even in the Romish Church, a considerable latitude of private opinion is, very properly, allowed. But these internal differences do not affect the essential principles of the respective systems; and in expounding, for example, the theology of Protestantism, it is unnecessary to draw a distinction between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches: they both agree in certain fundamental points as against Rome, and refuse to be combined with the system of the latter into a *tertium quid*.


The writer has aimed at compression throughout, and therefore historical details and subordinate points of discussion have been, as much as possible, avoided, or briefly referred to in notes. In some parts he may seem to have transgressed this rule by a rather

* Cardinal Newman's preface to his 'Prophetical Office of the Church' third edition, 1877.

† 'Apologia,' p. 260.

copious citation of passages from Confessions of Faith and theologians. On such abstruse subjects as, *e.g.*, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, Original Sin, and the like, the writer was not indisposed to shelter himself under the authority of great names. Moreover, where doctrines are ascribed to a system, or an author, it seems only fair to quote the *ipsissima verba* in which they are expressed. He also indulged the hope that some readers may be induced to explore for themselves the treasures of thought which lie buried in the ponderous tomes of what may be called the scholastic age of Protestantism, that is, the two centuries succeeding the Reformation. No better corrective of the loose habits of thought prevalent in our day exists than a perusal of writers who for learning, depth, and, above all, precision of language, have few equals.

It will be perceived that this volume contains only a part of the great subject of which it treats. Another one might comprise the remaining topics, such as justification, the Church, the sacraments, eschatology, etc. But whether the author advances further in this direction will depend partly on the reception the present volume meets with, and partly on the measure of life and health which a gracious Providence may vouchsafe. The volume, however, as far as it extends, is complete in itself.



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INTRODUCTION

TO

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.



PRELIMINARY.

§ 1. *The Province of Dogmatic Theology.*

THE word 'dogma' occurs in the New Testament in the sense of injunctions or ordinances to which obedience was required, such as the decree of Cæsar (Luke ii. 1, comp. Acts xvii. 7), the decisions of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem (Acts xvi. 4, 17), and the precepts of the Mosaic law (Ephes. ii. 15; Col. ii. 14); and not in the sense of doctrines proposed to faith. In the writings of the early Fathers, the word signifies the fundamental truths of Revelation, such as they were delivered by the Apostles in their oral teaching and their writings, and before they became acted upon by the speculative intellect of the Church. Philosophy assigned to each science its peculiar dogmata, or first principles; and those of Christianity were its historical facts with their inspired explanations. But since religion leaves no faculty of man unaffected by its influence, and appeals to the intellectual as well as the emotional part of his nature (as indeed faith, the most comprehensive of its synonyms, always presupposes something to be believed), it was inevitable that in process of time attempts should be made to systematise and arrange the materials furnished partly by Scripture, and partly by the implicit faith of the Church; and this necessarily in the current language, and under the influence of the philosophy, of the age. And this scientific action was materially promoted by the appearance of successive heresies. Each, as it grew to a head, called forth in opposition all the resources of argument, from whatever quarter, which the Church could summon to her aid; and no Christian truth emerged from the conflict the same in its mode of expression, and in its established

connection with other truths, as it descended into the arena. A legitimate development, not of new truths from the old, but of the mode of exposition of the old, was coëval with Christianity, and is inseparable from the idea of a living body like the Church; it finds a place in Scripture itself, in which the progression of Christian doctrine, from its first elements to its more perfect exhibition, is evident, though, from the form in which by Divine wisdom the New Testament was cast, and the special function which Scripture discharges in the Church, a systematic arrangement of doctrines, and especially as distinguished from Christian practice, is not to be looked for in it. This reflex action of the intellect on the faith of the Church is the source of dogmatic theology, and furnishes its true idea. Hence may be obviated sundry misconceptions of its nature. It is not, for example, a mere stringing together of texts or passages of Scripture under certain heads; which may be a preliminary to the formation of Biblical, but is not in itself dogmatic, theology. Of course a Christian dogmatic theology must, of necessity, be a Biblical one; so far, that is, as it ever appeals to Scripture as its ultimate authority; but formally the two are not identical. The Church, in its true idea, being the Communion of Saints, the temple of the Holy Ghost (Ephes. ii. 21, 22), possesses a relative independence as regards spiritual illumination: the voice of the Holy Spirit in Scripture is one thing, and the work of the same Spirit in the Church is another, though the two are inseparably connected: and hence the Church may, for the time being, and for a special purpose, dissociate reflection upon her own faith from the authentication of it by Scripture: and in so doing, she lays the foundation of that branch of theology to which the name of 'dogmatic' is properly to be assigned. Nor is it, as sometimes seems to be supposed, merely a system of logical analysis and deduction, like the scholastic theology, with no basis in the living Christian sentiment, the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, in the Church. Severed from this latter, it no doubt merits the strictures that have been levelled against dogmatic theology in the mass, but which apply only to a limited and inaccurate conception of it.* Still less may it assume the position of an arbiter of the faith, dictating its 'sentences' to the submissive reception of the Christian body; to which assumption the word 'dogmatism' probably owes the sinister meaning commonly attached to it. No order or class, in the Church, whether ecclesiastical or scholastic, is empowered thus to rule the Christian conscience;

* Such, *e.g.*, as that of the late Bishop Hampden, who, in his otherwise instructive 'Bampton Lectures,' appears to identify dogmatic theology with the subtleties of scholasticism.

and dogmatic theology loses its value if it is not a living reproduction of what is already held, in solution as it were, by the Christian community at large to which the writer belongs.

From these observations it will be seen that the dogmatic theologian occupies an essentially different position from that of a philosophic inquirer into the claims of Christianity. He is presumed to be neither outside nor above the Church, but in it; a partaker of its life, an expositor of what he himself believes and has experienced. To this branch of theology the maxim emphatically applies, *Pectus theologum facit*. A dogmatic theology free from all prejudication, the author of which is supposed to come to his subject with his mind a *tabula rasa*,* is a misnomer; and not less so is one which affects to be an exposition of individual opinion rather than of the common faith of the Church. Nor does he take up the position of an apologist. Dogmatic theology presupposes the Divine origin of Christianity to be admitted, and occupies a midway position between the study of evidences and the homiletic functions of the Christian minister.

But here questions arise which seem to present difficulty. What are we to understand by the Church of which the dogmatic theologian is supposed to be a member? And where is its accredited profession of faith to be found? Before the schism of East and West the reply was easy; the faith of the Church—not the *fides quâ*, but *quæ creditur*—expressed itself, on certain fundamental points at least, in the Ecumenical creeds, or the two earliest of them. Heresies, on these points, had come and gone, proving themselves to be such, not by the Vincentian rule, *Quod semper*, etc.—an unsatisfactory one at best, for of what value was it, to take one example, at a period when, as one of the Fathers complains, the whole world almost had become Arian?—but by their very want of vitality and permanence, as the branch from which the sap has been diverted of itself withers and drops off. On this basis of the creeds the work of J. Damascenus (A.D. 730) contained a valuable, though limited, survey of Christian doctrine; but it was the first, and the last, of the kind which could lay claim strictly to the title of Catholic. After its separation from the East, the Western Church busied itself with questions in which the Greek Church, even if no rupture had taken place, would have felt little interest; and the West itself, at the Reformation, became split up into separate Churches, bound together by no tie, except the acceptance of the three creeds, and each with a Confession of Faith of its own, more or less polemical in character. The result is that a Catholic dogmatic theology, except as regards the fundamental doctrines of the creeds, is now

* Strauss's notion of it—'Christliche Glaubenslehre.'

only an idea, incapable of being realised ; for a writer on the subject must belong to one or the other of the sections which divide Western Christendom, and must, if he is to produce anything of value, be an exponent of the theology of his own particular communion : he must identify himself with its teaching and traditional sentiment. And thus, in the present day, any such system must be more or less of a partial character ; it is the dogmatic theology of the Romish, or of the Lutheran, or of the Reformed, or (as some would say) of the Anglican, Church. If we consent, as we well may, to merge minor differences, at any rate the Romish and the Protestant systems stand out in strong contrast ; and it may be affirmed that no Romanist could fairly expound a system of Protestant doctrine, and probably the converse equally holds good. The other question is, Where is the traditional theology of each particular Church to be found ? Not primarily in the works of its theologians, still less in the varying teaching of schools or parties, which may from time to time make their appearance, and then pass away. The authorised public Confessions of Faith are the proper standards to appeal to ; it is they that impart a definite character and historical continuity to each Church. As long as these Confessions are not repudiated, or altered, by the body in its corporate capacity, they must be taken to decide the position which, in the controversies which agitate Christendom, that Church occupies. And on this ground, if the Thirty-nine Articles are to be considered as the distinctive, as they certainly are the principal, dogmatical formulæ of the Anglican Church, there can be no doubt as to her position. The chief theologians, however, of each Church, if not primary, may be very important secondary sources of information ; and the more so in proportion as they lived nearer to the time when the Church first assumed its distinctive features. Hence the earlier are, in this point of view, more valuable than the later. Some of the works of such writers have enjoyed an almost symbolical authority in their respective Churches ; as, *e.g.*, those of Jewell and Hooker in our own, those of Melancthon in the Lutheran, and those of Calvin in the Swiss Protestant Churches. Where the meaning of the Confessions may be obscure or ambiguous, the comments of those who either assisted at the drawing-up of such Confessions, or have been held most accurately to represent their spirit, are justly deemed of the greatest assistance towards arriving at a conclusion. But no name, however venerable, and no school of opinion, however for the time prevalent, can be of much use in this point of view, if, instead of building on the foundations already laid, it aims at raising a new structure not in harmony therewith : such attempts to alter the essential

character of a Church can only be of detriment to it; they must impede its natural growth, and therefore efficiency, and may issue in its dissolution.

§ 2. *Literature of the Subject.*

The Patristic remains of the first centuries contain many valuable dogmatical treatises, that is treatises on special topics, but hardly any the aim of which is to exhibit the faith of the Church in a connected system, the proper province of dogmatic theology. Some attempts, however, in this direction were made, as, *e. g.*, by Clemens Alexandrinus, and especially by Origen in his work *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*; but they were defective in many respects, and moreover seem to have led to nothing beyond themselves. John of Damascus, to whom allusion has been already made, may be considered the founder of this branch of theology. His work 'De Fide Orthodoxa' is a summary of the decisions of councils, and of the statements of the principal Greek Fathers, especially Gregory Nazianzen, on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation; and deservedly obtained a high reputation not only in the Eastern Church, but in the Western also, as soon as it became known through the medium of translations. And with it the literary activity of the Eastern Church on this subject seems to have come to a close. The main defect of the work is its almost total silence on Anthropological questions, or those relating to human agency in the work of salvation; nor does it treat of the Church, its idea, functions, and ministry. To supply these deficiencies was the appointed work of the Western Church. But though in the controversial treatises of Tertullian, Ambrose, and above all Augustine, with whom must be joined the Augustine of the middle ages, Anselm, the father of the scholastic theology, the materials were furnished in rich abundance, they were not collected and arranged until the great theologians of the properly scholastic period undertook the task, and performed it in a manner which must extort the admiration even of those to whom the general features of scholasticism are repulsive. What a marvellous monument of industry and acuteness is the 'Summa Theologiæ' of Thomas Aquinas, the angelic doctor! And the same may be said of the works of his fellow-labourers in this field. But its slavish submission to ecclesiastical authority on the one hand, and its unwarranted employment of Aristotle's philosophy on the other, rendered the scholastic theology but a meagre expression of the Christian faith; and at the first breath of the religious impulse of the Reformation it tottered to its fall. The material principle of Protestantism, justification by faith only—or, in other words, the doctrine that the

Christian believer enjoys direct access to God through Christ, without the intervention of the Church—and its formal principle the supreme authority of Holy Scripture, were alike foreign to the spirit of this theology, which accordingly found no congenial home in the Reformed Churches. Yet it had had too deeply struck its roots wholly to disappear. The first Reformers, while protesting against its Pelagian tendencies, made use of its terms and received arguments—they could not do otherwise if they were to be understood; and to this day we employ its language without perhaps suspecting whence it is derived. No writer is appealed to with greater deference by the Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century than Thomas Aquinas. But though the scholastic theology continued to furnish the shell of theological discussion, it lost its power as a living system.

It was the Reformation that gave birth to what we now mean by the term ‘dogmatic theology.’ The public confessions on either side—such as that of Augsburg, with its Apology, on the one, and the decrees of the Council of Trent, with its Catechism, on the other—are in reality compendiums of this science, of no mean literary merit, a praise especially due to the Romish Catechism. At an early period of the movement Melancthon’s ‘*Loci Communes*’ (A.D. 1521) appeared, a work pronounced by Luther to be worthy of admission into the Canon; it was much enlarged, and in some points of doctrine modified, in subsequent editions. The most distinguished commentator on it, and indeed the chief Lutheran theologian of that century, was Martin Chemnitz, whose ‘*Loci*,’ and especially his ‘*Examen Concilii Tridentini*,’ are classical works. The school of Melancthon occupied a middle position between the fully developed Lutheranism of the ‘*Formula Concordiæ*,’ drawn up A.D. 1579, and the doctrine of the Swiss Calvinistic Churches. For these latter Calvin performed the same service which Melancthon had done for the Lutheran; and in his ‘*Institutions*’ produced a work which for lucidity and philosophical depth surpassed all similar attempts of that age, and exercised a vast influence throughout the Reformed Churches of Europe, our own not excepted. It has not been superseded by any subsequent work on the same basis, viz. the doctrine of absolute predestination.

The seventeenth century was the scholastic age of Protestant theology, and witnessed its most important productions. Such works as the ‘*Loci*’ of J. Gerhard (best edition that of Cotta, 1762-81 in twenty quarto vols.), and the ‘*Theologia Didactico-Polemica*’ of A. J. Quensledt (died 1688), remind us of the labours of Albert Magnus and Aquinas; but they are in a great measure free from the defects which have consigned their prede-

cessors to the shelf. Equally exhaustive in their treatment, they are far more Scriptural, and less prone to indulge in idle subtleties. With these lights of the Lutheran Church are to be associated the names of Baier, Buddeus, and Hollaz (the two latter of the next century); while the Reformed Church may boast of such writers as Beza, Gilbert Voetius, and F. Turretin. It is from the writers of this period that the student will derive the most solid instruction.

The Romish Church has never been so productive as the Protestant in this branch of theology. Two great theologians, however, she possesses—Bellarmino and Bossuet: the former a controversialist, armed at all points, and though not always fair in his statement of the opinions he opposes, eminent for learning and acuteness; the latter of classic rank in the literature of his country.*

The history of dogmatic theology in recent times is its history in Germany; for in England, with the exception of some isolated treatises, little attention has been paid to the subject. After the dreary reign of rationalism, of which the works of Wegscheider and Bretschneider, at the beginning of this century, may be taken as the culminating point, there has been an auspicious revival of the old orthodox theology, under a form more suited to modern taste: among others of less note, Nitzsch, Twisten, Thomasius, Philippi, and Martensen, deserve honourable mention as having contributed to the change. None of these would dissemble their obligations to the celebrated Schleiermacher, who, though he can hardly find a place in the ranks of orthodoxy, yet, by recalling attention to the fact that the true basis of dogmatic theology is to be sought in the inner life of the Church, communicated an impulse in the right direction, which has been widespread and lasting. But for the history of recent German theology the reader is referred to works which expressly handle that subject.†

It remains briefly to notice the arrangements that have been adopted by different writers. The ordinary one, for a long time, was that of 'Loci,' or heads: thus J. Gerhard's great work treats, in order, of Scripture, Person and Work of Christ, Creation, Freewill, Justification, Sacraments, Church, Christian Ministry, Civil Magistrate, Wedlock, Death, Resurrection and Judgment, and a Future State. The want of a central governing principle in this method produced attempts at a more scientific one, and the 'Loci' gave place to systems such as that of Calvin, who treats, first, of God the Creator; secondly, of Christ the Redeemer;

* See especially his '*Histoire des Variations*,' etc.

† As, for example, Farrar's '*Bampton Lectures*.'

thirdly, of the Holy Ghost; and lastly, of the Church—an arrangement evidently founded on the Apostles' Creed: or that of Quenstedt—1. The end of Theology (God); 2. Its subject (man); 3. The sources of salvation (Christ); 4. The means of salvation (Church, etc.). The trichotomy of the Apostles' Creed, the doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, has been recently revived as a foundation by Marheineke and Martensen; it is however open to objection, as more suited to the dogmatic theology of the Greek than to that of the Protestant Church. The method of 'Loci,' on the whole, offers as many advantages as any other; and in the present work, at any rate, which is intended to be indirectly a commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles, seems the appropriate one. The topics, however, may be disposed in a natural order. The first thing, obviously, is to settle what is the supreme authority in matters of faith, or the Rule of Faith; Christian Theism, including the Holy Trinity, naturally follows; then the State of Man unfallen and fallen, with a section on the Angels; and then the Person and Work of the Redeemer. More could not be included within the limits of the present volume.

THE RULE OF FAITH.

‘Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation : so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an Article of Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation. In the name of Holy Scripture we do understand those Canonical books of the Old and New Testament of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church And the other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners ; but yet it doth not apply them to establish any doctrine All the books of the New Testament, as they are commonly received, we do receive, and account them Canonical’ (Art. vi.). ‘The Old Testament is not contrary to the New : for both in the Old and the New Testament everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and Man. Wherefore they are not to be heard which feign that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises The Law given from God by Moses, as touching ceremonies and rites, does not bind Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof ought, of necessity, to be received in any commonwealth’ (Art. vii.). ‘The three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasian Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles’ Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed : for they may be proved by most certain warranty of Holy Scripture’ (Art. xx.). ‘The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith : and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God’s Word wrtten, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore although the Church is a witness and keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree anything against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce anything as necessary to salvation’ (Art. xx.). ‘When they (General Councils) be gathered together (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed by the Spirit and Word of God), they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore things ordained by them, as necessary to salvation, have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture’ (Art. xxi.). ‘Credimus unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores æstimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse quam Prophetica et Apostolica scripta quum Veteris tum Novi Testamenti . . . Hoc modo luculentum discrimen inter sacras Veteris et Novi Testamenti literas et omnia aliorum scripta retinetur, et sola scriptura S. iudex, norma, et regula, cognoscitur, ad quam ceu ad Lydium lapidem omnia dogmata exigenda sunt et indicanda, an pia, an impia, an vera, an falsa, sint. Cætera autem symbola, et alia scripta, non obtinent auctoritatem judicis (hæc enim dignitas solis Sacris Literis debetur), sed duntaxat pro religione nostra testimonium dicunt, eam que explicant, ac ostendunt quomodo singulis temporibus Sacræ Literæ in articulis controversis in ecclesia Dei a doctoribus qui tum vixerunt intellecta et explicata fuerint’

(Form. Concord., lib. symb. Eccl. Luth., edit. Francke). 'Credimus scripturas canonicas utriusque Testamenti ipsum verum esse verbum Dei: et auctoritatem sufficientem ex semet ipsis non ex hominibus habere. Et in hac scriptura S. habet universalis Christi Ecclesia plenissime exposita quæcunque pertinent cum ad salvificam fidem tum ad vitam Deo placentem recte informandam. Nihil dissimulamus quosdam Vet. Test. libros a veteribus nuncupatos esse Apocryphos, ab aliis Ecclesiasticos, utpote quos in ecclesiis legi voluerunt quidem, non tamen proferri ad auctoritatem ex his fidei confirmandam. Illam duntaxat Scripturæ S. interpretationem pro orthodoxa et genuina agnoscimus quæ ex ipsis est petita scripturis (ex ingenio utique ejus linguae, in qua sunt scriptæ, secundum circumstantias item expensæ, et pro ratione locorum vel similium vel dissimilium, plurium quoque et clariorum expositæ) cum regula fidei et caritatis congruit' (Conf. Helv., lib. symb. Eccl. Ref., edit. Augusti). 'Confitemur sanctos Dei viros divino afflatos spiritu locutos esse. Postea vero Deus . . . servis suis mandavit ut sua illa oracula scriptis consignarent' (Conf. Bel. iii., *ibid.*). 'Profitemur nos amplecti sacras canonicas . . . S. S. . . instinctu Spiritus S. primitus scriptas' (Dec. Thor. i., *ibid.*).

The subject of the Rule of Faith does not, in our Articles, occupy its proper place, which, as is evident, should be antecedent to the discussion of particular doctrines. As it forms a main point of controversy between the Romish and the Reformed Churches, the compilers were probably actuated by the laudable desire of exhibiting the common faith of Christians on the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, and the Person and Work of Christ, before noticing differences. But in a system of dogmatic theology, such an arrangement is out of place. If the symmetry of the system is to be preserved, and the subordinate doctrines to be properly estimated, the depository of the faith must be ascertained before its contents become matter of discussion. The doctrine of our Church, in common, as has been seen, with the foreign Protestant Churches on this point, is that Holy Scripture, by which is to be understood the Canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, is, as having been given by inspiration of God, the sole Rule of Faith (*norma credendi*), and the supreme judge of controversy; and further, that whatsoever is necessary to salvation may be plainly and sufficiently read therein, or proved thereby. This general statement branches out into several particulars.

§ 3. Canon of Scripture.

By the word Canon (*κανών*) was meant, originally, not a catalogue of the inspired writings, but the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, which were to be a rule, or guide, in public teaching. These sometimes, as in the Apostles' Creed, appear in short summaries, sometimes are referred to by writers (Irenæus, Tertullian, etc.) as well known and acknowledged by the Churches. It is in this sense that S. Paul calls the measure of divine truth which

the Philippian Church had attained to a Canon (Phil. iii. 16). Since this Canon of truth, whether inward in the heart, or expressed in writing, derived all its validity from its presumed correspondence with the teaching of the Apostles, and since this latter, after their decease, could be found with certainty only in their writings, it became a matter of vital moment to ascertain, with all care and diligence, what were those writings, which, when collected together, might for ever form an authentic record of Apostolic doctrine. The result of this pious labour is the volume of our New Testament, all the books of which we receive as they are commonly acknowledged. As regards the Old Testament, we accept the judgment of its proper historical guardians, and consequently exclude some of the books which the Council of Trent (Sess. iv.) admits, but which the Jews did not acknowledge as on a level with the others. The whole, as forming the standard of faith and morals, came to be called the Canon, and the writings contained in it Canonical.

For the history of the formation of the Canon of the New Testament, or rather of the evidence to its existence from an early age (for the actual process of its formation is involved in obscurity), the reader is referred to works which treat expressly of the subject, such as Westcott 'On the Canon,' and especially Kirchhofer's excellent work. For our present purpose, a mere sketch will be sufficient. We observe, then, that from the first our present books are cited as Scripture, that is, as books *sui generis*, possessing an authority which belonged to no others; that they were publicly read in Christian assemblies as the Word of God; that catalogues were formed of them, of which thirteen, of a date previous to the fifth century, are extant, and which, though in some of them certain books are omitted, all agree in containing no other; and that the oldest version, the Peschito, contains these and no others. Commentaries were written on them, and they were appealed to by heretics and unbelievers (with few exceptions), as well as by orthodox writers, as authentic records of the Christian religion. Notwithstanding this general agreement as to what books were to be accounted Canonical, it is impossible to assign the particular time when the collection was made, or the persons who were engaged in it. No traces exist of this question having been formally discussed in any Council; that of Laodicea, A.D. 364, which has been improperly supposed to have fixed the Canon, merely giving a catalogue of the books already received. Unlike the books of the Old Testament, those of the New were addressed to Churches scattered over the known world: time, therefore, was needed, both for a circulation of the books and for a general recognition of their authority. When to this we

add the difficulties of transcription and communication, and the political disadvantages under which for several centuries Christianity laboured, preventing the assembling of any Council to determine this and similar questions, it cannot be matter of surprise that the Canon should only gradually have assumed its present form. One circumstance that must have retarded the work was the swarm of Apocryphal writings which appeared soon after the Apostolic age, and which commonly laid claim to Apostolic origin. To sift the evidence for these spurious compositions must have been a work of no small difficulty; and it speaks highly for the diligence and judgment of the early Church, that none of them appear in its catalogues, are quoted as Scripture by the Fathers of that age, or were read in the assemblies of Christians.

The books which Eusebius, a writer of great research and impartiality (A.D. 315) calls *ὁμολογουμένοι*, that is universally and without controversy admitted, are our present ones, with the exception of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that of S. James, that of S. Jude, the second of S. Peter, the second and third of S. John, and the Apocalypse: these, he says, were questioned by some, though received by the majority.* They are just such as, from their nature or contents, we might expect to have been of tardier recognition. For either, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, those of S. James and S. Jude, and the Apocalypse, they do not expressly assert their Apostolic origin; or, like the second and third of S. John, they were addressed to individuals, which evidently would render it more difficult to prove their genuineness. Whatever may be the deficiency of evidence for these books, it must never be forgotten that it is comparative, and that those for which there is the least, rest on testimony incomparably stronger than can be adduced for any Apocryphal writing. Nor must it be forgotten that the very hesitation and reserve with which the disputed books were received adds weight to the judgment of the early Church, where it was unanimous. From the candidly expressed doubts of the first three centuries in regard to some books we derive the same benefit in estimating the claims of the rest as we do, on the fact of our Lord's resurrection, from the incredulity of S. Thomas.

Nevertheless, these disputed books cannot be placed exactly on the same level with the rest. We admit them into the Canon as, on the whole, sufficiently attested, but we cannot now repair the disadvantage under which they labour, as having been not universally accepted by the ancient Church. The doubts which were then felt propagate themselves, unless fresh evidence should come

* Eccl. Hist., lib. iii. 27.

to light, which is not likely. Comparatively, therefore, with the others they occupy, as regards the external testimony, an inferior position, and on this account have sometimes received the name of Deutero-Canonical.*

The Canon of the New Testament being established, that of the Old to us Christians at once follows. For by our Lord and the Apostles our present books of it are quoted and classified, and no others. Amidst the censures that Christ directed against the Jews of that age, he never charged them with adding to or corrupting their Scriptures. By their traditions they frequently 'made the Word of God of none effect,' but the Word itself they left intact. Tradition points to the return from the Babylonish captivity as the time when the task was undertaken of collecting the books, which, after the destruction of the temple, had become dispersed; and the same tradition makes Nehemiah and Ezra, especially the latter, principal agents in the prosecution of the task. To the collection thus formed, whether by Ezra or not, his own writings, together with those of Nehemiah and Malachi, that were written before Ezra's death, were added, and the Canon of the Old Testament completed. It was, with the exception of a few insignificant sects, acknowledged by the Jews throughout the world. Though a number of Apocryphal writings, most of them of Alexandrian origin, appeared subsequently to the last of the prophets, and some became incorporated in the LXX. translation, it does not appear that even in Egypt they ever obtained Canonical authority, and certainly not among the Jews of Palestine. It was, therefore, in disregard of the unanimous tradition of the appointed guardians of the Old Testament, as well as of the facts of history, that the Church of Rome pronounced, at the Council of Trent, that all the books contained in the Vulgate, Apocryphal or otherwise, should, under pain of an anathema, be accounted as sacred and Canonical. (Sess. iv., c. 1.)

We now proceed to the properly dogmatical aspect of the question. On what grounds, let us ask, do we receive a book as Canonical? The ultimate ground can be no other than our conviction that it is, or contains, the Word of God; in other words, that (to speak at present only of the New Testament) it is an authentic record, written under special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, of the Christian revelation. This, however, only leads the way to the further question, How do we arrive at this conviction? And the reply of the Romish Church is that the authority of Scripture depends on the decision of the Church; or, in other

* 'Ubi desunt primæ et veteris ecclesiæ firmæ et consentientes testificationes, sequens ecclesia, sicut non potest ex falsis facere vera, ita nec ex dubiis potest certa facere' (Chemnitz, Exam. Con. Trid., lib. i., 22).

words, that the Canonicity of a book is to be admitted because the Church affirms it. It is true that this is not openly avowed in the decisions of the Council of Trent, but it is virtually assumed. For when the Council anathematises all who do not receive as sacred and Canonical, *e.g.*, the books of Tobias, Judith, and Wisdom, and the two books of the Maccabees, which notoriously never had a place in the Jewish Canon (the original Hebrew), and were never unanimously accepted by the ancient Christian Church, but, on the contrary, were rejected by those Fathers who were acquainted with Hebrew, and who made the subject their special study,* it is obvious that it claims the power of fixing the Canon by its own plenary authority. It is only an accident how far the power may be exercised. The Council stops short at certain books which, no doubt, have been esteemed in the Church; but the principle may be extended to any books, whatever their contents or the attestation they enjoy. For the principle is, that the existing Church of Rome is the final court of appeal to decide what books are to be esteemed Canonical and what not.

Against this principle the Reformed Churches protest. In the first place, whatever may be the functions of the Church in this matter, it is certainly not the existing Romish Church, nor the Romish Church of the sixteenth century, from which we receive the Canon, but from that early Church which makes no pretensions to be an independent, infallible authority, but exercises its functions only in connection with the facts of history. The Tridentine Fathers were in no better position to determine these questions than we are. But, in the next place, the Reformers denied that *any* Church, or even the Church Catholic, possesses the authority claimed. By them the office of the Church, in relation to Scripture, is defined to be ‘a keeper and a witness;’ a keeper inasmuch as to its custody the sacred records are committed, to be jealously guarded from addition, mutilation, or deprivation; and a witness inasmuch as it is incumbent on the Church to hand down, from age to age, the chain of evidence which proves these books, and no others, to have been from the first acknowledged. So far, no doubt, it is the Church that first introduces her members to the knowledge of the Bible, and, moreover, accompanies this introduction with her own testimony to its supernatural origin and priceless value; but this is a very different thing from assuming a power to *make* a book Canonical by a simple authoritative decision. The Church, in this matter, discharges an office similar to that of the Samaritan woman in

* *E.g.*, Jerome, whose catalogue agrees with ours. The Apocryphal books found an entrance into the LXX version, and thence passed into the old Latin translation; from which they were received into the Vulgate.

John iv., who invited her fellow-townsmen to come and see a man who had told her all that ever she did: she was the means, or occasion, of their becoming acquainted with the Messiah, but she did not make Him what He was, nor could she produce saving faith in them: they believed, when they did believe, not because of her saying, but because they had heard Him themselves, and perceived that it was indeed the Christ. The Scripture is never fully received on its proper grounds until a similar personal experience is wrought in its readers.

It must not be dissembled that the witness of the Church to the Canonicity of a book comes to us with a great weight of authority (authority in the classical sense of the word *auctoritas*, viz., prevailing moral influence), though not with that claimed for it by the Council of Trent; but it is important to point out wherein this authority lies. The nearness of the primitive Church to Apostolic times, its knowledge of the original language, the sources of evidence then probably accessible which now no longer exist, and other like external advantages over us, are no doubt of great moment; but they by no means exhaust the question. If they did, then *any* body of historical testimony, say of heathen writers possessing the same advantages, would be of equal value. The witness of the Church is valuable because it is the witness of the *Church*; that is, of the body which possesses, by covenant promise, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the same Divine agent who inspired the books. The Church, therefore, of the Apostolic age had a spiritual tact and perception which, independently in a measure of the external testimony, enabled it to discriminate between the genuine writings of the Apostles, or Apostolic men, and spurious compositions. It was by its exercise that such a writing as the Epistle to the Hebrews, of which the human author, the *auctor secundarius*, is doubtful, gained admittance into the Canon, while others bearing the names of eminent Apostles were rejected. Neither species of evidence produced its full effect apart from the other: the historical led to the internal, and the internal confirmed the historical; a reciprocal action was constantly going on, the result of which was the final settlement of the Canon. This process of mutual confirmation belongs to the evidences themselves of Christianity, and is nothing but what occurs in the departments of art and literature. For example, a picture by Raphael commends itself at once to a cultivated taste; and a cultivated taste, without knowing the painter, assigns such a picture to the bloom, not to the decadence, of the art.

And this internal evidence, the *testimonium S. Spiritus* in Scripture, is ever repeating itself, and is as valid now as it was in the first century. For the presence of the Holy Ghost is not limited

to any age of the Church; we, too, believe that we enjoy His gracious influences, and with them the power of discerning the voice of the Spirit in Scripture. A book written by an Apostle, in the exercise of his office, strikes a corresponding chord in the spiritual mind; and a spiritual mind, even if the name of the author be not certainly known, feels no hesitation in accepting the testimony of the early Church as to its Apostolic parentage. The external evidence, say the Protestant theologians,* can only produce an historical faith (*fides humana*); the witness of the Holy Spirit in Scripture itself is the source of the *fides divina*, or spiritual persuasion; and on this, in the last resort, our conviction of its being the Word of God must be founded. So it is, in fact. The Holy Spirit in the Word, and the Holy Spirit in the heart, answer one to the other as sound and echo, or voice to voice. Christians have the mind of Christ, and therefore know, as none else can, the things of the Spirit, that is of Christ (John xvi. 14; 1 Cor. ii. 14, 16); and the testimony thus furnished by Scripture itself is direct and conclusive, it being presupposed that the external testimony corroborates, or does not militate against it. Those who disparage this source of conviction may be asked how otherwise are the laity, who have neither time nor ability for learned researches, ever to arrive at a happy persuasion that the words they read are a message from God?

From the foregoing observations it will be seen how the inference, that because, in a certain sense, we rely upon the Church to declare what is Scripture we are therefore bound to receive implicitly all else that the Church teaches, is to be met. As *against Rome* the reply is sufficient that we do not, in fact, receive the Scriptures on the testimony of the Romish Church; but the question may arise in reference to the early Church, on whose testimony we do acknowledge that we rely in this matter. The answer, then, must be that the office, even of the early Church, is here only ministerial, not finally authoritative; it is but the outer tabernacle through which we pass to the Holy of Holies, not the very interior sanctuary itself. The Church presents us with the book, but this does not necessarily imply that she has succeeded in exhibiting in her faith or practical system a true re-

* 'Ex superioribus constare potest testimonium illud ecclesiæ nec unicum nec præcipuum esse argumentum, sed accedere interna κριτήρια et ipsius Spiritus S. testimonium. Initium quidem fieri potest ab ecclesiæ testimonio, sed postea scriptura ipsa et Spiritus S. per scripturam luculentissime de se testatur. Ecclesiæ testimonium nunquam sufficiens erit ad fidei πληροφορίαν' (J. Gerh. Loc. i., c. 2, s. 30). Quum Conf. Gall. Art. 5 dicitur, 'Nos cognoscere scripturæ libros esse canonicos non tam communi Ecclesiæ consensu quam testimonio et persuasione internâ Spiritus S., per Spiritum S. intelligendus est Spiritus tam in Verbo quam in corde loquens' (Turret. Inst. lib. ii. 26).

flection of its contents. The Jews scrupulously guarded and handed down their sacred books, but failed to read them so as to correct their prevalent errors of faith and practice; they handed down, in fact, their own condemnation. And so it is with the Christian Scriptures. The Church of every age that transmits them in their integrity, hands down, consciously or unconsciously, the antidote to its errors, if such there be; and must submit to be tested by this unerring standard. We are grateful for the care with which the sacred touchstone has been preserved and conveyed to us; but once in possession of it, we apply it without hesitation to test the Christianity even of the transmitters—even as our Christianity of the present day may undergo a similar ordeal at the hands of our successors, and by a similar application of the Divine standard which we religiously cherish. The Bible may not have spoken its last word to the early Church; and it may be equally true that it has by no means done so to modern Christendom. In short, the two questions are altogether distinct, Has the Church faithfully discharged her office of keeper and witness of Holy writ? and, Is her practical interpretation of it a correct one? We may thankfully reply to the former in the affirmative, while suspending our judgment as regards the latter. Nor would the early Church itself have demanded more at our hands. A Cyprian, a Chrysostom, or an Augustine, may not be safe guides on all points, but they would have been the first to say, Here is the inspired volume which we have received from our predecessors, and to which we, in our turn, bear testimony; let whatever we write be judged by it, and accepted or rejected accordingly.

That the doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit to His own Word may be misapplied is true. It is so when a professed discerning of the mind of the Spirit in a book is held of itself to warrant its admission into the Canon; or, to state the same thing from its converse side, if, because we fancy we do not discern the Holy Spirit in a book, we conclude that we are at liberty to reject it; as Luther rejected the Epistle of St. James because it did not come up to his conception of what a Canonical book should be. But the error lies, as is often the case, not in the principle itself, but in the misuse of it. A book which comes down to us, on probable testimony, as the work of an Apostle, written in the exercise of his office, or under his immediate superintendence, and on that ground assigned a place in the Canon by the early Church, cannot be set aside on the adverse judgment of any individual Christian. For if such a one should profess that he discerns in it no trace of inspiration, the answer must be, that no individual Christian possesses a monopoly of the Holy Spirit, and

that it is more probable that he should be mistaken than that the whole Church should have gone wrong. It would be a serious thing indeed were the whole Church to come round to his opinion; but this is exactly what has never happened in the case of any Canonical book. We must believe, then, that it was Luther's own fault if he failed to find spiritual nutriment in the Epistle of St. James, rather than that the epistle itself is deficient in internal evidence. We must not put asunder what God has joined together, or invert the order which Divine Providence has established in this matter. The Epistle of St. James, or the Apocalypse, reaches our hands as part of the Canon, admitted into it by that age which had the best means of deciding on its pretensions, and accepted by all Christian Churches. It comes therefore with a *prima facie* weight of evidence in its favour—evidence, as we must believe, partly founded, as regards those who admitted the book, on the very same internal witness of the Holy Spirit which we profess to rely upon. From this its position it cannot be deposed except by a verdict of the Church universal; and this cannot now be expected, partly on account of the divisions that prevail in Christendom, and partly because the historical evidence on which the early Church decided is, in a great measure, no longer extant: a plain intimation of Providence that we are not to make our private—or in modern phrase 'subjective'—notions the sole ground of our acceptance or rejection of a book. And thus, though the external attestation and the internal testimony are not the same, and the one is not complete without the other, we are warranted in believing that no one who, taking into his hands a book which has been received as Canonical by the whole Church, proceeds in a humble and devout spirit to study its contents, will eventually fail to perceive therein the witness of the Holy Spirit.

It must be admitted that in some instances it is the external testimony on which we have chiefly to rely. It might, *e.g.*, be difficult to maintain that the Books of Joshua and Ruth, though we place them in the Canon, reflect their own light, or convey a conviction of their origin, so forcibly as the Gospel of S. John, or the Epistles of S. Paul; and the same may be said of some books even of the New Testament as compared with others. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is in these more latent, does not appeal so directly to the spiritual instinct, and therefore we are compelled to make up for the deficiency by leaning more upon the historical attestation.*

* 'Non putandum notas illas pariter et æquali gradu fulgere in omnibus Scripturæ libris. Ut enim stella a stellâ luce differt, ita in hoc Scripturæ cælo libri quidam splendidiore et uberiores lucis radios emittunt, alii longe tenuiores

It is to be noted, finally, that there is reason to believe that the office of inspired men was not merely to write themselves as the Holy Spirit prompted, but to authenticate the writings of their predecessors; a circumstance which may be thought to be hinted at in the well-known passage of Josephus (Cont. Apion, i. s. 8): 'From the time of Artaxerxes to the present day, books of various kinds have appeared, but they are not esteemed of equal authority with the more ancient, because since that time the legitimate succession of prophets has failed.' As long as this succession continued, inquirers had an infallible authority to appeal to on the question whether a book was to be deemed Canonical or not. Every reader of the Old Testament will have observed how often passages from the earlier prophets are quoted by the later ones, and thus receive an inspired attestation. In like manner S. Peter authenticates S. Paul's epistles; and it was doubtless ordered by Divine Providence that S. John should survive to see the Canon of the New Testament virtually completed, and to give it his imprimatur.

§ 4. *Inspiration of Scripture.*

In the preceding section the questions have been: What books constitute the volume of Holy Scripture? and What has been, and is, the office of the Church in the fixing of the Canon? The question now before us is, On what ground do we assign to the books thus ascertained a supreme authority in matters of faith and practice? To the Christian the books received in the first instance on the tradition of the Church commend themselves by the light which they impart, as the sun is seen by his own beams; but a further question remains: what is the measure of the intensity of the light? The witness of the Holy Spirit in the volume seals the witness of the Church; but *to what extent* was the Holy Spirit an agent in its composition? this is the point which now demands consideration. And the answer is: The supreme authority of Holy Scripture rests on the presumption that its authors when they wrote did so under a special influence of the Holy Spirit, differing not merely in degree, but in kind from His ordinary influences; to which special influence the Church has given the name of Inspiration.

et pauciores, prout magis vel minus necessarii sunt Ecclesiæ et doctrinas majoris vel minoris momenti continent; ut longe magis radiant isto splendore Evangelia et Epistolæ Paulinæ quam liber Ruthæ vel Estheræ; sed tamen certum in omnibus ea esse veritatis et majestatis argumenta, quæ librum divinum et authenticum per se arguunt, vel saltem nihil in iis deprehendi quod eorum *ἀυθεντιαν* dubiam reddere queat' (Turret. Inst., i. Q. 4).

The plenary* inspiration of Scripture is rather assumed than anywhere directly affirmed in our formularies; probably because at the time no controversy on the point had arisen, at least between the great contending divisions of Christendom. If there ever was a general consent of the Church Catholic on any question, it exists on this. East and West, from the earliest to the latest times, concurred in assigning to Scripture a pre-eminence which consisted in its being—as no other collection of writings is—the Word of God. The foreign Protestant Confessions (more explicit than our own on this point), take up the sacred tradition; and the Church of Rome is in substantial agreement with them. That Church, as we think, has on insufficient grounds added to the number of Canonical books; she has, in our opinion, improperly made tradition a co-ordinate authority with Scripture; but the books which she does receive she with us assigns to the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It is, next to our common acceptance of the doctrines contained in the three creeds, one of the links that connect us with that Church, and makes a reconciliation at any rate within the range of possibility. From this it will be seen that it is the province of dogmatic theology not so much to prove the inspiration of Holy Scripture—for no Christian Church, as a Church, least of all our own, doubts the fact—as to define and explain what is meant by it, and to attempt to meet objections which may be urged against the received doctrine on the subject.

And, first, let the meaning of the term ‘inspiration,’ as applied to Scripture, be fixed; fixed for the purposes of this discussion. The etymology conveys simply the notion of ‘in-breathing,’ or the communication of Divine influence; for what special purpose is determined by the nature of the result. Thus Bezaleel is said to have been inspired for the work of the tabernacle (Exod. xxxi. 3); Moses was inspired to give the law, David to compose Psalms, the Prophets to admonish and to predict, the Apostles to preach and lay the foundations of the Church. In one of our Collects we ourselves pray for the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The expression therefore ‘inspiration of Scripture’ admits of a variety of meaning: it may, *e.g.*, be understood as simply affirming that a peculiar religious geniality pervades a book: or, in a more definite sense, that the authors of certain books did indeed enjoy the privilege of a special Divine assistance as men, but not particularly so as writers; and that this is enough to account for the position of pre-eminence which the Church assigns to Holy Scripture.

No definition of the term, when used in reference to *Holy Scripture*, is adequate which puts aside, or ignores, its application

* This descriptive epithet is on many grounds to be preferred to ‘verbal.’

to the actual composition of the books. The Apostles were inspired, but were they all inspired to *write*? If not, what was the nature and extent of the Divine influence which prompted, or superintended, those of them who did write, in the particular act of *writing*? Was it something, if not beyond yet distinct from their general endowment of inspiration; or was their writing such and such books merely the natural efflorescence of the latter? As we may say, Milton was a great genius, and, therefore, naturally threw off the 'Paradise Lost.' Was there, in short, a commission to write as well as to teach? The hinge of the controversy really turns on the answer to these questions.

No little difficulty has been introduced into the subject by the indiscriminate use of the words 'revelation' and 'inspiration.' A revelation must, of course, have been in-breathed, or inspired, into the recipient thereof; but it is better to confine the term to all Divine communications that stopped short of being committed to writing, and to appropriate the term 'inspiration' to this latter special act. The distinction is founded on fact. Revelations may have been imparted to a person who was not commissioned to reduce them to writing, that task being deputed to another; or the same person might receive the revelation at one time, and long afterwards be directed to place it on record. Of some of the writers of the New Testament—*e.g.* S. Mark and S. Luke—it is not recorded that they received any revelations; yet we believe them to have been inspired to write the books which bear their names. The Divine teaching with which S. Paul had been favoured he himself calls revelation (*ἀποκάλυψις*), not inspiration (Gal. i. 12). Of revelation, miracles and prophecy were the proper credentials; but in the case of an inspired *writer* they were not necessarily attached to the function. It may, indeed, be a question whether the theory that revelation belongs especially to the Logos, and inspiration to the Holy Spirit, has Scriptural foundation; but that the terms may fitly be appropriated to different operations of the same Divine agent, hardly admits of doubt. Inspiration thus understood may be defined as a special influence of the Holy Spirit, whereby the *writers* of Scripture were, in the act of writing, supernaturally preserved from error, and enabled to transmit, in its integrity, the original revelation as they had received it, either themselves directly, or mediately through others. We call it a *special* assistance of the Holy Spirit, to distinguish it from that which all Christians enjoy, or ordinary illuminating grace; between the highest degree of this and the gift of inspiration there exists a specific difference, nor could the former, by natural growth, ever have passed into the latter. We confine it to the writers (or compilers) of Scripture,

to distinguish it from the spiritual gifts with which men of God, who had received no commission to write, may have been endowed; who in one sense were inspired, but were not the chosen agents of the Holy Spirit in the particular function of writing.

An *à priori* mode of arguing, that what seems to us necessary to the efficiency of Scripture must therefore belong to it, cannot, certainly, be universally commended; but there are some cases—and this is one of them—in which the probabilities are so strong that it has real weight. If the volume, and not merely the subject-matter, of Scripture is to be our Rule of Faith, how can we conceive it capable of discharging this function if a special superintendence was not vouchsafed to the writers, *as writers*? It does not seem enough that, if the Almighty vouchsafed to reveal to man the wondrous scheme of redemption, He must also be supposed as providing for its being somehow committed to writing, for otherwise the benefit would be confined to the hearers of the first recipient and his oral teaching: this is true, but the case seems to demand more, viz., that the record thus intended should itself be so watched over and controlled by a special agency of heaven as to preclude the possibility of error, or essential error—too probable from the prevalence of human infirmity—on the part of the human instrument; the letter as well as the contents of the volume must in a real sense admit of being called the Word of God. We may approach the same conclusion by another path. Regarding the New Testament simply as a trustworthy history, let us examine what it tells us respecting the prerogatives of the Apostles as witnesses for Christ, and founders of the Church. We read, then, that to these chosen witnesses a special guidance of the Holy Spirit was promised, not only to remind them of what Jesus had taught, but to supply what was wanting in their knowledge of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven (John xvi. 13). They were assured that when summoned to give an account of their doctrine before public authorities they needed not to be anxious about the result, for the Holy Ghost should speak in and through them (Matt. x. 20). The risen Saviour symbolically conferred on them the Holy Ghost for a special function connected with their office (John xx. 22, 23). These promises, we are assured, were fulfilled. On the day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit, under visible symbols, descended upon them, and thenceforth they appear in quite a new character. They speak boldly, as conscious of a Divine mission; represent themselves in their official acts as acting under the guidance of the Holy Spirit (Acts xv. 28; 1 Cor. vii. 40); and lay claim to a spiritual wisdom which was not of man, but was revealed to

them by God, and which they clothe in words 'not of man's teaching, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth' (Gal. i. 12; 1 Cor. ii. 10-13).

If these claims are not groundless, we must believe that the Apostles, in their public teaching and their official acts, enjoyed a Divine assistance which no other Christians have enjoyed, prerogatives to which no teachers of a subsequent age can make pretension. With their *oral* teaching, at any rate, the plenary inspiration of the Holy Spirit must be connected. But then of the eight writers of the New Testament, five belong to the company of these accredited messengers; and surely we cannot suppose that when they took in hand to write for the benefit of the Church they would be left destitute of special spiritual aid; that they would be supernaturally preserved from error when preaching to the comparatively few, and revert to fallibility when writing for all ages? Indeed, the promise of Christ that He would be with His Apostles for ever (Matt. xxviii. 20), implies such a Divine superintendence over their writings; for since they were not in their own persons to remain always upon earth, and since as *Apostles* they have no successors, it can only be in their writings that they survive; which they do. S. Matthew, S. John, S. Peter, still in the Scriptures authoritatively declare the doctrine of Christ, refute error, remit and retain sins, order the affairs of the Church, preside in all Christian assemblies; in short, exercise all their Apostolic functions. If therefore the Holy Ghost was not the Prompter of their writings in the same sense in which He was the Prompter of their oral teaching, it is not easy to see how the promise of Christ has been fulfilled.

This however, it will be said, applies only to the Apostles in the strict sense of the word; but a considerable portion of the New Testament, viz., the Gospels of S. Mark and S. Luke, and the Acts of the Apostles, was not written by Apostles, and therefore does not come to us with the same authority as the rest of the volume. But let it be considered, in the first place, that the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Spirit were by no means confined to Apostles; and therefore that there is no antecedent improbability against the supposition that S. Luke and S. Mark, equally with S. John, may have been endowed with the gift of inspiration. And, in the next place, let us ask what it was that rendered the Apostles specially qualified for the discharge of their office? Not natural endowments of mind, or acquired learning, but the fact that they alone had lived for years in closest intercourse with Jesus; that their eyes had seen, their ears heard, their hands handled, the Word of life, as had been vouchsafed to no other disciples (1 John i. 1); and thus that they, beyond all other men,

were fitted to transmit the living portraiture which we have in the Gospels. Emphatically they were witnesses of Christ. But this advantage was possessed only in a secondary degree by the Apostolic men in question. If they were not actual witnesses of the mystery of godliness (1 Tim. iii. 16), they consorted habitually with those who had been; received from their lips the very words and actions of Christ; and possessed opportunities which none of their successors could possess, of testing the accuracy of current traditions and correcting their own impressions by constant reference to those who had seen the Saviour in the flesh. If they were not actually founders of the Church, they were the friends and companions of those who were. Next, then, to the Apostles themselves, none, surely, were so fitted to be entrusted with the Divine gift as persons thus circumstanced. If, then, they were commissioned to write, there seems no reason why we should assign to their writings a position inferior to that of the others; and we receive, without hesitation, the testimony of the Church that the Gospels of S. Mark and S. Luke, the Acts of the Apostles, and, we may add, the Epistle to the Hebrews, are inspired compositions in the same sense in which those of S. Paul are. It is to be observed that the special relation in which these Apostolic men stood to the Apostles, as friends and constant companions, draws the line between them and other Apostolic men, such as Polycarp, who may have seen and heard Apostles, but were not in habitual attendance upon them. Nor, when we examine their compositions, does the internal testimony refuse to lend its aid. Were any marked discrepancy visible, either in doctrine or style, between these books and those of the Apostles, there might be reason, if not for a summary decision against their claims, yet for doubt and perplexity. But what may be called the style and manner of inspiration are as clearly stamped on these writings as on any others contained in the volume. There is the same absence of mere human emotion, the same dignity and authority of address, the same freedom from puerile details and legendary fables, the same *abstinence* of taste in the selection of materials, the same noble simplicity of language. If we may judge from the spurious productions of the first two centuries, these characteristics are most difficult of imitation. With the single exception of the first epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, nothing, even in the age immediately succeeding that of the Apostles, approaches, in these points, the books in question. Writings so peculiar, proceeding from men not remarkable for genius or learning, carry with them their own impress of authority: the Christian instinct discerns in them, as writings, the co-operation of the Holy Spirit, and assigns them without an effort to the same

category with those of S. John or S. Paul.—Yet again, we may find an argument on the manner in which the New Testament speaks of the Word of God as contained in the Old. It is to be observed, then, that our Lord, in referring to the Old Testament, constantly describes it as ‘the Scriptures’ (τὰς γραφάς, Mark xii. 24). The well-known collection of Canonical writings received by the Jews, ‘Moses and the prophets,’ in our Lord’s view, means not the matter of which they treat, but ‘the volume of the book’ itself (Heb. x. 7); the written, and not merely the contained, Word of God. The idea is a definite, not a nebulous, one. ‘Search,’ says Christ, ‘the writings’ (τὰς γραφάς, John v. 39); ‘the writing’ (ἡ γραφή, *ibid.* x. 35) ‘cannot be broken,’ or nullified. And, in a capital passage, S. Paul declares that each particular writing (πᾶσα γραφή) of the collection with which Timothy had from his childhood been acquainted was inspired of God, the quality being attached not merely to the authors in their *persons*, but to the authors in their *writings*.* It appears, then, that by our Lord, and the Apostles, the inspiration of the Old Testament belongs to the writing; we may say the writing as distinguished from the author. And the argument is—If the records of the earlier and merely preparatory dispensation are thus honoured, can we suppose that those of the later and more perfect one would come under another category? It is true that Christianity is described as a system ‘not of the letter but of the Spirit’ (2 Cor. iii. 6), but this refers to the nature of the dispensation, and not to the quality of the written documents which belong to it. In proportion to the superiority of the revelations which it contains, we should expect, to say the least, that the outward vehicle of these revelations would be the subject of as careful a Divine control as the outward vehicle of its predecessor; to which, as we have seen, no slight importance is attributed by Christ and the Apostles. And if we be asked to point out any passage affirming of the New Testament Canon what S. Paul affirms of the Old, we reply that none such could be expected until this latter Canon was complete; but that of a most important portion of it, S. Paul’s Epistles, we actually have such an attestation in the words of S. Peter, ‘Even as our beloved brother Paul hath written to you in all his epistles . . . which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures [τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς] unto their own destruction’ (2 Pet. iii. 16).†

* 2 Tim. iii. 16. Whether θεόπνευστος in this passage is to be taken as an epithet, or as the predicate of γραφή, *sub judice lis est*. The present writer inclines to the former; but whichever way we take it, matters little to the argument.

† Another passage has been cited in this connection, viz., Rom. xvi. 26, ‘by the Scriptures of the Prophets made known’ (διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν) as if the Apostle were alluding to a collection of writings by *New Testament*

In considering then the question of the inspiration of Scripture, the actual writing cannot be put in the background; and, as previously suggested, the subject will gain in clearness by our appropriating the term to the particular act of literary composition. With a true instinct the Church deems all such statements as that 'the men were inspired, the books are the result of that inspiration,'* not indeed erroneous, but inadequate to express the facts of the case.

Before we pass on to consider more particularly the nature of the superintendence which the Holy Spirit exercised over the inspired writers in their act of writing, it may be noted that though every Canonical book was held to be inspired, the converse does not follow, that every inspired book necessarily found a place in the Canon. It is probable that at least one Epistle of S. Paul—we must suppose an inspired composition—disappeared soon after it was written† (1 Cor. v. 9); and there may have been others. If so, we see that the principle of *selection* prevailed even amongst inspired books, and that the formation of the Canon was a work of Divine Providence, preserving certain books, and permitting others to be lost. But we may be sure that any lost writings of the Apostles, if such there were, would, if discovered, add nothing essential to what we already possess; that our existing Scriptures are sufficient in all respects to make us wise unto salvation. It is also to be noted that though the question of the authorship of a book is not, as regards its Canonicity, an essential one (otherwise that of the Epistle to the Hebrews would not have been left in doubt), it is not a matter of indifference as regards its inspiration. For the authorship involves the question of the age of the book; and it should seem that the gift of inspiration (to speak only of the New Testament) was confined to the Apostolic age. If, *e.g.*, the Epistle to the Hebrews had been a work of the second century, the evidence for its *inspiration* would, notwithstanding the excellence of the book, be defective, and it could not form part of the Canon. It was therefore important not merely to prove that the contents of a book were in accordance with the oral teaching of the Apostles, still fresh in the minds of

prophets (Gaussen, Theopn. c. ii. s. 4). But it is more probable that it is the Old Testament volume of prophecy that is intended; and that S. Paul means to intimate that a main part of his teaching consisted in proving, from this volume, that Jesus was the Christ; as indeed we know was his usual practice (see Acts xvii. 1-3).

* Dean Alford, Com. vol. i. c. 1, s. 6.

† After all that has been written on the subject, it is difficult to understand the Apostle otherwise than as having addressed a third epistle to the Corinthians, which is no longer extant. It may, indeed, be maintained that no such lost book could have been inspired; and then Canonicity and inspiration will be co-extensive terms.

their converts, but to ascertain with all due care the name of the author, and where this was impossible, at least to fix the age of the book.

And now to examine a little more closely the nature and extent of inspiration thus defined. It is obvious that the mode of the operation of the Holy Spirit on the mind of a writer is a matter quite beyond our ken : the result is all that is cognizable by or concerns us. The result, then, in the case of the inspired writings, is such a combination of Divine with human agency as renders them at once Divine and human.

The older theory of plenary inspiration which makes the sacred writers to have been merely amanuenses, or passive organs, of the Holy Spirit*—the theory which in modern times has received the name of mechanical—has not been able to maintain its ground. In all acts of creative power it is only the first entrance of the Divine agency into the world that is properly independent of natural causation ; afterwards the two co-operate, and can no longer be distinguished. Thus, in the work of regeneration, the first quickening of the soul is an act of grace in which the subject has no share ; but in the subsequent stages man co-operates with God, and by a mixed agency, Divine and human, the work of sanctification is carried on. By analogy we should suppose that while the primary communication of the inspiring Spirit would be independent of the human instrument, the subsequent process of exposition would be conducted in conjunction with, and by means of, the natural faculties. This conclusion is confirmed by the confessed differences of style which the inspired volume exhibits. The writings of the several authors are strongly marked by the peculiar colouring which the abilities, education, or natural temperament of each were calculated to impart. An epistle of S. Paul could never be mistaken for one of S. John, and S. Peter, in his manner, resembles neither of those Apostles. Each has his own peculiar—shall we say favourite?—topics, and expresses himself in his own way. The compositions themselves seem to have been the offspring of circumstances, and do not exhibit, on the part of their human authors, any preconceived plan. We must suppose, then, that the sacred writers, when under the influence of inspiration, were under no constraint in the exercise of their faculties, but wrote as men to men ; that the result, therefore, as it is the Word of God, is also, in a very real sense, the word of man. The Person of the Redeemer presents an analogy. He was truly God and truly man : his manhood was no docetic phantasm, but a reality (1 John i. 1) : but the mode of union is a

* ‘*Omnia et singula verba, quæ in sacro codice leguntur, a Spiritu S. Prophetis et Apostolis inspirata, et in calamus dictata sunt*’ (Hollaz, De S.S. 217).

problem which Christian speculation can hardly be said yet to have solved.

On the other hand, we must believe that the preternatural influence was so exercised as to exclude the contingency of human error, or inadvertence, at least where the latter might be of serious moment. The Holy Ghost made use of natural or acquired faculties, but effectually guarded the *result* from adulteration. Less than this would render the whole doctrine of inspiration nugatory. Be it remembered that it is not with the occult deposition in the writers' minds that we are concerned, but that the stream should issue from its source pure and uncontaminated: it is the written Word of God that is to be a lamp to our feet and a light to our path (Psalm cxix. 105). Therefore we must hold that the language used, as well as the thoughts thus embodied, was subject of the Holy Spirit's guardianship: the writers may not have been 'pens,' or 'amanuenses,' of the Holy Spirit, but their mode of expression, and even words, must have been subject to His control. We argue this not merely from the statements of Scripture (1 Cor. ii. 13); not merely from instances in which the argument turns upon the use of a word (Gal. iii. 16); but from the nature of the case. The thought or sentiment of another is nothing to us until it is expressed in words; it is they that give it form and permanency. If, therefore, inspiration had extended merely to the thoughts of the writers, while in the expression of those thoughts they were left to themselves, what guarantee should we have that improper or erroneous expressions had not been used as the medium of communication? Another thing must be remembered, viz.: that in this case, to a considerable extent, a *theological language* had to be created as the vehicle of Christian ideas. Missionaries tell us that one great difficulty in preaching to the heathen, or translating the Scriptures, arises from the lack of terms in the native languages to express the ideas peculiar to Christianity—*e.g.*, faith, holiness, humility, even the idea of God. It is true that in the case of the New Testament writers such a language was, to some extent, already formed for them in the Jewish Scriptures, in which they had been nurtured; and a great advantage it was to them in preaching the Gospel to their fellow-countrymen, who had enjoyed a similar advantage. But they were to preach also to the heathen, and they were to write to the heathen in their native Greek; and to frame all at once, in what was to them a foreign, if not an unknown tongue, a vehicle perfectly adapted to convey the varied and mysterious revelations

* It may be said that this applies to the Apostles' oral as well as to their written teaching, that is, not to the latter exclusively. No doubt it does: but this does not seem to affect the argument.

which they had received seems a task beyond human power, unless supernaturally assisted.

Furthermore, we must hold that inspiration extends to all parts of the Bible—the history, as well as the morality or the doctrine, and in an equal degree to all. For if some portions are inspired and others not, or in an inferior degree, while no oracle is at hand to discriminate between them, it is obvious that the whole becomes involved in doubt, and we stand not upon a rock, but upon shifting sand. The rule has been propounded*—the more closely a book is connected with Christ, the higher the degree of its inspiration. But who is to decide the measure in which a book may be connected with the Christian redemption? Judgments on this point are very likely to vary with the notions entertained respecting the nature of that redemption, which we know to be various; some making the essence of Christianity to consist in its pure and elevated morality, others seeing in it a remedial appointment from sin and death: to the former the Sermon on the Mount would probably seem inspired in a higher degree than S. Paul's Epistles. In short, it would ultimately depend on each man's private judgment, which was to be considered the more, and which the less, Divine element in Scripture. But, it is urged, to transcribe the annals of the Jewish nation, or to write memoirs of Christ, was a task within the compass of human power, and needed no Divine assistance. It is forgotten that Scripture contains but a *selection* of historical matter; and what mere human power would have been adequate to the task of selection? Out of the mass of the national records those portions were to be taken, which had a special bearing on the scheme of redemption, as it advanced to maturity; and ignorant as they were of the ultimate purposes of God (1 Pet. i. 11), even prophets could not have fulfilled this task without Divine prompting; even they wrote, or compiled, without fully knowing why this was to be omitted and that supplied. The same principle of selection pervades the New Testament. S. John tells us that he recorded only a portion of what Christ said and did (John xxi. 25); in their Epistles the Apostles omit many things,

* Twesten, Vorlesungen, i. 388. Previously enunciated by Luther—'the true touchstone to try any book is to see whether it treats of Christ or not; if not, it is to be rejected, whether professing to be the work of S. Paul, or S. Peter, or not' (Preface to Epistles of S. James and S. Jude). He, Luther, himself, was to be the judge how far a book had relation to Christ; and accordingly he expunged S. James from the Canon, and arranged the other books as they appeared to him to stand in order of merit. 'The first rank,' he says, 'is to be assigned to the Gospel of S. John, and his first Epistle, S. Paul's Epistles, and the first of S. Peter;' the rest, of course, occupying a subordinate position.

which it seems natural for them to have alluded to or enjoined, many details which uninspired writers would probably have enlarged upon. What guided them in this choice and treatment of topics? We perceive now the wisdom of these omissions; but we can hardly ascribe the procedure to human wisdom.

The statement, then, that the Bible is not—but contains—the Word of God, which is but another mode of stating this theory of partial inspiration, cannot be deemed a satisfactory one. The stream of inspiration meanders, it is admitted, through the sacred volume; but of what advantage is that to us if we have no infallible guide to enable us to track its course? If the volume, as a whole, presents itself to us as inspired, we have no need to enter upon an investigation so hazardous and so little likely to lead to useful results.

Had the term inspiration, when used in reference to Holy Scripture, been confined, as suggested, to the act of writing, some of the objections that have been taken to the doctrine in its plenary sense would have been seen to lose much of their force. Can we, it has been said, believe every part of the Bible to have been divinely guarded from error, when we read of Deborah's approval of the act of Jael (Judg. v. 24), or Stephen's mistakes (whether they are mistakes or not is not now the question) in Acts vii.* For Deborah was a prophetess, and Stephen a man 'full of faith and of the Holy Ghost' (Acts vi. 5); if any persons could be called inspired, they surely were so. But the answer is that neither Deborah nor Stephen were the authors of the books which respectively record their addresses. The author of the Book of Judges, whoever he may have been, was divinely commissioned to write the book, and in it to insert Deborah's song; and was guided to record it faithfully: his task was ended when he had done so. This implies no approval on his part, nor on the part of his Divine Prompter, of what Deborah had uttered: why may not her song have been recorded to show that even so eminent 'a mother in Israel' was very far from being perfect? In like manner, S. Luke was commissioned to write the Book of Acts, and in it to insert Stephen's speech: we may rely on the accuracy of the record, but this implies no endorsement on the part of the author, whether the *primarius* or the *secundarius*, of Stephen's mistakes, if he made any: they may have been recorded to prove that the holiest of men is not secure from lapses of memory. The same principle applies to many similar instances. We meet, for example, with sentiments in some of the Psalms which seem to jar on our feelings as Christians: the inspired collector (whoever he may have been,

* Alford, Com. i. c. 1, s. 6.

even if he had himself been a Psalmist) may have been commissioned to place these Psalms in it, as a warning that even the most exalted rapture of devotion is no safeguard against an admixture of human infirmity. The record of the failings of holy men of old—Abraham, Moses, Peter, etc.—comes under the same law of explanation: the inspiration now in view belongs not to the men as such, still less to their failings, but to the author of the writing; who, not for our imitation, but for our admonition, was commissioned to embalm them in an imperishable record. How much more perplexing would the case have been if any approval of such failings had fallen from the writer's pen !*

Other objections commonly urged do not seem to deserve a lengthened notice. Objections from alleged discrepancies in the narrative, which usually turn out to be omissions by one Evangelist of what is supplied by another;† or inversions in the order of events, which are easily reduced into an harmonious whole.‡ Objections from alleged inaccuracy in natural science, as that the sun rises in the east and sinks in the west—language which is in constant use among scientific men themselves, and which must have been used if the writers were to make themselves understood. Objections from the various readings of the MSS., which proceed on the gratuitous assumption that if God originally inspired a writing, He thereby pledged Himself never to allow the slightest variation to slip into subsequent copies, no matter

* Connected with the theory of *degrees* of inspiration is that of different *kinds* of it, as they are supposed to have been variously needed by the writers—'suggestion,' 'direction,' 'elevation,' etc. (see Bishop D. Wilson's 'Lectures on the Evidences'). Such distinctions have little Scriptural foundation. The only one of any importance is that between the first impulse of the Holy Spirit to write—or, in other words, to take in hand a subject for the benefit of the Church—and His subsequent superintendence over the act of writing.

† The apparent discrepancies of the inscriptions on the Cross are quoted by Dean Alford (Com. i. c. 1, s. 6) as decisive in favour of his view; but are they discrepancies, or imperfect notices?

Matt.—This is Jesus, the King of the Jews.

Mark.—The King of the Jews.

Luke.—This is the King of the Jews.

John.—Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews.

Let them be combined into one, and we have the full inscription—This is Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews. It must never be forgotten that Scripture (and this remark applies particularly to the four Gospels) is to be considered as a whole (one work of the Holy Ghost), and not as a collection of independent authors connected by no supernatural bond: one part, therefore, supplies what is wanting in another. The men, the *auctores secundarii*, possess only a *relative* interest for us.

‡ As in the ten 'discrepancies' discovered by Lessing (or rather the author of the 'Wolfenbüttel Fragments,' which Lessing published) in the accounts of the resurrection.

how insignificant the variation might be. Had the variations seriously affected the sense, this objection would have had greater force; but modern research has effectually proved that in no instance has the sense been thus affected. Objections from quotations in the New Testament purporting to be from the Hebrew, or the LXX. Version, but differing from the original; which are merely instances of the Holy Spirit's modifying, enlarging, or paraphrasing His own previous statements. From an erroneous interpretation of a passage in 1 Cor. (vii. 10-25), it has been inferred that the Apostle himself, in this instance, and as a writer, disclaims the prerogative of inspiration; whereas an attentive examination of his argument will prove that he asserts it. He had no express Divine commandment to allege on the subject of virginity, as he had on the indissolubility of the marriage-tie (Gen. ii. 24); but he, notwithstanding, gives his own judgment, and this judgment, far from possessing only a human authority, he declares to be that of the Spirit of God speaking through the writer as the human instrument.

§ 5. Interpretation of Scripture.

As an inference from Canonicity and Inspiration, as already explained, the Protestant theologians are accustomed to predicate of Holy Scripture certain qualities, or attributes, which bear upon its fitness for the position which they assign to it in the Church; such as truth, holiness, sufficiency, perspicuity, etc.* Of these properties, perspicuity and sufficiency are of dogmatical import, and constitute points of controversy between the Protestant and the Romish Churches. With the former the subject of the present section, the Interpretation of Scripture, is intimately connected; the latter will come before us in the following section.

In fact, a principal argument with writers of the Romish Communion against the fitness of Scripture to be the Rule of Faith is derived from its alleged obscurity; of which they produce as evidence the variety of interpretations of which it seems capable; both the Church and heretics appealing to it in support of their views, and in orthodox Christianity different sects, and even Churches, drawing different conclusions from the same book. As to individuals, can two Christians be found in absolute agreement as to the meaning of Scripture? 'It is plain' (says Bellarmine) 'that Scripture is not *judex controversiarum*, because it admits of various senses; nor can Scripture itself declare which is the true

* 'Affectiones primariæ sunt quæ S. Scripturæ formaliter spectatæ conveniunt, ut sunt Divina autoritas, infallibilis veritas, omnimoda perfectio seu sufficientia, luculenta perspicuitas, seipsam interpretandi facultas' (Quenstedt, i., c. iv. th. 8).

one. Besides, in every well-ordered state, the law and the judge are distinct. The law prescribes what is to be done, and the judge interprets the law, and decides accordingly. The question is about the interpretation of Scripture; but it cannot interpret itself.* And after him Möhler: 'It is one thing to say that Holy Scripture is the source of doctrine, and another that it is the judge in the determination of what is doctrine. It can no more be the latter than a code of laws is identical with the bench of judges; judgment is given according to the code, but the code does not judge itself.† In other words, Scripture needs a standing hermeneutical tribunal, invested with authority to declare its meaning as particular cases arise, without which it would be of little value. Such a tribunal is actually supplied in and through the Church; whether by that term we are to understand the collective Episcopate, or general Councils, or the Pope, or the Pope and a Council combined.‡ As might be supposed, the Protestant Confessions speak otherwise, for how can Scripture be the Rule of Faith if its meaning is not apparent, at least on all essential points? The following statement of a Polish Confession expresses the sentiment of all the Protestant Churches: 'In which Scriptures there is so much of what is plain and perspicuous that in them everything may be found that relates to faith and morals, or is necessary to salvation.'§ Accordingly, our own formulary declares that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, or may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an Article of Faith' (Art. vi.). It is true that *who* is to read Scripture and prove thereby is not here specified; this is left to the common sense of those who accept the Article,|| but it is plainly implied that *some one* can discover in the Scriptures

* De Verb. Dei. lib. iii. c. 9.

† Symbolik, p. 405. It is to be noted that this argument, so common with Roman Catholic writers, is intimately connected with the general view which Romanism takes of Christianity, viz., that the Gospel is a 'new law,' and Christ a lawgiver in the sense in which Moses was. 'Si quis dixerit Christum datum fuisse ut Redemptorem, cui fidant homines, non ut Legislatorem cui obediant, anathema sit' (Con. Trid. sess. vi. can. 21). 'Sacramenta novæ legis' (*Ibid.* sess. vii. *passim*).

‡ 'Dicimus Judicem veri sensus Scripturæ et omnium controversiarum esse ecclesiam, id est Pontificem cum concilio, in quo omnes Catholici conveniunt' (Bellarm. De V. D. lib. iii. c. 3).

§ Dec. Thor. ii. 1.

|| 'Not a word is said' (in Articles vi., xx.) 'in favour of Scripture having no rule or method to fix interpretation by; nor of the private judgment of the individual being the ultimate standard of interpretation' (Tract 90, v. 1). True, but why should such a rule or method be supposed necessary in the case of Scripture more than in that of any other book? And who can it be, after all, but an individual, or a company of individuals, that is to read and prove?

statements plain enough to establish all the essential Articles of Faith, and this is all that is necessary for our present purpose. No doubt this 'some one' may be affirmed to be a Council, or the Pope, or the ancient church; but until it is proved that these, or any of them, possess by Divine right a power to see in Scripture what the ordinary Christian cannot see, of which we say that no proof exists,* the Article must retain its natural meaning.

It is hardly to be supposed that a collection of books which professes to contain a Divine revelation would be purposely written so as not to be understood. To demand reverence towards writings of this character would be to set up a kind of fetish-worship, and must be accounted wholly unworthy of Him from whom we believe them to have proceeded. The Scriptures, too (to speak at present only of the New Testament), were addressed not to schools of philosophers, nor even to the ministerial order exclusively, but to whole Churches, containing men of every degree of culture and ability. That they would be understood by these must have been the expectation of the writers; and if they had been virtually in an 'unknown tongue,' the Apostle Paul, at least, would hardly have enjoined their being read in the public assemblies of Christians (Col. iv. 16; 1 Thess. v. 27; compare 1 Cor. xiv.). Now, it is true that we, as compared with the early Christians, labour under some disadvantages for the understanding of these writings; the language which was a living one to them, is to us no longer so; allusions familiar to them present, it may be, difficulties now; we possess not the advantage of living Apostles to explain their own statements; and other sources of comparative obscurity exist. But by the providence of God, sufficient knowledge of the language, and of the history, private and public, of the times, has come down to us to put us, for all practical purposes, in the position of the first readers. And what difficulties do remain, cannot be supposed to affect the essentials of faith.†

Moreover, whatever the obscurity of Scripture may be, the question remains whether the sources we are referred to for its removal are themselves plainer. If it is the Creeds, their controversial clauses are, many of them, not very clear in meaning, and, at any rate, might be made the subject of prolonged debate;

* Art. xxi., On the Authority of General Councils.

† An important distinction is to be drawn between obscurity of the *subject-matter* and obscurity of the *expression*—e.g., 'The Word became flesh;' here the fact is most mysterious, but the language is plain enough. We see 'through a glass darkly' as regards many revealed facts, such as the Incarnation or the Holy Trinity: but the question between Romanists and Protestants is not whether the *things* are obscure, but whether the *language* in which they are expressed is sufficiently plain.

if a catena of the Fathers, say of the first four centuries, it is doubtful whether, amidst conflicting statements, any consentient interpretation, except as regards a few leading passages, could be extracted from their works. In truth, of all species of tradition, the hermeneutical is the least capable of being reduced to form.* But, even if such did exist, it must be expressed in human language, the meaning of which itself would become subject to controversy; the interpreters would need to be interpreted themselves, and so on *ad infinitum*. The truth is, it is not because of the obscurity of Scripture that so much controversy has arisen respecting its meaning, but because of the universal latent feeling that it is, or ought to be considered, the supreme Rule of Faith; and if any other book, or formulary, were to occupy this position in its stead, there would be just as much dispute respecting its meaning. The controversy evidently would be endless, unless it could be referred at last to the decision of a living, infallible judge; which is, in fact, the conclusion to which the Romanist is ultimately driven.

It is not, indeed, affirmed that Scripture contains no obscure passages—passages in which the allusion is not apparent, or the expression ambiguous, or the construction difficult, or the reasoning not at first sight clear, or which may be prophetic and await light to be thrown upon them by future events; but this is only what occurs also in heathen authors, of whose general meaning we entertain no doubt. Scripture contains in itself a germinant principle, and what may be obscure, or not acted upon in one age of the Church, may come to full recognition in another. The teaching of S. Paul on the topics of original sin and predestination can hardly be said to have received its due attention before the appearance of that great luminary of the Western Church, Augustine; nor the teaching of the same Apostle on justification, previously to the Reformation. It was not until much later that Christian men perceived that the principles enunciated in the Pauline Epistles are inconsistent with the institution of slavery, though the institution itself is never expressly condemned; and efforts were made to remove the scandal. But these admissions are compatible with the conviction that on all the essential points of faith, morals and discipline, Scripture is sufficiently perspicuous, it being presupposed

* As is confessed by Möhler—‘We could hardly, with the exception of a very few classical passages, discover in them (the Fathers) any general agreement of interpretation, beyond the fact that they all teach the same doctrine of faith and morals’ (Symb. p. 390). In truth, the prescription of the Council of Trent, ‘*Ut nemo contra unaninem consensum Patrum ipsam Scripturam sacram interpretari audeat*’ (sess. iv.), or any similar one, is incapable of fulfilment.

that the reader brings with him a willingness to receive what it seems plainly to teach.* And it may well be that some difficulties have been suffered to remain, in order to stimulate curiosity, and to lead to a more diligent study of the sacred volume.†

The Protestant rule of interpretation is thus enunciated in the Helvetic Confession: 'Scripture (as the Apostle Peter says) is not of private interpretation, consequently we do not approve of any and every interpretation, much less of that which the Romish Church imposes, but only of that which is sought out of Scripture itself (due regard being had to the original languages, etc.), and which agrees with the Rule of faith and charity. The interpretations of the Fathers and the definitions of Councils we do not undervalue, but neither do we assign to them unlimited authority. In matters of faith we admit but of one Judge, God Himself speaking through the Scriptures; and as regards human opinions, the weight which we attach to them depends upon their being those of spiritually enlightened men.'‡ Here is stated the great Protestant Canon—SCRIPTURE IS ITS OWN AUTHENTIC INTERPRETER;§ on which, as against Rome, all the Protestant Churches are in agreement. This rule rests on a twofold foundation—the doctrine of inspiration, and the structure of the volume. Each book of Scripture being the Word of God, in a sense in which no other writing is, requires for an authentic interpretation of it an interpreter similarly gifted with the writer, and none such is or can be formed outside the Canon itself: to interpret the writings of S. Paul, so that the interpretation shall be free from possibility of error, can only be the work of another Canonical writer; uninspired expositions may be valuable, but they can never be put on a level with the writing expounded. It might have been, however, that no inspired comment on another inspired writing could exist—that the Bible had been the production of one author;

* 'These Epistles' (S. Paul's) 'were certainly addressed to the whole Church, and were meant to be understood by men of average intelligence, who applied their attention properly. Their predestinarian meaning in parts is, on the whole, clear and decided, and the reason why their meaning is thought by many to be so very obscure and difficult to get at, is that they will not acknowledge this predestinarian meaning to be the true one. These interpreters create difficulties for themselves by rejecting the natural meaning of passages, and then lay the difficulty on the passages.' Mozley 'On Predestination,' note viii. The remark is applicable to many parts of Scripture, besides those relating to predestination.

† 'Magnifice et salubriter ita Spiritus S. Scripturas modificavit ut locis aperitiore fani occurreret, obscurioribus autem fastidia detergeret' (Aug. De doc. Christ. lib. ii. c. 7).

‡ Conf. Helv. i. c. 1.

§ More explicitly enunciated in another part of the same Confession, 'Hujus (scripturæ) interpretatio ex se ipsa sola petenda est, ut ipsa interpretes sit sui, caritatis fidei que moderante regulâ' (ii. 2).

in which case, no doubt, the Protestant Canon would have been difficult of application. But here the structure of the volume comes to our aid. For, in fact, Scripture is not the production of a single writer (as regards its human authorship), but a collection of books by different authors, of various gifts and diversified religious experience, only connected together by the supernatural tie of inspiration. Hence, what is wanting in one may be supplied by another; and this is actually the case. The Levitical ritual is a system of dumb elements until we study it in conjunction with the Epistle to the Hebrews; the fourth Gospel could not have been dispensed with if we were to have a full portraiture of the Word become flesh; on the question of justification, S. Paul needs to be read with S. James, and both with S. John. Now, the writing of each of these authors is really an interpretation of his coadjutor in the same field; not exactly an exposition—we cannot say that one writer comments on another—but yet really an interpretation in this sense, that the full meaning of the New Testament on any point cannot be gathered without a comparison of all the writers. And by this comparison it may be satisfactorily ascertained. If it is not S. John, or S. James commenting on S. Paul, it is the Holy Spirit Himself supplementing, through the individuality of S. John or S. James, what He had conveyed through the individuality of S. Paul; which latter, because it had been conveyed through an individual without obliterating his peculiarities of character and training, could not, without a needless miracle, present *all* the sides or aspects of Divine truth—the πολυποίκιλος σοφία of God (Eph. iii. 10)—but needed the completion which it actually received from other inspired sources. Thus the books of the New Testament (to confine our attention to these) mutually interpret, and are interpreted by, each other; the structure of the volume points to its design and use; and relieves us from the necessity of seeking in other quarters than within itself instruction on the essentials of faith and practice.

The fundamental system of Christian doctrine thus elicited from a comparison of scripture with scripture, and of one book with another, is what writers on dogmatic theology call the ‘analogy of faith,’*; in accordance with which doubtful passages are to be explained. It is obvious that this must be gathered from Scripture itself, otherwise it would be tradition under another name. It is not, however, a mere stringing of texts together on certain subjects, but the doctrine which lies at the foundation of

* ‘Analogiam fidei, id est, vocem Spiritus S. in perspicuis locis sonantem’ (J. Gerh. loc. ii. c. 6). The expression is derived from Rom. xii. 6; where, however, it bears an altogether different meaning.

the various passages which relate to a subject; substantially the same amidst the variety of forms under which it may be presented. That such a substantial identity may and must exist is an inference from the unity of the primary Author, the Holy Spirit: if the human authors, however otherwise differing from each other, derived inspiration from one source, no real contradiction, none at least affecting essential points, can be supposed possible. Whether the reader discovers this unity or not, depends more upon his moral and spiritual than upon his literary qualifications: Scripture is understood by the light itself imparts; but as the sun's rays shine in vain to the blind, so if the organ of spiritual vision be not in a sound state, it may well be that the meaning of Scripture shall be missed, or at least the analogy of faith not perceived. Nor is this without its analogy in merely human systems. The Platonic philosophy, for example, is a connected system; it is understood to lie at the foundation of the various treatises of Plato; statements or expressions in his writings which at first sight may seem to present difficulties are equitably interpreted by a reference to his philosophy as a whole; and some have not hesitated to say that no one can fully understand, still less be a successful commentator on these writings, whose intellectual and moral endowments are not in sympathy with those of the philosopher.*

But Romanists adduce not merely varieties of meaning in passages, but essential ambiguity in the language of Scripture; which latter may be literal and figurative, and figurative in many senses.† And so it may be, and is, in uninspired productions, without leading to real ambiguity. There seems to be, in fact, a confusion here between the meaning of a passage and the nature of the language employed; which latter may no doubt be figurative, or analogical, and yet not introduce a double sense. The instance adduced by Bellarmine, 'My sheep hear my voice' (John x. 27), is in point. Although the term 'sheep' is figurative, and needs to be explained from other passages, there is but one *meaning* to the passage. Or merely typical applications, or accommodations (intended as such by the Holy Spirit), are transformed into double senses: as the passage, 'Moses made a serpent of brass,' etc. (Numbers xxi. 8), which by our Lord is applied to

* 'Every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian' (Coleridge).

† 'Est Scripturæ proprium, quia Deum habet auctorem, ut sæpenumero duos contineat sensus, literalem sive historicum, et spirituales sive mysticum' (Bellarm. De V. D. lib. iii. c. 3). The 'sensus literalis' is again divided into 'simplex' and 'figuratus'; the 'spiritualis' into 'allegoricus,' 'tropologicus,' and 'anagogicus' (*ibid.*); which are explained in the following distich:

'Littera gesta docet; quod credas Allegoria;
Moralis quid agas; quod speres Anagogia.'

Himself typically (John iii. 14); or 'A voice was heard in Ramah,' etc. (Jer. xxxi. 15), which by the Evangelist is accommodated to the slaughter of the innocents by Herod (Matt. ii. 17, 18). But there is no real ambiguity in the meaning; as there is in the famous oracle, *Aio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse*. Hence the hermeneutical Canon on the Protestant side, that each passage of Scripture admits, in the first instance, of *but one sense, and that the grammatical*; and, indeed, it is plain that if *any* sense might be imposed on a passage, this would be tantamount to its having *no* definite sense; and thus Scripture would become useless as a Rule of Faith.

There appears, therefore, nothing special in this case to warrant the assumption that a living infallible interpreter is necessary; and we may add, that if such had been intended we should surely have been left in no doubt to what body, or individual, the authority is committed. But Romanists themselves are, or until lately were, not agreed on this point. Is then each reader to be the judge of the meaning of Scripture? Properly understood, this is nothing but the truth. It must be the reader himself who is to judge; and this whether he expects to extract the sense from the text itself, or betakes himself to an infallible interpreter; for, even in the latter case, he must have previously convinced himself, by an exercise of his own judgment, that the interpreter is infallible. Directly or indirectly, the reader is the ultimate judge. But then not as a mere reader, but as a member of the Church, which he is supposed to be; under the checks therefore, and with the aids, which such a position implies. He is supposed to be under the influence of the Holy Spirit; supposed to be putting up constant prayer for enlightening grace; supposed to be of a humble and teachable disposition, and to bear in mind that he is but a single member of the body in which collectively the Holy Spirit dwells. The Protestant right of private judgment is the privilege not of the philosophical inquirer, who places himself outside the Church, and has no more personal interest in the Scriptures than he has in the history of Thucydides, but of the believer in whom Christ is already formed (Gal. iv. 19). To such the Scriptures were addressed and were committed, and by such only can they be understood. And this responsibility of the individual, in the exercise of his private judgment, is the only check which Providence has thought fit to commit to the Church, as a safeguard against arbitrary or heretical interpretation; a net of fine meshes, no doubt, which anyone can break through if he be so minded, but fine or coarse, the only one that is given to restrain eccentricity. Standing tribunals, an infallible chair, would not be in harmony with a religion which aims at producing free conviction;

and prefers an agreement gradually reached by conference, by study, by prayer, to one prematurely snatched by the submission of individual judgment to an external authority—that is, in fact, by the subjugation of reason and conscience to the mere ‘subjectivity’ of another. And thus, on the basis of the analogy of faith—‘one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all’ (Ephes. iv. 5, 6)—without the acknowledgment of which a Church would be no Church, but only a casual assemblage; by preaching, by versions, by conferences, by commentaries, by treatises of all sorts, by private Christian intercourse, the meaning of Scripture is gradually approximated to, though never finally exhausted; in the way and by the methods intended by its Divine Author—methods not legally stringent, or authoritatively decisive, as might be suitable to the dispensation of the law, but living, plastic, spiritual, as becomes a dispensation of grace and truth (John i. 14), the manhood, not the infancy, of revealed religion (Gal. iv. 1, 15).

They to whom Scripture addresses itself are presumed to have accepted the ‘analogy of faith’ in its substantial elements, for the Church cannot be conceived of as debating whether or not she reposes on the foundation of ‘the Apostles and Prophets, Christ being the chief corner-stone’ (Ephes. ii. 20), or whether or not she has the Holy Spirit dwelling in her. Her belief may be illusory, but she cannot formally place herself in the position of a doubter on such points. Hence the Socinian principle of interpretation, the opposite pole to the Romish, viz., that reason is to sit in judgment on the contents of revelation, and to receive or reject them, according as the inner moral (not spiritual) consciousness dictates, ignoring as it does the necessity of spiritual influence, is as far removed from the genuine Protestant doctrine as the east is from the west. It puts out of view the true idea of the Church as the communion of saints, and leaves no place for a dogmatic theology. And what is meant by reason in this connection? Reason in the abstract, as the faculty which distinguishes man from the brutes, cannot, of course, be dispensed with in the study of Scripture; on its exercise depends the acquisition of the original languages, the investigation of the grammatical sense, the comparing scripture with scripture. But reason, as it exists in us, and in reference to spiritual verities, is a different matter. The very idea of a revelation seems to imply the weakness and insufficiency of *our* reason in matters of religion, especially when the religion bears a *remedial* character, and presupposes an opposition of the will to its requirements. In this case the abstract faculty, which as a mere faculty even fallen man possesses, may be so influenced by the obliquity of the will as to

reject as unreasonable simply what it cannot comprehend, the secret motive being a moral repugnance to the provisions of mercy revealed, and especially to the obligations of duty, which, if accepted, they seem to involve. The claim of reason, then, to decide what a Divine revelation should contain, always unfounded, becomes in this case doubly hazardous; for to fallen man the revelation must contain not only mysteries (every subject of contemplation ends at last in mystery), but mysteries which may be expected *à priori* to be in themselves as unpalatable as the remedies which the physician prescribes are to the sick man. Hence Scripture speaks of the necessity of a spiritual illumination without which 'the things of God' are very likely to appear foolishness (1 Cor. ii. 14), and even of a positive predisposition against the light of Divine truth, as if inability to see the sun arose not from disease or accident, but from the wilful closing of the eyes (Matt. xiii. 15). Private judgment apart from this presumed illumination is not the doctrine of the Protestant Churches.

But it may be asked, 'Of what use is this discussion when, after all, it is but a few learned men who can use the Bible as it came from the pen of inspiration? If a man knows neither Hebrew nor Greek, can he be said to have the Bible at all? What he reads is but a translation, and liable, of course, to all the inaccuracies connected with translation from a dead language: the unlearned Christian (that is, the vast majority of Christians) seems to be entirely at the mercy of those who have rendered the original into his native tongue.' To this objection, not uncommon with Romish writers,* he has a twofold answer. He may appeal to the fact that the Spirit of God accompanies the exposition of the commonly-accredited versions with the same quickening and sanctifying influences which He exerted at first through the medium of the original text. The bread of life is plainly furnished in and through them, and this is an argument which, to the recipient thereof, nothing can controvert. *Solvitur ambulando*, he may reply to those who would persuade him that he has no Bible to interpret. But his confidence may also be justified on another ground, which appeals to the common reason, viz., the substantial agreement of his own with other versions in the vernacular, and its acceptance by other Christian societies not in communion with his own. For example, we believe that the Douay version contains inaccuracies; but no English Protestant who compares it with his own can be otherwise than pleased with their substantial agreement, and with the thought that it has furnished spiritual nutriment to multitudes in the com-

* See 'Charity maintained by Catholics,' by Knott the Jesuit, Chillingworth's antagonist, Chillingworth's Works.

munion which will not accept his own. He may note the fact, too, that the Authorised Version is accepted by all the Protestant dissident bodies at home, and by other Protestant Churches of English parentage abroad; which, differing on many points, agree in this, that this version is a faithful representation of the original. If it were not so, would it have been accepted by Christian societies too often not favourably disposed to each other? He may safely draw the inference that in this Authorised Version he does possess the Bible for all its saving purposes.*

On the other hand, it must be remembered that these versions are but versions, and cannot be allowed to usurp the place of the original. To attempt to stamp any one or more of them with ecclesiastical authority, as superseding that text, would be to place unwarrantable fetters on the science of exegesis, and to shut the door to improvement of the versions themselves.†

§ 6. *Scripture and Tradition.*

It has been seen that, as regards the question of interpretation, no hermeneutical tradition either exists, or is necessary, to enable us to ascertain the meaning of Scripture. But there is another kind of tradition, to which, indeed, the name is more commonly applied, and which the Church of Rome asserts to be of equal authority with Scripture, viz., *additions* to the written Word, supposed to have come down from the Apostles by an independent channel. The traditions of the Church, the Council of Trent affirms, whether relating to faith or practice, are to be received with the same reverence as Holy Scripture itself.‡ There is an unwritten§ as well as a written Word of God; and the former was intended to run parallel with the latter, both conjointly forming the Church's Rule of Faith. As in the preceding section the perspicuity, so in the present the sufficiency, of Holy Scripture is the question in debate. The Reformed Churches

* It is a remarkable fact that in two great nations at least, Germany and England, the translation of the Bible has formed an epoch in the history of the vernacular. This is eminently the case with Luther's translation, and our own authorised one. Such is the power of the original text to mould the native tongues.

† 'Statuit (synodus) ut hæc ipsa vetus et vulgata editio, quæ longo tot sæculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata est, in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, prædicationibus, et expositionibus, pro authentica habeatur; et ut nemo illam rejicere quovis prætextu audeat vel præsumat' (Con. Trid. sess. iv.).

‡ 'Pari pietatis affectu et reverentiâ' (sess. iv.).

§ Not that it was never committed to writing, for it is supposed to be found in the Fathers and other uninspired sources; but that it was not committed to writing, like Scripture, by the first inspired author. 'Vocatur doctrina non scripta, non ea quæ nusquam scripta est, sed quæ non scripta est a primo auctore, exemplo sit Baptismus parvulorum' (Bellarm. De V. D. lib. iv. c. 2).

admit no such co-ordinate source of things to be believed as necessary to salvation. Ecclesiastical practices which have been handed down from antiquity, and are not repugnant to Scripture, they do not indiscriminately reject; the decisions of Councils they do not undervalue; the three Creeds they accept as agreeable to Scripture and venerable monuments of the faith of the early Church; but none of these can claim to be the Word of God in the sense in which Scripture is, or, indeed, in any sense. 'No Word of God,' says one of the Protestant Confessions, 'at the present day exists, or can certainly be ascertained, concerning doctrines or precepts necessary to salvation, which is not written or based on the Scriptures, but has (as is alleged) been committed by unwritten tradition to the custody of the Church.*' The decision of the Tridentine Fathers is otherwise, and so is the statement of the principal theologian of their Church. 'The controversy between us and heretics' (Protestants), says Bellarmine, 'consists in this—that we assert that all necessary doctrine concerning faith and morals is not expressly contained in Scripture, and, consequently, besides the written Word there is needed an unwritten one; whereas they teach that in the Scriptures all such necessary doctrine is contained, and consequently there is no need of an unwritten Word.†

The real question at issue must be clearly understood. A 'Word of God,' whether written or unwritten, conveys the idea of a revelation—something to be believed as an essential part of the Christian scheme. And it is in this sense that the expression is used in the Protestant Confessions, when they treat of this subject. 'Holy Scripture,' we say, 'containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be *believed as an article of faith*' (Art. vi.). It is not affirmed that rites and ceremonies, in themselves indifferent, should be summarily rejected if not literally found in Scripture; or that it is necessary to adduce express Scriptural authority for such as we retain. Hooker, long ago, successfully maintained against the Puritans that the Church possesses an inherent power to adapt her polity or ritual to changing circumstances, provided always that such ecclesiastical regulations are in harmony with the spirit of the Apostolic tradition as it is preserved in Scripture. She may be justified, for example, in introducing or retaining infant baptism, though no instance of it occurs in Scripture, and its express Apostolic origin may be doubtful, as 'agreeable to the institution of Christ' (Art. xxvii.), or the general spirit of the Christian dispensation. 'Traditions and ceremonies' of the

* Dec. Thor. de Reg. Fid.

† De V. D. lib. iv. c. 3.

kind, if 'not repugnant to the Word of God,' are recognised as possessing a *relative* authority, so far as not to be needlessly infringed (Art. xxxiv.) ; but they can with no propriety be termed part of the Word of God, or necessary to salvation. Whether retained or rejected, they stand on the lower ground of expediency or order. But these are the things which the Romish controversialist commonly adduces as instances of the 'unwritten Word of God ;' a skilful extension of the term to what really does not come under it. The instances, for example, which Bellarmine relies on are, infant baptism (as distinguished from adult), the forty days' Lenten fast, and the use of the holy oil in baptism.* Would he himself have maintained that these things are necessary to salvation? or that a Church which does not practise them, or some of them, thereby cuts itself off from the body of Christ.†

Confining our attention, then, to such tradition as may properly be termed the Word of God, the first question that we naturally ask is, Where is it to be found? And the answer is precisely the same as in the case of hermeneutical tradition ; viz., that whether this unwritten word ever existed or not, that is, whether the Apostles taught more or otherwise than what is recorded in the Canonical Scriptures, no church or individual is now in a position to adduce a syllable thereof with certainty. Bellarmine divides such traditions into those of which Christ Himself was the Author, those which the Apostles delivered, and those which the Church has made such :‡ nothing under any of the divisions can be produced which can establish its claim to be received as a gift to the Church, supplementary to what is contained in Holy Scripture. There is no evidence for the Apostolicity of such doctrines as, *e.g.*, Purgatory, or the Immaculate Conception, or the Infallibility of the Pope ; and the decisions of the existing Church cannot supply the missing links of history.

It is desirable that there should be no misunderstanding on the point in debate. The vehicle of transmission is immaterial provided we have the same certainty in either case. The inspired oral teaching of the Apostles stood exactly on the same footing as their inspired written teaching: we pay no superstitious

* De V. D. lib. iv. c. 9.

† Much confusion has arisen from the indiscriminate use of the word 'tradition' to signify either doctrines or ceremonies. 'Semper autem memoria repetendum est, statum disputationis Pontificiorum de traditionibus hunc esse :—Scripturam non omnia quæ ad *articulos fidei* et ad dogmata pietatis pertinent, habere, sed multa quæ ad *articulos fidei* necessaria sunt, credenda esse sine Scriptura, extra et præter Scripturam, ex traditionibus non scriptis' (Chemnitz, Exam. lib. ii.).

‡ De V. D. lib. iv. c. 2. The Church *makes* a tradition Apostolical, just as it claims the power to *make* a book Canonical.

reverence to a book *as such*, that is, as distinguished from instruction conveyed orally. Let the tradition of the latter be authenticated as Scripture is, and we are ready to assign to it the same authority. It is not because they are unwritten, but because they cannot certainly be proved to be Apostolical, that traditions affecting the faith, not found in Scripture, or to be proved thereby, are to be rejected as an unwritten word; and the sufficiency of Scripture is to be inferred from the fact, not that the words were traced with a pen, but that it is really the only Apostolical tradition which can with certainty be pronounced such. S. Paul tells the Corinthians that what he had received of the Lord he had delivered to them (1 Cor. xi. 23); he exhorts the Thessalonians to hold the traditions which they had been taught, whether by word or epistle (2 Thess. ii. 15), and to rebuke the brother that walked not after the tradition which he had received (2 Thess. iii. 6); he enjoins Timothy to hold fast the form of sound words which he had heard (2 Tim. i. 13): either these (oral) traditions have irretrievably perished, or (as is the fact) they have passed, in another form, into the written Word, so that the Bible comprehends both the written and the unwritten Word of God, and we need not look further. In short, no Apostolical teaching is certainly extant except that which is embalmed in the New Testament; and if any such were to be disinterred, it would be equivalent to the discovery of a new Canonical book.

The first Christian Church was, no doubt, founded by the oral teaching of the Apostles, and continued for some time dependent on that oral teaching; never, however, wholly without a written Word, for it had the Old Testament, and the Apostles were always careful to connect their teaching, as far as might be, with the Jewish Scriptures (Acts xvii. 2, 3, xviii. 28, xxviii. 23); but still, certainly, without New Testament Scriptures. And if it had been provided that a succession of Apostles, of men inspired as S. Paul and S. John were, should continue to the close of this dispensation, the Church could have been perpetuated, and preserved from error, as it was during the Apostles' life-time. This, however, was not the appointed plan. The men were to drop off in the course of nature and in succession, and an Apostolate of the written Word was to take their place, the men surviving in their writings. This work commenced in due time, and continued through a series of years; one Apostolical writing proving itself on and by another, until the Canon was complete. These writings may be obscure or defective, but it is certain that we have nothing else to rely upon as genuine Apostolical tradition. And let us imagine what would be our condition if, without a living Apostolate, we had nothing but a tradition of oral teaching to look to, no authentic

record of what Christ and the Apostles delivered. We need not go far to form a prediction. The Jews held fast to their written Word, but as soon as ever they attempted to complete it by traditions, it was to make it void (Mark vii. 9). Certain Christian Churches retain, and profess to honour, the written Word; but they have admitted the principle of tradition as a co-ordinate authority, and the practical aspect of their Christianity is not such as to recommend the principle. It follows that a doctrine which professes to rest on unwritten tradition must be tested by its agreement with what we *know* to be Apostolical tradition, while we are not certain that anything else is; and be accepted, or rejected, accordingly.

Pressed by these difficulties, the modern Romish controversialist modifies, by spiritualising it, the idea of tradition. 'What,' asks Möhler,* 'is tradition? It is that sentiment which belongs to the Church, and propagates itself by means of the teaching of the Church; it is the living Word in the hearts of the faithful. To this sentiment the interpretation of Scripture in the decision of doubtful questions is entrusted; or, in other words, the Church is the judge of controversies. In an external historical form' (where this is to be found Möhler does not attempt to explain), '*i.e.* reduced to writing, this inner sentiment becomes the standard and Rule of Faith. In every political community a certain national character or spirit distinguishes it from other communities, and expresses itself in the public and domestic life, the laws and customs, the art and literature, of the community. This is its guardian genius, and as long as it flourishes in pristine vigour, it preserves the continuity of the national life; either absorbing into itself or expelling foreign elements, should they make their appearance. When it becomes feeble, internecine factions and party spirit split up the body politic, and the latter tends to its dissolution. How much more must this be the case with the Church which is the body of Christ, His perpetual incarnation, possessing a more refined and delicate organisation than any earthly society. Here to allow private opinions or private interpretations of Scripture to prevail against the common sentiment would be suicide; it is only to the whole body that the promises of its exalted Head belong, and to it alone therefore it appertains to decide.' Thus far Möhler.

It is obvious that this is a conception of tradition very different from that of Bellarmine; and in fact, there is a great deal in it which the Protestant is not at all concerned to deny. For what is this 'common sentiment' of the Church of which the gifted author speaks, but the spiritual illumination which is the fruit of

* Symbolik, s. 38.

the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and which so far are Protestants from disparaging that, as we have seen (§ 3), they make it a necessary constituent in the argument for Canonicity.* And it is true that this gift belongs to the whole body, and to individuals as supposed to be members of the body. Moreover, it is certainly in its essence 'unwritten' tradition, for its primary seat is the heart (2 Cor. iii. 3), from which it may never emerge in spoken or written forms. But is it an absolutely *independent* sentiment? No, for if it is the work of the Holy Spirit it is so through the external instrument specially thereunto appointed—the written Word of God. Through this, as an instrument, mediately or immediately applied, the Holy Spirit calls the inner sentiment of the Church into being: dissociated from the written Word such alleged sentiment, as experience amply proves, is apt to become fanatical, or worse: it is not produced, nor can it be perpetuated, in its proper purity apart from the written Apostolic tradition. But what is thus dependent upon another thing can never stand alone; it may, and it does, possess a *relative* independence, but the ultimate test of its genuineness must lie out of itself, viz. in the inner sentiment of those writings respecting which we stand in no doubt that they come from God. But it is worth while to dwell a little longer on this point.

The oral teaching of the Apostles preceded their written, and the Church existed before the New Testament Scriptures. Strictly and formally, therefore, the Church cannot be said to be founded on the Scriptures as a book, but on the doctrine which the Scriptures contain.† And what was the order then is, by providential appointment, the order now—oral teaching precedes the written Word. Children receive the first lessons of Christianity from their parents, catechumens from their instructors, congregations from their pastors; certainly the heathen from their missionaries. 'The Bible alone the religion of Protestants,' is a saying which, most true in its proper acceptation, may be misunderstood: as, for example, if it be supposed to mean that scattering-broadcast translations of the Scriptures is the appointed means of converting the heathen.‡ And thus, no doubt, there may exist for a

* Tradition, therefore, is an improper term to apply to it; being a gift of grace, it is incapable of being handed down from one generation to another, as a book, a doctrine, or a practice can.

† Hence the Canonicity of Scripture is not itself an article of faith. Bellarmine remarks with truth: 'Credere historias testamenti veteris vel evangelia Marci, Lucæ, etc., esse canonica scripta, immo ullas esse divinas Scripturas, non est omnino necessarium ad salutem, nam sine fide hac multi sunt salvati antequam Scripturæ scriberentur' (De Eccl. lib. iii. c. 14).

‡ This is the particle of truth in Archdeacon Grant's 'Bampton Lectures' on Christian missions. His (imaginary?) opponent, who is supposed to prescribe 'letter-press printing, or type,' as the great instrument of evangelisa-

time a pure Christian faith amongst those who have never seen the Scriptures? But not only has this oral teaching, if it is pure, been derived from the Scriptures, but it is the bounden duty of the Church along with it to place the inspired volume in the hands of the young within her pale, or of her heathen converts; and to do so as soon as possible, in view of the too probable contingency of the enemy's sowing tares. Nay, a considerable part of the oral teaching itself must consist of simple exposition of the sacred text. But as soon as this duty is fulfilled, there commences that healthy interaction between the Church and the Scriptures which was intended by their Divine Author; the Church teaching, the Scriptures proving; the Church speaking, no doubt, with authority (in the proper sense of the word), but ever appealing to the Scripture in confirmation of what she advances: and then it becomes difficult to distinguish how much of the common Christian sentiment has proceeded from the oral teaching, and how much from Scripture; still more difficult to maintain that the former could have been what it is, if it is pure, without the latter. The case, then, supposed, as it must be if the argument is to be valid, of an inner tradition or sentiment, quite independent of Scripture, and ruling its interpretation, can never arise except in a Church which withholds the Scripture from the laity, and in so doing disparages Apostolical tradition itself. Where the Scriptures are freely read and habitually expounded, the spiritual perception of the Church is constantly recruited and corrected from them, so that the inner and the written tradition become inextricably intermingled. Should it, however, happen, as it may do and frequently has done, that the prevailing sentiment of the Church, that is, the visible Church, has, from the Scriptures falling into abeyance or other causes, drifted away from the Apostolic standard; and this latter in the disinterred Scriptures comes into collision with the former; how is the difficulty to be met? A very prevalent ecclesiastical sentiment, for

tion, certainly needed to be reminded that to the Church, as a living body, this office is in the first instance committed. Holy Scripture always presupposes a Church as in existence; which Church has come into being through oral teaching. Scripture follows, not to found the Church, but to promote its spiritual growth, and to eliminate error as it rises. Scripture was a Divine gift to the Apostolic Church, already gathered out of heathenism by the living ministry. Scripture is the property and jewel of the Church, not of the world. And this process is still the normal one. All this may be admitted without supposing that there is any special virtue in the Church in its 'corporate,' i.e. its externally organised capacity, to promote the cause of missions.

* Irenæus, *Cont. hæ. lib. iii. c. 4.* But, after all, Irenæus may mean no more, with respect to the barbarous people of whom he speaks, than S. Paul does with respect to the Corinthians (2 Cor. iii. 2, 3).

example, pleaded in the person of Dr. Eck, Luther's antagonist, for the sale of indulgences, and a similar one in the persons of inquisitors demanded that they whose only crime was that they could not believe certain doctrines, should be sent to the stake. There can be no doubt as to the answer. The voice of God in His written Word must control and correct the voice of God in the Church (real work of the Holy Spirit as that may be); for while the former was delivered, as we have seen (§ 4), under a special Divine superintendence, the latter enjoys no such prerogative, and is liable not merely to an admixture, but to a predominance, of human infirmity. The Romanist, however, cuts the knot otherwise. If the Church and Scripture seem to differ, so much the worse for Scripture. Scripture must give way, for it is only a book which anyone who fancies he understands it may make what he pleases of, while the sentiment of the Church is infallible. It is the necessary result of his theory.*

From the foregoing observations it will be seen that the question, Could a man, if left to himself, construct from Scripture a true system of Christian doctrine? is a speculative one. Without affirming that he could not, we may certainly say that he is not ordinarily put to the trial. The Church perpetuates herself by the living ministry, and no one of her members comes to Scripture without a predisposition of doctrine already formed in his mind. This may seem to interfere with freedom of thought, and to be unphilosophical, but it is the appointment of Providence, which no one, born within the pale of the Church, can evade. He comes to Scripture, expecting to find therein what in substance he has been taught; just as a pupil of Aristotle, after hearing the lectures of his master, or of those commissioned by his master to teach, would approach the study of one of the philosopher's treatises with a mind prepossessed, and not a *tabula rasa*.

But, it may be urged, we have in the Creeds a Rule of Faith, and one in some measure independent of Scripture. Christendom, as a whole, accepts the three Œcumenical Creeds; and, moreover, each Church has its own particular symbol, which, to it, seems practically its Rule of Faith: the Romish Church, the decrees of Trent and its Catechism; the Anglican, its Thirty-nine Articles; the Lutheran, the Confession of Augsburg; the Swiss Churches, the Helvetic Confessions. If these are not, respectively, Rules of Faith, what are they? The question is not unimportant.

The reply, then, is that, although these formularies may for certain purposes, and under certain aspects, be considered Rules of Faith, none of them is *the* Rule of Faith; and, in fact, they

* See Möhler, Symb. ss. 39, 40.

are Rules in quite a different sense from that in which Scripture is. And our Church, in Article viii., is careful to guard against any misunderstanding on this point. The three Creeds, especially the earliest of them, come to us with the greatest claims to our attention, as deliberate professions of the faith of the Church of the first centuries on certain fundamental doctrines; professions, as regards the two later, put forth after much controversy, and under circumstances which lend peculiar weight to them. But in their present form they are not of Apostolical origin. Their contents, or the main truths expressed in them, we, of course, believe to be Apostolical, otherwise we should not receive them; but the mode of expression, the *statement* of the truths, was the work of uninspired men. They form, therefore, an Apostolical tradition only in the sense of being attempts to state, explain, or defend, the great doctrines respecting the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, which, in an unsystematic form, are expressed or implied in Scripture. The fable which makes the Apostles' Creed the joint production of the Twelve has been long since exploded; the various forms under which, though in substance the same, it was used in different localities, sufficiently prove that the Apostles left no such summary behind them; or only such bare elements as, *e.g.*, 1 Cor. xv., 3, 4. This does not in the least derogate from its just authority as the oldest traditionary relic of what the first Christians believed on certain points, or from its value as a basis of Christian instruction, or as a baptismal profession of faith. But it does invalidate its claim to supersede, or to be co-ordinate with, Scripture as the Rule of Faith; for, like all other alleged traditionary relics, we cannot, in its present form, trace it directly to the Apostles. How much more does this apply to the two subsequent Creeds; one of which is the production of a Council which 'may err even in things pertaining to God' (Art. xxi.), and the other is probably a work of the fifth century. But besides this, a moment's inspection of the Creeds proves that they are insufficient to be the Rule of Faith. The Apostles' Creed, though the Trinitarian hypothesis lies at the base of it, is so meagre in its statements on that subject that Socinians have always professed their willingness to subscribe to it. It omits, too, all mention of the Sacraments and their nature, and all allusion to the doctrine of justification; points important enough to have produced a separation, apparently permanent, between large sections of the Western Church. The later Creeds, though explicit against Arianism and Sabellianism, do not fully supply these defects. On the whole, these venerable formularies cannot be considered a complete Rule of Faith; and we may add, they were never intended to be so; they were special protests against special heresies. They ex-

pressed not what the Church *was* to believe, but what she did believe on the doctrines assailed ; they are not *norma credendi* but *norma crediti*. And, as such, they can only make good their claims by proving their correspondence with Holy Scripture (Art. viii.). Nor is there anything essentially permanent in the form in which they enunciate these doctrines ; the permanency belongs to the doctrines themselves. That is to say, though we may admire the precision of language in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and think it could hardly be improved upon, yet the Church is not tied to these or any other uninspired formularies ; and even if the Creeds had perished, though the loss would have been great, the Church, taught from above, and possessing the written Word, would be able, should the necessity again arise, to frame new formularies suitable to express her faith and to expel error.

Yet the Creeds, and other symbols of particular Churches, are in a certain sense *a* Rule of Faith ; they are so to the members of the Christian society which has adopted these symbols, and made them tests of admission : the proper light to regard them in is, as terms of communion. They lay down, that is, the conditions on which an applicant is to be admitted a member of the society. In framing such conditions, the society does not arrogate to itself infallibility ; it merely states what it believes as such a society, and reminds the applicant that if he becomes a member thereof he must be supposed to share its convictions. If he does not share them, he is under no compulsion to join the society ; and if he ceases to share them, he is under no compulsion to continue a member. Our Church proposes the Apostles' Creed to candidates for baptism as sufficient to stamp a distinctive character on their profession. If the candidate agrees with this, *her* interpretation of Scripture, he is admitted ; otherwise not. Such terms of communion are obviously a very different thing from the Rule of Faith. And what the Apostles' Creed, or the two other Creeds, are to the Church at large, each Church's particular symbol is to itself ; with this difference, that such symbol affects rather the teachers than the mere members of the society in question. Our Thirty-nine Articles are terms of Communion for the clergy of our Church ; we do not propose them to mere candidates for baptism. Such subscription is intended, and is necessary, to provide some guarantee that our teachers accept the peculiar ecclesiastical position which we occupy in reference to other Churches. For this position is one of opposition, not merely to the ancient heresies, but to various errors (as we believe them to be) of the Church of Rome ; and to leave it open to public teachers to teach what they please on other points, provided they adhere to the doctrines of the three Creeds, would be to ignore

an essential feature of our Church, and to reduce it, so far, to a nebulous haze, without form or outline. The points of difference between us and Rome constitute the really essential portions of our formulary; essential, that is, not to our being a Christian Church, but to the justifying of our position as regards the Romish Communion of which we once formed a part. Hence the attempts that have been made from time to time, in some Reformed Churches, to substitute, *e.g.*, the Apostles' Creed as the *norma docendi* for their distinctive confession, cannot be commended. If successful, it would be tantamount to ecclesiastical suicide; nor, for the reasons before given, can this Creed be made the Rule of Faith instead of Scripture.*

It is almost needless to observe that teachers who have subscribed our symbol cannot claim a right to fall back on Scripture alone, on the ground that we make Scripture the sole Rule of Faith. For the statements of the symbol are, in fact, our Church's interpretation of Scripture; she claims to have examined Scripture and settled what it teaches; the symbol is *to her* Scripture or Scriptural; and she justly may call upon her ministers either to adopt her interpretations, or to retire from her communion.

The nature of the sufficiency of Scripture may be dismissed in few words. It contains no catechism, no articulated formulary of doctrine standing out in relief; but the essential doctrines are so interwoven in its texture, that they can no more be separated from it than the miraculous element can from the Gospels. It is the Holy Spirit addressing those in whom He dwells as one friend would another, or as a father would his children come to years of discretion; not as a schoolmaster or lawgiver (Gal. iv. 1-7)—‘The servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth, but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you.’ And as regards matters of ritual and polity, precedents are given, principles laid down, but no positive prescriptions or minute details—a ceremonial law forms no part of Apostolic Christianity. But whether as regards doctrine or discipline, the Church has ever found in the sacred volume all that she needs to fulfil her mission in the world, and to conduct herself to eternal glory; all that she needs to refute heresy, or to separate from herself those accretions of error which may be expected, from time to time, to gather round her system in this imperfect state.

* The well-known theory of Grundtvig, in Denmark. It had been previously defended in a work by Professor Delbrück, of Bonn, which drew forth three valuable letters in reply from Sack, Nitzsch, and Lücke, Bonn, 1827.

§ 7. *Relation of the Old Testament to the New.*

In the Canon of Scripture we include, as has been seen, the books of the Old Testament; but our seventh Article deems it necessary to remind us that there is no contrariety between the two main divisions of the sacred volume, neither as regards the author of salvation (Christ), nor as regards the object of faith (not transitory promises, but eternal life). It is probable that there is an allusion to the Gnostic and Manichæan heresies of ancient times, both of which exhibited a tendency to depreciate or reject the Old Testament as unworthy to have proceeded from the same Divine Author who inspired the New. These have passed away; but opinions still differ as regards the propriety of co-ordinating the Jewish Scriptures with the Christian as a Rule of Faith: or if from the Canonicity of the former this must be allowed in general terms, how far it must be accepted with limitations; in short, whether, though we may not *sever* the one from the other, we must not *distinguish* between them, and especially under the particular point of view now before us. Things may not be *contrary* the one to the other, and yet may differ in many important respects.

If we believe that the Jewish Scriptures proceeded from the same Holy Spirit who inspired the Christian, it is of course impossible to suppose that the former can contain anything really inconsistent with the latter; still less can this supposition be entertained if we believe that the Mosaic dispensation, in its principal parts, viz. the Ceremonial Law and the institution of Prophecy (which also form the principal subjects of the Old Testament Scriptures), was specially intended to prepare the way for Christianity, or, as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews expresses it, to be a shadow of good things to come (Heb. x. 1). It is thus that Christ and His Apostles speak of this dispensation: they appeal to its prophecies, they illustrate Christian verities by a reference to its ritual, they assert its Divine origin and authority; and the first Christians were so far from supposing that in becoming Christians they were setting up any system of religion *contrary* to that in which they had been nurtured, that they continued to attend the temple services, and to observe the Jewish feasts; and this under Apostolic sanction (Acts iii. 1; xviii. 21; xxi. 24). If, later on, the Jewish ritual seemed to be waxing old and ready to pass away (Heb. viii. 13), it was only as the type begins to lose its importance in proportion as the anti-type is seen to have come. It is plain that there can be no *contrariety* between things which thus stand to each other in the

relation of prophecy and fulfilment. But, as the very terms 'type' and 'anti-type' intimate, there may be a *distinction*.

The general answer then which must be given to the question, How far is the Old Testament to us Christians a Rule of Faith? is, *so far* as it is in accordance with the clearer revelation of the New. This latter is to us the supreme authority, not only in contradistinction to human tradition, but also to those portions or features of the elder economy which, as compared with the Christian, bear the marks of imperfection, or of a merely provisional use; and which therefore, we justly argue, have been superseded by the later revelation.

We may observe, then, that the two portions of Scripture are in complete accordance as regards the characteristics of a Monotheistic religion, founded on the moral attributes of Deity, and thus distinguished as well from the impure nature-worship as from the polytheism of heathenism. Hence, whatever instruction the Old Testament imparts respecting the nature and attributes of the Most High—His spirituality, power, goodness, holiness, and all-embracing providence—belongs to us as much as to those to whom it was originally addressed. All this is *presupposed* in the New Testament. Again, the religious experience of holy men of old, as portrayed especially in the Book of Psalms, connects us with them: insomuch that these lyrical compositions of the Old Testament have ever been found to adapt themselves readily to the purposes of Christian worship. With the exception of some portions, due to the immaturity of religion at that stage of its existence, and which our superior light enables us to separate from the mass, they adequately represent our religious experience: they fix for ever the substance and form of the emotional side of religion; no small advantage, when we remember how easily the latter lends itself to perversion or deterioration. The typical import too of the Ceremonial Law, so far as it is declared in the New Testament, is of abiding value; not the ceremonies themselves, but the truths shadowed forth in them and fulfilled in Christ, such as vicarious sacrifice and the covering of sin with blood. The ciphers of the Law, interpreted by the pen of inspiration itself, remain even to us a valuable source of instruction; and the place where the Lord lay, under the veil of type and symbol, can never to Christians lose its interest. Finally, the moral lessons of the Old Testament, so much insisted on by the prophets to the disparagement of the mere ritual, remain as obligatory as ever they were. To some such extent as this the Jewish Scriptures form a portion of our Rule of Faith.

On the other hand, there are parts of them which have become antiquated by the coming of Christ. The Theocracy, *e.g.* as a

civil regimen, cannot be reproduced in the present day: the perfect fusion which it presented of the civil and religious economy, or, as we should now term it, of Church and State, was only possible where the Almighty Himself condescended to be a temporal King, and where idolatry was not only a sin but disloyalty to the Monarch, a crime *læsæ majestatis*: a truth too much forgotten by the Puritans of the seventeenth century, and not always recognised even now in its full import and inferences. 'The civil precepts' of the Law of Moses ought not 'of necessity to be received in any commonwealth' (Art. vii.). Human priests, too, and visible sacrifices have been for ever displaced in the Christian Church by the One High Priest, and His one sacrifice on the cross; another truth which not only is set at nought in the Romish system, but seems forgotten by some modern Protestant expositors of Jewish prophecy. Again, *fulfilled* prophecy belongs rather to the department of Christian evidences than to the subject of the Rule of Faith. And, generally, the spirit of the Old Testament gendered to bondage (Gal. iv. 24): the Law exacted an obedience which it furnished no means of fulfilling: it provided no adequate atonement for the sins specified, while for some of a deeper die it provided no atonement at all: and so far as this was its tendency, it is opposed to the Gospel which reveals a full atonement for all sin, and encourages the spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father (Gal. iv. 6.) The Law still has its use in convincing of sin, but so far as it is merely preparatory to the Christian standing, it is not our standard of faith or experience.

Such are some of the points of agreement and of distinction between the Jewish and the Christian Scriptures, and the dispensations to which they respectively belong. Our Church, in Art. vii., makes some further statements on this subject, which must be taken with a measure of limitation. They are two: that in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ; and that the old fathers did not look only for transitory promises. The former will become consistent with the facts if we modify it thus—*so far* as everlasting life was offered to men under the Jewish dispensation, it was offered through Christ. But the fact is, it was not offered at all under that dispensation, as a matter of covenant. The sanctions of the Mosaic law were purely temporal. How could they be otherwise, when the covenant was made with Israel as a nation, and nations as such have no existence beyond the grave? How could it be otherwise, when it is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, that by the Law eternal life is unattainable (Gal. iii. 21)? But whether we can account for it or not, the fact is unquestionable:

no promise of eternal life was given by Moses as the reward of obedience. But if no promise at all was given, then, of course, it could not be given through Christ. But, moreover, the Christian sacrifice and atonement were not clearly revealed under the Law: the sacrifices and symbols of the latter were like the dumb chords of the statue, until the morning sun shone upon them.* It could hardly have been otherwise ordered. For since eternal life is procured by Christ and Him alone, the revelation of the one must proceed *pari passu* with that of the other: where the blessing 'life and immortality' were not brought to light, neither was it suitable that the Author of it, in His person and work, should have been clearly revealed: the reticence of the Law on the one point carried with it its reticence on the other. So it is, in point of fact. The typical appointments of the Law, read by the light which the New Testament throws on them, are full of Christ; but in themselves, and when given, they were silent as to their ulterior reference. If this reference had been disclosed, the Gospel would have been preached to the Jews as fully as to us; which is inconsistent with the statements of Scripture (1 Pet. i. 11), and the manifestly progressive character of the Divine dispensations. None of the passages that have been supposed to favour the opposite opinion is decisive. As a specimen, that celebrated one in which our Lord declared to the Jews, that Abraham rejoiced to see His day and saw it (John viii. 56), may be adduced. Here at least, it is argued, is plain proof that some of the patriarchs possessed a full knowledge of the Gospel. But, in the first place, it is by no means certain, notwithstanding Warburton's somewhat authoritative assertions,† that the word 'day' implies a reference to the work and office of Christ; the simple meaning seems to be, that Abraham was permitted, perhaps by some special revelation over and above what is recorded (Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18), to receive a full assurance that a Redeemer from sin and death would in due time come; an expectation which we cannot doubt he entertained. And in the next place, which is the principal point, admitting that such special revelation was given to the patriarch, we find no trace of its having been made public property, or becoming incorporated in the faith of those early ages. It seems to have been a special reward of Abraham's faith and piety, and to have died with him. In short, we should never have known of it had not our Lord informed us of the fact; and as the revelation of a *fact* not before known, it seems to stand on the same footing as His revelation of an *interpretation* of another passage (Luke xx. 37) not before suspected. There is no difficulty in supposing that particular communications were made

* Davison on Prophecy, p. 143.

† Div. Leg. b. vi.

to particular saints of old ; but the question is, were they intended to be, and did they become, part and parcel of the acknowledged stock of contemporary religious knowledge? Of this no proof exists ; at least, as regards this instance. No age, indeed, of the world was left without a promise and a hope of restoration from the effects of the fall ; but the precise method by which it was to be effected was only gradually revealed, and until the Sun of Glory actually arose much obscurity enveloped the subject. If everlasting life had been explicitly offered to the old fathers, through Christ, how comes it that they were all their lifetime, through fear of death, subject to bondage (Heb. ii. 15), as appears in many passages of the Psalms, and in the prayer of Hezekiah? How comes it that even in our Lord's time, though the popular opinion was in favour of a resurrection of the dead, a considerable sect of the Jews disbelieved it without thereby forfeiting their Theocratical standing? and that our Lord's proof of it (Matt. xxii. 32), however cogent when produced, seems never to have occurred to His hearers? It was a hope, a surmise, until He who alone could reveal it as a fact did so. And pretty much in the same state was the doctrine of the atonement by which eternal life was procured. It was prefigured in the law, and gradually unfolded in prophecy, but to the last the way into the holiest was not made manifest (Heb. ix. 8). Even after the great fact had been accomplished, and the veil of the temple rent in twain, the full discovery of it was postponed ; and the mourning disciples needed the Divine Teacher Himself to remind them of what He had taught, and to explain to them their own Scriptures (Luke xxiv. 25-7). Such seems to have been the degree of knowledge possessed by the ancient believers. They walked in comparative darkness, insomuch that the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater in this respect than the greatest of them (Matt. xi. 11). They were not without some light : the Law spoke of atonement through bloodshedding ; Prophecy described in glowing imagery the main features of Christ's Kingdom, and in its *later* accents pointed to His vicarious sacrifice : they had the general promises of God to rely on ; but it was only a twilight which they enjoyed, not the splendour of noonday. The Prophets themselves were ignorant of the full import of what they spake and wrote as organs of the Holy Ghost, and are represented as diligently searching into the meaning of their own writings (1 Pet. i. 11). Yet it by no means follows that the old fathers were not saved through Christ ; only that eternal salvation was not *explicitly* offered them in His name. For most true it is, that the promises of mercy to the penitent never were, and could not be, made save with an *implied* reference to the Christian atonement, certain in

the councils of God, though not revealed till the fulness of time ; and hence Christ is said to be the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world (Rev. xiii. 8), His sacrifice on the cross having a retrospective virtue to save. All that ever were saved before His coming, whether Jew or Gentile, were saved through Him ; but their faith may have been implicit, not explicit ; as efficacious as ours in quality, though the objects were not so well defined. In the infinite mercy of God the atonement was applied to the ancient believers, in consideration of their faith in His immediate promises (Gen. xv. 6) ; for faith, whatever its object, is the substance of things hoped for (Heb. xi. 1), and true religion is in its essence the same in all ages, a matter of the heart rather than of the understanding. But the fore-ordained sacrifice of Christ was the real *ground* and *reason* of the application.

The other point may be dismissed with few words. We have it, on the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the old fathers did not look only for transitory promises (ch. xi. 16). But as we have seen, the Law of Moses was not the source of their expectations, nor did even Prophecy throw very clear light on the life beyond the grave. Neither Law nor Prophecy, however, *contradicted* whatever hopes or surmises might have been cherished, whether grounded on ancient tradition, or the voice of conscience, or philosophical reflection. The Law superadded temporal sanctions to piety, but did not deprive it of any of another kind which it had previously possessed. Prophecy, especially later Prophecy, may be thought to have advanced further.* That such surmises and hopes may have been entertained even outside the theocracy the Book of Job proves. How much more within it ! In short, the promises of God under the Law would be construed according to the piety of the worshipper ; some would see nothing in them but the temporal rewards explicitly promised ; others would look beyond these, and declare plainly that they sought for a country, that is, a heavenly (Heb. xi. 14).

* See Is. xxv. 8 ; Hos. xiii. 14 ; Dan. xii. 2.

CHRISTIAN THEISM.

‘There is one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions ; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness ; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible : and in the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons of one substance, power, and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost’ (Art. i.). ‘The Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God’ (Art. v.). ‘Ecclesiæ apud nos docent, decretum Nicænæ Synodi de unitate essentiæ divinæ et de tribus personis verum et sine ulla dubitatione credendum esse ; vid, quod sit una essentia divina quæ et appellatur, et est, Deus, æternus, incorporeus, impartibilis ; immensa potentia, sapientia, bonitate ; Creator et Conservator omnium rerum visibilium et invisibilium : et tamen tres sint Personæ, ejusdem essentiæ, et potentiæ, et coæternæ, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus S.’ (Conf. Aug. i.). ‘Deum credimus unum esse essentia vel natura, per se subsistentem, immensum, æternum, Creatorem omnium rerum . . . eundem nihilominus Deum immensum, unum et indivisum, credimus Personis inseparabiliter et inconfuse esse distinctum, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum S. ; ita ut Pater ab æterno generaverit, Filius generatione ineffabili genitus sit, Spiritus S. vero procedat ab utroque, idque ab æterno, cum utroque adorandus : ita ut sint tres non quidem Dii, sed tres Personæ consubstantiales, co-æternæ, et co-æquales, distinctæ quoad hypostases, et ordine alia aliam precedens, nulla tamen inæqualitate’ (Conf. Helv. c. iii.).

CHRISTIAN THEISM, our present subject, may, as appears from our Articles and the corresponding statements of other Reformed Confessions, be considered under two divisions ; one comprising those truths respecting the Divine nature and attributes which are common to all Monotheistic religions, the other the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, which is distinctive of the Christian faith. In the following discussion this arrangement will be adopted. It must not, however, be supposed that the Monotheism of Christianity is either borrowed from natural religion, or from other sources than revelation. The unity and spirituality of the Divine Being are here to be considered as part of the revealed doctrine of the Godhead, as resting on the authority of the Word of God, no less than the mystery of the Holy Trinity ; for the Christian faith is that we worship one God in Trinity as well as Trinity in Unity.* Only it was the paramount object of the Jewish religion to insist upon the former truths, while the doc-

* Athanasian Creed.

trine of the Holy Trinity belongs especially to the Christian revelation. But the later revelation presupposes and incorporates the earlier, so that we must not understand that the Christian faith rests on a twofold foundation, what the light of nature teaches and what Scripture teaches, respecting the nature of God, but on the one foundation of positive revelation. How far natural religion confirms the statements of inspiration is another question, which will presently come under consideration.

PART I.—ONE GOD.

§ 8. *Natural Theism.*

Scripture teaches that there is but ‘one God,’* ‘living and true,’ as distinguished from the gods many and lords many of heathenism;† ‘everlasting’ (in the Latin *æternus*);‡ incapable, as pure spirit, of being represented in bodily shape, and therefore ‘without parts,’ whether physically or metaphysically;§ exempt from those human affections which we call ‘passions’ (*παθή*);|| among other attributes ‘of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness’;¶ the Creator and Upholder of the universe.** This brief description, or rather attempt at description, of what God is, is sufficient for the needs of practical piety, and further explanations may seem unnecessary. But good reasons may be given for the considerable space devoted to general Theism, as it may be called, in all the dogmatical systems of the older theologians; reasons which certainly do not seem to have lost their force under the present aspects of theological speculation.

Questions relating to the nature and attributes of God, exclusive of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which, in Scripture, is

* Deut. vi. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 6.

† Is. xlv. 8; 1 Cor. viii. 5—‘Nothings,’ as the Apostle in the preceding verse calls them.

‡ Deut. xxxiii. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17.

§ Exod. xx. 5; John iv. 24; Rom. i. 23. Physically, as when we say that matter is composed of parts; metaphysically, as when we distinguish between substance and accident, essence and attributes, etc.

|| Acts xiv. 15. See Beveridge’s remarks on this passage (Art. i. p. 36, note. Oxford edit.). The Latin version of the Articles has ‘inpassibilis,’ which may refer to the Patripassian heresy; but, on the other hand, it is not God the Father, *i.e.* the first person of the Holy Trinity, of whom the Article here speaks, but the one God.

¶ Gen. xvii. 1; Matt. xix. 26; 1 Tim. i. 17.

** Gen. i. 1; Heb. i. 3.

always associated with the work of redemption, form that part of Christian Theism in which natural and revealed religion overlap each other, and render mutual aid. Reason confessedly is entirely at fault as regards the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; it could never have surmised, and can never fully comprehend, this great mystery of revelation. But Scripture itself recognises a natural knowledge of God—a *γνωσὶν τοῦ θεοῦ* (Rom. i. 19)—partly innate and partly acquired, or capable of acquirement. It even indicates the lines of reasoning by which, from facts observed or experienced, man may rise to some just apprehensions of the Divine Being, and on which philosophy has expended so much thought; as, *e.g.*, the argument from final causes in Psalms viii., civ., cxxxix.; that from the idea of God in the mind, in Rom. i. 19; and that from the moral nature of man, in Rom. ii. 15. If this natural knowledge of God has, in any instance, been lost, if conscience has been perverted, Scripture ascribes the result to man's own fault, to a culpable misuse of opportunities, and a depraved will (Rom. i. 20, 21, 24). In short, if no revelation had ever been given, still man, as such, is in possession of innate notions and principles respecting the Divine Being, which he may either improve or stifle, and so rise or fall in the scale of his being.* Faint, or practically inoperative, as these traces of the Divine image may be, they are not wholly obliterated. And that their existence should be recognised may be of importance to the Christian argument. For example, the evidences of revealed religion lean, to some extent, on the conclusions of natural. It has been sometimes assumed that miracles alone form the criterion of a revelation. 'In what way,' asks Paley, 'can a revelation be made but by miracles? In none that we are able to conceive.'† The remark is just in the sense that miracles, as a rule, are necessary to attest a Divine mission; but not in the sense that nothing else is necessary. In Scripture the case is supposed of miracles, real ones, being wrought by a malignant power, and in support of error: in the Old Testament to seduce men from the worship of Jehovah (Deut. xiii. 1-5), in the New to promote the cause of Antichrist (Matt. xxiv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 8-10). On what ground is such a pretended revelation to be rejected? Not solely on that of its contradicting a previous revelation, for the question is, which is the true one, not which is the earlier? It is a case of miracle against miracle, and mere priority does not seem sufficient to warrant a decision. What else can we fall back upon but

* 'Est aliqua naturalis Dei notitia, sed languida et imperfecta; novit ratio aliquam particulam legis divinæ, potest ex κοινῆς ἐννοίας et libro naturæ discere, quod sit Deus, quod justus sit, quod sapiens,' etc. (J. Gerh., loc. xii. s. 4).

† Evid.

reason, or conscience, or moral intuition, or by whatever name we choose to call the faculty of moral discrimination; and to fall back upon it as furnishing a *relatively* independent testimony? It is true that under the light of revelation it may be difficult to determine how much of this moral perception is original, and how much borrowed. We are reminded that the 'religion of nature has had the opportunity of rekindling her faded taper by the Gospel light, whether furtively or unconsciously taken;'^{*} but even so, a faded taper she must be supposed to have had, or to have. And in the instances cited, it seems to be taken for granted that if this natural moral sense, instead of being allowed to abdicate its office, were in active exercise, it would be sufficient for spiritual guidance to this extent at least, that if the doctrine on behalf of which the miracles should be wrought were immoral or irreligious, there would be warrant for the rejection both of the prophet and his message. It was on a principle somewhat similar that our Lord, when accused of working miracles by the aid of Satan, pointed to their beneficent nature, and asked, could Satan be supposed to operate against himself? In the one case and as in the other, a certain light of nature is presumed, to which an appeal may be made with decisive effect. In Deut. xiii., the Jews, as an additional motive, were directed to the temporal benefits conferred on them, for that dispensation was one of temporal inducements: 'He [the false prophet] hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God which brought you out of the land of Egypt' (verse 5): but since this appeal could be addressed only to Jews, a wider basis must be sought in those innate notions of God and morality which are the common property of human nature, and coincidence with which stamps the doctrine miraculously attested as proceeding from God. The existence of this testing moral faculty must also be presupposed in dealing with the question of the inspiration of Holy Scripture. Deborah and the authors of the Book of Psalms, for example, were inspired prophets, though not necessarily commissioned to write, or compile, the books which record their compositions (§ 4); by the aid of the moral faculty, in our case, no doubt, vivified by the teaching of Christianity, we separate in these writings the dross from the ore, and ascribe the former to the mixture of human infirmity from which no prophet but ONE has ever been quite free.

And even if this connection did not exist, or might be dispensed with, natural Theism being relegated to what might seem its more appropriate place, the philosophy of religion, the Christian believer may still derive a satisfaction from perceiving that no contrariety exists between the inferences of reason and the

^{*} Davison on Prophecy, p. 6.

declarations of Scripture on this great subject; similar to that which he derives from the study of the analogy of religion as expounded by Butler. And if he has imbibed the spirit of that great apologist, he will not demand more from the natural argument than that it should lend this negative aid; since his faith rests ultimately, not on the surmises of reason, but on the announcements of revelation.

There is another reason, too, why this topic cannot be safely neglected. From its earliest dawn philosophy has busied itself with speculations concerning the existence and attributes of God; whether there is a God, and if so, what idea we are to form of Him; how His nature is to be defined or described; what His relation to the world, and especially to man, is. This could not be without its influence on the Church; many of her converts from the schools of philosophy carrying with them, when they became Christians, traces of the habits of thought in which they had been nurtured. Hence, though in Church history we meet with few heresies on abstract Theism, speculations on the subject, traceable to philosophical systems, have never failed, from time to time, to make their appearance within the sacred precincts, modifying the aspects of Christian faith, and in some instances impairing its integrity. Pantheism and Dualism—the Scylla and Charybdis of ancient theistic philosophy—did not surrender their dominion without a struggle; and it would be too much to say that even in the present day their influence is not felt. What, for example, but a phase of Dualism is the notion of a *limited* Theism, lately revived, and apparently a favourite one even with writers who profess to believe in revelation? * Theories of this kind, the offspring of philosophy (not always a comprehensive one), must be met, if possible, with the weapons which philosophy itself supplies; and of course this need is the more urgent when they are propounded by those who reject revelation altogether.

A.—THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The arguments on this subject have been by some assailed as of no value for their professed purpose, † while by others they have been invested with the force of a real demonstration. ‡ They

* 'It was formerly argued that every Theist must admit the credibility of miracles; but this, it is now seen, depends on the *nature* and *degree* of his Theism, which may vary through many shades of opinion' (Baden Powell, *Study of Evid.* p. 113).

† Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, b. ii. s. 3.

‡ *E.g.*, Clarke, who calls his book 'A Demonstration,' etc.

seem to have suffered partly from placing them all on the same level as regards cogency, and partly from undue assumptions as to the nature of those which are of real weight. In the following brief sketch, which is all that our limits will allow, an attempt will be made to adjust their claims, and to determine their bearing on Christian faith.

§ 8. *A First Cause.*

Everything which we see around us depends upon something else as its cause: it is not self-existent, but produced. Now the proximate cause is either itself self-existent, or it is, in its turn, the effect of another superior cause; and the same remark applies to every link in the chain of causation, however high it may be traced. We must suppose, then, either the existence of a primary cause, itself uncaused, or of an endless succession of causes,* none of which possesses the property of absolute independence. This latter supposition only pushes back the difficulty indefinitely; for since no link in the chain is self-existent, the whole is not so, and the question remains unanswered, On what does the whole depend? We seem thus compelled to ascend to the conception of a Being whose existence depends upon no cause external to Himself, but who is Himself the ground of His own existence (*Ens a se—Aseitas*), to whom we give the name of God.

Again, everything visible is, in its nature, contingent; *i.e.*, it may, or it may not, have existed; it has no necessity of existence.† And, as above, we must either suppose an endless succession of contingent existences, or arrive at last at some one whose existence is necessary. The latter hypothesis is the only one consistent with reason, and therefore we conclude that such a Being exists (*Ens necessarium—causa necessaria*).

It is obvious that these lines of thought are not really distinct, and merely denote different aspects under which we contemplate the same object. Thus the first cause of all things must exist necessarily, and a necessarily existing Being must be the first cause. It is the same fact regarded from different points of view.

The philosophical ground of this argument is what is called ‘the principle of causation;’ that is, that everything that comes into

* Not, as it is sometimes expressed, an *infinite* succession. ‘An infinite succession in time is inconceivable; for this succession cannot be bounded by time, and therefore can only be apprehended by one who is himself free from the law of conceiving in time’ (Mansel, B. L., p. 79). A series from which we merely abstract beginning and ending admits of accretions; not so infinity.

† ‘*Tanquam in ejus comparatione qui vere est quia incommutabilis est ea quæ mutabilia facta sunt non sint*’ (Aug. De Civ. Dei, lib. viii. 11).

existence must have had a cause. But what is a cause? According to some, it is merely an antecedent, and an effect merely a consequent; and the material world exhibits nothing but a succession of antecedents and consequents: when these occur invariably in the same order, we call one cause and the other effect. But they are mere phenomenal changes, and furnish no answer to the question, Did one *produce* the other? The principle of causation, it is argued, is not a necessary truth independent of facts, but a mere assumption founded on experience; and experience can never give us more than the ideas of antecedent and consequent.* Nothing, however, is more certain than that mere contiguity and succession do not convey the full idea of causation; as appears from the familiar illustration of day and night, one of which invariably follows the other, but is in no sense the effect of it.† With the idea of a cause we always connect *power* to produce the effect; we conceive some occult influence passing from the one to the other. Whence do we derive this idea? The objections just mentioned seem to have arisen from overlooking the true source of it, viz., not the system of physical nature, but our own consciousness. It is from this, and this alone, that we gain the idea of power as distinct from that of mere succession. By an act of volition we move our limbs, and through them produce changes in matter external to us; and when we will to move them, we put forth power in the very act; and it is from the consciousness of this that we consider ourselves the cause of the changes that follow. By analogy, or perhaps by an act of the imagination, we transfer the idea thus gained to the case of physical antecedents and consequents, which otherwise certainly might not suggest it. How mind acts on matter is a mystery, but that it does so act as an efficient cause our consciousness tells us; and this is sufficient to save the theistic argument. Nay, to advance it a step: for we thus learn, not only that proper causation involves the idea of power, but that Mind, so far as our experience extends, is the only or the chief really efficient cause in the universe.

This last extension of the argument is of importance in view of the objections urged against it by the disciples of Comte. Causation, it is said, applies only to changeable phenomena, but matter and force, the substrata of these phenomena, are unchangeable; their sum never varies: they are therefore, so far as we see, uncaused. Let it be admitted then that volition also appears uncaused, and

* Hume, 'Treatise of Human Nature,' B. I. p. iii. Compare Brown, Lectures vi. and vii.

† In all cases of mere succession, the antecedent and consequent may change places. Thus either day may be regarded as following night, or night day, according to our choice of the antecedent.

that Mind only can produce mind; the result is simply that we have two co-ordinate principles in nature: mind and volition can only claim to be co-agents with uncaused matter and force, and must resign their pretensions to an exclusive place in the production of the universe. Two first causes, to say nothing of other possible ones, are as conceivable as one.* It may be questioned whether two first, and therefore necessarily existing, causes *are* conceivable, whether such a notion is not inconsistent with the common intuitions of human reason. Certainly it seems inconsistent with the avowed aim both of Comtism, and of the materialism which this latter calls in as an ally, viz., to discover the monadic primordial principle whence the universe proceeded; for two (not to speak of more) first causes must introduce an eternal dualism into the system of things, and of substances or essences which must mutually limit each other, and therefore cannot be self-existent. But the simple answer is that just given, viz., that we can form no idea of an efficient cause except from what passes within ourselves. Matter and force, as primary sources of physical change, elude our senses altogether; and moreover there exists no analogy between volition and mere natural phenomena which could throw light upon the mode of action of the latter; the argument, therefore, can never be more than a conjecture. Our own consciousness remains the sole basis of our idea of causation, and in this, as in other points, man is the true interpreter of nature.

But the validity of this inference from volition is itself disputed. 'The volition,' a distinguished writer remarks, 'a state of our mind, is the antecedent; the motion of our limbs, in conformity to the volition, the consequent. This sequence I conceive not to be the effect of consciousness, in the sense intended by the theory. The antecedent, indeed, and the consequent are subjects of consciousness; but the connection between them is a subject of experience. I cannot admit that our consciousness of the volition contains in itself any *à priori* knowledge that the muscular action will follow. If our nerves of motion were paralysed, I do not see (unless by information from other people) the slightest ground for supposing that we should ever have known anything of volition as a physical power, or been conscious of any tendency in the feelings of our mind to produce motions of our bodies, or of other bodies.'† It would seem more accurate to say that the antecedent, the state of the mind, is matter of consciousness; that the motion of the body following is matter of experience;

* Mill, 'Essay on Theism.' Anticipated by Hume, 'Dial. on Natural Religion,' p. ii.

† Mill, 'Logic,' b. iii. c. 5.

and that the connection between the two is a mystery. No doubt, apart from experience we should never have known that volition has a power to move our bodies ; but the question is not, whence do we gain our knowledge of the connection between volition and motion ? but, what is involved in the act of consciousness, the antecedent ? When the writer admits that ‘the power of the will to move our bodies’ is matter of consciousness, he seems to concede the point at issue. For this is all that is contended for, viz., that in every act of volition, followed by a motion of the body, the idea of power is involved, and that from this we gain the true notion of a cause. From no other instance of antecedent and consequent, certainly from none of a merely physical kind, do we gain this idea ; which is tantamount to saying that to *us*, mind is the only efficient cause in the universe. As to the supposed case of a paralysed limb, our reasonings, surely, must be founded not on a state of disease, but on the relation of mind and body when both are in their normal condition.

Another eminent writer objects to the theory, ‘that it is refuted by the consideration that between the overt act of corporeal movement of which we are cognisant, and the internal act of mental determination of which we are also cognisant,* there intervenes a numerous series of intermediate agencies of which we have no knowledge ; multitudes of solid and fluid parts must be set in motion by the will, but of this motion we know from consciousness absolutely nothing.’† But if we have no consciousness of these intermediate agencies, they are to us as if they did not exist. All that is necessary to the argument is that we should be conscious of the first and of the last link in the series, and that the idea of power should intervene. The question seems independent of intermediate agencies, or of theories respecting the agency of mind on matter ; it is concerned simply with the irresistible tendency of the human mind to ascribe to every true cause power, or influence, to produce its effect.

The eternity of matter was a recognised tenet of antiquity, even with those who rejected the notion of its being uncaused. Unable to conceive the creation of the world out of nothing, most of the ancient philosophers held matter to be indeed eternal, but not self-existent ; it was dependent on the Deity, as light is upon the sun—an eternal emanation from an eternal source.‡ None but avowed atheists taught that mere matter is the sole

* We are not cognisant of the act of mental determination and of the act of corporeal movement in the same sense. The former is self-determined, or matter of direct consciousness ; the latter is secondary and empirical.

† Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaphysics, ii. Lect. xxxix.

‡ Cudworth, Syst. b. i. c. 4.

independent principle of things; even Hylozoism endowing it with an unconscious life by which it is moulded into its various forms.* When therefore it is affirmed that 'the mere existence of the world does not prove a God,'† the statement must be taken with limitations. The existence of inert matter certainly does not lead to the ideas of personality and intelligence as connected with a first cause; nor does this branch of the theistic argument profess to go so far. What it establishes is the reasonableness of the conception of a first cause, eternal and self-existent; and of the high probability, from analogy, that this cause is not matter, or any probability of matter, but Mind.

§ 10. *An Intelligent First Cause. Final Causes.*

Marks of order and design in an effect force upon us the conviction of a designer. But the world abounds with examples of orderly arrangement (whence the term *κόσμος*), and of adaptation of means to ends. This is visible not only in particular instances, *e.g.* the structure of the eye as compared with its final cause, the power of seeing, but in the combination of these for still further ends; nature, however high we ascend in the scale, ever presenting the same aspect of harmonious co-operation among its various parts towards a designed end, or ends. This, as it is the oldest, is the most forcible argument for the Being of a God: the most forcible, inasmuch as it rests on the clearest analogies.‡ As certainly as we infer from the known final cause of a watch,§ viz. to show the hour of the day, that intelligence presided over its construction, so we conclude from the subserviency of means to ends in creation that it must have had an intelligent Author. Nor would the argument be invalidated if, in some instances, we did not know, or could not discover, the final cause; for the mere collocation of parts, and their dependence upon and relation to each other, would be sufficient to convince us that some end must have been intended: as, in the instance of the watch, even were we ignorant of its object, the analogy between its construction and that of other productions of human art, of which we do know the design, would lead us to place the instrument under the same category. For is it to be supposed that the parts could have arranged themselves by chance? Even ancient philosophy, in its better schools, could not entertain the supposition.|| Or

* Cudworth, *Syst. b. i. c. 3.*

† Mill, 'Essay on Theism.'

‡ See the reasoning of the Stoic Balbus in *Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cc. 45-66.*

§ Paley, *Nat. Theol.*

|| 'Quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem, non potest? Quæ sunt minus operosa, et quidem facilliora' (*Cic. De Nat. Deor., lib. ii. c. 37; comp. De Divin. lib. iii. c. 13*).

shall we say that the material world may 'contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does?'"* But abstract possibilities are one thing, inferences forced upon us by experience another; and the only experience we have in the matter, and therefore to us the only analogy to reason from, is that adaptations of means to ends never occur apart from the agency of intelligent Personality, either our own or that of others. We are therefore entitled to infer this agency whenever we meet with a corresponding fact, in the productions of nature as well as those of art, notwithstanding circumstantial differences which may exist between them. Whether we had ever seen a watch made or not, or known of the existence of such an instrument or not, the mere inspection of its structure would be sufficient to raise a presumption of a designer who had some end in view, and framed his means accordingly.

The advance of science not only furnishes continually fresh materials for this argument, but at the same time discloses a prevailing principle of uniformity, and adapted relations as well as parts, throughout nature, so that the hypothesis of discordant wills having been concerned in the cosmical arrangements may be considered as finally abandoned by philosophy itself. There are no notes of discord in the effect, and therefore not in the agency from which it has proceeded. But it may be questioned whether this argument is really a distinct one from the former, and not rather a particular application of it—that is, of the axiom that every effect must have a cause. The difference seems to be that here it is not the effect as a whole, but the marks of design in it that is the object of thought, which, like everything else, must have had a cause. This cause, from the nature of the case, can be neither a blind necessity, nor even Mind merely as involving the idea of power, but mind as involving the idea of intelligence. And thus it supplements the inherent deficiency of the cosmological argument, which merely leads to the belief of a first cause. This might be conceived of as a blind force, a *natura naturans*; but the idea of intelligence cannot be separated from the doctrine of *final* causes, they and a designing mind being correlative terms. It has been objected by a great metaphysician† that since the argument from final, like that from efficient, causes rests on experience, and we have never been present at the formation of a world, our own being to us a solitary instance, or 'singular effect,' we are not warranted in inferring from the marks of design in it the existence of a designing mind. But is there not a confusion here between the origin and the constitution of the

* Hume, Dial. on Nat. Rel.

† *Ibid.*, p. ii.

world ?* It is not to the creation of matter out of nothing, or to the *rudis indigestaque moles* of chaos, that the argument so much applies, as to the adaptation of means to ends in the existing frame of nature, with which we are personally acquainted. It may be difficult to establish the fact that the universe had a Creator, for certainly we have had no experience of creations; and yet it may be easy to discover in the arrangements of our universe, or one part of it, such a multiplicity of contrivances as to convince us that mere matter could not have produced them. Moreover, the experience from which we derive the idea of final causes is, like that which gives us the idea of an efficient cause, in ourselves, and not in the physical operations of nature. When we see a watch in process of construction, all that sense tells us is that the work is proceeding from a curious arrangement of bones, muscles, sinews, etc.; the intelligence which presides over it remains unseen. That intelligence is presiding over it we infer from the knowledge that such an instrument could not be produced by ourselves without the exercise of a designing mind; and by analogy we transfer the same to the watchmaker. It is only a more extended application of the reasoning when from the observation of the marvellous contrivances which the *whole* of nature, so far as it comes under our knowledge, exhibits, we ascend to the conception of a presiding Mind which framed them for ends, whether we can at present discern those ends or not. With respect to this last difficulty, it may be remarked that some of the greatest discoveries in science have been made in reasoning from means to unknown ends; as, *e.g.*, the circulation of the blood, which Harvey arrived at by asking himself what could be the design of the valves which so plentifully occur in the veins of the body. Here the final cause was unknown; being discovered, it threw light upon the contrivance.—As to the hypothesis that the complex structures of the world may be accounted for on the principle of ‘the survival of the fittest;’† the animal, *e.g.* in its efforts to see, throwing out at first the mere rudiments of an eye, and these, in the lapse of ages, improving themselves into the perfect organ; it seems hardly necessary to dwell upon it. The ingenious author can hardly have seriously intended it as an argument against final causes.‡ Certainly it

* ‘But allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the foundation of our judgment concerning the *origin* of the whole (which never can be admitted),’ etc. ‘So far from admitting that the operation of a part can afford us any first conclusion concerning the *origin* of the whole,’ etc. (Hume, *Dial. on Nat. Rel.*).

† Mill, ‘*Essay on Theism.*’

‡ For even if we admit that the primitive germ, or protoplasm, was endowed with instinctive tendencies, we must still ask two questions: 1. Whence

has nothing to recommend it, on the score of simplicity, in preference to that of an intelligent Creator.—Nor is the validity of the argument impaired by there being some things in nature of which perhaps we shall never discover the end intended, as, *e.g.* the use of barren deserts, venomous reptiles, fierce wild beasts, or the existence of evil.* To such instances Paley's remark is applicable: 'These superfluous parts do not negative the reasoning which we instituted concerning those parts which are useful, and of which we know the use; the indication of contrivance with respect to these remains the same as it was before.'†

§ 11. *Ontological.*

The first to propound this argument distinctly was Anselm of Canterbury. His reasoning is as follows: We have a conception in our minds of an all-perfect Being: but if this Being does not actually exist, we might add existence to our previous conception of Him, which, therefore, would be proved not to be the conception of an all-perfect Being; for to such a conception nothing can be added. Such a conception, therefore, necessarily involves actual existence.‡ It afterwards became particularly associated with the name of Descartes, who devoted the fifth of his celebrated 'Meditations' to the discussion of it. 'Actual existence,' he argues, 'can no more be separated from the essence of God than the equality of its three angles to two right angles from the essence of a triangle; or the idea of a valley from that of a mountain. It is as certain that I find in myself the idea of an all-perfect Being as I do that of any mathematical figure or number; and I have no less clear a conception that an actual and eternal existence belongs to His nature than I have of the properties which I can demonstrate to belong to such a figure or number. For to such a Being no perfection can be wanting, which would be the case if He did not possess existence.'§ Kant's refutation of the argument is, on purely logical grounds, unanswer-

did these tendencies proceed? Were they self-caused? If so, the principle of causation itself, on which science rests, is annihilated. 2. How came the environments, the correlation of the instinctive tendencies, and the condition of their successful result, into existence?

* Jowett, *Essay on Nat. Rel.*

† *Nat. Theol.*, c. 5.

‡ 'Convincitur etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest: et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod majus est. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re' (*Proslog.*, c. ii.).

§ *Medit.* v.

able. As long as we entertain the conception of a triangle, he remarks, it would be a contradiction to suppose its angles not equal to two right angles; but there is no contradiction in supposing such a figure not to exist at all. Remove the subject as well as the predicate, or predicates, and nothing at all remains. That a figure containing three angles should necessarily exist can never be proved; on the *supposition* that a triangle exists, no doubt it must have three angles, but with the disappearance of the supposition the angles also disappear. So it is with the conception of an absolutely necessary Being. That God is almighty is a necessary judgment; and the predicate cannot be removed as long as the subject God, *i.e.* an all-perfect Being, is in the mind; but that there is no God involves no contradiction. Moreover, existence is not a predicate which adds anything to our previous conception of a thing. A hundred actual dollars contain nothing more in the idea than a hundred imaginary dollars, though there is a great difference between them as regards a man's available resources. Whatever, then, our notion of an object may contain or involve, we must go out of it in order to predicate existence of the object.*

There seems, in fact, to lurk an ambiguity in Descartes' use of the expression, necessary existence. It may mean either that the adequate conception of a thing involves necessary existence, or that the thing of necessity actually exists. In the former sense it is true that no adequate conception of God, *i.e.*, of an all-perfect Being, can be formed which does not contain, as part of the conception, existence *à se*, or necessary existence; but does this involve the necessity of such a Being actually existing? As long as I frame to myself the conception of a winged horse, the wings are an essential part of it; but I am not entitled thence to infer that such an animal actually exists. As an intuition, however, of the human mind, the argument may hold its place. If I, an imperfect being, exist, how can I conceive an all-perfect Being as non-existent? Every attempt to do so will prove abortive. If I exist, and am not God, and yet have an idea of God, which I have, I cannot think and therefore be convinced of my own existence (*cogito ergo sum*) without believing that God exists; and if He exists, He must exist necessarily. The ontological argument is only a mode of stating the fact that belief in the existence of God is a necessity of the practical reason.†

* Kritik der R. V. Kirchmann's edit. p. 476.

† Descartes, in *Medit. iii.*, gives another turn to the argument; viz., that the idea of an all-perfect Being could not have originated with ourselves, but must have been implanted in us; and, on the principle '*nihil in effectu quod non prius in causa*,' by an all-perfect Being.

It is obvious that if, as some modern philosophers have maintained,* we can form no true, albeit inadequate, conception of God, the very basis of the argument is cut away from under it. For it proceeds on the assumption that such a conception is innate, though it may be dormant; that it exists previously to the observation of material objects, and is not derived from the mere multiplication of created perfections; and that it is not, as an original intuition, affected by the logical contradictions which, no doubt, beset every attempt to reduce the ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite to consistency with the laws of the human understanding.

§ 12. *The Moral Nature of Man.*

The moral law within us seems to point to a Lawgiver. For this law is not merely a passive faculty of discriminating between right and wrong, but speaks with authority, commanding us to choose the right and avoid the wrong, and acquitting or condemning accordingly (Rom. i. 15). The voice of conscience is, in fact, the voice of God; if not speaking directly† through it, yet indirectly, inasmuch as this wondrous faculty must have been implanted in the heart of man by the Creator. Nor is the inference invalidated by the erroneous judgments which an uncultivated conscience may deliver; for still what it commands it conceives to be right; it commands nothing *as wrong*, though it may err in the practical application. The evidence from the moral constitution of man bears rather on the character than on the mere existence of God; and perhaps it is going too far to say that the ‘categorical imperative’‡ of conscience *necessarily* implies a Lawgiver. The obligations of morality, we are reminded,§ need no other support than themselves: they are eternal and immutable. But the question relates not to the nature or obligation, but to the *origin* of the moral sense. Whence comes it? As the intuitions of the infinite and the eternal seem to imply an infinite Being from whom they proceed, so the existence of conscience seems to point to a righteous Lawgiver, the Author of the faculty.

§ 13. *Consent of Mankind.*

This is a favourite topic with writers on the subject, and is useful, not so much in proving the existence of a God, as in proving that such a belief is the common inheritance of the race.||

* *E.g.*, Mansel, ‘Bampton Lectures.’

† See Delitzsch, ‘Psychology,’ iii. s. 4 (Clarke).

‡ Kant, *Kritik der R.* V.

§ Mill, ‘Essay on Theism.’

|| ‘Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non im-

Hardly any nation, or tribe, however barbarous, but acknowledges a superior Power: the apparent exceptions are not such, when examined more closely. How is the fact to be accounted for? A primitive revelation presupposes a Revealer: an innate idea presupposes an Author. The universality of the belief guarantees the truth of it; not, indeed, in Descartes' sense, but as proving it to be a common intellectual judgment. A question arises, Has this common belief become impaired in the progress of civilisation, so that we may describe it as the special characteristic of a rude age? The contrary is notoriously the fact. The nations of Western Europe are theistic no less than the savage tribes to whom Cicero appealed. Nay, their theism has become more concrete, more personal, than that of ancient philosophy itself. The *Gods* of heathenism were personal, not so its abstract Divinity, the *τὸ θεῖον*, or in a more concrete form the *Dii Deæque omnes*: but the manifest tendency of human belief, in modern times, has been toward investing this supreme object of worship with the attribute of intelligent Personality. And whereas the Deity of the Jewish Revelation is more anthropomorphous (not in an erroneous sense) than the corresponding conception of heathenism, the Deity of Christianity exhibits an advance, in this point, upon the Jewish, for in the Gospel, 'the Word' Himself 'became flesh, and dwelt among us' (John i. 14). Against the atheistic argument that religion owes its origin to the policy of legislators availing themselves of a popular error to gain authority for their institutions,* this *consensus gentium* may be urged with great force; for, if the theory were true, the belief in a superior power would be found only in communities which enjoy the benefits of legislation, whereas it is found, in some form or another, in the most uncivilised tribes.

The following remarks may be made on these proofs in general. Neither singly nor collectively do they amount to a 'Demonstration *à priori*'† of the existence of God, much less of His attributes. No fact is capable of demonstration in the strict sense of the word, so that the denial of it shall involve a contradiction; and neither is this one. Mathematical deductions are demonstrations and necessary truths because they are concerned not with facts but with abstractions, or mental pictures of our own minds.

buerit deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet), omnes tamen vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur; nec vero id collocatio hominum aut consensus efficit, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus; omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est' (Cic. Tusc. lib. i. c. 13. Comp. De N. D. i. 16, De Leg. i. 8).

* Cudworth, I. S. c. v. s. 1.

† See Clarke's Work.

What is the triangle the three angles of which can be demonstrated to be equal to two right angles? No such figure exists actually in nature. We cannot draw a line on paper which shall have length without breadth, or which shall lie evenly between its extreme points; that is, the demonstration is not true of any actually existing triangle. It is the ideal triangle, formed by abstraction from the actual, on which we reason. Euclid is obliged to *postulate*, or make a condition of his reasoning, that a straight line may be drawn from one point to another, which yet is practically impossible; but the postulate once granted, all the properties of a trilateral figure bounded by such mathematical lines are necessary truths. It will be seen that none of the proofs for the existence of God partake of this character. They root themselves in experience, and though they rest ultimately on certain intuitions of the mind, they never can free themselves from the imperfections of their origin. The first step in the argument is, that something must have existed from eternity, for an intuition of reason tells us that from nothing nothing can come, and so far it is of an *à priori* character; that is, the intuition is part of our mental constitution, and begins to operate directly we perceive that something exists. But whether this something is God or the world the intuition does not decide. There is no contradiction in supposing that the eternity of existence may belong to the world itself, and not to a Being independent of it; which accordingly was held by many philosophers. An intuition of reason tells us that *if* the world is an effect, it must have had a cause, but not whether it is an effect or not. That it is so can only be argued from observation of facts, and depends, therefore, on probable reasoning. Similarly it is evident that whatever has existed from eternity must have the reason of its existence in itself, or necessary existence; but that the world may not possess this property cannot be demonstrated *à priori*. There are strong reasons for thinking that the world is an effect, and therefore must have had a cause, and therefore is not self-existent; but the *ὁὸς ποῦ στῶ* is wanting for demonstrative or *à priori* reasoning on the subject. That the first Cause possesses intelligence, and that He is a righteous Lawgiver, are obviously conclusions founded on an observation of facts, in the external world, and in ourselves; and therefore are *à posteriori*. The argument therefore falls short of apodeictic cogency, which accounts for the degraded notions entertained of the Divine Being by large portions of mankind, and, as travellers affirm, even the absence of the idea of God in some particularly uncivilised tribes. We may not 'like to retain God in our knowledge' (Rom. i. 28), and the natural result may be anticipated; for we are not *compelled* by a

necessity of reason to believe in Him, much less in the God of revelation. The evidence is only probable, but probable evidence is the usual, and the sufficient, guide of life.* It may be added, that to us Christians, faith, grounded on the revelation of God in the Scriptures, furnishes the *δός ποῦ στῶ* which the natural argument fails to do. The natural argument is rather the confirmation than the foundation of our belief.

The proper light in which these proofs are to be regarded is that of furnishing materials from which the imperfect consciousness of a superior Power, whether or not derived from revelation, is developed into more adequate conceptions, and attains a definite shape.† ‘The innate idea of God,’ says Jacobi, ‘resembles a mute consonant, which can only be sounded in combination with a vowel,’ viz. creation (*τὰ ποιήματα*, Rom. i. 20), including man and his moral nature. The faculty is there, but it is only potential until the reflective powers are directed to it. Sometimes this process never takes place, and then generations remain sunk in Fetichism, or the lower forms of idolatry. In more happily endowed races a few superior minds emancipate themselves from the grosser conceptions of the popular superstition, and from them the improvement descends until, in a greater or less degree, it permeates the mass. The conjunction of the two factors, human reason and the visible creation, being thus effected, the result is, sooner or later, a *γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ* (Rom. i. 19), not merely the belief of a God, but this belief purged from the taint of idolatry, which the Apostle describes as *unnatural*, and as the penal consequence of inattention to the lessons to be derived from creation (Rom. i. 21).‡

Further, the force of the evidence lies not in any one branch of it singly, but in the combination of all the branches. Inert matter could hardly suggest the idea of an intelligent, and the contrivances of nature hardly that of a righteous, Creator; in conjunction with each other, and with the evidence from the moral nature of man, they produce their full effect. This, indeed, is a feature of the evidences of Christianity itself; each of which singly possesses some force, but collectively a much greater one. It is to be observed, moreover, that these proofs, while rendering the existence of a God probable, at the same time, to some extent, make known *what* He is.

* Butler, Anal. Introd.

† See Martensen's remarks on these proofs, Dog. ss. 38-43.

‡ The Book of Wisdom contains striking examples of this purifying process (see cc. 13-15), in which the philosophic minds of later Judaism had the prophets as forerunners (see the latter part of Isaiah throughout).

§ 14. B.—THE NATURE OF GOD—INFINITY.

Although the conclusion of Simonides, when he was requested to give a definition of God,* must ever be substantially that of a finite understanding, it must not be supposed that His nature is absolutely incomprehensible; otherwise it is difficult to see how He could be an object either of thought or worship. That no logical definition of God is possible, is evident: for such a definition would consist of a genus and a difference; but neither is in this case conceivable: not the former, for there is no common notion or category between God and the creature, under which He can be brought; not the latter, for in God no such distinction as genus and difference exists. Even the highest category, substance, is predicable of God in quite a different sense from that which it bears in ordinary language. But can that inferior kind of definition called 'description' be applied to Him? Theologians usually hold that it can; but only in a limited measure, corresponding to the imperfection of our ideas on the subject. They tell us, that whereas the natural knowledge of God, which is partly innate and partly acquired (from the works of creation), is extremely imperfect (*languida et pæne nulla*), and inadequate to meet the wants of fallen man; and even under the light of Revelation we only know so much as our limited faculties can receive; yet our knowledge is only inadequate, not untrue as far as it extends: we do not worship the 'unknown God' of the Athenians (Acts xvii. 23).† They appeal, in proof, to Holy Scripture, which teaches that while 'no man hath seen God' (in His proper Being) 'at any time,' (not even Moses, the most favoured of His servants, Exod. xxxiii. 20), yet 'the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father hath declared Him' (John i. 18); that while we are far from seeing 'face to face,' or knowing as we are known, yet 'we see through a glass darkly,' and 'know in part' (1 Cor. xiii. 12); that while God dwells 'in the light which no man can approach to' (1 Tim. vi. 16), and the Spirit of God alone 'knows the things of God' fully and perfectly, yet we, having 'the mind of Christ,' are admitted to a measure of this knowledge (1 Cor. ii. 10-16). They remind us that if the only approach to a formal definition to be found in Scripture is the

* 'Roges me, quid aut quale sit Deus, auctore utar Simonide: de quo quum quæsierit hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causâ sibi unum diem postulavit. Cum idem ex eo postridie quæreret, biduum petivit. Cum sæpius duplicaret numerum dierum, admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret, Quia quanto, inquit, diutius considero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior' (Cic. De N. D. c. 22).

† Gerhard, loc. iii., c. 3. Comp. c. 1: 'Ergo est aliquod nomen Dei absconditum, et occultum, quod scrutari non licet: est etiam aliquod nomen Dei patefactum, quod vult agnosci, narrari, celebrari, et invocari.'

tautology 'I am what I am' (Ex. iii. 14 ; Isa. xliii. 13), yet what is important for us to know is conveyed in the statements that 'God is Spirit' (John iv. 24), and 'God is Love'* (1 John iv. 8).

We have now to ask, Does Philosophy teach us anything on the subject? Reverting to the proofs of the existence of a God, we are met by a difficulty, viz., that none of them seems necessarily to lead to more than the conception of a limited Deity. That the Author of the universe must have been a Being of vast power, wisdom and goodness, may be admitted as at least highly probable; the great difficulty of the existence of evil, moral and physical, being explained on the supposition either of the refractoriness of matter, or of an Evil Being counteracting the designs of his adversary. But since the effect is not infinite, why need we suppose an infinite cause? Why assume a Deity of unlimited attributes to produce limited results? Whence, in short, do we derive the ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute as connected with the idea of God, which yet we do spontaneously connect with Him? It must be confessed that here the argument *à posteriori* fails us.† Even the oneness, or rather 'Oneliness'‡ of God cannot be thus inferred. There can of course be but One infinite Being; but there is nothing contradictory in the supposition of a number of limited deities having been concerned in the production of the world, provided we also suppose them to have been actuated by accordant wills.

Attempts have been made, with various success, to supply this defect. A traditionary method, derived from the scholastic writers, of arriving at an idea of the Divine perfections consists in three processes of thought: *Via eminentiæ*, by which we ascribe to God all the perfections which we discover in the creature, only in a superlative sense (*sensu eminentissimo*); *via remotionis*, or *negationis*, by which we separate from the idea of Him the imperfections that belong to the creature; *via causalitatis*, by which whatever perfections we observe in the works of God we ascribe to Him as their cause, on the principle that the cause must contain at least as much as the effect. But the objection still recurs, that by none of these methods do we gain the idea of

* J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 8. s. 70.

† A defect admitted by Clarke (Ans. to seventh Letter)—'The finite phenomena of nature prove indeed demonstrably *à posteriori* that there is a Being which has extent of power and wisdom sufficient to produce and preserve all these phenomena. But that this Author of nature is Himself absolutely immense or infinite cannot be proved from these finite phenomena, but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of necessary existence.' Whatever may be thought of this latter 'demonstration,' the preceding remark holds good.

‡ 'Μόνωσις, unity, oneliness, or singularity, is essential to it'—the idea of God (Cudworth, c. iv. s. 10).

absolute perfection ; they are *à posteriori* methods, and the chasm between the Finite and the Infinite remains unbridged over. Others argue from necessity to perfection, that a self-existing Being must be Infinite, but hardly with success.* For, in truth, limitation of essence is not necessarily inconsistent with necessity of Being;† at least we cannot, on merely logical grounds, pronounce it to be so. Infinity may be a condition of self-existence, or rather the most suitable idea we can connect with it, and yet it does not follow that the thing conditioned may not exist without it; as, in the hypothetical judgment, if rain falls the grass will grow, the failure of the antecedent does not involve that of the consequent, for the grass may grow even if the rain does not fall. It seems, then, that we must attempt another path; and perhaps it will be indicated if we consider that all discussions respecting the Absolute or the Infinite presuppose some idea thereof in our minds to which we tacitly refer, for we cannot be supposed to reason about a nonentity. Not an adequate conception, for the forms of logical thought are inapplicable to this subject, and we become involved in contradictions when we attempt definitions; but an idea, or immanent intuition of reason. We advance *via eminentiæ* to the utmost limits of analogical reasoning; but we are conscious of something beyond, fathomless and immeasurable, in the nature of God. ‘We know,’ says Pascal, ‘that there is an Infinite, though we are ignorant of its nature.’ And this something does not, in transcending the conceptions of the understanding, become to us a mere blank, a yawning chasm, ‘without form and void;’ the created perfections which have been our prompters and our guides all along, project their shadow on the boundless bosom of the Infinite. We still anthropomorphise, as we must do if we are to reason about Deity at all; and thus Infinity becomes identical with absolute perfection, and when we speak of a God of ‘infinite,’ we mean a God of perfect wisdom, power, and goodness.‡ Let us hear Cudworth on the subject: ‘Since infinite is the same as absolutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the

* See Clarke, Prop. 6.

† Kant, Kritik der R. V. b. ii. c. 3, s. 3.

‡ The late Dean Mansel may perhaps be thus reconciled with his opponents. It could hardly have been the learned writer’s intention (in his Bampton Lectures), to maintain that the infinite and the absolute, as applied to Deity, in other words the infinite perfections of God, are to us mere nothings, or wholly incomprehensible. But he has given occasion to objections, not altogether unfounded, against his theory by insisting too exclusively on the negative as compared with the positive notion of infinity, and by omitting to explain why it is, that while unable to conceive it, we yet must believe that this notion exists. Moreover it is not ‘the infinite’ in the abstract, but the ‘infinite God’ that we are reasoning about.

latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also that though the word "Infinite" be in the form negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with "absolutely perfect"; as likewise the sense of the word "finite" is negative, it being the same with "imperfect." * It is, in fact, through not giving sufficient prominence to the positive element in our idea of Infinity that some modern philosophers of great name have failed to assign its due force to the theistic argument.† Etymologically the word 'Infinite' expresses a negation, that which is not limited; but philosophically it expresses an affirmation, however indistinctly the object may be apprehended; and it is in the latter sense that it denotes that element in the Divine nature which no mere *à posteriori* argument can supply. The idea of it is something more than that which we have of perfections vastly transcending our own, and something less than the immediate knowledge of Deity to which the ancient Mystics pretended; it is one of those indistinct ideas which we accept as a whole (intuitively), but are baffled when we attempt to reconcile its conflicting elements. The conclusion of the whole is that while God Himself alone knows what God is (1 Cor. ii. 11), man, by a combination of the intuitional and reflective faculties, knows too, but only in part; that partial knowledge, however, not being a mere creation of the intellect, but having correspondent realities in the Divine essence. And with this accords the language of Scripture, which refers us, for such knowledge of God as we can attain to, not to the understanding, but to faith, the intuitional organ of spiritual apprehension (1 Cor. xiii. 12; Heb. xi. 3, 6).

That there can be only one subject of these infinite perfections—one not merely in purpose but in essence—is evident; and further, that such a Being can have no 'parts,' divisibility into parts, which implies limitation, being inconsistent with the notion of infinity.‡

The arguments from marks of design, and from the moral sense, particularly point to the personality of God; but this has

* Int. Syst. c. v.

† E.g., Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, etc.

‡ It is satisfactory to find so careful a writer as Dr. McCosh coinciding in the view given in the text. 'It is at this place, if we do not mistake, that the idea of the Infinite, so much dwelt on by the German philosophers, comes in. The capacity of the human mind to form such an idea, or rather its intuitive belief in an Infinite, of which it feels that it cannot form an adequate conception, may be no proof (as Kant maintains) of the existence of an Infinite Being; but it is, we are convinced, the means by which the mind is enabled to invest the Deity, shown on other grounds to exist, with the attribute of infinity; that is, to look on His Being, power, goodness, and all His perfections as infinite' (Method of Div. Gov. p. 12, note).

by modern philosophers been thought to involve great difficulties. How can the Absolute and the Infinite be conceived as a Person? Personality, in the ordinary sense, involves relation and limitation: a person is related to another, as not being that other, and for the same reason is limited. That the word Person admits of modified senses is seen from its use in describing the relations of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity to each other, relations which are never supposed to be inconsistent with the infinity of each; but on the immediate question before us, has not personality been confounded with individuality? An individual must be limited, but God is never represented in Scripture as an Individual. 'God,' we read, 'is' not a Spirit, but 'Spirit,'* *i.e.*, the most perfect embodiment of intelligence and freedom; as He is 'Love,' the most perfect embodiment of goodness. To have created other spirits, possessing a relative freedom and independence, is not to have abdicated His own essential qualities; in Him we still live, move, and have our being (Acts xvii. 28); He is still the 'Father of spirits' (Heb. xii. 9); it is a self-limitation, not a necessary one, that He has clothed Himself in to come down to our apprehension; and though we must conceive of Him as possessing Personality, it is neither necessary nor correct to conceive of Him as a Person, in the sense in which each of us is. The difficulty arises, as it does also in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, from our attaching to Personality the only conception we can form of it, *viz.*, that derived from our own consciousness, which is always that of a limited nature: the conception may be true, but it is imperfect, and must not, any more than in the doctrine of the Trinity, be pushed to its consequences if we would avoid error. When we can understand what is involved in the title I AM (Exod. ii. 14), we can also understand what is meant by the Personality of God.

C.—ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

§ 15. *Origin and Divisions.*

The infinite nature of God does not, in fact, present itself to the mind as a single idea, but as an assemblage of properties or qualities, to each of which the idea of infinity is attached. The

* Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός (John iv. 24). 'Etsi vero non solum de Deo sed et de angelis et animabus prædicetur quod sint spiritus; absit tamen ut συνωνύμως prædicari statuamus: μονοτρόπως καὶ ἑξαρετῶς Deo competit nomen spiritus; ut enim est οὐσία ὑπερούσιος ita est spiritus, ut ita loquar, spiritualissimus, supra reliquorum spirituum seriem longe evectus, et infinitis modis illis superior' (J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 8, s. 70).

different wants of which we are conscious, as limited, or sinful, beings; the different circumstances in which we are placed; the different points of view from which creation may be regarded; modify the aspects under which we represent to ourselves the one living and true God, and thus give rise to the doctrine of the Divine attributes. In conceiving God as the infinitely wise, good, powerful, etc., we confine our attention, in each case, to one aspect of the Divine essence; we take a partial view of it suggested by existing circumstances; and because a partial, necessarily an imperfect one; but such a view as alone is of any religious value. There is no food for faith in the abstract ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute. How this Infinite Being is affected, what the relations He sustains, towards us, are the points with which we are practically concerned; a God of attributes can alone be the object of worship. That this is the true origin of these conceptions, and that they are not logical deductions from one or more determinations of His essence, is evident as well from our own experience as from the representations of Scripture; of which those portions which most abound in references to the Divine attributes, *e.g.* the Psalms, the Book of Job, and the latter part of Isaiah, are also those in which the varying phases of religious experience occupy a prominent place.

But the question may be asked, How come we to connect definite ideas with these Scriptural designations of the Divine Being? The methods above mentioned (*via eminentiæ*, etc.) teach us how to use the materials once supplied, but do not supply them. The answer is, that it is from human qualities we take our departure in framing predicates of God. Since revelation is conveyed in human language, it must either be unintelligible or avail itself of the innate notions and moral perceptions of the human subject; it must speak to us in our own tongue wherein we were born.* That is to say, in framing conceptions of God, we necessarily reason from the most perfect subject of which we are cognisant, the reasonable creature, and assign in an eminent, it may be inconceivable, sense to Him what we find in the creature. In so doing, a twofold caution is to be observed: one that we do not suppose the Divine attributes to be *identical* with the corresponding qualities in the creature. It is an axiom of theology that the attributes of God are not separable from His essence,† as in the case of a man his virtue, or his wisdom, is

* Hampden, *Phil. Evid. of Christianity*, p. 23.

† ‘*Essentia, bonitas, potentia, sapientia, justitia, et reliqua attributa omnia sunt in Deo realiter unum. . . . Si enim attributa illa realiter differunt ab essentia Dei, utique Deus ex essentia et accidentalibus esset compositus, et sic essentia divina non esset summe una et indivisa*’ (J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 7, s. 47).

separable from his rational nature; and therefore they partake of the incomprehensibility of His nature. When we pass from our most perfect notions of human wisdom or justice to God, we exchange, in the language of mathematics, continuous motion for motion *per saltum*: we confess the inadequacy of human thought to understand, and human language to express, the corresponding realities in the Divine nature: these form a different *species* from the former.* But the other caution is no less needed; that we do not treat these predicates as arbitrary conceptions, which have no meaning when applied to God. For our flight over the chasm continues in the direction which it held when parting from the finite; neither in a reverse nor a divergent one. As the schoolmen state it, these distinctions are not those *rationis ratiocinantis*, merely conceptions of our minds, but *rationis ratiocinatæ*, having a real basis of fact:† there is something in the Divine nature actually corresponding to them; they are *analogically* true, however inadequate. God is not righteous merely because He acts as a righteous man would act; nor, again, merely because He is the source of righteousness in us: but He acts righteously because it belongs to His nature to do so (ὁσιωδῶς).‡ He cannot be supposed as misleading His creatures when, in the language of inspiration, He describes Himself as just or merciful: His creatures, who have no means of understanding these terms, except such as their own minds furnish.§ This is no point of merely speculative interest. A blind force, a mere *natura naturans*, a system of ‘natural laws’|| working invariably and remorselessly,

* Davison on Prophecy, note on p. 382.

† ‘Non rationis ratiocinantis, quæ fit per meram intellectus operationem, sed ratiocinatæ, ubi est fundamentum aliquod re’ (Quenstedt, c. viii. s. 2, qu. 2).

‡ ‘Non sensu negativo, ut voluit R. Moses Ægyptius, lib. i. c. 58: is enim statuit, quando dicimus Deum esse intelligentem, nihil aliud hoc nomine significari quam quod Deus non sit quales sunt res vitæ et intelligentiæ expertes, sed aliquid excellentius: nec tantum per modum *causalitatis*, quasi hæc nomina nihil aliud denotent quam eum esse talium rerum quales per nomina significantur causam; ut Deus est bonus, id est causa bonitatis; vere quidem hæc dicuntur, sed non sufficienter: nec συνωνύμως Deo et creaturis talia attribui: sed prædicari ὁσιωδῶς, ἐξοχικῶς, ὑπεροχικῶς καὶ θεϊκῶς, hoc sensu, quod quicquid bonitatis, justitiæ, potentiæ, etc., in creaturis est, id totum prius præexistit et præexistat in Deo, et quidem longe perfectius et perfectiori modo quam in creaturis’ (J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 7, s. 58).

§ On this subject in general, see King’s ‘Discourse on Predestination,’ with Whately’s notes; Browne’s ‘Procedure, etc., of Human Understanding;’ and Copleston’s ‘Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity, etc.,’ dis. iii. and notes. It was matter of controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists, Realists and Nominalists.

|| ‘Pantheism naturally extends its denial of the personality of God to His attributes, which it transforms into laws of nature’ (Nitzsch, System. etc., s. 66. Anmerk.

can never call forth the sentiments which Scripture encourages us to entertain towards God; in such a rarified atmosphere all that is vital in religion perishes; love expires, prayer becomes a mockery. He who knows what is in man gives us better lessons when He authorises us to reason from analogy to 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,' and tells us that if 'ye being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?' (Matt. vii. 11). 'If this,' says Twisten, 'is Anthropomorphism, it is a natural and a necessary Anthropomorphism. For if we are formed in the image of God, why should we not from the image reason to the Original? Was He not in our likeness who could say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father"?' (John xiv. 9).*

Many divisions of the Divine attributes have been proposed which aim at an exhaustive analysis, but with indifferent success. Sometimes the distinction is not observed between the attributes and the nature of God, and sometimes the divisions run into each other.† They have been classified under the heads of absolute and relative, negative and positive, proper and improper, abstract and concrete, quiescent and active; the first and the last conveying the same idea, and furnishing the only generic division under which the others can be arranged. The absolute attributes are those which we conceive as existing in God in and by Himself, the relative those which express the relations in which He stands to the creature; the former may be termed quiescent (*immanentia*), the latter active (*transeuntia*);‡ in the former the distinction, in the latter the connection, between God and the world is more prominent. But if the origin of our conception of attributes has been correctly assigned, many of the so-called absolute attributes hardly come under the description; they either belong to the Divine essence, or are immediate deductions from our idea of it. Such are 'living and true;' infinity in its

* Vorlesungen, vol. ii. p. 16. He quotes Jacobi's well-known aphorism, 'God in creating man theomorphised; necessarily therefore man anthropomorphises.'

† As in the distinction between positive and negative attributes, the negative ones being so only in the form of expression. *E.g.*, when we say that God is unchangeable, we affirm the absence of changeableness in Him.

‡ This corresponds with a common division into incommunicable and communicable attributes. *Illa* (sc. absoluta) dicuntur ἀκοινώητα, hæc vero (sc. relativa) κοινώητα, quorum scilicet ex parte et per similitudinem rationales creaturæ possunt fieri participes'—*e.g.*, wisdom, justice, etc., as contrasted with unchangeableness (J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 7, s. 66). But this division is not strictly accurate. *Analogically* all the attributes are communicable; really, as they exist in God, none.

twin forms eternity* and immensity;† simplicity and unchangeableness, which follow from unconditioned existence; blessedness (*beatitudo*), which is implied in absolute independence.‡ Sometimes they reappear under the form of relative attributes; as, *e.g.*, under a certain aspect immensity becomes omnipresence. To the relative attributes then we may confine our attention.

§ 16. *Omnipresence.*

The immensity of God, considered in relation to space as a condition of creation, assumes the name of Omnipresence. For there are two ideas involved in this attribute, not separable in fact, but mentally—the Divine immensity in virtue of which God never can be absent from any of His works (*Dei adessentia*), and the Divine causality in virtue of which He is actively operative in all His works. These ideas are not separable in fact, for the attributes and the essence of God are one: wherever He is, there He acts; and wherever He acts, there He is: but under the former, Omnipresence is regarded as a quiescent and absolute attribute,§ involving no considerations of space (in fact out of it); under the latter as a relative one, having reference to existing things, and in immediate|| connection with them. For we can no more dis sever God from the world, since ‘in Him we live, move, and

* Not merely *αἰώνιος* but *αἰδιος*. ‘By the eternity of God we mean the Divine causality which, itself out of time, is the condition of time, and of everything temporal’ (Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. i. s. 52).

† ‘By the Omnipresence’ (rather the immensity) ‘of God, we mean the Divine causality which, itself out of space, is the condition of space, and of everything in space’ (*Ibid.* s. 53).

‡ ‘Deus a se ipso, in se ipso, et per se ipsum beatus est; ac proinde vere et proprie beatus’ (J. Gerh. loc. iii. s. 182). The usual attribute in Homer and Hesiod, *μάκαρες θεοί*.

§ Hence it is sometimes expressed negatively, as the *ἀδίαστας* (indistantia) of the Divine essence; which, however, by itself is inadequate as a description of what is meant by Omnipresence. ‘Omnipræsentiam Dei definiunt (Calviniani quidam) per nudam indistantiam *absque operatione*’ (J. Gerh. loc. ii. s. 179).

|| As distinguished from *remote* causality, such immediateness is, in the language of scholasticism, twofold: ‘*Immediatio virtutis*,’ the efficacy not passing at once from the agent to the object, and ‘*immediatio suppositi*,’ no other matter being interposed between the two. Fire warms water, but only ‘*mediatione virtutis*,’ *i.e.*, it has to warm first the vessel containing the water. Yet this direct contact, so to speak, between God and the world must be kept free from the idea of fusion, or anything approaching to hylozoism. ‘Deus ubique præsens est non per essentiae suæ multiplicationem, est enim ὅλως ὅλον τι, ens simplicissimum, ac proinde ubicunque est, totus est: nec per essentiae suæ divisionem, quia non est in dimidia mundi parte dimidius, sed ubique totus; nec per extensionem et rarefactionem, quia non est corporea quædam moles, sed infinita essentia; nec *per commixtionem*, quia est essentia simplicissima et indivisibilis, in nullius rei compositionem veniens’ (J. Gerh. *ibid.* s. 172).

have our being' (Acts xvii. 28), than we can identify Him with it. But if we are not to think of Him merely as an omnipresent spectator, the connection can be no other than that of an omnipotent agent, sustaining, guiding, impelling the course of nature. The rest of God from His works is a perpetual activity (John v. 17). And the dogmatical import of this attribute is to guard against the deistical notion that God, having once communicated to matter its forces and laws, has retired into a state of repose, leaving these laws to their regular and immutable operation; as an engineer, having set his machine in motion, withdraws from personal interference with it. The language of Scripture, of religion, and even of true philosophy, is at variance with this notion. If in the thunder the Psalmist hears 'the voice of the Lord' (Ps. xxix. 3); if it is He that makes 'darkness and it is night' (Ps. civ. 20), and gives to all creatures 'their meat in due season' (*ibid.* verse 27), this language is sanctioned by the spontaneous utterance of piety; as, *e.g.*, when a nation, grateful for deliverance from a threatened invasion, stops not, in commemorating the event, at the laws of nature established by God, but ascends to their Author—'*Deus afflavit et dissipati sunt.*'* Nor does a sound philosophy lead to a different conclusion, for to an all-perfect Being we cannot ascribe a state of *otium cum dignitate*.† But do we not thus annihilate the relative independence of secondary causes, and give countenance to the theory of Descartes and his followers, that God is the direct Agent in all that it happens,‡ the properties of matter only furnishing the occasions on which He exercises His power? Not if we bear in mind that these secondary causes are themselves dependent on God, who at the first established them, and defined their mode of working.§ If in His wisdom He has chosen to limit Himself to work in and through the laws of nature, it is not the less He who does the work. It is, however, the fact that nature *appears* to have a life of its own, and to act independently; and this difficulty especially meets us when under the term 'nature' we comprise free intelligences; the difficulty, viz., how finite beings, free to stand or fall,

* The inscription on the medal struck to commemorate the destruction of the Spanish Armada.

† '*Deus non discessit ab officio suo post creationem, sicut Architectus discedit ab extructa domo; sed idem quod primitus condidit, adhuc conservat et gubernat, estque officio suo perpetuo præsens*' (J. Gerh. t. ii. loc. 2, s. 178).

‡ To obviate the supposed absurdity of which '*operosa omnipræsentia*,' Cudworth proposed his hypothesis of a '*Plastic Nature*,' intermediate between the Divine agency and the actual production (Int. Sys. c. iii. s. 37).

§ '*Quamvis Deus in conservatione et gubernatione universi utatur causis mediis, tamen illæ ipsæ causæ in essendo et agendo suam a Deo habent dependentiam, absque cujus potenti sustentatione nec essent nec agerent, sed in nihilum reciderent*' (J. Gerh. t. ii. loc. 2, s. 178).

can co-exist with an infinite Spirit who created, and is ever present with them. Both as regards the material and the moral world, it arises from the inability of those whose conceptions are bounded by time and space to comprehend the nature of a Being who is unconfined by those limits. Hence theology takes refuge in antinomies, or apparent contradictions: God is everywhere, God is nowhere; He is not so much everywhere as He is that very thing which we call everywhere; He is in every place, and yet is not contained in any place (*illocalis presentia*). 'It is more proper,' says Augustine, 'to say that all things are in Him, than that He is anywhere, and yet they are not in Him as in a place'* : all which statements amount substantially to Chrysostom's confession, 'That God is everywhere we know and profess; but how He is so we do not understand.'†

Is God everywhere present in the same manner? It can hardly be a matter of words when we distinguish between that presence of His which belongs to creation generally (*præsentia generalis*); that by which He dwells in the regenerate (John xiv. 23, *præsentia specialis*); and that on which the union of God and man in the person of Christ is founded (Col. ii. 9). Nor can we consider the distinctions as merely of degree, and not of kind, or specific; as if, *e.g.* the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the regenerate is nothing but the general presence in a certain stage of intensity. Schleiermacher's remark, however, deserves notice: 'Properly understood, there is no difference in the Almighty presence of God, but only in the receptivity of the creature, which is greater in man than in any other created being, and greatest of all in the pious.'‡ The question whether the Divine essence, or the Divine operation, *i.e.* whether God Himself, or merely the virtue that proceeds from Him, is to be considered in proximity to the creature—at one time much debated§—can hardly be entertained by those who hold that wherever God works there He

* De div. quæst. xx. Similarly God is said to be 'totus in omnibus, totus in singulis, totus in se ipso' (J. Gerh. t. ii. loc. 2, s. 178). See also the verses of Hildebert; God is—

'Super cuncta, subter cuncta; extra cuncta, intra cuncta :
Subter cuncta nec substratus, super cuncta nec elatus :
Intra cuncta nec inclusus, extra cuncta nec exclusus :
Super totus præsidendo, subter totus sustinendo :
Extra totus complectendo, intra totus incomplendo :
Intra nusquam coarctaris, extra nusquam dilataris :
Subter nullo fatigaris, super nullo sustentaris,' etc.

Apud Vincent. l. xxv.

† Hom. ii. in Heb.

‡ Glaubenslehre, s. 188.

§ J. Gerh. loc. ii. c. 8, s. 188.

is, and must be, in all the fulness of His Being; yet possesses a measure of importance in reference to the crude notions of the Socinians, who maintained that God, in His essential Being, is only in heaven, all of Him that is present in creation being his attributes of Wisdom and Power.*

But if the Omnipresence of God is not quiescent, but active and co-operative—and we cannot think otherwise than thus of it—we must take care to confine its co-operation to its proper objects. We cannot, *e.g.*, conceive of God as actively co-operating with evil, the existence of which we feel too keenly, while we know that it could not exist without Divine permission. In what sense is God present (as in some sense He must be) to the minds and actions of evil men? This question will be more suitably considered in a following section.† Nor, as has been observed, does it dispense with the operation of secondary causes, which are *relatively* independent; and if piety leads us to pray for the former, prudence forbids us to neglect the latter. We pray for recovery from sickness, and if restored to health ascribe it to God's goodness; but we also avail ourselves of the resources of medicine, and ascribe our recovery to the skill of the physician. It is in the actually constituted course of nature, with its laws and forces, that Divine co-operation properly finds its place; according to the saying of Augustine, 'God so manages all things which He created that He also permits them to exert their own energies.'‡ We must, therefore, exclude it from creation strictly so-called, *i.e.*, the beginning of all things, when no course of nature was in existence; and from the evangelical miracles of the *creative* type, *viz.*, those on which Christianity is founded, the incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord. In the former, nature was passive; in the latter, her existing laws were suspended. The first communication of spiritual life, in the case of the regenerate, seems to come under the same category. If man 'cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God' (Art. x.), the initial impulse, when it occurs, must be ascribed exclusively to Divine agency. After-

* Vorstius, quoted by J. Gerh. : 'In Scripturis affirmari omnino videtur, Deum ratione substantiæ suæ tantum in cœlo esse.

† See § 24.

‡ De Civ. Dei, l. vii. c. 30 : 'Deus non solum vim agendi dat causis secundis et eam conservat, sed immediate influit in actionem et effectum creaturæ, ita ut idem effectus nec a solo Deo' (as the Cartesians held), 'nec a sola creaturâ, nec partim a Deo partim a creaturâ; sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et creaturâ producatur; a Deo vid ut causa universali et primâ, a creatura ut particulari et secundâ' (Quenstedt, p. i. c. 13, s. 1, th. 15). He adds : 'Juxta uniuscujusque capacitatem, indigentiam, et exigentiam;' *i.e.*, according as the created agents are either free, or act by necessity.

wards, or in spiritual growth, the powers of nature co-operate with Divine grace. In all cases, in short, in which we perceive an absolute beginning, a creation *ex nihilo*, it is God alone whom we consider as acting.

§ 17. *Omnipotence.*

To whatever extent any notion, however debased, of a God exists, to the same extent power is found connected with it; power to avert evil, and bestow benefits; power to order and dispose, if not to create. But except in revealed religion this power appears limited and controlled; the inferior gods by Jupiter, Jupiter himself by Fate. In strong contrast therewith, the God of revelation is omnipotent. To have called the existing frame of nature into being conveys to our minds the idea of wonderful power; but Omnipotence comprises a further idea, that of power adequate to all *possible* or conceivable objects, *e.g.*, a new frame of nature, should such seem good to the Divine wisdom: God has not exhausted all His resources in creating the existing universe. Hence the god of Pantheism is not, and cannot be omnipotent, as being identified with the sum-total of creation, and having his will fully embodied in its laws.* - 'In scholastic phrase, the Divine power is infinite,' both *extensive* in respect to the range and scope, and *intensive* in respect to the mode and energy of its exercise; so that God, had it pleased Him, could have created a more perfect universe than He did.† It is understood, of course, that the power of God does not extend either to what is contradictory in itself, that is, a nothing (as, *e.g.*, to undo what has happened, or to make two and two five); or to what is contradictory to some other of His attributes, as to pardon sin without an atonement would be contrary to His justice; to refuse pardon to those who repent and believe on Christ would be contrary to His mercy. But this is not to introduce limitations into His nature, but to avoid doing so; for to suppose Him capable of undoing what has been done would be to suppose Him capable of rendering false what is true; and to suppose Him capable of acting against any of His attributes would be to connect with Him the idea of 'passive power,' *i.e.* the power of being acted upon, whereas He is pure energy (*actus purissimus*), and to introduce division into that nature which is absolutely simple.‡ Nor is Omnipotence incon-

* Spinoza, Tract. Theo. Pol. c. vi.

† Abelard, in the twelfth century, is accused of having taught 'Deum non posse simpliciter aliquid facere præter illa quæ facit.' He is followed by Schleiermacher, Ch. Gl. s. 54.

‡ Anselm acutely remarks: 'Quoties dicitur Deus quædam non posse, nulla in eo negatur potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et fortitudo'

sistent with God's acting, sometimes independently of secondary causes (as in creation), and sometimes through them (as in healing a sick person); for in this latter case, it is He Himself who has ordained the limiting condition: of His own will He has ordered it, that certain effects shall be produced, not by a direct exercise of His power, but instrumentally through other agents. But He could, at the first, have arranged it otherwise; and He can (as in miracles) exchange His ordinary mode of operation for another, if reasons exist for the change.* His power can only become active through His will; and therefore if it is His will to act conditionally, His power can only act thus.

§ 18. Omniscience.

From the union of omnipresence and infinite intelligence we infer the attribute of Omniscience. Nothing can escape His knowledge, to whom all things are present, and who perfectly understands them in all their relations. He knows the thoughts of the heart (Ps. cxxxix.); every 'hidden thing of darkness' (1 Cor. iv. 5); every want before it is expressed in prayer (Matt. vi. 8); everything in the womb of the future (Acts xv. 18); and, finally, He, and He alone, knows Himself (1 Cor. ii. 11). As regards this attribute, we must, as with the others, separate from it (*via remotionis*) all imperfection, such as necessarily belongs to our knowledge: for example, the distinction of past, present, and future applies not to Him whose being is an eternal Now; God's knowledge is not, as in man, a property annexed to His nature, but is His nature; it is not after the manner of deduction (*discursivè*), nor succession (*successivè*); not by means of ideas (*species intelligibiles*), but immediate (*uno actu, se ipso*); it is not partial, but complete.†

In the attempt to analyse the idea of Omniscience distinctions have been invented, which however add little to our comprehension of it: such as *scientia simplicis intelligentie*, by which is meant the knowledge of everything possible, and *scientia visionis*, the knowledge of everything actual, God Himself included; *scientia neces-*

(Cur Deus Homo,' lib. ii. c. 18). With which Augustine may be compared, 'Si ista' (mori, fallere, peccare, etc.), 'posset, non esset omnipotens: magna in Deo potentia est non posse mentiri' (De Symb. lib. i. c. 1). Compare De Civ. Dei, lib. v. c. 10: 'Sic enim hoc non potest ut potius, si posset, minoris esset utique potestatis.'

* Hence the distinction between 'potentia absoluta et ordinans,' and 'potentia ordinata;' the former antecedent to nature, the latter acting through nature. (J. Gerh. t. ii. loc. 2, s. cc., with Cotta's note.)

† J. Gerh. t. ii. loc. 2, s. 13.

saria and *scientia libera*, etc.* The mode of speaking is analogical: what we can conceive (*intelligentia*) as contrasted with what we see (*visio*); what we call 'natural' as belonging to God's nature (therefore *necessaria*), as contrasted with the effects which flow from His will, and which seem more arbitrary;—these distinctions we, in whom nature and will are separable, transfer to God, in whom they are one. A distinction of some importance is attributed to the Jesuits, who made use of it in their contests with the Jansenists, viz., *scientia media*,† or the knowledge of things which would have happened had certain conditions been fulfilled, which never were; as, e.g., God knew that David would be delivered into the hands of Saul if he remained in Keilah, where he did not remain (1 Sam. xxiii. 12). So our Lord knew that had Tyre and Sidon seen His mighty works (which they did not see), they would have repented (Matt. xi. 21).

The knowledge of God in respect of contingent actions,‡ those of free agents, is supposed to present peculiar difficulties. Cicero pronounces it inconceivable.§ And undoubtedly, when by 'knowledge' we understand 'will' or 'decree',|| it is not easy to understand how such knowledge and contingency can co-exist. Under that aspect, however, it rather belongs to the topic of Divine providence (§ 23). But mere foreknowledge of an event is no more inconsistent with contingency than with necessity; for the *nature* of the event is not altered by it: our knowing that a contingent event *has* happened does not affect its contingency; neither,

* See these distinctions explained by Thos. Aq. Sum. Theol. p. i. quæst. 14.

† 'Media,' as occupying a middle place, as it were, between mere possibility and fact. It seems, however, to be nothing but a particular kind of '*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*,' both being concerned with possibility, the former of conception, the latter of fact. 'Nonnulli eam (Mediam) *conditionatam*, alii vero rectius scientiam de futuro conditionato appellare solent. Versatur enim circa ea, quæ sub conditione quâdam nunquam existente futura fuissent' (Cotta on Gerh. t. i. c. xix.).

‡ Usually called '*præscientia*,' fore-knowledge: not accurately, since past, present, and future have no meaning as applied to God.

§ 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiæ quam fortuna: ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur ut sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet: sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est' (De Div. lib. ii. c. 7).

|| Not merely *πρόγνωσις* but *πρόθεσις*. This was the point in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists, the latter connecting will with knowledge, the former not. Augustine, long before, had placed the matter in its true light: 'Non est autem consequens ut, si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostræ voluntatis arbitrio. Et ipsæ quippe nostræ voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo ejusque præscientia continetur; quoniam et humanæ voluntates humanorum operum causæ sunt. Atque ita qui omnes rerum causas præscivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse præscivit' (De Civ. Dei, lib. v. c. 9).

therefore, does our knowing (could we do so) that it will happen. Notwithstanding God's foreknowledge, free agents act freely, and necessary agents necessarily; *i.e.*, He has knowledge of free agents *as such*, and of necessary agents *as such*; or knows that each will act according to the laws which Himself has imposed upon them. Wisdom stands in the same relation to Omniscience as Imminence to Omnipresence; *i.e.*, it is a quiescent or absolute attribute, or at least does not necessarily presuppose an actual creation. To 'the only wise God' (1 Tim. i. 17) we ascribe especially the first planning of the universe,* with its laws and forces, its adaptation of means to ends, its final attainment of the greatest good of which it is capable. Hence this attribute is closely connected with the theistic argument from final causes. But the 'manifold wisdom' of God is especially revealed in the work of redemption, and the Church, even in its present militant state, is its highest embodiment (Ephes. iii. 10).

§ 19. *Goodness—Holiness—Righteousness—Mercy.*

These are what are called ethical, as distinguished from physical, attributes. The goodness of God may be understood in a twofold sense; either the essential goodness of His nature, ('There is none good but one,' Matt. xix. 17), or goodness in the sense of beneficence. As a relative attribute the latter is the sense which it bears. The earth teems with instances of God's goodness. 'It is a happy world after all.† The sportive movements of animals, the cheerful song of birds, the varied hues and fragrance of flowers (apparently serving no purpose but that of gratifying the senses), the pleasure attached to intellectual and even bodily exertion, all testify to the beneficence of the Creator. The existence of evil, it is true, lowers in the distance as a dark cloud, and is too important a subject not to demand special consideration. Meanwhile, thus much is evident: all the contrivances of nature have the well-being and happiness of the whole for their *natural* tendency: if the aim is not attained, it is in *spite* of natural arrangements, and because they are thwarted by some antagonist power. 'We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose.' If God had been indifferent to our happiness, He might have made, or permitted a rival Power to make, 'everything we tasted bitter, everything we saw loathsome, everything we touched a sting, every smell a stench, and every sound a discord.‡

* Prov. iii. 19; viii. 22-30. Comp. Is. xl. 12-14; Jer. x. 12.

† Paley. N. T. c. xxvi.

‡ *Ibid.*

Holiness.—The proper idea of this attribute is separation from what is unclean.* God, as He has no taint of sin in Himself, cannot tolerate it in the creature. The absolute holiness of God fences His love round; and without the constant recollection of it, worship degenerates either into pantheistic rapture, or impure mysticism. Hence the common title, ‘The Holy One of Israel’ (Is. i. 4); hence the more closely man is permitted to approach the Divine Presence, the more is he reminded of his unfitness for it (*ibid.* vi. 5). In general, in proportion as God becomes the God of history and revelation, mingles in human affairs, and assumes ‘a local habitation and a name’ in the congregation of Israel, the assertions of His holiness become emphatic, so as to establish a strong line of demarcation between Him and the impure deities of heathenism. Nor is the lesson unneeded under the Gospel, as the prevalence of Antinomianism at some periods, and in some sects, too plainly proves.

Righteousness.—Righteousness, or justice, is in man the virtue which rewards according to merit, and which redresses the inequality produced by wrong-doing, *i.e.* inflicts punishment on the transgressor.† Analogically, God is conceived of as righteous when He acts towards individuals as men would act under the circumstances. This attribute, then, is distinct from that of goodness, which embraces the whole creation, whereas this stands in special relation to beings endowed with personality and free-will (angels and men), *i.e.* to their behaviour. That God is righteous, rather is righteousness itself, is declared not only in Scripture, but by the moral law in man, and by the moral government of the world; the tendency of the latter, however, occasionally thwarted, being plainly in favour of virtue.‡ On the whole, virtue brings its own reward, while sin ends in, and is, misery. It must be confessed, indeed, that the traces of this attribute are not so clearly visible in creation as those of some others—wisdom, for example, or power; in fact, what are called

* “Ἅγιος (ἁγίος) means primarily, ‘consecrated’; in this sense it is used of the vessels of the tabernacle (Ex. xxx. 29), and of the Jewish people collectively (Deut. vii. 6). In the New Testament it acquires the further meaning of actual sanctity (Ephes. i. 1).

† Τὸ μὲν διανεμητικὸν . . . τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν, τὸ διορθωτικὸν (Arist. Ethics, v. 4). Theological divisions are, ‘justitia universalis,’ which seems only another name for all the moral attributes (‘Ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ’ *νί* (*ibid.* c. 1); ‘commutativa,’ or the reciprocation of benefits, which can have no place between God and man, as the latter can only receive; ‘distributiva quæ proprie versatur in æqualitate, suum cuique tribuendo; correctiva, quæ vitia corrigit, nocentes punit’ (J. Gerh. loc. iii. c. 18). The two latter correspond to Aristotle’s division.

‡ Butler, Anal. p. i. c. 3.

'the inequalities of life,' have furnished matter of objection to the unbeliever,* and of perplexity sometimes to the Christian. The frequent failure of merit to achieve the success due to it; the calamities which often overwhelm the righteous while the wicked enjoy prosperity (Ps. lxxiii); the apparent abortiveness of elaborate preparations for usefulness through the premature stroke of death—these are some of the difficulties which meet the inquirer, and form, in fact, a strong argument for a future state, where such inequalities will be rectified, and the righteousness of God vindicated. At present we walk by faith, not by sight; content with the assurance that, however perplexing appearances may be, the Judge of all the earth will eventually justify His ways (Gen. xviii. 25). But, it may be asked, has not this doctrine of retributory justice, especially under the aspect of reward (Heb. vi. 10), a tendency to impair the Christian sentiment of humility? Not if we bear in mind that both the will and the power to do good are the gift of God (Phil. ii. 13), who, in rewarding, merely crowns His own work; and that, as regards forgiveness of sin, if He is 'faithful and just' to grant it (1 John i. 9), it is not on account of our merits, but those of Christ, whose obedience, active and passive, becomes the property of those who believe upon Him. Inasmuch as no attribute of God is separable from His essence, and His essence is love, His righteousness can only be an efflux, and particular manifestation of His love; for which reason to attempt to set the one against the other, or to construct systems from their presumed opposition,† is unscriptural, and tends to introduce something like dualism into the Divine nature.‡

Mercy.—Although this attribute has been denied an independent existence, on the ground that it is identical with love, a distinction clearly exists between them. Mercy is love; but it is love towards the fallen, the miserable.§ It has special relation, therefore, to the fact of sin in the world, and to the provisions of the Gospel for deliverance from the consequences of sin. Even towards the regenerate, who are reconciled to God through Christ, and have learned to cry, Abba, Father (Rom. viii. 15),

* Mill, 'Theism.'

† The error of some of the Calvinistic writers.

‡ The truthfulness of God (*veritas et veracitas, ἀλήθεια* not *ἀληθινός*), is sometimes considered as a distinct attribute; but it seems too closely connected with righteousness to deserve such a place. It is an essential part of God's righteousness, or justice, to be true to His promises and threatenings; whatever expectations He may have raised in the creature, it would be *unjust* in Him to defeat. Hence faithfulness and justice are often found united; e.g., 'He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins' (John i. 9).

§ 'Bonitas est attributum absolutum, misericordia relativum; respectum enim habet ad miseriam in creaturis quam sublevat' (J. Gerh. loc. ii. c. 8, s. 9).

there is room for its exercise; for though they are no longer under the dominion of sin, they offend in many things (James iii. 2), and that continually; and therefore are continually compelled to fall back upon the assurance that, like as a father pities his erring and repentant children, so the Lord is merciful to them that fear Him (Ps. ciii. 13; Luke xv.).*

D.—THE WORKS OF GOD.

§ 20. Both the earlier Creeds connect creation with the existence of God:† and in this they are followed by our Art, which speaks of Him as the ‘Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible.’ But between the attributes and the works of God there is an intermediate link by which we pass from one to the other, viz. the Will of God, or His free agency. This can hardly be called an attribute, and yet is the ground of all His works, and therefore claims a short notice. In attributing will to God, we invest Him with the essential property of a free agent, the power of choice; we affirm that He was under no necessity, like a blind force, to do what He has actually done. And since there is no real distinction between the Will and the Being of God,‡ the imperfections connected with human will must be removed from our conception of the Divine: thus there is no succession in it, as when we deliberate first, and then will; no change involved, as when we pass from the power of willing to the act; but deliberation, decree, choice of means, choice of end, are all one in God, and co-eternal with Himself. That He is under no necessity of willing any particular effect, appears from the consideration

* A point overlooked by Schleiermacher when he says: ‘Since it’ (compassion) ‘presupposes a certain distance between two parties, so that in cases of close relationship, *e.g.* father and children, the term is inapplicable (?), they cannot be objects of it who participate in the blessings of salvation’ (Ch. Gl. s. 85). The objection which the same writer urges against its being considered an attribute, viz., that it is peculiarly anthropomorphic, and connects the idea of suffering with God, has been long ago answered: ‘Si misericordia notat tum compassionem cordis ob alterius miseriam contristati, tum promptissimam voluntatem verbis et re ipsâ eam sublevandi; tolle compassionis mutationem et cordis ægritudinem ex eâ ortam, ac quod remanet purum et perfectum, sc., promptam illam voluntatem miseriam alterius sublevandi Deo relinque’ (J. Gerh. loc. ii. c. 8, s. 222). Or, as Anselm expresses it: ‘Nos sentimus miserationis affectum, tu, O Deus, non sentis miseriæ affectum’ (Proslog. c. viii.).

† ‘I believe in God, etc., Maker of heaven and earth’ (Apostles): ‘In one God, etc., Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible’ (Nicene).

‡ ‘Voluntas Dei est ipsa Dei essentia vel Deus volens’ (Gerh. loc. ii. c. 8, s. 15.).

that He is in Himself all-sufficient; which He could not be, if anything outside of Himself were indispensable as a complement to His perfection. The object of God's will can only be absolute good, first in Himself, then in the creature: He cannot will otherwise; but this is no limitation, but a perfection.* Why His will should be described in one point of view as *absolute*, in another as *conditional*; or as *antecedent* and *consequent*; or as *efficacious* and the reverse; *active* or merely *permissive*;† in other words, why an effect which He wills does not, and one which He does not will does, take place, are questions which more properly belong to other heads of discussion.‡

The works of God, when we consider Him as the efficient cause of the universe, are usually described as creation, conservation, and co-operation. The first applies to the commencement, the second to the continuance, the third to the active forces of the frame of nature. It is needless to remark, that in God Himself there is neither variety nor succession of acts: all His acts are one, but to our apprehension they are distinguishable. For clearly it seems one species of act to call things into being, another to preserve them in being, and a third to co-operate with their powers. So it seems, we say, for in reality it may be doubted whether these acts do not run into one another: *e.g.*, to give existence to a thing is to give it continuance, for however short a period; to preserve a thing is to preserve all that makes it what it is, *viz.*, its vital powers as well as its material form. The distinctions are more valuable as safeguards against imperfect views of the Divine agency than in a philosophical point of view. For instance, if we fix our attention too exclusively on the conservation of things, we may be tempted to forget either that they owe their very being to Almighty power, or that they cannot exert their inherent forces without the Divine co-operation; if we have regard to creation alone, we may overlook the fact that, even when in existence, things could not continue so for a moment without God's sustaining presence.§ In this, as in other instances, it is the weakness of our faculties that compels us to consider under different aspects what is in reality one and the same operation.

* *Longe perfectior libertas est, non posse velle malum quam posse velle malum et bonum* (J. Gerh. *ibid.*).

† Other divisions are: 'Arcana et revelata; erga nos et de nobis; voluntas beneplaciti,' or the Divine will in itself ('essentialis Dei voluntas'); 'voluntas signi,' or the Divine will as signified to us, by the Word, the sacraments, providences, etc. Whence the verse, 'Præcipit, ac prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.'

‡ See §§ 23, 24.

§ 'By whom He made the worlds . . . upholding all things by the word of His power' (Heb. i. 2, 3).

§ 21. *Creation.*

The primary idea of creation is production out of nothing (*ex nihilo*); by which expression is to be understood not that ‘nothing’ was a kind of material out of which God created the universe, but that there was no material at all antecedent to the creative act.* It will be seen that this idea is necessary to obviate undue limitation of the Divine power. If an uncreated matter (ὕλη) existed independently of God, and co-eternally with Him, He would be a mere artificer, making the best use of the material to his hand, and possibly thwarted in his aim by its refractoriness, which, in fact, is one very ancient mode of accounting for the existence of evil. The emanation theory, according to which the world is an eternal efflux of the Divine nature, involves the absurdity of supposing that an infinite Being could throw off from Himself a finite being,† *i.e.*, undergo a change of nature. The world, while dependent upon God, both for its existence and continuance, is yet distinct from Him, and consequently has, in the proper sense of the word, been created; and all the passages of Scripture which declare that there is but one God, and invest Him with infinite attributes, furnish indirect proofs of a proper creation. The Mosaic account (Gen. i.) supplies, of course, the main materials for our knowledge and our reasoning on this subject. From it we learn, that ‘by the Word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing in the water and out of the water’ (2 Pet. iii. 5); and this general fact remains unaffected by any particular interpretation of the passage. Whether verse 1 is to be considered as a summary of what follows, or as referring to the creation of the elementary principles of matter, on which the subsequent changes proceeded; whether the ‘days’ of creation are to be understood literally, or as signifying vast intervals of time; the true principle of creation—‘He spake, and it was done; He commanded, and it stood fast’ (Ps. xxxiii. 9)—is equally asserted.‡

* The expression ‘*ex nihilo*’ appears to have been derived from Rom. iv. 17. Compare Heb. xi. 3. By some a different meaning has been given to it, viz. ‘*terminus ex quo*,’ *i.e.*, from a state of nothingness to a state of being. The axiom ‘*Ex nihilo nihil fit*,’ properly understood, necessitates the idea of creation.

† The generation of the eternal Son (‘God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God’) is an altogether different matter. ‘*Εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα*’ (1 Cor. viii. 6) signifies not emanation, but primary cause.

‡ Most of our divines interpret verse 1 of Gen. i. of the first creative act strictly so called, viz., that by which matter was called into being out of nothing; and consider the rest of the description as a series of creative acts operating on the material thus produced: whence the distinction of ‘*creatio prima*’ or ‘*immediata*,’ and ‘*creatio mediata*,’ one of some importance on the question of miraculous agency.

It is plain, that by ascribing the successive acts by which the world was prepared to be the abode of man, to the word of God, the writer implies that each was, in a true sense, an act of creation, that is, that they did not pass one into the other in the way of natural antecedent and consequent. Lifeless matter did not breathe into itself the principle of vegetable life, nor did vegetable life advance by any known law into animal, nor animal into rational; there was a chasm between each of these steps, which nature of itself could not bridge over. There must, no doubt, have been a groundwork in the earlier for the later manifestations of creative energy; a point of affinity with which the latter could connect themselves. Man, *e.g.*, was not created *per saltum*; there was a capacity in the irrational soul for the gift of reason. But the progression was not the less above nature; and each step involved a repetition of creative agency. Yet, since this agency made use of existing materials, and built upon them, it is distinguishable from the first Divine act of creation *ex nihilo*; whence its name of secondary, or mediate creation.*

Whether the world had a beginning or not, is a question which does not necessarily affect the idea of creation; for a world, the commencement of which we can assign to no point of time, may be as much dependent on the Creator as one to which we can assign such a point; hence it was held to be an open question. The controversy relates not to the secondary acts of creation, the works of the six days, for they are described as occurring *in* time, and therefore must have had a beginning, but to the primary creative act. When we attempt to conceive this either as having had a beginning or as having had none, we encounter metaphysical difficulties which Kant pronounces insoluble, and which really are so if we grant his premiss that time, in the proper sense of the word, can exist apart from the succession of events by which it is measured.† Augustine's formula seems nearest the truth: 'The

* Miraculous agency, *i.e.*, the agency of a personal God, is, as is well known, impugned in the theories of evolution and of the transmutation of species. But as they are at present but theories, which do not explain all the facts, they cannot be allowed to govern our belief.

† Kritik der R. V. Art i. If we suppose the first creative act to have had a beginning, we suppose time to have existed before the world; if we say it had no beginning, we suppose the world to have existed before time. The controversy evidently turns on the question whether time can be conceived apart from existing things; whether a 'vacant time' (*leere Zeit*), as Kant calls it, is properly time. In fact it is difficult even to understand how time could co-exist with the 'creatio prima' of 'simple substances' (Gen. i. 1); for by what succession of events was it, while 'the earth was without form and void,' measured? Yet we must believe it did, if we would escape still greater difficulties.

world was made not *in* time, but *with* time ;* *i. e.*, time was co-eval with creation, and though in *thought* we can extend it backwards beyond that point (as Scripture itself speaks of what occurred 'before the foundation of the world,' Ephes. i. 4), yet it is then no longer time *in fact*, and we plunge into the abyss of eternity. That the world had a beginning has, therefore, come to be the commonly received opinion. Another difficulty, of very ancient date, is stated in the question of Velleius, the Epicurean, in Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* l. i. c. 9: 'Why,' he asks, 'should artificers of the world have suddenly appeared? and why should they have slept for innumerable ages previously?' In other words, how can we conceive God's willing that the world should exist without His will immediately taking effect? Again, if He ever existed without the world, there was a time when He was not Creator; when He became so, did not this involve a change? to suppose which is not consistent with proper ideas of the perfection of the Divine nature. It was on this ground that Origen was led to argue against the world's having had a beginning; and so far as it was an idea in the Divine mind he was in the right; it must have been eternally present to the Divine intelligence. How this is to be reconciled with the apparent doctrine of Scripture, which is, that the actual world did not exist from eternity, but that time and it came into being together, is a question for metaphysicians to discuss, and is one which dogmatic theology has little to do with. Hence, though as a rule favouring the common opinion, theologians have never considered the other as inconsistent with Christian faith.†

The final end of creation can be no other than the glory of God and the communication of the highest good to the creature: things which in fact can never be separated. It would be improper, therefore, to say that God needed the world to complete His blessedness; *i. e.*, that He *must* have created it. He is in Himself all-sufficient and all-blessed. Nor is it less improper to maintain that God created any part of the universe, especially of the reasonable creation, to show forth His glory in its eternal ruin: a tenet incompatible with the fundamental ethical truth, that God is love.‡

* *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xi. c. 6. So Cic. *De N. D.* i. c. 9: 'Non enim si mundus nullus erat, secula non erant. Secula nunc dico *non ea*, quæ dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur. Nam fateor ea sine mundi conversatione effici non potuisse. Sed fuit quædam ab infinito tempore æternitas, quam nulla temporum circumscriptio metiebatur: spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intelligi non potest: quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset.'

† 'Mundum incepisse solâ fide tenetur; nec demonstrative hoc sciri potest; sed id credere maxime expedit' (*Thos. Aq.* pars i. q. 46, art. 2).

‡ 'Non pari conditione creatur omnes, sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna, præordinatur' (*Calvin, Inst.* lib. iii. 5).

§ 22. *Conservation.*

By the schoolmen conservation was identified with creation, being described as a *creatio continua*, or a series of successive acts of the same energy which called things into existence. And, no doubt, all the works of God are, as far as He is concerned, one. To us, however, there is a distinction between the maintenance of the existing frame of nature and its first production; and the idea can hardly be dispensed with in our conception of the Divine causality. It expresses the fact that the world, after its creation, does not continue to exist by any independent power of its own; and that if God's maintaining presence were withdrawn, it would relapse into pristine nothingness. Yet as things must be supposed to possess, by the gift of creation, inherent faculties and powers which naturally propagate themselves, the Divine agency in conservation is not exclusive, and God maintains the frame of nature by maintaining its faculties and powers. Thus certain plants were created with medicinal properties, which so far have an independent existence; but that they continue to exhibit these properties, and so minister to the art of the physician, is from God's sustaining power. How, then, does conservation differ from co-operation (*concursus*)? Not specifically, for both are modes of the Divine omnipresence;* but the former represents rather the passive, the latter rather the active, side thereof; the former is connected rather with the fundamental laws of nature (such as electricity, gravitation, generation, etc.), or with species as distinguished from individuals; the latter rather with the manifestations of those laws, or the actions of individuals. We apply, *e.g.*, the idea of conservation to the human race, the idea of co-operation to the conquests of an Alexander or a Napoleon; the former to the laws of storms, the latter to the particular tempest which destroyed the Spanish Armada. Yet it may be questioned whether the distinction can, philosophically, maintain its ground; whether it is not founded merely on the degree of prominence which the activity of secondary causes assumes in either case.

§ 23. *Providence.*

The Divine agency is here considered in relation not to efficient but to final causation. If God created the world for His own glory in the communication to it of the highest good, He must be conceived as providing for the attainment of the end, as well in the choice of means as in their combination; disposing and directing every event, even every purpose of free agents, towards

* See § 16.

the accomplishment of His designs. He is a *negotiosus Deus* who never lets the reins of government fall from His hands. The mode of speaking is, as usual, analogical. When we propose an end to ourselves we are compelled to select and make use of other agencies as means; but God needs not means to effect His purposes, and as regards Him the distinction vanishes: to Him everything is at once means and end. The doctrine of Providence is opposed, in the first place, to that of blind necessity (the *fatum* of the ancients), which leaves no room for an intelligent will in the order of nature, and confronts us at every step with the iron rule of inexorable law;* and, in the next place, to the doctrine of chance, which does not, indeed, deny efficient causation, but treats the belief of a controlling Providence, disposing all events to an intended issue, as a pious illusion. It places us in the hands of Him who has told us that not even a sparrow falls to the ground without His permission, that the very hairs of our head are numbered, and that all things work together for good to them that love Him (Matt. x. 29-30; Rom. viii. 28). With respect to the objects of Divine Providence, nothing is excepted from it, however insignificant it may appear to us: for, in the first place, to God nothing is either great or small, this relation existing only for finite intelligences—as in mathematics the smallest and the greatest quantity are equally nothing when compared with infinity; and, secondly, the (apparently) most trifling event may give rise to momentous and far-reaching consequences; as the noise of geese is said to have preserved Rome from destruction—and had Rome been destroyed, how different would the history of the world have been! The sentiment, therefore, ‘*Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt*,’ is as unphilosophical as it is irreligious. But though everything is an object of Providence, it does not follow that everything is equally so: hence the distinctions that have been drawn between general and special Providence, the former being concerned with nature as a whole, the latter with the Church.† And, no doubt, there must be some difference between the care which God has for all His creatures, in feeding the fowls of the air (Matt. vi. 26), in blessing the labours of the husbandman with rain and fruitful seasons (Acts xiv. 17), or in His providential government of the human race (Acts xvii. 26); and that which He exercises towards those whom He has chosen in Christ (Ephes. i. 4), redeemed with the precious blood of Christ (1 Peter i. 19), sanctified by His Spirit, and made

* ‘*Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans.*’

† A threefold division is often to be met with—‘*providentia generalis*,’ in reference to the irrational creation; ‘*specialis*,’ in reference to the rational, particularly man; and ‘*specialissima*,’ in reference to the Church.

heirs of eternal life. The distinctions, however, not unfrequently overlap each other : *e.g.* if the life and labours of S. Paul, after his conversion, were the subject of Providence in its most special sense, yet his mental endowments, his birth, his education, and other circumstances which fall under the head of general Providence, manifestly bore upon his special mission ; not to mention that if He was thus selected for a particular purpose, this again was for the sake of the heathen world which was his appointed field. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Divine Providence has ever had one grand aim, the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon earth under Christ ; and that all its subordinate agencies, whether in nature or in history, have been intended to promote that final result. This is the great lesson of sacred history, from the call of Abraham to the impending consummation, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ (Rev. xi. 15) : for this the world was created, has been preserved, and is controlled, in all its complicated movements, by the Providence of God.

There is, however, a distinction of real importance, as regards the manner in which Providence operates, that, viz., between ordinary and extraordinary, or those cases in which it works in the usual manner through secondary causes, and those in which it arrests attention by some unusual combination. The latter have received the name of special Providences. Events occur in history, or in the lives of individuals, of the greatest moment in their consequences, which have been brought about by a concurrence of circumstances so remarkable as to force upon us the idea of special Divine agency : the junction of the man and the hour has been marvellously effected ; lines of historical progression have intersected each other at the exact time and place when and where it was needful.* Yet a special Providence can hardly be called a miracle : partly because in order to recognise it a retrospect is necessary, whereas a miracle addresses the senses directly ; partly because there is here no interference with the established order of nature, the miraculous element lying in the combination, not in the nature of the events ; and partly because it is not a question of authenticating a mission to introduce a new religion, and this it is that furnishes the appropriate place for miracles properly so called. True miracles come under the head rather of Creation than of Providence ; which latter is associated in

* Who does not see that the success of the Reformation was promoted by many independent circumstances, all combining to one end—*e.g.* the revival of learning, the character of the Pope for the time being, the training and temperament of Luther, and the political state of Europe ?

our minds rather with the controlling and directing of the existing order of things, than with the originating of something new.*

A main difficulty remains—how to reconcile the doctrine of Providence, as explained above, with human freedom. If Providence were confined to mere foreknowledge,† the difficulty (though not by any means removed, for God's foreknowledge cannot be conceived without a result in act) would be mitigated; but if it involves, as it does, the idea of active government,‡ how can this co-exist with liberty of human action? That they must somehow co-exist, we know, on the testimony both of Scripture and of reason. We know that we are free to choose between contending motives, or, at any rate, actions; and Scripture proceeds upon this fact in its promises and threatenings, its examples of reward and punishment. Yet the same Scripture asserts, as plainly, the entire dependence of created beings upon God, without whose permission and direction nothing happens that does happen. Without human liberty there could be no virtue nor religion; without a recognition of Providence, no just views of the Divine nature. The philosophical difficulty lies in this: that owing to the connection of cause and effect every event, according as it happens or does not happen, carries with it an interminable train of consequences, the issue of which no one can foresee; the doctrine of free-will therefore seems to vest in man the power of permanently altering the course of nature; and if so, the designs of God would seem to be dependent upon human choice, or caprice.§ The complete solution of the problem is probably beyond the reach of our faculties: || meanwhile it may be observed that if anything could occur unexpectedly, so to speak, as regards God, He whose power and wisdom are infinite, can never be at a loss for means to counteract or divert its consequences. But this supposition is inadmissible; nothing can ever occur unexpectedly as regards God. We are brought back, then, to

* 'Providentia extraordinaria' is often described as 'miraculosa,' and applied directly to miracles; but, as it should seem, for the reasons in the text, improperly.

† See § 18.

‡ An act of providence is usually described as involving *πρόγνωσις*, foreknowledge; *πρόθεσις*, decree; and *διοίκησις*, execution. 'In providentia divina tria sunt considerata: scientia dirigens, voluntas imperans, et potentia exsequens' (Hug. de St. Victor, quoted by J. Gerh. loc. vii. c. 2).

§ It is however a pregnant hint of Turretine's: 'Fons erroris est libertatis naturam metiri ex *ισορόρσι*, et ei τὸ ἀμφιόρεπός essentialia facere: cum per lubentiam et spontaneitatem definienda sit' (Inst. Theol. lib. vi. 25).

|| 'Where does the difficulty in this case originate? Where is it situated? It originates in a province of thought wherein our notions confessedly are inadequate and imperfect; in an estimate of the Divine nature, and the infinite perfections of God' (Davison on Proph. dis. vii.). It should never be forgotten that in speaking of God's foreknowledge, or decrees, we anthropomorphise, and speak analogically.

the old solution, that when God determined to create free agents, He imposed upon Himself limitations in His dealings with or through them: He must, unless He was to annihilate the freedom which He had created, allow it its proper scope; He must permit voluntary causes to operate in their own way, as well as necessary ones in their way;* and the certainty of the event (which must be admitted) does not affect the nature of the causation which produces it, or transform freedom into necessity. Yet free as the causes may be, if God is omnipresent, not as a mere spectator, but as an efficient agent in every change that takes place (things being considered merely under the aspect of contingency, not of their moral quality; in what sense God co-operates with evil actions is a different question), He must be supposed as, in some way inscrutable to us, shaping the ultimate result. For freedom in the creature is not independence of God, who both created and upholds free agents not less than necessary, and apart from whom neither could exist for a moment. The difficulty of explaining how God, without interfering with free causation, yet makes it subservient to His purposes, meets us also on the subject of Divine grace: *trahit volentem*, but He gives the will to be drawn, as well as draws. In the one case as in the other, the concurrence of Divine agency with human freedom is a mystery which baffles comprehension. Attempts to evade it, by reducing Divine agency to mere foreknowledge,† only land us in other difficulties, and on more critical ground—the nature of the Divine perfections. The facts must be admitted, and the mystery acknowledged; and with this we must be content until an enlargement of our faculties enables us to see things in their unity, which at present exist side by side as independent truths.

* ‘Non tantum procurat (Providentia) ut res decreta fiat infallibiliter, sed etiam ut fiat eo modo quo decreta est, nimirum consentaneè naturæ ejusque, i.e., ut necessaria necessario, libera vero et contingentia libere et contingenter eveniant’ (Turretin, lib. vi. q. 6).

† ‘God leaves man free, and does not work directly and in the way of necessity upon the will; hence He only exercises foreknowledge, and no determination: *permissive*, not *effect-ive*’ (Ebrard, Dog. i. p. 386). But to work ‘directly’ is not identical with working ‘in the way of necessity’: God may work directly on free agents, and yet leave them free. A great thinker confesses his inability to solve the problem: ‘Si ad Dei naturam attendamus, clare et distincte perspicimus omnia ab ipso pendere, nihilque existere nisi quod ab æterno a Deo decretum est ut existat. Quomodo autem humana voluntas a Deo singulis momentis procreetur tali modo ut libera maneat, id ignoramus’ (Spinoza, Cog. Med. p. i. c. 3, s. 10). ‘Quod si quid in re obscurissimâ hæret scrupuli vel aliquid quod nostrum superet captum, meminisse decet vias Dei non esse sicut vias nostras, mirandas esse non temerè rimandas; et nobis hominibus sufficere debet τὸ ὄν, quod clarissime traditur in verbo, firmiter retinere, licet τὸ διότι vel τὸ πῶς nobis non detur plene nunc assequi’ (Turretine, lib. vi. q. 7).

§ 24. *Evil—especially Moral Evil.*

If a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness is the Creator of the world, the latter, it should seem, must be a perfect reflection of the Divine nature, *i.e.* it must contain no admixture of evil. And so, in fact, we are told that when God surveyed the work of His hands He pronounced everything to be ‘very good’ (Gen. i. 31). Yet the actual state of the world is quite the reverse: it abounds with evil moral and physical, so much so that it has been subject of debate, whether good or evil predominates in it. How are we to reconcile this fact with the infinite perfections of God? If it be said that creation, as it came from the hands of God, was perfect, but man, in the exercise of free-will, fell from his state of innocence, and with the fall sin and misery came into the world, it may be replied that God was under no necessity of creating the world, and if He foresaw (as He must have foreseen) that sin would find an entrance into it, why did He create it at all? or if He did choose to create it, why did He not adopt effectual safeguards against the intrusion of the foreign element? Questions which have never yet been satisfactorily answered.

The attempts that have been made in this direction may be reduced to two principal heads: those which affect our conception of God, and those which affect our estimate of the Christian redemption. Since in either point of view they seem inimical to religious faith, it is worth while to examine how far they rest on a solid foundation.

Where the proper notion of evil was retained, as something positively antagonistic to good, it was natural, especially in the absence of revelation, to have recourse to the hypothesis of two independent principles—one the Author of good, the other the author of evil—who, after contending in vain for the mastery, came to a tacit agreement to retire each to his own province, and partition between them the empire of the world. The Manichees in the third and fourth centuries, and the Paulicians in the seventh, were the chief representatives of this theory, which, however, dates from a remote antiquity, and, in fact, readily suggests itself to a mind which has never entertained, or has lost, correct notions of God.† A dualism of this kind leads to the hypothesis of a *limited* beneficent Deity, which, of course, is inconsistent with any form of Christian faith.

Those who recoil from it—some within and some without the

* See the imaginary dialogue between Melissus and Zoroaster in Bayle’s Dict. art. Manichees.

† See Plutarch’s confession of his own belief in his ‘Isis and Osiris,’ quoted by Bayle, Manichees.

pale of faith in revelation—have resorted to modes of explanation which virtually consist in denying that what we call sin is sin. Far from being an intrusive principle, foreign to the intended constitution of the world, and actively opposing itself to the Creator and His beneficent purposes, it is described as a necessary factor in the order of things, which without it would be less perfect, and indeed incapable of advancing to its appointed goal; like a sour sauce, it adds piquancy to the banquet, or like a passing discord, it not only is passing (*i.e.* has no substantial existence), but it enhances the perfection of the harmony. That this is not the idea of sin which Scripture conveys, is obvious; and not less obvious is it that the necessity and importance of the redemption which Scripture reveals are thereby disparaged; for why should man be redeemed from what is a necessary constituent in his moral progress, or an inseparable adjunct of his condition as man? It is by no means, however, so certain that the theories in question rest on a solid foundation.

One great writer, who has paid special attention to the subject, maintains that sin is a necessary consequence of the imperfection of the creature as compared with the Creator.* If the creature could be absolutely perfect, it would be as God Himself. God can bestow His gifts only in proportion to the capacity of the receiver; and even He could not create a finite being without the limitations and defects to which all such are subject. Hence the possibility of imperfection in knowledge, error in judgment, and perversion, or at least instability, in the will. It does not follow that these imperfections will acquire actual existence; but they were contained in the Divine understanding, the 'Region of eternal truths,' as possibilities; which Region of eternal truths may therefore be called the 'Ideal cause' of evil as well as of good, and is what the ancient philosophers had in their mind when they made matter as such the source of evil.† God therefore is the Author of sin in the same sense in which He is the

* 'Il faut considérer qu'il y a une imperfection originale dans la créature, avant le péché, parceque la créature est limitée essentiellement : d'où vient qu'elle ne sauroit tout savoir, et qu'elle se peut tromper, et faire d'autres fautes' (Leibnitz, 'Théodicée,' i. s. 20). 'Dieu est la cause de la perfection dans la nature et dans les actions de la créature, mais la limitation de la réceptivité de la créature est la cause des défauts qu'il y a dans son action' (*ibid.* s. 30). 'Dieu ne pourroit pas lui donner tout sans en faire un Dieu : il falloit donc qu'il y eût des différens degrés dans la perfection des choses, et qu'il y eût aussi des limitations de toute sorte' (*ibid.* s. 31).

† Théod. i. s. 20. It is difficult to see how Leibnitz's theory escapes making sin a necessary adjunct of human nature; but he seems to disavow the inference: 'Le mal métaphysique consiste dans la simple imperfection, le mal physique dans la souffrance, et le mal moral dans le péché. Or quoique le mal physique et le mal moral ne soient point nécessaire, il suffit qu'en vertu des vérités éternelles ils soient possibles' (i. s. 21).

Author of His own understanding ; *i.e.*, He is not the Author of it at all. But further, the source of sin being the imperfection of the creature, it is in its nature nothing positive, but merely a privation, as cold is the absence of heat, darkness the absence of light, or as the *vis inertiae* of bodies retards their velocity.* It is a nothing apart from the substance or quality which forms its opposite pole : it has no independent existence, but cleaves, like a parasite, to what is good ; as such, therefore, it needs no efficient but only a 'deficient' cause, *i.e.* abstinence from perpetual miracles to counteract its natural tendency—which is exactly God's attitude with respect to evil. If the question be asked, Why should God have created a world with such beings in it, in their own nature limited and imperfect ? the answer is, that an infinite number of possible worlds having presented itself to the Divine mind, God was bound by a moral necessity to choose that one which, on the whole, should contain the greatest amount of good ; and that one is our present world, notwithstanding its admixture of imperfection.†

The weak point in this theory does not lie in its Theodicy properly so called, for every Theodicy must aim at the same conclusion, *viz.*, that the world would be less perfect without evil than with it, but in its views of the nature of moral evil, or sin. If the source of sin is the inherent imperfection of the creature as such, then the highest archangel is not free from it, being a creature ; nor can sin ever be wholly extirpated from the Kingdom of God : whatever change may await the redeemed hereafter, they must still be creatures, and Leibnitz's reasoning will apply to

* This is a favourite illustration with Leibnitz. 'Suppose,' he says, 'two barges on the same river, but one more heavily laden than the other : this one will proceed the more slowly, not because the current is less strong, but because the *vis inertiae* of the heavier load opposes a greater resistance to it. The force of the current may be compared with the action of God on the creature ; the *vis inertiae* with the natural imperfection of the creature ; the slowness of the barge with the defects which meet the eye in the action of the creature. The current is the cause of the movement, but not of the retardation ; and so God is the cause of perfection in the creature, but the limited receptivity of the creature is the cause of its deficiencies. God is as little the cause of sin, as the current is the cause of the retardation' (Theod. i. s. 30).

† See the remarkable allegory at the end of part ii. of the 'Théodicée.' Leibnitz's reasoning on this point does not seem conclusive. His task is to prove that the existence of evil is a *sine quâ non* of the greatest amount of good ; but the proof seems to consist in the assertion that because God permitted evil, the world must be the best possible ; which is the very thing to be proved. 'Il est permis de dire que Dieu peut faire que la vertu soit dans le monde sans aucun mélange du vice, et même qu'il le peut faire aisément. Mais puisqu'il a permis le vice, il faut que l'ordre de l'univers trouvé préférable a tout autre plan l'ait demandé. Il faut juger qu'il n'est pas permis de faire autrement, puisqu'il n'est pas possible de faire mieux' (Théod. ii. s. 124).

them.* But especially, the notion of sin's being a mere privation is opposed both to Scripture and experience. Scripture speaks of sin not merely as an impediment to the Christian's progress, but as a principle of hostility against God (Rom. viii. 7): Christ and Satan, the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, are engaged in irreconcilable conflict, which can only end in the destruction of the latter (Matt. xii. 26, 27; Ephes. vi. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 25). And such, in fact, does sin show itself when the restraints of law or of society are removed, and it has free scope to display its nature. The tragic page of history, individual and national, conveys far less frequently the idea of misfortune to be lamented than of wickedness to be hated and punished; and the state, as a Divine ordinance, is compelled to deal with crime under this aspect (Rom. xiii. 4). The theory, in fact, confounds metaphysical with ethical good and evil.† Metaphysical good consists in the perfection of a thing as a mere production, so that no essential constituent is wanting to it; and hence it may be predicated of the inanimate and the irrational creation, to which the idea of moral goodness is inapplicable, or applicable only in a very inferior degree. Moral goodness implies reason and free-will, and consists in their right direction—moral evil in the reverse. According to the 'Théodicée,' the difference is one of quantity, not of quality: evil is the less, good the more, perfect metaphysically: a view with which the fact that the greatest wickedness is often found combined with the greatest energy of will is irreconcilable. It is here overlooked that privation, in a moral sense, involves or presupposes a positive perversion of will: man fails of reaching the standard set before him because he does not will to reach it: his failure is criminal, and is treated as such in Scripture. This celebrated essay, then, notwithstanding the just reputation which it enjoys, solves the problem by essentially altering one of its conditions, *i.e.*, it fails to solve it.‡

Another explanation is that the animal nature of man, as

* Hence his well-known description of the creature as an 'asymptote' of Deity. See 'Müller, Lehre der Sünde,' b. ii. c. 1.

† J. Müller, 'Lehre der Sünde,' b. ii. c. 1.

‡ The rudiment of the theory that sin is a mere privation, a nothing in short, appears in Augustine, *e.g.*, De Civ. Dei, lib. xii. c. 7: 'Nemo querat efficientem causam malæ voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens: quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire tale est ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire silentium: quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est; neque illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi per aures, non sane in specie sed in speciei privatione.' From Augustine it passed into the systems of the great Roman Catholic theologians. See Belarm. De Stat. Pec. l. ii. c. 18.

contrasted with his higher one, is the source of sin. Man is connected with the outer world by means of the senses, which not only convey impressions, but are the avenues through which, as in the case of our first parents, temptations find an entrance to the soul. 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit' (Gal. v. 17), and since in infancy and childhood the animal nature gets the start of the spiritual, the latter is placed at a disadvantage, its orderly development is checked, it advances by fits and starts, experiences frequent reverses, and sometimes never gains the ascendancy; and the result is—sin.* The *possibility* of sin is here sufficiently accounted for, but as an explanation of its *origin* the theory is a failure. The animal nature itself cannot be sinful, otherwise sin might be predicated of the brute creation; and moreover such a doctrine tends directly to Manicheism. How comes it, too, that the superior factor in human nature should, as experience shows, be so universally and permanently overcome by the inferior? Whence the feeling of *guilt*, if after all not the man, not his true self, *i.e.* his 'spirit,' but something which is not so, is the source of sin? Are there not special sins of the spirit which have no apparent connection with the flesh, such as those mentioned in Gal. v. 20? In Scripture the Pharisees, to whose charge sins of the flesh are not laid, are described as farther from the Kingdom of Heaven than the publicans and harlots. Above all, our Lord Himself cannot, on this hypothesis, be pronounced free from sin; for the Eternal Son in becoming flesh became subject to temptation as we are (Heb. iv. 15), and experienced the shrinking of nature from suffering (Matt. xxvi. 39; Heb. v. 7), or, in other words, its resistance to the higher law of the spirit; if, notwithstanding this, He was 'without sin' (Heb. iv. 15), the seat of the latter cannot be merely in the animal part of man. We have still then to ask, What is the intermediate factor between the flesh and the spirit, *i.e.* the lower and the higher parts of man's nature, whereby the latter is compelled to abdicate its natural supremacy, and make itself the servant of the former? (Rom. vi. 17). In this factor lies the true source of sin. But the theory in question supplies no answer. It is to be remarked, too, that it leaves the fall of the angels, purely spiritual beings, quite unaccounted for.†

But admitting that sin is more than a mere privation, or a necessary consequence of an animal nature—that, in fact, it is

* Schleiermacher, 'Glaubenslehre,' ss. 66–7.

† That the word *σάρξ*, so common in S. Paul's Epistles, means much more than the mere natural affections and impulses of which the body is the organ, is abundantly proved by J. Müller, *Lehre*, etc., b. ii. c. 2. See also Tholuck on Rom. i. 3; Harless on Ephes. ii. 3; Neander, *Geschichte der Pflanzung*, etc., p. 572, 3rd edit.

nothing less than a principle of active opposition to the law of God—do we not see that opposition and contrast pervade the whole of human life, and are the indispensable conditions of improvement, whether in the individual or the community? Action and re-action is a law of matter; in the human body every muscle has its antagonist; light and darkness are correlatives; every resultant is composed of diverging forces. In the domain of art, a picture without shadows would be without lights, and a piece of music without occasional discords would sound flat and insipid. What health means is known by sickness, and rest presupposes labour. In communities, especially free ones, opposite tendencies, opposite parties, supplementing and correcting each other, are the very materials of national progress; and the foremost of civilised nations have only won their position through protracted, and sometimes sanguinary, struggles. Thus the clashing of opposite elements is everywhere the condition of a higher unity; and why should we be surprised if we find the same law prevailing in the spiritual progress of the race? To be known as such, goodness must have its contrast and foil in evil, which therefore has a necessary, though transient, existence; and moreover, when felt, acts as a stimulus to improvement. Such is another rationale of evil, which can number among its supporters names of great authority.*

That it is inconsistent with the teaching of Scripture needs hardly to be observed, particularly with the doctrines of the sinlessness of Christ and the future sinlessness of His Church: for according to it, moral perfection is only attainable through the knowledge and antagonism of sin. But, in fact, it rests upon erroneous premises. It is assumed that goodness, apart from its foil of evil, is a mere passive quality, without activity or progress; than which nothing can be further from the truth. The Source of all goodness is perpetually active (John v. 17); it was our Lord's meat and drink to do the will of Him that sent Him; the introduction of Christianity into the world is compared to leaven which never ceases to work until it has permeated the mass (Matt. xiii. 33). Goodness has its spring of energy within itself, and needs no foreign force to impel it on its path. Besides this, so far from being a necessary condition of moral or spiritual

* This theory reaches its culminating point in Hegel and his school. Scripture tells us that man was created in the image of God (Gen. i. 27), but the philosopher's doctrine is that 'Man must eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, otherwise he is not a man, but a beast' (Hegel, quoted by Müller, *Lehre*, etc., b. ii. c. 4); on which Martensen pertinently remarks that Hegel's paradise is a 'zoological garden' (Dog. s. 82). Novalis describes sin as the poignant relish which makes religion palatable (*ibid.* s. 85).

progress, evil impedes, corrupts, perverts, every step of advance towards that perfection. In the individual, sin wars against the better law of his mind;* in the community it is an active principle of disintegration and ruin. Avowed enmity, not friendly co-operation, is its real character. It is true that the higher we ascend in the scale of organisation the greater the number and variety of constituent elements which, in a certain sense, present contrasts; as in man, the summit of terrestrial creation, body and soul, sensation and reflection, understanding, affections, will: but, according to the ordinance of God, these diverse faculties are intended not to counteract but to aid and supplement each other, so that no jarring discords shall mar the result. It is the same in communities; the beneficial effect of different ranks, pursuits, and opposite parties, depends on the degree in which all are actuated with a zeal for the common welfare, and are prepared to unite if it be endangered. So too in the Church: there are 'diversities of gifts,' and 'differences of administrations,' but they all proceed from the same Spirit, and all tend to the edification of the body (1 Cor. xii.). No such tendency can be perceived in sin; it is an enemy to be expelled, not an ally to be admitted. According to this theory, the first man could not have had a sinless development, or arrived at the knowledge of good and evil by a decision in favour of obedience; to emerge from an immature state of innocence he needed a fall; which is a gratuitous assumption. Man may have needed to be *tempted* in order to spiritual progress, but had he, like the second Adam, withstood the temptation, he would, in a manner analogous to that in which God does,† have arrived at the knowledge of good and evil; he would have attained it in the right way, whereas he took the wrong one.

It appears then that, for all the light that philosophical theories have thrown upon the matter, the origin of evil is as much a mystery as ever. Nor does Scripture profess to explain it. It assumes the fact; it describes sin as positive depravity; and it tells us how it found an entrance into *this* our world; but how angelic beings came to fall it leaves in darkness. That philosophy has not superseded the Scriptural statements on the nature of sin, and therefore the need of a Redeemer is evident; and this is all that we are concerned with. We can perceive, however, that the gift of free-will, and therefore the *possibility* of sin,

* 'Sed trahit invitum nova vis, aliudque cupido Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor.'

† 'The Lord God said, Behold the man is become like one of us, to know good and evil' (Gen. iii. 22). In whatever way God possesses this knowledge, it cannot be through the intermediate step of sin.

is the condition of some advantages which, apparently, could not otherwise have been secured. If there had been no free-will, there would have been no sin; but, on the other hand, no moral virtue, no superiority to the brute creation. The prerogative was a perilous one, and must be accepted with its hazards. Nor should we forget that though God is not the Author of evil, He can make it the occasion of far greater good. Thus the crime of Joseph's brethren was overruled to the preservation of the chosen family from whom Christ was to come (Gen. xlv. 5); and thus Adam's fall itself was the occasion of a greater restoration.*

This last remark leads us to consider the relation in which evil actions stand to the Divine causality, which, as we know, embraces all things, or at least is never wholly inactive in respect of them. God cannot be the author of a sinful action; and yet nothing can be conceived of as wholly independent of God—this is the difficulty. The scholastic distinction is *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malæ*; i.e., the Divine co-operation is confined to what in an action cannot be called evil, viz. the natural powers and faculties of the agent, and does not extend to the perversion of those powers, which is solely owing to a corrupt will.† In fact, if God were to withdraw His sustaining power for a moment, the whole frame of creation, including evil men, would collapse; to this extent, then, He must be considered as co-operating with such men, but only in the sense in which He co-operates with the motion of the planets. Hence the importance of the distinction between creation and conservation. Had God *created* man with a taint of sin, it would have been impossible to disconnect sin from the Divine causality; not so if He merely does not, because some reasonable beings in the universe misuse their faculties, withdraw the sustaining power by which all things consist (Heb. i. 3): in such a case, the misuse may, and in fact does, proceed not from God but from themselves. This distinction sometimes appears under another form, viz., that God neither wills nor produces sinful acts, but only permits them.‡ But how can God permit what He abhors, when He has

* 'O felix culpa, quæ talem et tantum meruit habere redemptorem!'

† 'Concurrit in malis actionibus divina providentia naturam sustentando, in ipso enim movemur' (Act xvii. 28). 'Est autem stupenda Dei longanimitas, quod sustentat membra, conservat vires ac motus in illis etiam actionibus, in quibus summa afficitur contumelia' (J. Gerh. loc. viii. s. 87). 'Cum actus quæ talis semper bonus sit quoad entitatem suam, Deus ad illum concurrit *effective* et *physice*, non modo naturam conservando sed motus etiam ejus et actiones ciendo motione physicâ, utpote quæ sunt bona naturalia, quo sensu dicimur in Deo vivere, moveri, et esse' (Turretine, lib. vi. q. 7). Compare Chemnitz Examen. p. i. lib. 7, s. 1.

‡ 'Augustinus pie et modeste loquitur, talia fieri Deo sinente, permittente, sive deserente' (Chemnitz, Ex. p. i. lib. 7, s. 1).

power to prevent it? The answer is that the Divine permission applies not to the sin directly, but to the free agency from which it proceeds. It pleased Him to create beings who possess an independent spring of action within themselves, who can originate and carry on a moral development in the direction either of good or evil. By so doing He has limited, not under necessity, but freely, the exercise of His omnipotent power, and acts accordingly even when evil rather than good is chosen by the creature. He permits the continued existence of free agency, with the full foreknowledge of the possibility, and even of the fact, of its choosing the wrong; and He does this because, though He hates the sin, He could not forcibly prevent it without destroying that in which Personality, *i.e.* a capacity for re-union with Himself, consists. It is thus that the language of the Old Testament is to be understood in passages which seem to refer evil directly to God. God is said to have 'raised up'* Pharaoh to show in Him His power (Ex. ix. 16), because, Pharaoh's will being already perverse, God did not interfere with its exercise, and could not have done so without destroying Pharaoh's responsibility. He is said to have 'hardened' the heart of Pharaoh, or of the children of Israel (Ex. vii. 13; Is. lxiii. 17); because having hardened their own hearts they were not forcibly restrained from the choice they had made, and because the commandment which came to them, in itself 'holy, just, and good,' became the innocent occasion of increasing their rebellion and their guilt.† Yet, in thus permitting the free-will of man to work out its own results, God is by no means an indifferent spectator of the process. For not only does the Divine law from without, and the voice of conscience from within, testify against the sinner, but the sin itself, once committed, does not escape from the control of Divine providence. God can place limits to its natural tendency; He can check one sin by another; He can make the sinful agent a means of executing His righteous judgments (Is. x. 7); and we may rest assured He will overrule it to promote the interests of His kingdom. The greatest of sins was thus made the means of conveying the greatest of blessings to mankind (Acts ii. 23).

But besides moral evil, or sin, the world abounds with suffering, mental and bodily; and this too seems inconsistent with its having proceeded from a Creator of infinite goodness. The difficulty here, however, is less than in the former case, for, the fact of sin once admitted, suffering is only its natural consequence

* Rather, 'I have made thee stand' (see marginal rendering), *i.e.*, 'I have preserved thee in life.'

† See Rom. vii. and its description of the natural effect of the law. 'To the one we are the savour of death unto death; to the other the savour of life unto life' (2 Cor. ii. 16).

under the government of a righteous Creator, and indeed can, in most instances, be directly traced to it; the amount of suffering which we could not avoid being insignificant as compared with that of which our own sins, or those of others, are the direct cause. 'By one man sin entered into the world, and death' (the comprehensive term for all kinds of woe) 'by sin' (Rom. v. 12); it could not be otherwise, consistently with the moral order of the universe. God permits this order to be violated by free agents, but He does not permit the transgression to pass unvisited: there is a recoil of the eternal law upon the sinner, which, as far as is possible, annihilates his sin, and restores the supremacy of right. This is the true idea of punishment, natural or positive—a point forgotten by those who limit its object merely to be a warning to transgressors, or to improve them. The extreme penalty of the law is an instance in point; there is here no question of improvement; a crime has been committed which, if the community is to be purged from the taint of complicity, must be expiated by death.* And since the State no less than the Church is God's ordinance (Rom. xiii.), and a revelation of His will, there is here a clear manifestation of His displeasure against sin. It is quite another aspect of suffering when we view it as *chastisement*, intended to promote the good of the sufferers (Heb. xii.), and meted out by infinite wisdom; here it is no longer punishment, *i.e.* retribution, but fatherly discipline. To be subjected to this discipline is the privilege of the Church; and her light affliction, which is but for a moment, is working for her a far more exceeding weight of glory (2 Cor. iv. 17), to be manifested on that day when suffering, as well as its parent, sin, shall for ever disappear from the kingdom of God (Rev. xxi. 4).

PART II.—THE HOLY TRINITY.

§ 25. *One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.*

The attributes and works of God, as we have seen, present to us the one Divine agency under various aspects and in different relations; and thus far Christian Theism coincides with that of other monotheistic religions, at any rate with the Jewish, which

* The term 'expiation' expresses this particular aspect of punishment; and the fact of it should be borne in mind by those states which, in modern times, have been led from false humanitarian tendencies, to abolish capital punishment, formally or practically. 'He that is dead is freed from sin' (Rom. vi. 6); *i.e.*, he has expiated it, and, as far as he can, repaired the breach.

leaves nothing to be supplied as regards the purity and loftiness of its conceptions of the Divine being. Does the later revelation add anything to our knowledge of the nature of God? The answer to the question is contained in the Confession* of the Catholic Church at all times and in all places, that 'in the Unity of the Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost;' in other words, that in the one Godhead there are three, and no more, Subjects of whom Divine attributes are predicated, and to whom Divine works are ascribed.

The usual arrangement, which our Article follows, of placing the doctrine of the Trinity under the general head of Theism is open to objection. For the interest which the Christian feels in this doctrine is of a practical rather than of a speculative character; that is to say, he is not so much concerned with the fact that in the Godhead there is a Trinity of Persons, as with the offices which the three Persons discharge in the work of redemption. The inner constitution of the Divine nature may be, and must be if Scripture reveals it, a subject of hallowed contemplation; but if it terminates in itself as a question of philosophy, or even if it occupies the foreground in our discussions, to the forgetfulness of its practical import in the Divine plan of salvation, it proportionably loses its Christian character. The immediate object of the Christian's faith is not the ontological Trinity, or the relations of the first, second, and third Persons to each other, but the Trinity of redemption, the Father who created, the Son who redeemed, and the Holy Ghost who sanctifies us. It is a disadvantage then to approach the subject, in the first instance, from the ontological side, or to introduce the terms of the Athanasian Creed before showing the practical foundation on which they rest; which, however, is a very common method of proceeding.† It is hardly necessary to observe, that it is not the method of Scripture. The New Testament, as we shall see, is not silent on this mysterious topic, but the hints which it furnishes are comparatively few and obscure, and the prominent aspect is ever the love of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, in devising, accomplishing, and applying

* Either implicitly, before the Council of Nice, or explicitly, since the promulgation of the Nicene, or rather the Constantinopolitan, Creed.

† Thus J. Gerhard, after remarking very properly that the doctrine of the Trinity is one which could never have been discovered, and cannot be proved *à priori*, or on grounds of natural reason, first discusses the meaning of the words *οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ὑπαρξίς*, 'Trinitas, Persona,' etc.; and then proceeds to prove the Deity of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost (tom. ii. loc. iii. s. 23). So Hollaz, Examen, p. i. c. 2. Even Calvin, usually so practical, adopts this method (Inst. l. i. c. 13).

the means of our restoration from the effects of the fall. In following this method it is difficult not to anticipate, to some extent, what properly belongs to other topics, viz., the Person of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit; but we thus avoid the abrupt introduction of formulas and modes of expression which cannot be understood except in connection with the history of the Trinitarian controversy.

The central figure of the New Testament is Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin, crucified under Pontius Pilate. He announces Himself not merely as a teacher sent from God, approved by miracles which no one, unless in intimate connection with God, could perform (John iii. 2), but, as His name imports, the anointed Saviour, foretold by the prophets, and now appearing in the fulness of time (Luke xxiv. 27); as come to seek and to save the lost (Matt. xviii. 11); as having power on earth to forgive sins (Matt. ix. 6); as hearing and granting prayer (John xiv. 13); as the bread of God which gives life unto the world (John vi. 33); as the resurrection and the life (John xi. 25); and as the future Judge of quick and dead (Matt. xxv. 31). Unless Jesus was either a deceiver or self-deceived in appropriating to Himself such exalted functions, which not even the greatest of the prophets of the Old Testament venture to do, we must at least, with Arius, grant Him a rank in the scale of existence second only to that of the supreme Deity; He must be, if not eternal and self-existent (*ἦν πῶτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*), a kind of *δεύτερος θεός*, or the highest of created beings. But Scripture goes beyond this, and uses language which cannot be understood otherwise than as asserting His absolute Godhead. Let us take, for example, the title 'Son of God,' which, though not the one chosen by Himself to designate His person,* is of frequent use, and is never disclaimed by Him as unsuitable or improper (Mark i. 1; Luke viii. 28; Rom. v. 10; and above all, John vi. 69). In what sense is it used? There is no doubt that in Scripture the title is of wide application. Israel collectively, or as a nation, is called the son of God (Ex. iv. 22; Hosea xi. 1); Christians are sons of God (Rom. viii. 14); all men are so in a certain sense (Acts xvii. 29). It may mean, also, merely *ethical* resemblance to God (Matt. v. 45). But in some of the passages alluded to the connection in which it occurs leaves no doubt as to its meaning. On two occasions (John v. 18; x. 33) the Jews sought to put Jesus to death because they understood Him, in saying that God is His Father,

* The 'Son of Man' is the title which our Lord usually applies to Himself; partly in a Messianic sense (Dan. vii. 13), and partly to indicate that He is the second Adam—the head of the spiritual—as the first Adam was of the natural, creation.

to assert His equality with God; and this in their eyes was blasphemy. If they misunderstood Him, why did He not remove the impression by disavowing the imputation? Still more to the point, when the High Priest adjured Him in the most solemn manner to declare whether He were the Son of God, He replied in the affirmative (Matt. xxvi. 63); and in what sense the question was put is plain from the exclamation of the proposer, 'He hath spoken blasphemy' (verse 65).^{*} Nor must the distinguishing epithet, 'only begotten' (*μονογενής*) be overlooked which S. John (i. 18) introduces in connection with the title, and which, without entering at present further into its meaning, is evidently intended to establish an essential difference between the Sonship of Jesus and that of any other being. But passages are not wanting in which He is directly spoken of as God. As for instance, the exclamation of Thomas, when convinced of His resurrection, 'My Lord and my God' (John xx. 28), which elicits no reproof from the risen Saviour; S. Paul's statements that His second coming will be that of 'our great God and Saviour' (Titus ii. 13),[†] that 'in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily' (Col. ii. 9), that He 'is over all, God blessed for ever' (Rom. ix. 5); and S. John's, that He is 'the true God and eternal life' (1 John v. 20). To which we may add that worship is represented as offered to Him (Rev. v. 12), and that by Jews to whom 'the gods many and lords many' of heathenism were an abomination.

But the title 'Son of God,' which, taken in connection with other statements of Scripture, establishes the Deity of the man Christ Jesus, involves another conception of God, viz., as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; which, accordingly, repeatedly occurs in Scripture, and nowhere more emphatically than in our Lord's own discourses (see John xvii. ; 2 Cor. i. 3 ; Ephes. iii. 14). The Deity and Personality of the Father are not matter of dispute; but His distinction from the Son is equally marked. The Father did not come into the world, but sent His Son to redeem it (John iii. 16 ; Gal. iv. 4, 5): nor does Christ say that He is the same, but that He is one with the Father; that He is in the

^{*} It might be supposed that in the question, 'Art thou the Christ, the Son of God?' the latter title is employed as explanatory of the former; and it would not have been deemed blasphemy for anyone to claim to be the Messiah, however unfounded the claim might be. But there is no evidence that the title Son of God was at that time in use among the Jews as belonging to the Messiah. Their notions of the Christ were very different. See Olshausen *ib.*

[†] The force of this passage is somewhat obscured in our translation. The absence of the article before *σωτήρ* connects it with *Θεῶν*, as belonging to one and the same subject, *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

Father and the Father in Him (John x. 30 ; xiv. 11) ; that He works as the Father works (John v. 17) ; and that He came not to do His own will, but the will of the Father which sent Him (*ibid.* 30). The Father is said to love the Son (John iii. 35), and to bear witness to the Son (John v. 37) ; and on two solemn occasions this witness is recorded when a voice from heaven was heard saying, 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased ; hear ye Him' (Matt. iii. 17 ; xvii. 5). The language employed suggests an analogy to the human relation, and it is plain that the titles cannot be indiscriminately applied to the same Subject ; that is, that the Father cannot directly be said to be the Son, nor the Son the Father.

But before His departure from the world the Saviour promised His disciples that He would pray the Father to send them another 'Comforter,' or Advocate, to take His place (John xiv. 16), and again that He Himself would send this Comforter (*ibid.* xvi. 7), whom He calls the 'Spirit of Truth,' and the Holy Ghost. We learn that shortly after His Ascension this promise was fulfilled, and thenceforward the Holy Ghost appears so prominently as the Divine Administrator of the Church that the Gospel dispensation is fitly described as the 'ministration of the Spirit' (2 Cor. iii. 8). The Holy Ghost is spoken of in terms which imply a Divine nature. He is said to 'search the deep things of God,' which reason tells us no created being can do (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11) ; spiritual blessings are invoked from Him conjointly with the Father and the Son (2 Cor. xiii. 14) ; to Him, and also to God, spiritual operations such as the New Birth (John iii. 5), the dispensing of gifts (1 Cor. xii. 11), the inspiring of prophets (1 Pet. i. 11), are ascribed.* And lest we should suppose that nothing more is meant than an emanation, or influence, from God, He is invested, equally with the Father and the Son, with a personal character: the Holy Ghost teaches (John xiv. 26) ; appoints ministers (Acts xiii. 2) ; sends an apostle on a mission (Acts x. 19) ; bestows gifts as He wills (1 Cor. xii. 11) ; can be 'grieved' (Ephes. iv. 30) ; makes intercession for the saints (Rom. viii. 26). And He must be distinguished from the Father and the Son in

* 'That which is born of the Spirit is spirit' (John iii. 6). 'Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin' (1 John iii. 9).

'To another faith by the same Spirit ; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit ; to another the working of miracles ; to another prophecy,' etc. (1 Cor. xii. 9, 10) . . . 'And God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings,' etc. (*ibid.* 28).

'What manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify' (1 Peter i. 11). 'God, who spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets' (Heb. i. 1).

the same way and to the same extent as they are distinguished from each other. He who is sent by the Father and the Son cannot be either of them *as such*; if He receives of Christ (John xvi. 14) He cannot, *so far*, be Christ; if He descended upon the Saviour at His baptism, while a voice from heaven proclaimed, 'This is My beloved Son' (therefore the Father's voice), His could not be the voice.

Finally, in appointing the initiatory rite of the Christian Church, our Lord formally associates the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as the sacred Name into which converts are to be baptized (Matt. xxviii. 19).*

The above statement, which contains little more than an enumeration and collation of passages of the New Testament, presents to us the *facts* on which we are to reason; and the problem is, as in the analogous case of natural philosophy, to frame an hypothesis which, though it may not be without difficulties, shall best comprise the whole of the facts, without omission or distortion.† Our starting-point is the fundamental truth of revealed religion, viz., the unity of the Godhead, which is as strongly implied in the New Testament as it was expressed in the Old (Mark xii. 29; 1 Cor. viii. 4; 1 Tim. ii. 5). Where the Father is, there is the Son, and there is the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost, *e.g.*, was promised to abide with Christ's disciples, but immediately afterwards it is the Father and the Son in reference to whom the same promise is made (John xiv. 23); and so S. Paul prays that 'Christ may dwell' in the Christian's heart by faith (Ephes. iii. 17), which heart is also described as the habitation of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. iii. 16). Yet, unless the language of Scripture was framed to mislead, in the unity of the Godhead there are three Divine Subjects, or what, for want of a better term, we call Persons, to whom distinct offices in the work of redemption are assigned: to the Father election (Ephes. i. 4), to the Son atonement (*ibid.* 7), and to the Holy Ghost sanctification (2 Thess. ii. 13). And under this, its practical aspect, the doctrine reposes in many minds, which accept it, as thus stated, without difficulty, and are only conscious, in a general

* 'According to Apostolic teaching, baptism into the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, cannot be considered as having reference to the peculiar *doctrines* of Christianity: the catechumen is said to be baptized into that *fellowship* with God which is a fellowship with the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost' (Nitzsch. System, s. 81).

† 'The Scriptural expressions are examined, they are considered as so many facts or phenomena, which must be consistent, in some way or other, though we know not how. What can be done? What does the best and calmest reason dictate to be done in such a case, but that we should endeavour to *class* these facts or phenomena, and then ask whether there is not some *supposition* on which they might all be accounted for' (Hey's Lectures, art. i.).

way, of a threefold causality in the work of salvation, which commends itself to the felt necessities of the Christian life.

To what extent the doctrine of the Holy Trinity formed part of the Jewish revelation is to Christians rather a matter of interest than importance. It could not be expected that as long as redemption itself was subject of prophecy or type, and not a fact, a doctrine so intimately connected with it should have been revealed as it is under the Christian dispensation: the revelation of the Godhead naturally kept pace with the unfolding of His purposes towards fallen man. The facts may be thus summed up: there are preparations in the Old Testament for the doctrine, but no explicit statement of it. If we cannot argue from the plural *Elohim*,* nor from the Theophanies of the Old Testament, no more can the fact be overlooked that this *Elohim*, the abstract Deity whom the heathen ignorantly worshipped (Acts xvii. 23), manifests Himself in Israel under the name *Jehovah*, the God of history and revelation, entering into mundane relations with the chosen people. That the 'Angel of the Lord,' of whom mention is so often made in the earlier Books of Moses, was no created being appears from his being identified with *Jehovah* Himself;† and yet a distinction is made between *Jehovah* and the angel; the angel is sent by *Jehovah*, though Himself bearing the sacred name, *i.e.*, being partaker of the Divine nature (Exod. xxiii. 20, 21). Moses cannot see God as He is in Himself, but a shaded ray of the Divine Glory passes before him (Exod. xxxiii. 22).‡ In the prophets, especially *Isaiah*, another phase appears: 'The Spirit of the Lord' confers on the prophet his mission (Is. xlviii. 16); is to abide in all His fulness on the predicted Branch of *David* (Is. xi. 1, 2); and to display Himself, at a future time, in a manifold variety of gifts (Is. xlv. 3; Joel ii. 28). In the Book of Proverbs the 'Wisdom of God' assumes a hypostatical character: it was 'set up' (anointed) 'from everlasting, or ever the earth was;' 'brought forth when there were no depths;' was with God 'daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him,' yet also 'rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth, with the sons of men' (Prov. viii. 23-31).§ With the light of the New Testament reflected on them, these notices of the Old seem to acquire significance, and stand in the same relation to the later revelation

* See Gesenius, *Lex.* s. v.

† See Gen. xvi. 7, compared with verse 13; xii. 11, compared with verses 12 and 16; Exod. iii. 2, compared with verse 4.

‡ Compare John i. 18: 'No man hath seen God at any time, the only-begotten Son . . . hath declared Him.'

§ The uninspired Jewish writers developed the personification still further. See *Ecclus.* i. and xxxv.

as the Law itself did to the Gospel—as a prefigurement and anticipation; but more than this can hardly be found in them.

§ 26. *The Immanent Trinity.*

The two principal heresies on the subject of the Holy Trinity were Sabellianism and Arianism, for information on which the reader is referred to the works which treat of the history of dogma.* Sabellius, a presbyter of Ptolemais in the middle of the third century, in order to avoid the semblance of Tritheism in the doctrine of the Church, taught that in the Godhead itself there is no distinction of Persons, but that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only different manifestations of the One Supreme Deity, who assumed these names and corresponding functions for the purposes of redemption only (*πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστοτε χρείας*), revealing Himself under a different character (*Persona*) as occasion required.† Arianism, on the contrary, so strongly distinguished the Persons as to ‘divide the substance,’ subordinating the Son to the Father as the creature to the Creator, and the Holy Ghost to the Son. Both, it will be seen, tended ultimately to the same result, viz., such a unity of the Divine Being as excluded any essential and eternal distinction of the Persons; but in Sabellianism this was attained by making the Persons merely dramatic parts which could be put on and off, in Arianism by robbing the Second and Third Persons of the proper attributes of Deity.

The Arian heresy, after a long struggle, was expelled from the Church, and under the name of Unitarianism exists only in bodies external to it. It laboured, from the first, under the twofold absurdity of introducing a species of being intermediate between the Creator and the creature, and of teaching the union of two created beings in the one Person of Christ. But Sabellian tendencies, under various names, such as Modalism, etc., occasionally reappear within the sacred precincts; and indeed this mode of explaining the statements of Scripture is not unlikely to be the first to suggest itself to a mind impressed with the difficulties of the subject, and anxious to save the great truths of the unity of the Godhead, and of what seems connected therewith, His proper personality. For how, it may be urged, can such a personality be conceived as divided among three Subjects? That the orthodox doctrine is not chargeable with this error will be explained hereafter.‡ The question now before us is, What

* Hagenbach, ss. 87–93. Newman, ‘Arians of the Fourth Century.’

† Hence the Sabellians in the East were called Patripassians in the West. ὡς ἐὰν ἡ ἐν ἡλίῳ ὄντι μὲν ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει, τρεῖς δὲ ἔχοντι τὰς ἐνεργείας (Epiph. Cont. Hær. l. ii. t. i. 62).

‡ § 27.

does Scripture teach on the subject? Does it represent the distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as meaning merely that to us, and in time, God exhibits Himself in a threefold aspect, or as belonging to the Divine nature itself, and immanent therein? Are the *operationes ad extra* founded on *operationes ab intra*, i.e. upon relations in the Godhead itself, and therefore eternal? Or, to put it in another way, Does the *τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως* (the mode of revelation) imply a *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως* (a mode of existence)? This is the question with which our first Article 'of faith in the Holy Trinity' is properly concerned.

The first remark to be made is, that as God reveals Himself, so He must be presumed to be; otherwise the revelation would convey inaccurate notions of His nature. If in Scripture the salvation of man is derived from a threefold causality, or from God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and *never from more*, e.g. a fourth, this raises a strong presumption that the terms signify more than mere aspects under which the one God may be regarded, mere characters which He assumes as need requires. For, on the Sabelian hypothesis, what reason can be assigned why He should reveal Himself under precisely three, and not any number that may be imagined, seeing He stands towards the creature in manifold relations? Apart from an immanent, or ontological Trinity, the Trinity of redemption seems to have no proper foundation, and to become an arbitrary assumption. But to the Scripture testimony. Let us note, then, the language of S. John respecting that Word of Life, which he had seen with his eyes and his hands handled; had seen, as the Christ of history, the Word become flesh. In the first chapter of his Gospel he tells us that 'in the beginning' (*ἐν ἀρχῇ* = *בְּרֵאשִׁית*, Gen. i. 1), that is, at the commencement of creation, this Word did not then first come into existence, but was actually in being (*ἦν* not *ἐγένετο*); thus disconnecting His existence altogether from the idea of time, which is coincident with creation. Further, that the Word was with God (*πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*), in closest fellowship with God, yet in some sense distinct from God. And then, apparently to obviate Philo's doctrine of a *δεύτερος Θεός*, he adds, 'and the Word was God' *Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*). If the first clause hardly by itself establishes the *eternal* existence of the Word, the third supplies the defect; for if He is God He must be eternal. Here then, the Deity of the Word, and a distinction in the Godhead, are both intimated, and this without reference to creation or redemption; for it is not until the third verse that we are told that 'through Him all things were made,' in accordance with the usage of Scripture, which ascribes creation to the

Father, but through the Son (Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2).^{*} In the eighteenth verse we again find the Word described as in closest connection with, and yet distinct from, God (*εἰς τὸν κόλπον = πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*), but under another name, viz. 'the only-begotten Son,' a relation which necessarily implies the corresponding one of Father. This use of the word 'Son,' in an absolute sense, and abstractedly from the Incarnation, is common with S. John (e.g. v. 19; viii. 36), but occurs also in the other Gospels (Matt. xi. 27).

Another class of passages which deserves notice is composed of those in which the Son is described as the 'Image,' or counterpart, of the invisible God. Thus Heb. i. 1-3, the writer, after referring to the revelation of God in and through His Son, *i.e.* the incarnate Word, proceeds to speak of that Son's pre-existence, as the Maker and Upholder of all things, and describes the Son as the 'brightness of God's glory, and the express image of His person;' which latter words, according to the best commentators, describe not the revelation of God's glory in the incarnate Son, but the identity of the Son with the Father as regards His Divine nature;† and yet seem to establish a distinction between them analogous to that between the splendour of light and its source, or between a seal and its impression; and this without reference to creation or redemption. With this may be compared Col. i. 15, in which Christ is described not only as *πρωτότοκος*, *i.e.*, in existence before the birth of creation, but as the 'image' *εἰκὼν* 'of the invisible God,' God as the Father contemplating Himself in the Person of the Son, and therefore not formally the same with the Son.‡ And in a corresponding passage, Phil. ii. 6, the expression 'in the form of God,' which, from its opposition to the 'form of a servant,' is now usually held to relate to the pre-existence of the Logos, implies, like the word 'image' above, a certain distinction from God, when God is considered under another aspect, viz., as the ground or fountain of Deity.§

^{*} This seems to imply a *personal* distinction, and not merely that between the λόγος *ἐνδιάθετος* and the λόγος *προφορικός* of Philo and Theophilus. Compare 1 Cor. viii. 6: Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα . . . Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα.

† ὢν, as in John i. 1; not *γενόμενος*. On the whole passage see Bleek's Commentary.

‡ As Olshausen (Com.) remarks, the whole passage speaks of Christ under a twofold aspect: verses 15-17, as He is the Logos, antecedently to time; verses 18-20, as He is incarnate, and the Head of the Church.

§ This passage, as is well known, admits of two leading interpretations, one applying the whole to Christ in His human nature, the other applying verse 6 to Him as the Logos, and verses 7-11 to Him as incarnate. The former was generally adopted by the Lutheran theologians, as furnishing ground for their doctrine of the communication of Divine properties to the manhood of Christ; the latter by the Reformed.

As regards the Holy Ghost, if He 'searches the deep things of God,' in a manner analogous to that in which the 'spirit of man' knows 'the things of a man' (1 Cor. ii. 11)—and this Divine energy cannot be understood to apply merely to creation or redemption—not only is the personality of the Holy Ghost indicated, but He appears as a distinct subject in the Godhead, a third relation of God to Himself not to be confounded with the other two.

The result seems to be that the New Testament, besides revealing the economical Trinity, or the Trinity as related to the Church and operative *ad extra*, furnishes a revelation of the same Trinity as it exists intrinsically, and is operative *ad intra*, and teaches that apart from all manifestations of God in creation or in redemption, He is in Himself not an abstract Monas, but a Trinity of immanent relations, expressed under the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; that is, that in the Godhead there exist energies which terminate in itself. To defend and illustrate this doctrine was the main object of the great writers, and of the councils, of the Church for several centuries after the Apostolic age; and the result is seen in the statements of the Œcumenical Creeds.

§ 27. Ecclesiastical Definitions.

The doctrine of the Church, as laid down at the second Constantinopolitan Council (A.D. 381), may be summed up in the words of the Athanasian Creed: 'We worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost; but the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal.' 'The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten; the Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten; the Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.'

Let us first ask, What does the word Person here mean? The idea we commonly attach to it is that of an individual; and a Trinity of persons in one Godhead might be supposed to resemble the classification of three individuals, John, Peter, Thomas, under the one species, man. But this would be an erroneous conception of its meaning in the Creed. It would be equivalent to denying the numerical existence of the Godhead, for the species 'man' is but an abstraction, having no existence outside the mind that frames it; that is, it would 'divide the substance,' and lead to Tritheism. It must not be forgotten that what we mean by personality belongs to the Divine *essence* as it is distinguished from the Trinitarian relations; just as the personality of a human

father resides not in his paternity as a mere relation, but in his individuality as a man. The word *persona*, of which Person is the translation, properly signifies a dramatic part, or character; and was adopted, as Augustine tells us,* by the Latins on account of the poverty of the language, which has no word exactly corresponding to the *ὑπόστασις*† of the Greeks, the term employed by the latter to denote each of the three Subjects of the Holy Trinity. The meaning of *persona*, then, must be determined by that of hypostasis. Now this term, as distinguished from essence (*οὐσία*), signifies the Divine Being when viewed in connection with a particular 'Personal property' (*Proprietas personalis*)‡, that is, the property which compels us to make a distinction between the Persons; which in the first Person is paternity, in the Second filiation, and in the Third procession; so that the Father means God considered as begetting, the Son God considered as begotten, and the Holy Ghost God considered as proceeding (*essentia divina cum proprietatibus personalibus*). The personal properties flow from acts immanent in the Divine Being (*opera ad intra*), viz., generation (active) the act of the Father, generation (passive) the act of the Son, and spiration (procession) (passive) the act of the Holy Ghost;§ and as these acts cannot be ascribed indiscriminately to the three Persons, so far forth as they are Persons, we have the well-known canon, '*Opera ad intra divisa sunt*'—the immanent acts of the Trinity belong respectively to only one

* 'Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus essentiam (*οὐσία*) quod intelligitur cum dicimus substantiam (*ὑπόστασις*), non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam vel substantiam, tres autem personas: quemadmodum multi Latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt *cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent quod sine verbis intelligerent*' (De Trin. lib. v. c. 10).

† The word *πρόσωπον* would have exactly corresponded to the Latin 'persona,' and it is actually used by J. Damasc. as equivalent to *ὑπόστασις* (*Χρῆ δὲ γινώσκειν ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὑπόστασιν καὶ πρόσωπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάλεσαν*—Dial. c. 43); but it fell into disuse, lest it might lead to Sabellianism.

‡ In Greek, *ὑποστατική ιδιότης*. See J. Damasc. De Fid. Orth. lib. i. 138. 'Character hypostaticus, sive proprietas personalis, est relatio in actu personali fundata, personam in esse certæ personæ constituens, et per oppositionem relativam realem ab alia persona distinctionem inferens' (Hollaz, p. i. c. 2, q. 8).

§ It may be asked, How can the *generatio passiva*, the being begotten of the Son; and the *spiratio passiva*, the being breathed, or proceeding, of the Holy Ghost, be described as *acts*, when they seem more like *passivities* (if such a word may be used)? And we know that God, as *actus purissimus*, is incapable of being acted upon. But when, as in this case, the subject and the object are the same, the passive form is merely grammatical; e.g. I think of myself, and I am thought of by myself, are identical in meaning. Therefore the procession of the Holy Ghost is really an act of God considered as proceeding; and in like manner the *generatio passiva* of the Son is an act of God considered as begotten, though the corresponding active term cannot here be used, on account of the special relation between Father and Son.

Person.* Thus the three Persons are not three Gods, but God under three inner relations, or modes of subsistence (τρόποι ὑπαρξέως, *modi subsistendi*). These relations, however, are not merely creations of our minds, not merely relations of God to the world which may be supposed as ceasing when the occasion ceases; they have an eternal ground of subsistence in the Divine nature itself, or, in the language of the schools, they depend not upon *ratio ratiocinans*, but upon *ratio ratiocinata*. There is no actual distinction between the 'substance' and the hypostatical character of each Person taken *singly*: God the Father is very God, with all the fulness of the Divine attributes and perfections, and so is God the Son, and so is God the Holy Ghost;† paternity, filiation, and procession, adding nothing in each case to the Divine essence. But when the Persons are considered *collectively*, these distinctions become in some sense real, for otherwise there would be no distinction, except in our minds, between Father, Son and Holy Spirit.‡ God is not ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but certainly ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος: the Divine essence (or 'substance') is in the Father ἀγενήτως, in the Son γενήτως, and in the Holy Ghost ἐκπορεύτως; yet this does not affect the simplicity of the Divine nature, for according to the ancient Canon, 'Relations do not compound' (are not constituent parts of a thing), but merely 'distinguish'; e.g. if John is the father of Thomas, the relation distinguishes John from Thomas, but does not *divide* John into two parts, himself and his paternity. There is a distinction (as Keckermann illustrates it), and in some sense a real one, between the *degree* of light at noonday and that at twilight; and yet degrees of this kind do not affect the composition of light.§ In

* Thus 'active generation,' an *opus ad intra*, belongs only to the Father; but 'creation,' an *opus ad extra*, is the work of the whole Trinity.

† This is what is meant by the περιχώρησις, 'circumincessio, immanentia,' of old writers; viz., that the Father is in the Son, the Son in the Father, and the Holy Ghost in both: and it hardly deserves the censure bestowed upon it, and kindred scholastic terms, by Abp. Whately (*Logic*, App. Person). These terms are attempts, more or less successful, to translate Divine mysteries into human language. 'Singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum omnia' (Aug. *De Trin.* vi. 12).

‡ 'Relatio ad essentiam comparata non differt re sed ratione tantum; comparata autem ad oppositam relationem habet virtute oppositionis reale discrimen' (T. Aquinas, p. i. q. 29, art. 1).

§ See Twisten's *Dogmatik*, ii p. 222. 'Modes,' Keckermann observes, 'of existence are not the thing itself, yet neither are they merely creations of our minds. Thus the open and the closed hand are the same hand, but they differ *modaliter*. So the thing called motion may be quicker or slower; the degree of heat is not heat; the degree of light is not light, etc.' Of course these are merely illustrations; taken strictly they would lead to Sabellianism. Besides the three *Proprietates personales*, the schoolmen have two *notiones personales*, ἀγεννησιά, 'innascibilitas,' belonging to the Father; and 'Spiratio activa,'

fact, distinct relations in the Godhead no more introduce into it the idea of composition than do the distinct quiescent attributes (infinite, eternal, immense, unchangeable, etc.). It will be seen, then, that the word Person in the Creeds must mean something very different from what it does in common speech; and in fact, as J. Damasc. remarks,* while in created things the distinction of individuals or persons exists in *fact* and their common nature only in conception (John, Thomas, etc., are actually existing persons, their common nature man is a logical entity), the opposite holds good in the doctrine of the Trinity;—the common nature, or essence, of the Godhead exists in fact, and possesses real personality, and the personal distinctions, though not indeed logical abstractions, yet have no distinct will or intelligence apart from the nature in which they inhere as relations. Yet they are so far real that they constitute subjects which cannot be used as predicates: *e.g.* as Thomas is a subject which cannot be the predicate of anyone but Thomas (not like ‘man,’ which may be predicated of any number of individuals), so the Father cannot be a predicate of the Son, nor the Son of the Father, nor the Holy Ghost of either. And with this imperfect notion of a Trinitarian ‘Person’ we must rest content: and with a not less imperfect one of the difference between ‘generation’ and ‘procession’ as applied to God. In truth, these are points which, pushed beyond a certain limit, bring us too near ‘the light which no man can approach unto’ (1 Tim. vi. 16), and in reflecting on which we shall do well, with Augustine,† never to forget the inherent limitations of human reason.

But if the Father alone is God ἀγενήτως, while the Son is so γενήτως, and the Holy Ghost ἐκπορεύτως, does not this introduce something like subordination among the three Persons, so that Arius may seem to have been unjustly accused of heresy? If the subsistence of the Son is grounded in that of the Father and the subsistence of the Holy Ghost in that of the Father and the

common (according to the Western Church) to the Father and the Son. They only deserve notice as explaining why ‘Spiratio activa’ is not numbered among the *Proprietates personales*, viz., because being common to two Persons, it cannot constitute a relation of opposition between them; according to the rule, ‘In Divinis omnia sunt unum; ubi non obviat oppositionis relatio.’

* Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἑτερόν ἐστι τὸ πράγματι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄλλο το λογι καὶ ἐπινοῖα. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων, ἡ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαίρεσις πράγματι θεωρεῖται. Πράγματι γὰρ ὁ Πέτρος τοῦ Παύλου κεχωρισμένος θεωρεῖται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Τριάδος, τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν κοινόν καὶ ἐν πράγματι θεωρεῖται, ἐπινοοῖα δὲ τὸ διηρημένον (De Fide Orth. lib. i. 139).

† ‘Cum quaeritur, Quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum eloquium laborat. Dictum est tamen, Tres Personæ, non ut illud diceretur sed ne tacetur’ De Trin. v. 10). (‘Distinguere inter illam generationem, et hanc processionem nescio, non valeo, non sufficio’ (Contra Max. iii. 14).

Son (as in fact the Father is sometimes called by orthodox writers *πρῆν Θεότητος*, *fons et origo Trinitatis*),* how is the statement of the Creed to be understood, 'And in this Trinity none is afore or after other, none is greater or less than another'? Unquestionably there is a difference, but one that does not necessarily imply a gradation of dignity, or at any rate inferiority of nature. The difference consists not in reference to *time*, for all three Persons are co-eternal; nor in reference to *essence*, for all three are God; but in reference to the *order* of subsistence† (*ordo subsistendi*), according to which the Father is the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third Person. The ideas of finite and infinite, and generally the category of quality, belong to a thing itself, not to the modes of its subsistence: as, *e.g.*, the human relation of father and son does not imply that the son is inferior in *nature*, but merely that he owes his existence to his father, who in this case must be antecedent in time. If we remove the element of priority of time, which necessarily inheres in the human relation, and conceive an eternal generation, we arrive at the Catholic doctrine, that while a certain inequality must be admitted, the three Persons are, as regards their Deity, co-equal. So that the Son *as God* is not inferior to the Father *as God*, but the former as a Person of the Holy Trinity stands to the latter as a Person of the same Trinity in the relation of begotten to begetting. Nor should it be forgotten that when we say the Son has His subsistence in the Father, we cannot, indeed, affirm the direct converse, that the Father has his subsistence in the Son; but we can say that paternity, the 'personal property' of the Father, could not be conceived without the 'filiation' of the Son, and that to this extent the Father is not without the Son; and the same remark applies to the relation ('spiration') between them and the Holy Ghost.

In contrast with the *opera ad intra*, acts which terminate in the Deity itself, are the *opera ad extra*, acts in which God enters into relations with the creature: and to the Father is especially

* The orthodox doctrine of later times avoided the use of the word 'cause' to describe the relation of the Father to the Son, because an effect is different from its cause, and seems dependent upon it; and preferred the word 'principium,' or metaphorical terms, as *πρῆν*, *ρίζα*, *fons*, etc. 'Satiùs est abstinere ab istis vocibus, quod Filius sit causatus, ne *ὑποουσία* Patris et Filii labefactetur' (J. Gerhard).

† 'Deus Pater nuncupatur prima Persona Divinitatis, non ratione essentiae naturæ, quia eandem essentiam habet Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quam habet Pater: neque ratione temporis quoniam tres Personæ Divinæ sunt co-æternæ: sed ratione originis et ordinis' (Hollaz, p. i. c. 2, q. 22). Waterland's language seems hardly guarded enough: 'Neither are we to understand it' (the equality) 'of office; for the Father is *supreme* in office, while the Son and Holy Ghost condescend to *inferior* offices' (?) (Comment. on Athan. Creed).

assigned the work of creation, to the Son that of redemption, and to the Holy Ghost that of sanctification. With respect to these the rule is, *Opera ad extra sunt indivisa* ;* i.e., in them the three Persons co-operate to the result. When, therefore, a work *ad extra* is ascribed to any one Person by Himself, the others have a share in it ; in other words, when one Person only is named, the name is to be taken not ὑποστατικῶς but οὐσιουδῶς, not as referring to the Person but to the substance.† Thus, when one Person is addressed in prayer, the other two are simultaneously invoked. The incarnation especially belongs to the second Person, but Christ is also said to have been conceived of the Holy Ghost (Matt. i. 20) : and we have seen above that to the Son, to the Holy Ghost, and to the Father, is indifferently ascribed indwelling in the Church : and in general, 'Whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise' (John v. 19).‡ What reason then, it may be asked, is there for ascribing a special work to each Person? In attempting to answer this question, theologians experienced great difficulty. They remark, in general, that an order in working (*ordo et modus agendi*) may be expected to correspond to the order of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi*) ; and since, according to this latter, 'the Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten ; the Son is of the Father ; and the Holy Ghost of the Father and the Son,' therefore such works as election and creation, which seem to be especially *ex nihilo*, are appropriated to the Father,§ while others, as redemption and sanctification, which are not of so absolute a character, as being performed in time, are more properly connected with the second and third Persons.|| And this is the meaning of the rule, *Opera ad extra tribus Personis communia sunt, salvo tamen earum ordine et discrimine* ; or, as it is otherwise expressed, special works are attributed to each Person *terminativè* : e.g. the atonement is the work of the whole Trinity, but it

* The prepositions ἐξ, διὰ, ἐν (1 Cor. viii. 6 ; 2 Thess. ii. 13 ; Rom. xi. 36) are commonly taken as denoting the participation of each Person in 'opera ad extra.' E.g., creation was *from* the Father, *through* the Son, *in* the Holy Ghost.

† The name Father is often thus used in Scripture οὐσιουδῶς, e.g. in the Lord's prayer, and indeed throughout Matt. vi. Comp. 1 Pet. i. 17.

‡ 'Nullatenus namque Patris et Filii, secundum ipsas proprietates, id est secundum Paternitatem et Filiationem, ulla voluntas aut potentia est : sed secundum Divinitatis substantiam quæ communis est illis' (Anselm. De Fid. Trin. c. iii.).

§ 'I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world.' As creation is not an 'opus æconomicum,' or work belonging to *redemption*, it may be a question whether, in an exposition of the Apostles' Creed, election rather than creation should not be assigned to the Father.

|| Thus J. Gerhard remarks, in reference to the Holy Ghost : 'Missio in tempore facta est manifestatio processionis ab æterno' (loc. v. s. 59).

'terminates,' or finds its completion, in the second Person; and the special Divine presence in the Church is the work of the whole Trinity, but it terminates in the third Person.*

The Procession of the Holy Ghost was, as is well known, the occasion of a schism between the Greek and the Latin Churches which exists to this day. The original Constantinopolitan Creed, while affirming the Deity of the Holy Ghost, had simply declared that He proceeds from the Father; which appeared insufficient to some of the Western Churches. By Augustine the procession from both Father and Son was taught:† and under the influence of his great name the word *Filioque* came to be introduced into the Creed, and received formal sanction in the third Council of Toledo, A.D. 589. This gave umbrage to the Greeks, who refused to admit the addition, partly on exegetical grounds, but principally because they objected to any change being made in the Creed without the consent of the whole Church. As regards the usage of Scripture, the Greeks urged that the Holy Ghost is not said to proceed from the Son, but only from the Father (John xv. 26); but the Latins replied that, though the term 'proceeding' may not be used, others equivalent to it are, as, *e.g.*, 'the Spirit of Christ' (Rom. viii. 9), 'the Spirit of His Son' (Gal. iv. 6), compared with the 'Spirit of your Father' (Matt. x. 20): if this last means 'proceeding,' why should not the former? They referred also to the symbolical action of our Lord, when, after His resurrection, He breathed on the Apostles, using the words 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost' (John xx. 22); and to such passages as, 'All things that the Father hath are Mine' (John xvi. 15); inferring from the latter, that since Procession from the Father is the Father's, it must also belong to the Son.‡ But especially they insisted, with reason, on the fact that the *sending* of the Holy Ghost is, in express words, attributed both to the Father and the Son (John xiv. 26; xv. 26); with reason, because mission in

* Anselm, *De Fid. Trin.*, has a curious chapter on the question, why the Son rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit should have become incarnate? His main argument is, that if the Spirit had become incarnate, He would have been the Son of Man, and so there would have been two Sons in the Trinity, the Son of God (the second Person), and the Son of Man; which would have introduced confusion. His objection to the Father's becoming incarnate must be left in his own words: 'Si Pater in unitatem suæ personæ hominem assumpsisset, eandem faceret in Deo pluralitas filiorum inconvenientias, et adhuc aliam. Nam si esset filius virginis, duæ Personæ in Trinitate nomen nepotis assumerent; quia et Pater nepos esset parentum virginis, et Filius ejus esset virginis nepos: cum ipse tamen nihil haberet ex virgine' (c. v.).

† 'Qui potest intelligere sine tempore generationem Filii de Patre intelligat sine tempore processionem Spiritus Sanctus *ab utroque*' (*De Trin.* xv. 47).

‡ 'Si enim quidquid habet de Patre habet Filius; de Patre habet utique ut et de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus' (*Aug. De Trin.* xv. 47).

time corresponds to procession in eternity. Some of the Greeks were willing to use the formula that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *through* the Son; but this was objected to by the Latins on the ground that it savoured of Arianism;* while the double procession seemed to the other party to affect their favourite tenet of the Father's being *πηγή Θεότητος*. But, as Anselm observes,† the ground of subsistence of Father, Son, and Spirit is not that in which they are distinct (the *relationes oppositæ*), but that in which they are one (the *essentia*, or 'substance'): therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (in His Divine essence), He must also proceed from the Son. But why may it not, by parity of reasoning, be inferred from the generation of the Son from the Father, that He is also generated from the Holy Ghost? Because the necessity of an 'opposed relation' stands in the way. Filiation is opposed to paternity, but spiration is not opposed to generation; and so it might happen that the Son would be conceived as both generated and proceeding, and the Holy Ghost as both proceeding and generated; and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit would constitute but one Person, for want of an 'opposition of relation' between themselves. This is supplied by the relation of *spirans* and *spiratus*: the necessary caution being added that Father and Son are to be conceived, not as a twofold, but as a single Principle of spiration.‡ The dispute culminated with mutual excommunications in the eleventh century, and has never since been adjusted.

§ 28. *Natural Analogies.*

At an early period attempts were made not indeed to establish, but to illustrate, the doctrine from various sources: some of which are proofs of the pious zeal rather than of the judgment of their authors.§ But that derived from the human consciousness is of a more solid character. Augustine here led the way, and is followed by the schoolmen. If man, he observes, is created in

* 'Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Patre ἐμπέσωσς interventu scil. Filii; hæc enim ratione uni Personæ esset propinquior quam alteri: sed procedit ἀπέσωσς ab utroque' (J. Gerh. loc. v.).

† De Process. Spiritus Sanctus, c. 2.

‡ This whole subject is discussed with great acuteness by Anselm (De Proc. Sanctus Spiritus cc. 14-18). The Greeks would of course maintain that the difference in the *modus procedendi* (in the case of the Son *γεννητῶς*, in the case of the Spirit *ἐκπορευτῶς*), does of itself constitute a sufficient 'opposition of relation.'

§ As, e.g., that of the sun, in which we have its substance, its light, and its heat; that of water, which is the same in the fountain, the river, and the lake (Anselm. De Fid. Trin. c. viii.). Herbs and flowers have form, smell, and vitality: in a seal we distinguish between the material, the impression, and the seal itself (Abelard). And many others of like character.

the image of God, it may be expected that in the mind, or its faculties, some resemblance will be found to the Archetype. Now if we consider the Mind itself in the act of knowing and loving, we find three aspects under which it presents itself: the Mind as subject, a knowledge of itself, and the love which springs from that knowledge; and yet these are really one:* or, if we consider the principal faculties of the Mind, we again find them to be three, viz., Memory, Intelligence, and Will; and these three also inhere in one subject.† Apart from Augustine's particular theory, it is a fact that in our mental operations *ad intra*, i.e. abstractedly from external things, we can distinguish between the Mind which makes itself an object of contemplation (the subject), the Mind which is thus contemplated (the object), and the Mind which, by the union of the two, attains its full consciousness: yet it is the same Mind, or Ego, which is thus conceived under a threefold aspect. The analogy must be transferred with due caution to the Divine essence; yet it may serve to explain how neither the unity nor the simplicity of that essence is affected by energies which terminate within itself. The orthodox doctrine is, in fact, opposed not to the unity of the Divine Being, but to the notion of an abstract, impersonal Monas, without will, or affection, the Monotheism of Judaism and Deism. If the fulness of life, the plenary consciousness of blessedness, is to be ascribed, as it surely is, to the Godhead, the Trinitarian hypothesis of God generating from eternity a counterpart or image of Himself, and dwelling with ineffable complacency upon that image, is the only one which supplies such an idea, and effectually secures the *αὐτάρκεια*, or self-sufficiency, of the Divine Being.‡ Hence, where the

* 'At in illis tribus, cum se novit mens, et amat se, manet trinitas, mens, amor, notitia; et nullā commixtione confunditur: quamvis et singula sint in semetipsis, et invicem tota in totis, sive singula in binis, sive bina in singulis' (De Trin. lib. ix. 8).

† 'Hæc igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitæ, sed una vita: nec tres mentes, sed una mens: consequenter utique nec tres substantiæ, sed una substantia' (De Trin. lib. x. c. 18). More fully explained by Anselm: 'Si mens ipsa sola ex omnibus quæ facta sunt, sui memor, et intelligens, et amans esse potest; non video cur negetur esse in illa vera imago illius essentiae, quæ per sui memoriam, et intelligentiam, et amorem in Trinitate ineffabili consistit. Si in memoria summi Spiritus intelligitur Pater, in intelligentia Filius; manifestum est quia a Patre pariter et a Filio summi Spiritus amor' (the 'voluntas' of Augustine) 'procedit' (Monol. cc. 47 et seq.). Compare T. Aquinas, De Trin. q. 27, art. 3.

‡ 'God,' says Athanasius, 'is not like a lake which derives its water from without, but is a fountain in Himself. But who can conceive a fountain without life and movement? Who can separate from the sun its splendour? The Divine fountain is never dry, the light never without its radiance. God is not fruitless (*ἄγονος*): were He so, He would also be *ἀνέργητος*, and could not create, for He creates through the Son' (De Decret. N. S. syn. 12). Quoted

Trinitarian doctrine is rejected, the remedy is sought in Pantheistic theories; as in modern sceptical philosophy. The Divine Monas, deprived of living movement in *Himself*, comes first to a consciousness of Himself in the act of creation, and maintains that consciousness only in and through the ceaseless evolutions, the manifold movements, of the universe; that is, God and nature are practically identified.

§ 29. *Concluding Remarks.*

The question may be asked, Of what value, at the present day, are these abstruse distinctions and the technical phraseology in which they are clothed? Do they not seem invented only to perplex plain minds, and furnish matter of disparaging comment to the sceptic? What bearing have they on practical piety? Why should we not relegate them to the lumber-room of antiquity, and fall back upon the simplicity of Scripture, distinguishing between the revealed facts and the theories which have been raised upon them? As regards the former demand, it may be replied that it is as impossible for us to fall back on the simplicity of Scripture as to put back the dial of time and live in the second or third century. It is with the (legitimate) development of doctrine as it is with the progress of constitutional polity; in either case, to revert to earlier forms is impossible, because it is impossible to obliterate the traces of the past. For good or for evil, controversies arose respecting the Person of Christ, and the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, even within the pale of the Church; controversies which were vitally important. It was to meet the ever-shifting forms of error that Creeds were framed, and from time to time enlarged; and as long as there is danger of the revival of these, or similar forms of error, the Creeds must be retained, at least in substance. And such a danger never can be pronounced imaginary, for human nature remains the same from age to age, and phases of thought which seemed to have lived their day, may at any time reappear under new forms and in unexpected quarters. A composition like the Athanasian Creed, with its laboured and nicely balanced statements, every one of them bristling with controversy, may not be a very edifying study; but the question is, Could the Church have guarded the true *Scriptural* doctrine against heretical subtleties without resorting to similar subtleties

by Dorner, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, etc., Theil i. p. 903. 'Deus est merus et purus actus, ergo ab æterno egit, non autem produxit aliquid extra se per creationem. Ergo intra se per generationem Filium, per spirationem Spiritum Sanctum' (J. Gerh. loc. iii. s. 24).

on her side? It does not appear that she could have done so; and it may be affirmed that if the ancient controversies were again to come up, they would have to be met by the same weapons, and in the main determined in the same sense, if the substance of revealed doctrine was to be preserved. Particular expressions may be open to doubt whether they are happily chosen; but if the Creeds, as a whole, were expunged from the literature of the Church, it seems we should be compelled before long to draw up formularies substantially the same, as terms of communion. They may not be the truth in its Scriptural *form*, but they are the casket that contains it, and preserves it from essential depravation. In short, like our first parents we have come to the knowledge of good and evil, and it were a mere fiction of the imagination to suppose we can revert to a state of paradisaical innocence. Moreover, it is not the province of Scripture to supply summaries of doctrine, or defensive statements against heresy; Scripture furnishes the materials which it is the office of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to explain and to harmonise in such a manner as to be an adequate expression of her faith.

With respect to the other point, that we should distinguish between the revealed facts and theories based upon them, we ask, *What are the facts?* If it be replied, *The facts of the Gospel history, e.g., that Jesus of Nazareth was born of the Virgin, died on the Cross, rose again, and ascended to heaven, and that the Holy Ghost came down, with visible signs, on the day of Pentecost,* we must remind the objector that the *doctrines* of revelation which connect themselves with these facts are themselves facts as much as the visible events, but facts for our knowledge of which we depend upon Divine revelation. *Who, e.g., or what, was the Jesus who died on the Cross? Who, or what, is the Holy Spirit who came according to Christ's promise? What relation, or connection, exists between Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Father? What was the import, and the effect, of Christ's death? What the offices He discharges now that He has ascended to heaven?* The answers to these questions, if Scripture furnishes them, are as really *facts* as the events that met the eye. An atonement has been made for the sins of the world: this, if true, is not a mere doctrine in the sense of an opinion or theory; it is a fact just as much as the visible death of Christ, of which it forms the invisible side, or aspect. In this enlarged sense of the word the facts, so far from being independent of the theories, are the 'theories' themselves, only not formally arranged or clothed in the current language of the age. They are independent of the theories so far as this, that they might be translated into other language than that of our present Creeds, provided the

substance were retained ; but somehow or other, the substance must be retained if the revelation of God is to be preserved in its integrity. Thus, as regards the present subject, the nature of the Divine being in Himself is not a mere hypothesis, but a fact—most mysterious and incomprehensible—but still a fact of revelation ; and no creed which did not declare it more or less explicitly could lay claim to be an adequate representation of the teaching of Scripture on the subject, and therefore of the appointed measure of our faith.

MAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL.

THE ANGELS.

‘Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam ; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit ; and therefore in every person born into the world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea even in them that are regenerated : whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek “*phronema sarkos*,” which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin’ (Art. ix.). ‘The condition of man after the fall is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will’ (Art. x.). ‘Item docent quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia ; quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque æternam mortem his qui non renascuntur per baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum’ (Conf. Aug. p. i. 2). ‘De libero arbitrio docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis, quia animalis homo non precipit ea quæ sunt Spiritus Dei (1 Cor. ii. 14) ; sed hæc fit in cordibus quum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur (*ibid.* 18). De causa peccati docent quod tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum, videlicet diaboli et impiorum, quæ, non adjuvante Deo, avertit se a Deo’ (*ibid.* 19). ‘Assuunt (Pontificii) et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco dictum non reprehendimus ; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum peccatum originis’ (Apol. Conf. 43). ‘Damnamus Manichæos qui negant homini bono ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum præceptum bonum’ (Conf. Helv. 1566, c. 9). ‘Homo perfectissima Dei in terris imago, primasque creaturarum visibilium habens, ex anima et corpore constans : quorum hoc mor-

tale, illud immortale est: cum esset sancte a Deo conditus, sua culpa in vitium prolapsus, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, ac eidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit. Atque hæc lues, quam originalem vocant, genus totum sic pervasit ut nulla ope iræ filius inimicusque Dei curari potuerit Unde sic homini liberum arbitrium tribuimus ut, qui scientes et volentes agere nos bona et mala experimur, mala quidem agere sponte nostra queamus, bona vero amplecti et persequi nisi gratia Christi illustrati, excitati, atque impulsu non queamus' (Conf. Helv. 1581). 'Deus nequaquam est auctor ullius peccati, sed fons et auctor omnis boni, osor vero et ultor mali. Peccatum originis non tantum justitiæ nuda carentia, sed etiam in pravitate, seu pronitate ad malum ex Adamo in omnes propagata consistit' (Decl. Thor. iii.). 'Etsi in renatis peccatum originis quoad culpam et reatum gratuita remissione deletur, et quoad pravitatem magis magisque per Christi gratiam mortificatur, manent tamen in ipsis, quamdiu in carne vivunt, ejus pravitatis reliquiæ, vid. pravæ inclinationes et motus concupiscentiæ, quæ proinde vere et proprie peccatum dicitur, non tantum quatenus est pœna et causa peccati, sed etiam quatenus et ipsa cum legi Dei tum Spiritui gratiæ repugnat' (*ibid.*).

§ 30. Creation of Man.

WITH the various interpretations of which the first chapter of the Book of Genesis has been the subject, dogmatic theology has little concern. Its sole interest is to secure the idea of a proper creation, an original act in the first instance whereby matter was created *ex nihilo*, and subsequent successive acts whereby the various species which exist were called into being.* The first verse of the chapter may refer to the former, or it may be understood of cosmical arrangements of unknown antiquity, fitting our world for a race of happy beings, amongst whom sin found an entrance and reduced their abode to the condition described in verse 2, when the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. On the latter supposition, the earth was restored by a succession of creative acts to be again a paradise of happy beings, no longer, however, of angelic nature, but of a nature 'a little lower' in itself 'than that of the angels' (Ps. viii. 5), though immeasurably superior to them in that it was to be eventually taken into union with the Divine.

When five days of creation (whatever the duration of a creative 'day' may have been) had thus restored the earth from the ruin in which it had become involved, man was formed on the last day to occupy the habitation prepared for him. There is a marked distinction between the language used in reference to his creation and that of the inferior species. A simple fiat of the Almighty gave them being, but man is the subject of a consultative or deliberative process (Gen. i. 26), whether with the older divines we are to conceive the three Persons of the Holy Trinity as uniting

* See § 21.

in the work, or, with later ones,* the elect angels, already bearing the image of God, as taken into the Divine counsels. In chapter i. man is described in his ethical and cosmical aspects; he is the head and lord of creation, and bears the image of God. In chapter ii. the subject is resumed, and material details are supplied. His body was formed of the dust of the ground (verse 7), thus connecting him with the visible universe, and especially that portion of it which was to be the theatre of his fall and his redemption; formed not as the clay, or the marble, is fashioned into the likeness of a man, but organised from within by the assimilation of the earthly elements, which, under the plastic hand of God, lost their original forms and grew into that wonderful piece of mechanism which constitutes the human frame. Thus on its first page the Bible contradicts the Manichæan or Platonic theories, which consider the body either as like all matter, the production of an inferior deity, or as a clog and impediment to the aspirations of the soul. Man's material nature proceeded directly from God; formed of dust and therefore capable of resolution into dust (Gen. iii. 19), but also capable of a future renovation (1 Cor. xv. 44); the first element of his being in order of creation, the last in order of restitution (Rom. viii. 23). Into this body God Himself breathed 'the breath of life,' the symbolical action representing, not as in a somewhat parallel instance (John xx. 22), the communication of the Holy Ghost in His hypostatical character, but the gift of a created spirit, the source and seat of all that distinguishes the human soul from that of the brutes, but which as yet was destitute of the principle of individuality. The spirit thus infused proceeded to ally itself with a distinct form of animal life, vegetative and sensitive, not essentially differing from that of the lower animals, and man became 'a living soul';† but a self-conscious soul, possessing all that is comprised in the term personality. Adam being thus created, the process was not repeated in the case of the help-meet provided for him: from man woman was formed, in the way of derivation, the spirit-soul passing with the material element; and thus as the man is the image and glory of God, the woman is the glory of the man, and through him, or mediately, the image of God (1 Cor. xi. 7).

* As Delitzsch, *Psychology, Creation*, s. ii. Comp. Job xxxviii. 7.

† נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה This term is applied in the Old Testament to the life of brutes, and does not of itself denote anything peculiar to man (Gen. ix. 4). It is otherwise with the expression נְשֵׁמַת חַיִּים 'breath of lives,' which is not interchangeable with the former. The soul of man, as distinguished from that of brutes, has a spiritual element which connects it with the Divine nature.

But this Scriptural account of the creation of man has been pronounced by high authorities incompatible with the discoveries of modern science. The antiquity of man, it is said, extends backwards far beyond the received chronology of 6,000 years; the plurality of races contradicts the notion of the descent of mankind from a single pair; and a special act of creation is rendered unnecessary by the theory of the transmutation of species. With respect to the first of these objections, it may be observed that the precise period of man's creation is a matter of little moment to the Christian faith. The received chronology may, or may not, be erroneous; man may have existed 20,000 years ago instead of 6,000; the difference would in nowise affect the religious aspect of the question. It might throw some doubt upon the accuracy of the Biblical narrative as regards matters of chronology, or rather perhaps of current interpretations of the narrative, but this is all. It is therefore unnecessary to inquire how far geological or other evidence tends to invalidate, or to establish, the apparent meaning of Scripture on this point. It is otherwise with the objections last named. If mankind did not spring from a single pair, the truth of the narrative is substantially affected; the subsequent statements of the Old Testament (Gen. ix. 19; x. 32; Deut. xxxii. 8; Mal. ii. 10) are convicted of error; S. Paul was mistaken when he declared that God 'made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth' (Acts xvii. 26); the doctrine of original sin becomes involved in difficulties; and the corresponding doctrine of restitution by One man, the Head of redeemed humanity, redeemed out of all nations and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), loses its significance. But when we examine the proofs alleged, they seem of no great stringency. It is chiefly the colour of the skin, or diversities in the shape or size of the skull, in the protuberance or depression of certain parts of the body, or in the degrees of mental and moral culture which different races of men exhibit, on which the stress is laid. There is, no doubt, a marked difference between the physical and mental characteristics of the negro or the bushman and the European; but are they specific? Are they such as it is impossible to account for by the gradual influence of climate or modes of living; by variations in the type at first slight but afterwards more marked, as two diverging lines, however small the initial angle, soon place a great distance between each other? Until ethnology is able to frame a positive answer to these questions, we must hesitate to accept its surmises as subversive of the express statements of Scripture. Amidst all the varieties of race the essential organs of the body are found the same, and so is the moral nature, though its voice may be silenced, or utter a perverted verdict. Everywhere men think,

reason, feel, alike. Under auspicious circumstances, the intellect of the negro has proved itself equal to that of the European. Everywhere, too, where the light of the Gospel has not penetrated, the moral state of man resembles the picture drawn in such sombre colours by the Apostle in Romans i. The objector may fairly be asked whether his hypothesis of several centres of creation, independent of each other, does not greatly augment the difficulty of accounting for this universal moral degradation of humanity. The entrance of sin into the world must always remain a mystery; but whereas Scripture deduces its prevalence from one act of disobedience on the part of the primeval pair, this theory has to admit a fall at every centre, the results of which unite all men in a common ruin. For distinct acts of creation are not denied; the different races are not supposed, as of old, to have sprung out of the ground: and as each pair must be supposed to have been created, like Adam and Eve, in the image of God, each must have fallen from this original righteousness in order to account for the existing state of man. To say the least, the Scriptural account has the advantage in point of simplicity.

Still more opposed to revelation is the theory which has received the name of Evolutionism. According to it there is no need for the interposition of a creative fiat to account for the variety of existing species, with man at their head: all has proceeded by a natural law of development. From a dark abyss of life, a Miltonic chaos without form, gradually emerged, through vast periods of time, a few primitive types; and these, through the instinct of self-preservation and the survival of the fittest, in the lapse of further vast periods, separated themselves into the species of plants and animals which we now see; each ascending in the scale of complex organisation until we reach the summit, the human race. We behold, therefore, in the ape, or the gorilla, our ancestors of a remote generation. The scientific merits, or validity, of this theory must be left to natural philosophers to estimate; it cannot be said, in its grosser form at least, to have gained universal acceptance even amongst these. We may ask, How did life first come to be breathed at all into a germ of lifeless matter? and we may remark that, as far as observation extends, while species have become extinct, no instance occurs of the transmutation of one into another.* The attempts to combine species have resulted, as is well known, in sterility. Its inconsistency with Scripture is our immediate concern. Scripture tells us, with marked emphasis, that God made everything on the

* Whatever diversity there may be, and there sometimes is great diversity, among the individuals of a species, this does not constitute a *new species*.

earth after its kind (Gen. i. 24-5), but this theory leaves no room for the agency of a personal Creator after the first production of matter; Scripture establishes a specific distinction between man and the inferior animals in that he was created in the image of God, and endowed with the capacity of knowing, loving, and serving God, but this theory makes the difference one only of degree, and the religious faculty an accident of human nature, not its distinguishing characteristic.

§ 31. *Dichotomy or Trichotomy?*

From an early period it has been a subject of debate whether Scripture ascribes a dipartite or a tripartite nature to man. Plato, it is well known, considered the soul as consisting of three parts (*τὸ λογιστικὸν* the undying, *τὸ θυμοειδὲς* and *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν* the mortal); but as he did not consider the body an essential part of man, his division is a mere logical one, and has little bearing on the present subject. A nearer approach to Scripture appears in Plotinus, who made man to consist of *σῶμα*, *ψυχὴ*, and *νοῦς*. Probably the earlier Greek Fathers, especially those of Alexandria, were influenced by these philosophic speculations, and Clement, Justin Martyr, and others,* drew a distinction between the soul and the spirit of man; and for some time Trichotomy was the prevailing doctrine of the Eastern Church. But the use made of it by Apollinaris, who substituted the Logos for the human spirit in Christ, led to a suspicion of its tendency, and the simpler view of a dipartite nature, body and soul, began to take its place.† In the West this latter from the first prevailed. Tertullian rejected the tripartite division,‡ and was followed by Augustine,§ whose authority in this, as in other points, became decisive.

* Irenæus is commonly quoted as holding this opinion, but it is doubtful whether by 'Spirit' he did not mean the Holy Ghost, and whether he did not confine 'Spirit' in this sense to the pious. See Mosheim's note on Cudworth, c. v. s. 3.

† *Μᾶς δὲ φύσεως λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅνυχ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα μᾶς ἐστὶ φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁμοίως ἕκαστος ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ σῶμα, καὶ ἕκαστος δὴ φύσεως ἔχει* (J. Damasc. Dial. cont. Manich. 42).

‡ 'Si separas animum et spiritum, separa et opera. Si duo sunt anima et spiritus, dividi possunt: ergo duo non sunt, quæ dividi non possunt' (De Anima, c. x.).

§ 'Sicut ergo video, interiorem hominem vis esse animam; intimum, spiritum: tanquam et ipse interior sit animæ, sicut illa corpori. Itane nondum respicis quanta te absurdissima consequantur cum animam conaris asseverare corpoream? Apostolus quidem, præter interiorem et exteriorem non video quod sciat alium interioris interiorem' (De Anima, lib. iv. c. 20). Augustine, as we have seen (§ 28), finds in the faculties of the mind (or soul) an illustration of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; but as he takes no account here of the body, it is not a tripartite division of man.

According to the *usus loquendi* of Scripture, both in the Old and in the New Testament, the word 'soul' (ψυχή) signifies not merely the animal life,* but the whole man, no doubt however with an especial reference to his inward nature. 'Let every soul,' S. Paul writes, 'be subject to the higher powers' (Rom. xiii. 1). It is also used of the immaterial part of man as distinguished from his corporeal, as when our Lord contrasts soul with body (Matt. x. 28), and speaks of His 'own soul as sorrowful even unto death' (*ibid.* xxvi. 38). Soul and body is the usual division of man's nature in Scripture, which thus appears to favour dichotomy. But there are passages in which not only is the word 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) used for soul, but in which a trichotomy seems distinctly intimated. The former are easily explicable. When the dying Stephen commends his spirit (πνεῦμα) to Christ (Acts vii. 59), or when we read of the spirits (πνεύμασι) of just men made perfect (Heb. xii. 23), or of the spirits in prison (1 Peter iii. 19), it is obvious that 'spirit' means in such passages the same as the more ordinary term 'soul,' viz., the immaterial part of man when separate from the body: the distinction, if any, seems to be that soul is spirit in union with the body, spirit is soul in a separate state of existence. Spirit expresses the essential nature of the soul, which it has in common with the angels and with God Himself who is described as spirit (John iv. 24); its immateriality therefore, and its power to survive the stroke of death. Soul is spirit embodied.† But from the interchange of the terms it is plain that no essential distinction is intended. The other passages present more difficulty. S. Paul prays for the Thessalonians that their 'whole body, soul, and spirit may be preserved blameless' unto the coming of Christ (1 Thess. v. 23); and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews the Word of God is described as 'piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, joints and marrow' (Heb. iv. 12): in either case a trichotomy seems to be implied. But if, as even the advocates of this view admit,‡ soul and spirit do not form distinct elements of man's immaterial nature—that is, are separable only in thought, so that we never can conceive of man's soul without spirit, or his spirit without soul—what after all do these Biblical expressions describe but the same essence under different aspects, and in different relations? It is to be noted that in the

* It is frequently used for this: e.g. Matt. ii. 20; xx. 28; Mark iii. 4; Rom. xi. 3; Phil. ii. 30.

† In the Apocalypse the souls (ψυχὰς) of the martyrs underneath the altar (vi. 9), and of those who had been beheaded for Christ's sake (xx. 4), are seen in vision by the apostle: but it is doubtful whether the word in these passages is not to be taken in its Hebrew signification of 'persons'; so that the 'souls' were seen invested with bodily form.

‡ Heard, 'Tripartite Nature of Man,' c. vii. Delitzsch Psych. ii. s. 4.

New Testament whenever the word 'spirit,' or 'spiritual,' is used in reference to Christians, there is an implied reference also to the Holy Ghost who dwells in them; as appears most plainly in the distinction which the Apostle draws between the mere 'natural' (unregenerate) man (ψυχικός) and the regenerate man (πνευματικός) (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). The natural man has a soul with all its essential faculties; but inasmuch as it is only active towards the world and self, while it is inactive towards God and spiritual things, the man himself takes his position accordingly. In this state the faculty of the soul which distinguishes it from that of the brutes, viz. of knowing and loving God, is not indeed lost or extinct, but it is dormant, and cannot be roused into activity without a special influence from above. As soon as this takes place, and the soul's relation to God becomes its governing one, the man assumes another name, and becomes a πνευματικός. But the name appears given him not to denote philosophical distinctions, or because there was originally implanted in him a πνεῦμα as well as a ψυχή, but because the author of the new spiritual life is no other than the Holy Ghost Himself. There is no objection to this faculty of the one indivisible soul, when thus quickened from above, being called the πνεῦμα; and in fact the inspired writers do so call it, and so far are trichotomic; but it may be doubted whether they mean to establish an essential tripartite nature of man. They write theologically, not as natural philosophers. When S. Jude describes certain persons as 'sensual' (ψυχικοί), 'having not the spirit' (πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες) (verse 19), he can hardly have meant that they were lacking in an essential constituent of human nature, but rather (as our translators rightly perceived) that they had not the Spirit of God. S. Paul therefore in Thess. v. 23, prays that the whole Christian may be sanctified; his body in the connection of its members with the world, his soul in its twofold relation, as related to the same world sensitively, morally, intellectually, and as related towards God spiritually (σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα); and more seems hardly capable of being drawn from the passage. The Word of God (Heb. iv. 12), like a sharp sword, pierces to the discovering of sin in the inner man, not only as the latter is related to the world (ψυχή), but as it is related to God (πνεῦμα); dissects and judges the very new nature itself: both so keenly that it is as if a sword penetrated not merely up to the bone, but through it to the marrow.* On the whole, it seems that the word 'soul' in Scripture

* Bleek's interpretation of this passage is here followed: according to which the 'dividing asunder' applies not to the separation of soul from spirit, but to the dissecting of each. The 'joints and marrow' seem to be merely an illustration drawn from the bodily frame. See Bleek, Hebräer-brief *ad loc.*

means one spiritual essence, but endowed with diverse faculties, and capable of being viewed in different relations: technically (if we may so speak) this essence, so long as it is unrenewed, is called $\psi\chi\eta$; when born again of the Spirit it is called $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$; but the essence itself, or substratum, remains one and the same.*

§ 32. Image of God—Original Righteousness.

According to the inspired writer, man was created in the image and after the likeness of God (Gen. i. 26); what are we to understand by these expressions? Was the body, or the soul of man, or both together, the seat of this likeness? Those who, like Tertullian, invested God Himself with a certain corporeity,† supposed that the body was framed thereafter; but this conception was too gross to hold its ground in the Church,‡ though it was revived in the tenth century by the obscure sect of the Anthropomorphites. Others, with more reason, saw in the words a prophetic allusion to the Incarnation; Christ's body being the prototype after which man's was formed. But there are difficulties connected with this view. Our Lord's body while He was upon earth can hardly be called the pattern after which Adam's was created; and as regards His *glorified* body, the true ideal of humanity, S. Paul draws a distinction in this point between the first and the second Adam: the former, he tells us, was made 'a living soul,' the latter 'a quickening spirit;' the first man 'was of the earth, earthy,' the second man 'the Lord from heaven' (1 Cor. xv. 45-7). Even if this description be held to refer to Adam fallen, not to Adam as he came from the hand of the Creator, it seems to imply that the glorified body of Christ is something specifically different from that in which Adam was created, and that even if Adam had never fallen, some change must have taken place in his bodily organisation in order to its becoming 'a spiritual body;' which, no doubt, may have been his final destination. Although, therefore, the body may

* 'Non quæritur an possint aliqua ratione distingui corpus, anima, et spiritus in homine regenito, sed an spiritus sit tertia pars essentialis hominis; prius concedimus, posterius negamus. Disting. inter animam consideratam prout informat corpus, et sic vocatur anima, et prout a Spiritu Sancto est renovata, et sic appellatur spiritus, John iii. 6; Rom. viii. 9, 10.' (Quenstedt, p. i. c. 12, q. 2).

† 'Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est' (De Car. Christi, c. xi.). 'Quis negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in effigie' (Adv. Prax. c. vii.).

‡ 'Non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sed secundum rationalem mentem. Cogitatio quippe turpiter vana est, quæ opinatur Deum membrorum corporalium lineamentis circumscribi atque finiri' (Aug. De Trin. lib. xii. c. 12).

have to some extent represented (as the heathen poets observed),* or shared in (as, *e.g.*, in the matter of immortality), this dignity, yet primarily the image of God must be supposed to have belonged to the soul, and to have consisted in those features in which the soul bore a resemblance to its Creator.

The first of these, and the foundation of all the rest, was the gift of personality, or self-consciousness—the consciousness of what we call ourselves, and of its unbroken continuity amidst the various changes, mental and bodily, which we undergo, and the power of making it a subject of reflection. The lower animals appear either to be wanting in this faculty, or to possess it only in a very limited measure. God is a Spirit—absolute Personality; man possesses derived and relative personality. But this cannot be supposed to exhaust the notion of the image of God, for the fallen angels have not lost the gift of personality though they have lost the image. The Protestant Confessions therefore, as we have seen, on the neutral basis of personality, build the further conclusion that the first man was created in a state of moral perfection, and, as this could not exist without fellowship with God, in a state in which the knowledge, fear, and love of God existed without any intervening cloud of sin.† This doctrine was worked out in detail. The natural appetites were perfectly subject to the law of reason, so that no conflict could arise between them. Adam's knowledge of God was not like ours, partial and obscure (1 Cor. xiii. 12), but direct and full; his holiness had no stain; his will was coincident with the Divine.‡ Secondary prerogatives were immortality, and dominion over the other creatures; to the latter of which exclusively the Socinians reduce the idea of the image of God.

Substantially the theologians were in the right; for it is impossible to conceive any positive imperfection in that which a God of infinite holiness pronounced, when He beheld it, very good (Gen. i. 31). But it may be a question whether they sufficiently distinguished between the perfection of an initial state and that of

* 'Pronaque cum spectent animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, cælum que tueri
Jussit, et evectos ad sidera tollere vultus.'

Ovid.

† 'Justitia originalis habitura erat non solum æquale temperamentum qualitatū corporis, sed etiam hæc dona, notitiā Dei certiolem, timorem Dei, fiduciam Dei, aut certe rectitudinem et vim ista efficiendi' (Apol. Conf. c. i. 17).

‡ 'Perfectiones principales, imaginem Dei constituentes, fuerunt: excellens scientia intellectus, perfecta sanctitas et libertas voluntatis, sincera puritas appetitus sensitivi, et suavissimus quasi concentus affectuum, cum dictamine intellectus et regimine voluntatis, sapientiae, sanctitati, et puritati Dei, pro captu hominis primi, conformes' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. 1, q. 15).

a final one : between virtue, as it were, in the crude material, and virtue confirmed through trial and victory over evil ; between the natural impulse and the habit, the latter being usually formed by repeated acts of will. That Adam's original righteousness needed such a confirmation may be inferred from the trial to which he was actually subjected ; and that it was not guaranteed from diminution or loss, is equally evident from the result of the trial. It was an inchoate righteousness, yet perfect of its kind ; and had he withstood the temptation, it would have proceeded to a higher quality, until at length the probation being complete, the possibility of not sinning would have been exchanged for the impossibility of sinning. This relative imperfection of his original state no more implies a positive defect than the essential sinlessness of Christ excluded the possibility of His being tempted, and not only so, but the necessity of it in order to His being 'perfected' in His capacity of Redeemer (Heb. ii. 10 ; v. 9).

Like the second Adam, the first had to emerge from a condition of unconscious innocence, not knowing good or evil (*i.e.*, the distinction between them), and to be confronted by a prohibition ; to be solicited to disregard it, and to undergo an effort in resisting the temptation ; and all up to this point without actual sin, or even concupiscence : only thus could the righteousness of a being endowed with free-will become an inalienable possession. The issue in either case is a comment on the Apostle's words, that 'the first man was of the earth, earthy ; the second Man was the Lord from heaven.'

All the Protestant Confessions agree in describing the original state of man as not one of indifference between good and evil, still less of actual sin and its concomitant death ; they agree too in denying the necessity of a fall, whether through the weakness of the nature thus created, or as a step towards the realizing its idea. And in the former point they dissent from the doctrine of the Romish Church, that original righteousness was not natural to Adam, but a superadded gift, *gratia gratum faciens*, which might be and was withdrawn at the fall, and yet leave man in no worse a position than Adam was in before he received the gift.

The source of this doctrine is to be sought in the Pelagian tendencies which prevailed in the Western Church in the Middle Ages, and which naturally aimed at extenuating the effects of the fall. It found a congenial home in the scholastic theology, and appears therein under a twofold form : some, as Duns Scotus and his followers, holding that the gift was conferred subsequently to man's creation ;* others, as Aquinas and his school, making it coincident

* These therefore are the real predecessors of the Romish doctrine : Thomas Aquinas approaches more nearly to the Protestant. See next note.

therewith.* But both agreed in considering it a matter of 'grace,' *i.e.* not of nature, something added over and above to the nature considered in and by itself. The Council of Trent, having regard to this difference of view, avoided in its decree on the subject the use of the word 'created,' substituting for it 'constituted;' and indeed the real point in controversy can hardly be gathered from its decisions.† The Catechism of the Council is more explicit: 'As for the soul of man, God formed it after His image and likeness, and conferred upon it the power of free-will; the appetites and impulses of the soul He so attempered that they should always obey the dictates of reason. Then He added the excellent gift of original righteousness, etc.‡ The image of God in Adam is here described as something separable from his original righteousness; and if so, it may remain in man after, through the fall, he has lost the latter gift. Bellarmin, as is his wont, expounds without reserve the doctrine of his Church, and pushes it to its consequences. Man, he observes, consists of flesh as well as spirit, and these are naturally opposed the one to the other; consequently, from the very nature of matter, a strife must have arisen between the opposite inclinations, which could only be kept under by the 'golden rein' of the superadded gift of original righteousness. This lost by the fall, the strife which had been forcibly repressed immediately recommenced; and this is now our present condition. But as it could not have been called sin in Adam, but only the inevitable result of his compound nature, so it cannot be called sin in us; and the Creator is no more accountable for it than the smith is accountable for the rust which accumulates on the sword he has made; not he, but the material is in fault. (Bellarmin overlooks the fact that the smith does not create his material; could he do so, he would make it proof against rust.) The conclusion is, that Adam, apart from the superadded gift, was precisely what fallen man now is, and fallen man what Adam would have been but for that gift; if the

* 'Quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia ei fuit collata, antequam peccasset. Plurimæ autem sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentie gratiam habuisse. Sed quod fuerit etiam conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud (Eccles. vii. 29), Deus fecit hominem rectum' (Sum. Theol. p. i. q. 95, art. 1).

† 'Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso transgressus fuisset, statim sanctitatem, et justitiam in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse . . . anathema sit' (Sess. v. 1).

‡ 'Quod autem ad animum pertinet, eum ad imaginem et similitudinem suam formavit, liberumque ei arbitrium tribuit: omnes præterea motus animi atque appetitiones ita in eo temperavit ut rationis imperio nunquam non paterent. Tum originalis justitiæ admirabile donum addidit' (De Symb. art. i. s. 22).

image of God and free-will belonged to Adam *in puris naturalibus*, they equally belong now to his posterity.*

Apart from the ulterior object of this doctrine, viz., to exalt unduly the spiritual powers of *fallen* man, it may seem to be more a question of words than anything else. For, on the one side, it is admitted that, though Adam may be conceived as created *in puris naturalibus*, his condition never was actually such; the gift of original righteousness having been added at once to the morally indifferent substratum of nature. And on the other side, the Protestant, it is admitted that an image of God still in some respects, and partially, exists in man; it is blurred, and in its chief characteristic obliterated, but there remain vestiges (*reliquiæ*) of it;† thus much must be conceded from Scripture itself, which, in Gen. ix. 6 and James iii. 9, presupposes even in fallen man an image, or remains of an image, of God. Personality and conscience have not been extinguished by the fall. Nevertheless, the doctrine must be pronounced both exegetically and dogmatically erroneous. Exegetically, for it is founded on a distinction between the words ‘image’ and ‘likeness;’ the former, it is argued, signifying the abstract nature, the latter the more positive idea of resemblance;‡ which distinction is not borne out by the usage of Scripture.§ Dogmatically, for it represents God as creating an intelligent nature which needed a remedy for inherent defects, defects which *now*, when the remedy is removed,

* ‘Sciendum est hominem naturaliter constare ex carne et spiritu . . . ex his autem diversis, vel contrariis propensionibus existere in uno eodemque homine pugnam quandam, et ex ea pugna ingentem bene agendi difficultatem, dum una propensio alteram impedit; et divinam providentiam initio creationis ut remedium adhiberet huic morbo, seu languori naturæ humanæ, *qui ex conditione materiæ oriebatur*, addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam vid. originalem, quæ velut aureo quodam fræno pars inferior parti superiori subjecta contineretur. Et quia donum illud supernaturale erat, eo remoto, natura humana sibi relicta pugnam illam experiri cæpit partis inferioris cum superiore, quæ naturalis futura erat, id est, ex conditione materiæ sequutura, nisi Deus donum homini addidisset. Non ex intentione conditoris, sed ex conditione materiæ, quale vitium est in gladio ferreo subjectum esse rubigini’ (De Grat. Prim. Hom. c. v.).

† ‘Non sublatum est quidem homini intellectus, non erepta ei voluntas, et prorsus in lapidem aut truncum est commutatus’ (Conf. Helv. c. ix.).

‡ ‘Quod legimus Gen. i., creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, communis expositio Patrem ita accipiendum docet ut Imago ad naturam intelligentiæ et voluntatis, similitudo ad sapientiam et justitiam referatur’ (Bellarm. De Grat. Prim. Hom. c. ii.).

§ In Gen. i. 27, the word ‘likeness’ is omitted; so it is in Gen. v. 1. Adam is said (*ibid.* verse 3), to have begotten a son ‘in his own likeness, after his image.’ ‘Similitudinis vocem ἐξῆγητικῶς accipiendum esse statuimus’

(J. Gerh. loc. ix. c. 1, s. 18. The LXX. translate לְצַדִּיק and תְּבִלָּה by the same Greek word.

lead inevitably to sin; which seems, not indirectly, to make God the author of sin. This difficulty cannot be evaded by alleging 'the condition of matter;' unless, indeed, it is held that matter existed independently of God, and He had to make the best of a bad material. If matter was created, on whom is the fault of its being able to resist and overcome the spirit to be laid? But further, it seems an error at all to introduce the idea of 'grace,' or supernatural aid, into that of the original state of man, except in the sense in which all gifts of God, therefore creation itself, are of grace. This is an error from which Protestant divines themselves are not free, as, *e.g.*, when they speak of 'sacraments' in paradise. Grace, in Scripture, means free favour, or free aid, to the fallen; the term is inapplicable to Adam's state before the fall. To apply it to Adam unfallen, is to transfer the religion of redemption into Paradise, a state with which it has nothing to do. Nor does there seem occasion to admit that, though the notion of a superadded gift is to be rejected, Adam may have been favoured with special gracious influences of the Holy Spirit;* nor does it seem safe to argue to Adam's original state from such passages as Ephes. iv. 24 and Col. iii. 10, in which the 'new man' of the regenerate is said to be formed after the image of God. The work and the result of regenerating grace must be considered as of another and a higher quality than that of original righteousness: it is more than a mere restitution. The error of the Romish Church consists in transferring the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, which is strictly supernatural, to the natural creation of man, where it could have no place, and must necessarily give rise to unfounded theories.†

* 'Quamvis enim negemus justitiam originalem fuisse donum aliquod supernaturale, ex eo tamen ἀπαδείκτως infert Bellarminus nos plane nulla supernaturalia dona in primo homine agnoscere. Fuit certe Adamus ante lapsum pulcherrimum Spiritus Sancti templum, et totius Spiritus Sanctæ Trinitatis domicilium' (J. Gerh. loc. x. c. 2, s. 79).

† Both Bishop Bull and Bishop Jeremy Taylor, in their treatises on original sin, approach the boundary line, if they do not pass over it, which separates the Protestant view of man's original state from the Romish: and from the same cause, viz., that they consider the unfallen state of Adam as a merely negative one, which would not of itself have conducted him to eternal felicity without the supernatural graces of the Holy Spirit. 'Our first parents, besides the seeds of natural virtue and religion sown in their minds, in their very creation, and besides the natural innocence and rectitude, wherein also they were created, were endowed with certain *gifts and powers supernatural* by the Spirit of God; and in these gifts their perfection consisted' (Bull, 'State of Man before the Fall'). 'The effect of this consideration is this, that all the product of Adam's sin was by despoiling him, and consequently us, of all the *superadditions and graces* brought upon his nature. Even that which was threatened to him, and in the narrative of that sad story expressed to be his punishment, was no lessening of his nature, but *despoiling him of his supernaturals*' (J. Taylor, 'Doctrine of Original Sin,' chap. vii. p. 1). The infer-

According to the Protestant view, original righteousness, in the sense of perfect conformity to the will and law of God, was natural to the first man before his fall; natural, not as constituting the essence of his nature, for this remains in fallen man, but as belonging to the conception of it, which the Creator framed to Himself in intending to create it. Hence it is described as 'a debt to the nature;' it was due to it, regard being had to the archetype in the Divine mind, and to the end proposed, eternal felicity, which could not be attained without it.* How otherwise, indeed, could it have been transmitted to Adam's posterity, as no doubt it would have been, had he not sinned? Supernatural grace cannot be tied to such a law. The distinction, therefore, which Protestant theologians draw between the 'essential' and the 'accidental' image of God† in man, must not be misunderstood as a concession to the Romish doctrine: it is merely another mode of saying that man has not ceased to be man because he has lost original righteousness; that this latter was not so much a right nature, as rectitude of nature.‡ It was a quality, and so far accidental as all qualities must be; but the same Word of power which said, 'Let us make man' (Gen. i. 26), made him also in the moral image of God. Since the impossibility of sinning now comes to man first through Christ, to this extent Adam's original state may be admitted to have been an imperfect one.

§ 33. Freedom—Immortality.

With personality, or the faculty of self-consciousness, free-will, or the power of self-determination, is necessarily connected; and

ences which Taylor draws are such as might be expected; that Adam's un-fallen state is ours, if we set aside some disadvantages brought upon us by his fall; that Adam had 'concupiscence' as well before the fall as after, and therefore the mere fact of having it does not constitute *us* sinners; that the proper idea of original sin consists in *imputation* not *inherency*: in all which he approaches the received doctrine of the Romish Church. Bishop Bull, though agreeing with J. Taylor in the principle that the grace of the Holy Spirit was necessary to Adam's attainment of eternal life, is more cautious in his other statements. But the transfer of the Holy Spirit and His graces to the paradisaical state is the error common to both.

* 'Primo homini naturalis fuit, quia per creationem cum ipsa hominis natura esse cæpit; adeo que ipsi *tum debita*, tum penitissime infixæ fuit, juxta atque naturam hominis *integri*, ad obtinendum finem ipsius intime perfecit' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. 1, q. 20).

† 'Distinguitur inter substantiam hominis seu materiem ipsam, et id quod substantiæ hominis tanquam *ἐπόμενον* aliquod arctissime adhæret, et illam accidentaliter, tamen intrinsece perficit. Imago Dei non est homo sed in homine, h.e. non est homini substantialis sive essentialis, sed accidentalis' (Quenstedt, p. ii. c. 1, q. 4).

‡ 'Non fuit natura recta, sed rectitudo naturæ' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. i, q. 7).

accordingly Adam must be supposed to have had this endowment conferred upon him. His obedience was neither that of external compulsion, nor did it proceed from blind instinct as in the lower animals; it was the result of choice. But, his nature being supposed to have remained in its integrity, the choice was a matter of moral necessity; just as there is a moral necessity of the elect angels acting according to the will of God, while acting with perfect freedom. His freedom was a real, and not merely a formal, one; not the equilibrium of a moral neutrality, but the freedom of the will from the bondage under which it now labours. Man still has will, but it is biassed by tendencies which he has no natural power to overcome; in Adam's original condition there was no such impediment. Yet he was capable of temptation as Christ Himself was; and as his righteousness was merely that of the first creation, it did not include the impossibility of his being overcome by the temptation; it was a *posse non peccare*, not a *non posse peccare*. The former denotes his advantage over his posterity, the latter the prerogative of the future glorified Church.*

Was Adam created free from the law of mortality? It seems so. He was not created immortal, as the event proved; immortality, in its absolute sense, belongs to God alone (1 Tim. vi. 16); but he was created with the possibility of not dying. To suppose that he was subject to death in the course of nature would be inconsistent with the whole spirit of the Mosaic narrative, and not less so with the Apostolic doctrine that death is the consequence and the penalty of sin (Rom. v. 12). Geology proves that death reigned over the inferior creation long before the appearance of man, but the extension of this reign to the human race must be considered as something abnormal. On the other hand, a so-called 'natural immortality' can hardly be maintained, even when the phrase is applied, as it usually is, to the soul alone. Scripture supposes that the soul survives its separation from the body, but on the question of its inherent immortality it is silent; the body too, in one sense, survives its separation from the soul, for no particle of matter is ever annihilated. Butler has done his best for the philosophical argument, but probably most readers of the 'Analogy' have felt that the first chapter is the least satisfactory of that celebrated treatise. An uncompounded substance cannot indeed perish by dissolution, but this does not prove that it may not perish in some other way; *e.g.* by the

* 'Ante lapsum rectus nimirum (homo) et liber, qui et in bono manere, et ad malum potuit declinare' (Conf. Helv. c. ix.). 'In utramque partem flexibilis erat ejus voluntas, nec data erat ad perseverandum constantia' (Calv. Inst. lib. i. c. xv. 8).

exhaustion of its vital forces. Surmises and probabilities on this subject are one thing, assurance is another; and from no quarter does assurance come of immortality in the true sense but from the Gospel of Christ, and this includes that of the body as well as that of the soul. Adam was capable of death, but it was his destination not to die, as is clearly intimated by the appointment of the tree of life in Paradise. Whatever we are to understand by it, it was plainly the symbol and means of immortality; and from the prohibition to partake of it after the fall, it must be inferred that previously thereto it would have been a prophylactic against disease and death. On the future that awaited Adam and his posterity, if sin had not entered, Scripture throws a veil. The common opinion is that the paradisaical state would in due time have been exchanged for a heavenly; that men would have put on, by a painless process, the spiritual body in which Adam was certainly not created (1 Cor. xv. 47), but which was intended for him; and that successive generations would have been thus translated after their appointed sojourn on earth.* It may, however, be doubted whether this is not an instance of the common tendency to confound creation with redemption, by adapting what the Apostle teaches respecting the change which those who shall be alive at Christ's coming must undergo (1 Cor. xv. 51), to the state of man before the fall.

§ 34. *Traducianism or Creationism?*

An essential distinction between the original state of man and that of the redeemed in Christ is that in the former the bodily life was sustained by natural means, and the race propagated by natural descent (Gen. i. 28); while 'in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven' (Matt. xxii. 30). In connection with the doctrine of original sin, which, as our Article declares, is an inherited defect, and not a mere imitation of Adam, and which has its primary seat in the soul, it became in early times a debated question whether the soul, like the body, is propagated from parent to child, or whether a special act of creation implants it in each individual. The former is the Traducianist, the latter the Creationist theory.

Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls, which he considered were created simultaneously with the angels, is well

* 'Quia Adam integer animale[m] vixisset vitam, cibo ac quiete fovendam, et generationi sobolis idoneam, non fuisset in vitam æternam translatus sine mutatione corporis terreni in conditionem spiritualem, quæ tamen sine omni doloris sensu fuisset futura' (Quenstedt, p. ii. c. 1, q. 6).

known; it has been revived in modern times by such philosophers as Kant and Schelling, and such theologians as J. Müller, who applies it to explain the doctrine of original sin.* But, on account of its foreign origin (the Platonic philosophy), and its lack of Scriptural foundation, it never obtained general recognition in the Church. Traducianism found a strong defender in Tertullian,† as might have been expected, from his inability to conceive spiritual substance, not excluding God Himself, without corporeity of some sort; and according to Jerome, it was the prevailing tenet of the Western Church,‡ though he himself inclined to the other view.§ Augustine confesses that he could arrive at no certain conclusion on the subject; and contents himself with pointing out the difficulty of explaining the inherited taint of sin on the Creationist hypothesis.|| T. Aquinas makes a distinction between the ‘sensitive’ soul and the ‘intellectual;’ the former he holds to be propagated, the latter to be created.¶ After the Reformation the Lutheran Church became almost exclusively Traducianist, while the Reformed, for the most part, adopted the Creationist theory.

The question must be cleared from the ambiguity which attaches to the word ‘creation,’ accordingly as it is used in its strict, or in a looser sense. In its strict sense it denotes production out of nothing (*creatio prima*),** secondary causes being excluded; and this is what is intended in Creationism. But it is sometimes applied to the Divine co-operation with secondary causes in the propagation of existing species (*creatio mediata*), and in this lower sense it is not denied by the Traducianists. The Divine co-operation, they admit, is necessary to the act of propagation; but it exercises itself through that act, just as in other species of animals; the soul does not come into existence through a simple fiat of the Almighty. The Creationists, on the other hand, dispense in the matter with secondary agency. Both parties appeal to Scripture, but with no very certain result. On the Creationist side reference is made to Gen. ii. 7; which proves, indeed, that of the *first* man the soul was created *ex nihilo*; but,

* In his elaborate treatise, *Lehre von der Sünde*, b. iii. a. 1, c. 4.

† ‘Simulne conflata utriusque substantia corporis animæque, an altera earum præcedente? Immo simul ambas et concipi et confici et perfici dicimus’ (De Anim. c. xxvii.)

‡ ‘Maximam partem occidentalium in ea sententia fuisse’ (Ep. ad Marcell.).

§ ‘Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas’ (Ep. ad Pam.).

|| ‘His igitur quantum pro tempore potuimus pertractatis, omnia paria vel pene paria ex utroque latere rationum testimoniumque momenta pronuntiarum, nisi eorum sententia qui animas ex parentibus creari putant, de baptismo parvulorum præponderaret’ (De Gen. ad Lit. lib. x. 39).

¶ Summa, pars i. q. 118, aa. 1 and 2.

** See § 21.

as one of the ablest defenders of the theory himself admits, decides nothing as to the souls of his descendants;* for in like manner the body of Adam was formed directly by God out of the dust, and yet it is admitted on both sides that our present bodies come into existence by propagation. Also to Eccles. xii. 7 ('and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it'), which does not define *how* God gives it; and, above all, to Heb. xii. 9, which describes God as the 'Father of spirits,' as distinguished from the 'fathers of our flesh.' But it is doubtful whether this latter passage will bear such an interpretation. The fathers of our flesh are our earthly fathers, and by flesh is meant not the body alone, but the whole man: the 'Father of spirits' is God, so called because He is the Creator of purely spiritual beings (the angels) as well as of men, and especially because the regenerate man (πνευματικός) stands through Christ in a filial relation to God.† It is very improbable that by the word 'spirits' should be meant souls as distinguished from bodies. Yet in a modified sense Creationism may find a support in the passage. Whatever is spiritual, whether in essence (as that of angels), or by the new birth (as in the regenerate), bears a special relation to God as its Author; who, therefore, in the case of the human soul, may be supposed as specially co-operating with the secondary instruments. But more than this does not seem to be contained in it. To supply the place of Scripture-evidence recourse is had to philosophical considerations. If the soul is propagated, it must be from both parents or from one; and again, in its totality or in part only. If from both, two souls would coalesce into one, which is absurd; if from one, the other would be excluded from the process. If the soul is propagated in its totality, the parents would be left without one; if in part, then it is divisible. It must be propagated either from the body or the soul (of the parents); if the former, it is material, if the latter, the difficulty just mentioned recurs. The soul is not immortal if it does not exist independently (*per se*); but it cannot thus exist if it is propagated.‡ The Traducianists found little difficulty in replying to these arguments. Both parents, they said, are here considered as but one cause, for propagation cannot take place without both. Not the soul alone, or the body is propagated, but the whole man: it is a maxim in the schools of philosophy, *generationem esse totius compositi*. Neither does the soul of the parent, nor any

* Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat. lib. iv. c. 11.

† The author of the Epistle seems to have had before his eyes the LXX. translation of Num. xvi. 22: Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός. See Bleek on the passage.

‡ Bellarmine, *l. c.* Compare Turretin, loc. v. q. 13.

part of it, pass into the child ; it is endowed with a prolific power by force of the Divine command and blessing, 'Be fruitful and multiply,' etc. The posterity of Adam, if he had stood, would have been immortal, even as regards their bodies, though there is no doubt these would have come into being by propagation : immortality, therefore, and being propagated are not incompatible.* But they were less successful in explaining their own view ; and were compelled to fall back upon negations,† or upon the incomprehensibility of the process,‡ or, after all, upon physical conceptions.§ A favourite illustration was that of a torch communicating light to a torch ; but this involves physical separation.

Traducianism is most in accordance with the language of Scripture, as when Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness, after his image (Gen. v. 3) ; which can hardly refer to the body merely. It seems also to agree better with S. Paul's doctrine of the first and the second Adam, as the respective heads of fallen and regenerate humanity. It may appeal to the creation of Eve, which was not like Adam's, *ex nihilo*, but by a derivative process ;|| and to the statement of Scripture that God rested on the seventh day from works of creation (Gen. ii. 2), which, though it does not exclude the idea of *creatio mediata*, does seem to imply that creation in the strict sense then ceased ; not indeed as a power or idea inherent in the Godhead, but in reference to this world of ours. The reply that the creation of souls is not a *new* thing, because Adam's was created, seems hardly to deserve notice.¶ But above all, the Traducianist may ask, as Augustine of old, how the transmission of a sinful nature is to be explained on the other hypothesis ? If God creates each soul directly, it must be supposed pure as it comes from the Creator ; is it con-

* Gerhard, loc. ix. c. 8 ; Hollaz, p. i. c. 5.

† 'Anima filii non potest produci ab animâ patris, nec *terminative* quia terminus a quo perit producto termino ad quem ; nec *decisive* quia anima est ἀπερίστροφος ; nec *constitutive* quia anima patris non est pars constitutiva animæ filii' (Turret. lib. v. q. 13). One mode, Hollaz replies, is omitted, nempe *multiplicative et propagative*. Nam omnis anima vi benedictionis Divinæ, est sui *multiplicativa*' (p. i. c. 5).

‡ 'Modo nobis forte inexplicabili' (Gerhard, l. c.).

§ Some, according to Gerhard, held that a 'semen animatum' from the parents produced the soul ; others 'aliâ quandam vim seu entelechiam et perfectionem semini Divinitus insitam esse, qua possit animam producere' (*ibid.*).

|| Compare the Apostle's γυνή ἐξ ἀνδρός (1 Cor. xi. 8). To the Creationist objection that a material rib never could propagate a soul, it was replied that the soul is in every part of the body, and so Adam's rib was a *costa animata* (J. Gerhard. loc. ix. c. 8).

¶ Bellarmine, De Am. Grat. iv. c. 11.

sistent with His goodness to allow it to become subsequently contaminated by union with an infected body, as pure water suffers defilement by being poured into a filthy vase? Can we suppose that an immaterial substance is capable of being contaminated by a material? If, as Romanists hold, original sin is merely a defect, the loss of original righteousness, the difficulty may be lessened, but is by no means removed; for why should God implant a pure soul in a defective organisation? In short, it is difficult to see how a rigid Creationist theory can avoid making God the Author of sin. It may be added that the principal seat of sin surely is the soul, not the body; but if, as all admit, sin is transmitted from the parents, it seems as if the subject in which sin inheres must, in some inexplicable manner, share in the transmission.*

Neither hypothesis can claim either sure warranty of Scripture or ecclesiastical consent; but as pious opinions they are an expression of facts which must in some way be combined, if we are to gain an adequate view of the subject. Creationism is opposed to the tendency to consider each individual as he comes into the world a mere repetition of the type of the species, without individual characteristics or a distinct personality; or to merge the individual in the race. Our own consciousness, and the varieties of mental and moral endowment which men exhibit, testify against this notion. It is not without a ground of reason that popular language ascribes the genius of a Newton or a Shakespeare to a direct gift of heaven.† Traducianism, on the other hand, represents the principle of organic connection of the whole race under one head, the first Adam, as the leaves of a tree proceed from one stem; it refuses to consider mankind as a collection of atoms, without a common root: and it can claim not only its relative share of philosophical truth, but its agreement with the general tenour of Scripture. A modified hypothesis on either side may lead to a combination of both; which perhaps is as near an approach to truth as the subject admits of.

* It is not easy, indeed, to evade the force of Quenstedt's argument, 'Ps. li. 7 : In peccato concepit me mater mea; hinc ita argumentatur: a quibus propagatur peccatum originis, ab illis etiam propagatur ipsum *πρῶτον δεκτικόν*, sive subjectum primarium, sedesque radicalis illius, puta anima rationalis; accidentia enim sine et ante subjectum non propagantur, ubi enim accidens ibi subjectum ejus, ubi peccatum ibi et anima' (p. i. c. 12, q. 3).

† Creationism, as a mode of accounting for certain facts of human nature, must be distinguished from fantastical additions, as, *e.g.*, that the soul is infused into the body in the case of males forty days, in the case of females eighty days, after conception; which Polanus (see Ebrard's Dog. s. 260) pronounces a *communis sententia* of his time.

§ 35. *The Angels.*

From Scripture we learn that the fall of man was occasioned by a temptation proceeding from a being not of his own rank in creation ; and this seems naturally to lead to the question, What does Scripture teach respecting the order of intelligent beings thus for the first time presented to our notice ? This topic is usually treated of under the head of Creation, or that of Divine Providence, inasmuch as the angels, not less than man, declare the glory of the Creator, and are represented as His ministers in the providential administration of the world ; but as connected with the history of redemption it seems not inappropriately to claim a place between the original state of man and his fall.

In considering the nature and offices of angels, we may put aside the ethical distinction between them, as good and bad, as beneficent or malignant ; for this distinction was not an original one, but superinduced by events subsequent to their creation. As distinguished on the one hand from God, and on the other from man, both the good and the bad possess common characteristics. And it is important thus to consider them collectively, or as they were intended to be, in order to avoid the appearance of an original dualism in any department of the universe ; if there are evil angels they became such—whereas all were at first good. Moreover, the unfallen angels themselves are not in the same state as they were when created ; a change has passed over them for the better, as over the others for the worse. The question now before us is, What is an angelic nature, as such ?

We have first to ask whether a real personality is to be ascribed to the angels, or whether they are merely personifications of natural forces or phenomena, such as a rude or poetical age might invent. Our Lord and His Apostles, it is said, accommodated themselves to popular notions, but their language is not to be interpreted literally, any more than ours is when we speak of elves or fairies.* Now, it is true that the creation of the angels is rather presupposed in Scripture than expressly mentioned ; and it is also true, that in some instances they seem to be merely personifications of the power of nature, as when the Psalmist describes them as ‘spirits’ (*i.e.* winds) and as ‘flames of fire’ (Ps. civ. 4);† or when an angel is said to have endued the pool of

* Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, s. 42. Martensen allows that Christ and the Apostles occasionally speak of angels as persons, but maintains that for the most part they represent the eternal ideas which mediate between God and the actual creation (Dog. ss. 68-70).

† If indeed we are not rather to translate ‘He maketh the winds His “angels,” or instruments.’ See De Wette, *Com. Über die Pss. in loc.*

Bethesda, at certain times, with healing powers (John v. 4). But to the majority of passages no such explanation applies, for they consist chiefly of plain historical narration. Angels appear on special errands: to the Virgin (Luke i. 26), to Joseph (Matt. i. 20), to Zacharias (Luke i. 11), to the shepherds (Luke ii. 9), to the keepers of the Lord's sepulchre (Matt. xxviii. 4), to the women at the same place (Luke xxiv. 4), to Cornelius (Acts x. 3). They are mentioned as ministering to our Lord (Matt. iv. 11), and as strengthening Him in His last temptation (Luke xxii. 43). They announce to the gazing disciples their Master's ascension (Acts i. 10); they release Peter from prison (*ibid.* xii. 7); they assure Paul of safety when in danger of shipwreck (*ibid.* xxvii. 23). In the Old Testament they appear more sparingly, and not so often under their proper denomination, but still very distinctly. They guard the way of the tree of life in Paradise (Gen. iii. 24); they conduct Lot out of Sodom (*ibid.* xix. 15); they appear to Jacob on his journey (*ibid.* xxviii. 12). It is impossible to understand all this of mere poetical imagery, and the plain sense of Scripture is that they exist as a distinct order of intelligent beings. That Christ and the Apostles could have sanctioned a popular error without dropping a word of caution that they were not to be understood literally, is incredible.

The titles which these superior beings bear in Scripture are descriptive rather of their offices and qualities than of their nature. The word angel (מַלְאָכִים) signifies a messenger, or one who executes the Divine behests: poetically, they are called 'sons of God' (Job i. 6; xxxviii. 7), as, in the writer's view, specially related to God, and 'sons of the mighty' (Ps. lxxxix. 6), as excelling in strength. Cherubim and Seraphim are of the nature of proper names; the meaning and etymology are doubtful;* but to judge from the material symbols under which they are represented (Ezek. x., Is. vi.), they seem to signify dignity and might.

Angels are represented as assessors in the court of heaven (1 Kings xxii. 19), and as being very numerous (Ps. lxviii. 17; Rev. v. 11).† Gradations of rank appear to exist among them (Ephes. i. 21; Col. i. 16), though not worked out after the fanciful manner of Dionysius the Areopagite, who arrays them in nine orders, subdivided into three classes, with different functions.‡ It is an archangel that rebuked Satan (Jude 9), and who is represented as with a host of subordinate angels waging a suc-

* See Gesenius Lex. sub vv.

† The 'Angel of the Lord,' in the earlier books of Moses, must not be confounded with the angels as an order of created beings. The former was a theophany, strictly so called.

‡ Followed by J. Damasc, De F. O. lib. ii. 3, and the schoolmen generally. See T. Aquinas, i. q. 50.

cessful war with him (Apoc. xii. 7). In the later books of the Old Testament traces are found of the notion that nations have their respective tutelary archangels: thus Michael appears as the guardian angel of Israel (Dan. xii. 1).

On these notices of Scripture the statements of the theologians are founded, which it must be confessed in some instances exceed the limits of what is written. An angel is defined to be a spiritual substance, *i.e.* without body, finite, complete, and endowed with true personality.* They are finite as created beings, and complete as distinguished from the soul of man, which, though a spiritual substance, is, if separate from the body, incomplete, *i.e.* needs the body as its complement. Opinions in the Early Church varied as to the incorporeity of angels; many taught that they had bodies, but of an ethereal nature; but it was generally held that they are incorporeal.† When therefore they assumed a visible form, as in Gen. xviii., this was an accidental union, for a certain time and purpose, not part of their proper hypostasis, as the body of a man is an essential part of his nature.‡ The properties common to both good and bad angels are partly negative, such as indivisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, and illocality: as simple spiritual substances they are, like the human soul, indivisible, as such too they are invisible; they are not liable to changes which we undergo, *e.g.* they do not increase in size, nor do they grow old; they are not liable to death, nor are they confined in space like a material body. The positive properties are knowledge, freedom of will, power, endless duration, a definite whereabouts (πού, ubi), and rapidity of movement.§ These definitions seem framed to give us the conception of a being inferior to God, as every creature must be, and yet superior to man. Their knowledge and power far exceed ours, yet they are neither omniscient nor omnipotent; they are not eternal, but æviteral, *i.e.* though they had a beginning they have no ending;|| they are

* 'Sunt angeli substantiæ spirituales, h.e. omnis corporeæ molis expertes, finite, completæ, adeoque veræ hypostases' (Quenstedt, p. i. c. 11).

† Incorporeal, but not therefore immaterial. 'Ἀσώματος δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἄυλος, ὅσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πᾶν γὰρ συγκρινόμενον πρὸς Θεόν, τὸν μόνον ἀσύγκριτον, παχύ τε καὶ ὑλικὸν εὑρίσκεται' μόνον γὰρ ὄντως ἄυλον τὸ Θεῖον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσώματον (J. Damasc. De F. O. lib. ii. 3).

‡ 'Quod autem aliquando corpus assumpserunt, id factum est κατ' οἰκονομίαν' (Gerh. De Ang. s. iii.) 'Disting. inter assumptionem corporis, (1) per unionem personalem seu hypostaticum; (2) per unionem essentialē qualis est animæ et corporis; et (3) per unionem accidentalem quæ competit angelis' (Quenstedt, De Ang. s. ii. q. 2).

§ Hollaz, p. i. c. 4, q. 27, 28.

|| Æviteritas is distinguished from eternity, which has neither beginning nor ending; and from time, which has both. 'Duratio angelorum habet quidem initium sed caret fine, ideoque communiter vocatur ævum; hoc enim agnoscit initium sed nescit finem' (Hollaz, *ibid.*).

not circumscribed in space as our bodies are, and yet they are not omnipresent, they must be spoken of as in a certain place and not elsewhere at the same time;* their agility is inconceivable, and yet they cannot pass from one point of space to another except in an interval of time, however small. As spirits, that is persons in the highest sense of the word, they possess knowledge and free-will; the latter in common with man; the former of a kind and measure far transcending human. And as their faculties, compared with the Divine, are limited, so are the effects which they can produce; they cannot, *e.g.*, create or generate anything; nor can they change the essential nature of things; nor can they perform true miracles.† In what manner, and to what extent they can operate on the minds of men—to us the most important point—cannot be certainly gathered from Scripture, and is not satisfactorily explained by writers on the subject. It is agreed that they have no immediate access to the rational soul, a prerogative which belongs to God, and can act upon it only mediately, by raising impressions or fomenting evil passions; nor can they exercise constraint on the will (James iv. 7); but how they can operate through impressions (*phantasmata*),‡ or by presenting objects of unlawful desire, is not explained, and perhaps is inexplicable. In our Lord's temptation the evil spirit is represented as appealing to sense, and in the way of direct colloquy.

Many subtle questions have been raised by the schoolmen on this subject, as, *e.g.*, At what particular time the angels were created? Whether more than one angel can be in the same place? Of what kind is their knowledge? How they communicate with each other? etc.§: respecting which J. Gerhard well

* This is called 'ubi definitivum,' 'Deus dicitur esse in ubi repletivo, quoniam omnia in omnibus implet: corpora physica sunt in ubi circumscriptivo, seu occupativo, ideo quod commensuratum sibi spatium occupant, et ab ambiente aëre circumscribuntur. At angeli non sunt in ubi repletivo quia non sunt ubique sicut Deus, neque in ubi occupativo quia juxta indolem spiritualis suæ naturæ commensuratum non occupant spatium. Mensura enim sequitur quantitatem cujus expers est angelus' (Hollaz, *ibid.*).

† Hollaz. p. i. c. 4, q. 8. 'Multa mirabilia efficere potest (Diabolus), interim tamen diabolica illa mirabilia non sunt miracula proprie dicta; non enim sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat præter ordinem alicujus naturæ particularis, sive præter ordinem faciendi modum; sed ex eo dicitur proprie miraculum quod fit præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ' (J. Gerh. loc. vi. s. 17).

‡ 'Potest Diabolus phantasiam Sagarum falsis corrumpere imaginibus' (Quenstedt, p. i. c. 11, s. 2, q. 4). 'Nihil possunt in ipsam animam rationalem, sed mediate tantum per phantasmata, vel per τὸ θεωρικόν et τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, non effective et physice . . . phantasmata objiciendo, et affectus excitando, etc.' (Turretin, lib. vii. q. 5).

§ See T. Aquinas, i. 250 *et seq.*

remarks, 'De his omnibus ita disserunt ut merito quis quærat quam nuper sint de cœlo delapsi' (loc. vi. sq.).

Nescire velle quæ Magister maximus
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.

§ 36. *Continuation. Good and bad Angels. Satan.*

The angels collectively were created in the image of God, and perhaps in a higher sense than that in which Adam was; not merely with an abstract power of will to choose and follow the good, but with a will directed towards the good, and furnished with all the moral and intellectual gifts which were sufficient in themselves to ensure their continuance in the favour of their Creator. Yet they were not, as the event proved in respect to some of their number, without the possibility of sinning; not a proximate, but a remote possibility—one, that is, which might never have become fact. In short, all that goes to form our conception of Adam's original state, equally applies to that of the angels. Scripture declares that God, on a survey of creation, which must have included the angels, pronounced everything good; and that the angels who fell did so by wilfully abandoning their first estate and own habitation (Jude 6).

From this presumed analogy between the original state of man and that of the angels, the question arose whether as in the former a superadded gift of righteousness, so in the latter a special act of 'grace,' was necessary to its perfection.* By the schoolmen this was generally affirmed, but the grace was supposed to be coincident with the act of creation, so that the angels were never actually in a state of moral indifference. T. Aquinas draws a distinction between the 'natural blessedness' of the angels, and the supernatural, which consists in the vision of God; and confines the necessity of an act of grace to the latter.† An angel, he argues, could not, any more than ourselves, attain to this vision, *i.e.* eternal life, without Divine grace; according to the Apostle's statement (Rom. vi. 23), 'Gratia Dei, vita æterna.‡ Hence, he continues, the more probable opinion is that they were created 'in grace.§ Being so created, they determined, by an

* See § 32.

† 'Angeli fuerunt a Deo creati beatitudine naturali: non autem beatitudine supernaturali quæ in visione divinæ essentiæ consistit' (S. T. i. q. 62, a. 1).

‡ 'Per conversionem ad Deum angelus pervenit ad beatitudinem. Si igitur non indiguisset gratiâ ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum, sequeretur quod non indigeret gratiâ ad habendam vitam æternam. Quod est contra illud Apostoli, Rom. vi. 23' (*ibid.* art. 2).

§ *Ibid.* art. 3.

act of choice, their future position ; and by this act in the right direction the good angels merited their ultimate blessedness.* When did this act in either direction take place? Directly after their creation ; that is, the good angels and the bad became so instantaneously, and remain for ever so ; so that, properly speaking, no state or condition of angels as such, and without reference to their choice and its consequent separation, actually existed.† The whole of this theory, which was adopted by the Romish theologians,‡ is open to the objections which lie against the corresponding one in reference to the creation of man : it has no foundation in Scripture, and it introduces the term ‘grace’ in a connection foreign from the proper idea thereof. Only so much of it is retained by the Protestant writers as seems to have some Scriptural basis. The angels, like man, were created in positive righteousness ; but by an act of choice, when and how exercised we know not, a separation between them took place. By that act of choice, those whom the Scripture calls the ‘elect’ angels (1 Tim. v. 21), or ‘angels of light’ (2 Cor. xi. 14), were confirmed in their goodness : they were admitted to ‘the vision of God,’ which precludes the possibility of their falling away.§ their service is perfect freedom, but the highest kind of freedom, which consists in a moral impossibility of their choosing otherwise : nor can we say that other gifts and rewards were not, in the exuberance of the Divine goodness, conferred upon them.|| By a corresponding act, the rest excluded themselves for ever from participation in this blessedness. For when they chose evil, evil became their nature in a sense in which this cannot be predicated of man when he fell. Hence the common opinion is that they are beyond recovery. Not merely on account of the heinousness

* ‘Cum solus Deus sit naturaliter ab æterno beatus, oportuit Angelos fuisse a Deo in gratiâ creatos, ut suam supernaturalem beatitudinem mererentur’ (*ibid.* art. 4).

† ‘Angelus post primum charitatis actum beatitudinem consecutus est’ (*ibid.* art. 5).

‡ Apertissime distinguit (Augustinus) in Angelis naturam a charitate quam gratiam vocat, et non per creationem, sed per Spiritus Sanctus inspirationem diffusam in eis fuisse scribit’ (Bellarm. De. Grat. Prim. Hom. c. 7).

§ By some it was supposed that the redemption of Christ had an effect on the good angels, securing their stability ; and such passages as Ephes. i. 10, Col. i. 20, are referred to in support of the opinion. Thus Calvin on the former passage : ‘Nihil impedit quominus Angelos quoque dicamus recollectos fuisse, non ex dissipatione, sed primum ut perfecte et solide adhæreant Deo, deinde ut perpetuum statum retineant. Homines perditæ erant : Angeli vero non extra periculum.’ But Scripture does not seem to warrant this view.

|| ‘Nacti sunt beneficio confirmationis scientiam excellentiorem, sanctitatem perfectiorem, libertatem præstantiorem, potentiam majorem, concordiam ætitiorem’ (Hollaz, p. i. c. 4, q. 14.)

of their sin, whatever it may have been,* in itself or from the circumstances accompanying it, such as that it was committed by a nature superior to that of man, and not at the prompting of another;† but because the depravation of nature which ensued was complete.‡ If they could repent, they would no doubt find mercy; but their state can only be paralleled by that described by our Lord in Matt. xii. 31, 32, which perhaps, as regards any man in this life, is to be considered rather as an hypothesis than as a fact. All their faculties have suffered correspondingly; their intellect, *e.g.*, has become darkened, proofs of which are thought to be found in Satan's ignorance that Jesus was the Son of God, or, if he knew it, in his supposing that the Son of God could be tempted to commit sin (Matt. iv. 3-10); and his prompting Judas to betray Christ to death (John xiii. 2), which, in fact, proved the destruction of his own kingdom.§

The employments of the good angels are described as partly contemplative and partly active. They are represented as surrounding the throne of God, and singing His praises (Ps. ciii. 20; Is. vi. 3; Rev. v. 11); and also as ministering spirits (in what manner is not declared) to the heirs of salvation (Heb. i. 14). On all important occasions in the history of redemption, angels appear on the scene; at the giving of the Mosaic law (Acts vii. 53), at the birth of Christ (Luke ii. 13), at His second coming (Matt. xxv. 31), and at the gathering in of His elect (*ibid.* xiii. 41). They share in the joy of the Redeemer over repentant sinners (Luke xv. 10); they are present in the assemblies of Christians (1 Cor. xi. 10); they convey the souls of the pious departed to their rest (Luke xvi. 22). Though not interested in them as man is, they make the mysteries of redemption their earnest study (1 Pet. i. 12). That a guardian angel is assigned to each believer is a pious opinion which may derive some support from our Lord's words (Matt. xviii. 10); but whatever hints Scripture may furnish on this subject,|| it gives no prominence thereto, nor

* 'Probabiliter colligimus superbiam fuisse primum angelorum peccatum' (Hollaz, p. i. c. 4, q. 24).

† 'Atrocitas peccati angelici æstimatur ex modo peccandi. Peccarunt enim Angeli non ex infirmitate, aut inadvertentia, sed ex pleno intellectu, deliberato consilio et voluntario liberi arbitrii abusu, nemine instigante' (*ibid.* q. 25).

‡ Causam hujus obstinationis debes accipere non ex gravitate culpæ, sed ex conditione naturæ seu status. Misericordia Dei liberat a peccato penitentes: illi vero qui penitentiae capaces non sunt, immobiliter malo adherent et per Divinam misericordiam non liberantur' (T. Aquinas, i. q. 64, a. 2).

§ Quenstedt, De. Ang. c. 11, th. 36.

|| The other passage commonly quoted in behalf of this opinion (Acts xii. 15) is not so decisive. That it was Peter's 'angel' was the belief of the assembled disciples, and the writer of the book records their belief; but this does not prove that it was well founded. (See § 4.)

does it ever encourage us to look to angels for guidance or help in the emergencies of life. Why should it, when the Christian has a right to rely upon His over-ruling providence and ever-present succour, whom the angels themselves worship as their Creator? * That the subject of angelic agency is wholly without dogmatical import for us † is too much to say; but that it may be abused to superstitious practices Scripture itself intimates (Col. ii. 18), and experience proves.

The error of the Colossians has, in fact, often reappeared in the Church. S. Paul warns them, among other things, against 'angel-worship,' which he traces to the tendency of human nature to add to what is revealed, and to pry into mysteries placed beyond our ken. ‡ After the return of the Jews from Babylon, the doctrine of angels became more prominent in the popular belief, and the sect of the Essenes is particularly mentioned in connection with it. § From Jewish converts it probably passed into the early Christian Churches, and in the Colossian Church, at least, in such a form as to imperil the simplicity of the Christian faith. But though many speculations on the subject are met with in the early Fathers, no further trace, if we except one ambiguous passage in J. Martyr, || occurs of the existence of angel-worship, or invocation, in the Church. It was on the favourable soil of Gnosticism that these illicit doctrines chiefly flourished. The Church of Rome, therefore, can allege no patristic tradition for her decisions on this point: ¶ still less can she allege Scriptural authority. The angel whom Jacob invoked (Gen. xlviii. 16), and with whom he wrestled (*ibid.* xxxii. 26), was not a created angel; nor can any conclusions be founded on such ambiguous passages as Job v. 1, or Rev. i. 4. Rev. xix. 10 is not ambiguous, nor the corresponding passage, xxii. 8, 9, and

* The old writers assign a most comprehensive field to good angelic agency. 'In vitæ ingressu infantum rationibus prospiciunt. In vitæ progressu adulterios custodiunt. In vitæ egressu animas morientium comitantur. Statui ecclesiastico assistunt, ministerium verbi promovendo. Statui politico ferunt suppetias, pro religione et justitia vigilando, et magistratum defendendo. Statui economico præsto sunt conjugia piorum promovendo, rem familiarem custodiendo, liberos a periculis vindicando' (Hollaz, p. i. c. 4, q. 15). In all these beneficent aims they are thwarted by the evil angels (*ibid.* q. 29).

† Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehre, ss. 42, 43.

‡ Θέλων ἐν θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἃ μὴ ἑώρακεν ἐμβατεύων (Col. ii. 18).

§ Joseph. De B. J. ii. 8.

|| Apol. i. c. 6. Quoted by Hagenbach, i. 121.

¶ Whether the Council of Trent meant to include angels in its decree respecting the invocation of saints may be a question (Sess. xxv.); but the Catechism of the Council is explicit: 'Docendum est venerationem et invocationem sanctorum, angelorum, ac beatarum animarum . . . huic legi (Dei) non repugnare' (De Prim. Dec. Præc. 16).

in them the Apostle himself records the Divine warning which he received not to render worship save to God only. Nor will the distinction between *Latreia* and *Dulia* avail to justify the practice; the distinction is not in itself a Scriptural one, nor can there be an intermediate worship between that due to God (*cultus religiosus*), and the respect due to eminent, but created, dignity or virtue.* All created distinctions vanish in presence of Deity; and as worship is the prerogative of Deity, there can be, if the word is used in its proper sense, no degrees in it.

The evil angels are represented in Scripture (*i.e.*, the New Testament) as endeavouring to the utmost of their power (which, however, is limited), to thwart the gracious purposes of God in the redemption of mankind; and it contains not a few indistinct notices of their forming a kind of community under a supreme head, who bears the name of Satan.† It is he who is said to have tempted Christ (Matt. iv. 10), to have prompted Judas in his sin (John xiii. 2), to have filled the heart of Ananias (Acts v. 3), to have hindered the Apostle in a proposed journey (1 Thess. ii. 18), to have 'buffeted' him with some unknown bodily ailment (2 Cor. xii. 7). He is described as tempting the saints (1 Thess. iii. 5), as going about like a roaring lion (1 Pet. v. 8), as counteracting the effect of the Word of God (Luke viii. 12), as sowing tares among the wheat (Matt. xiii. 39), as the instigator of persecution against the Church (Rev. ii. 10). To destroy his power was the special object of Christ's coming (Heb. ii. 14). He is the spirit who works in the disobedient (Ephes. ii. 2), and who blinds the minds of them that believe not (2 Cor. iv. 4). To the unbelieving world he stands in a special relation as its patron and prince (John xii. 31, xiv. 30). For him and his angels there is reserved the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. xx. 10; Matt. xxv. 41). A description of better defined outline it is difficult to imagine. But, as we have said, Satan does not stand alone in his opposition to Christ: he is Beelzebub, 'the prince of the devils' (Matt. xii. 24); he is ruler over 'a kingdom' (*ibid.* 26); his angels are mentioned as well as himself; Christians are warned against the wiles of the devil (Ephes. vi. 11), and also are enjoined to put on the armour of God if they would wage a successful war against 'principalities and powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world' (*ibid.* 12, 13). In short, over against the Kingdom

* Est excellentia quædam media inter divinam et humanam, qualis est gratia et gloria sanctorum; et huic excellentiæ respondet tertia species cultus, quam Theologi vocant *duliam*—negamus præter cultum *latriæ* nullum esse alium cultum nisi civilem; jam enim ostendimus quendam tertium cultum, qui etiam dicitur religionis, licet *secundario* (Bellarm. De Sanct. Beat. l. i. cc. xii. xiv.).

† שָׂטָן Adversarius, hostis, κατ' ἐξοχὴν Satanas, Diabolus (Gesen. s. v.).

of God, of which Christ is the Head, and for the coming of which we are taught to pray (Matt. vi. 10), stands a kingdom of darkness, of which Satan is the head, and from which it is our privilege as Christians to be delivered.

And yet modern thought has very generally arrived at the conclusion that this whole doctrine of Satan, which, it is allowed, the *letter* of the New Testament seems to favour, has no foundation in fact; that the Satan of Christ and the Apostles is a mythical personage, the offspring of Jewish superstition; or a mere personification of the abstract principle of evil; or the poetry of symbol, suitable for liturgical use, but not of any moment as a doctrine.* It is urged that the Old Testament contains few traces of the doctrine; that in the New Testament it is indeed presupposed, but not distinctly propounded; that it is difficult to conceive the fall of a being created in righteousness; equally so to conceive how a being of supernatural powers of intellect can maintain a warfare against the Most High, in which he must know he will be defeated; but if he does not know this, so foolish an antagonist is not to be dreaded by us; that why some angels should have fallen and others not is inexplicable; that inasmuch as Satan can do nothing without the Divine permission, and, in the event, without furthering the Divine designs, his enmity against God would be better gratified by his remaining inactive; and that a kingdom, or community, of evil spirits cannot exist, for Satan must ever be divided against himself.†

As regards the Old Testament, it must be admitted that it is not so explicit as the New on this subject. The doctrine of Satanic agency, in fact, passes through several stages in the inspired volume; and so far from this being otherwise than natural, it is only what we should expect. As long as redemption was a matter of promise, it was not proper that the power and malignity of him whose head the Saviour was to bruise (Gen. iii. 15) should be revealed: there would be no use, and there might be harm, in inducing men to brood upon the spiritual dangers that surrounded them, while at the same time no clear revelation was given of the Almighty Redeemer in whom and by whom they were to be delivered. A veil, therefore, is drawn over this sombre subject until at the actual coming of the Seed of the woman it might be safely lifted. The Satan of the Old Testament does not appear as the irreconcilable enemy of the Most High, but rather as His instrument, in inflicting not undeserved chastisement on the people of God; he is represented as

* Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehre, ss. 44, 45.

† Schleiermacher, *l. c.* From this theologian's armoury, most of those who have since written on his side have taken their weapons.

in consultation with Jehovah respecting certain persons whom he is permitted to try, and as having limits assigned to his agency by a kind of pact or agreement (1 Kings xxii. 20, 21; Job i. 6-12). In Zech. iii. 1 he arraigns before the throne of Divine justice the sinful nation in the person of its High Priest Joshua; and is silenced, not as having brought a false accusation, but as having overlooked the abounding grace of God (vers. 2-4). Notwithstanding this, his true nature is sufficiently disclosed to prevent us from ever confounding him with an angel of light. If such an angel inflicts, at the command of God, temporal chastisement (2 Sam. xxiv. 16; 2 Kings xix. 35), yet he never appears as tempting men to commit sin in order to have matter of accusation against them, or as taking a malignant satisfaction in proving, as in Job's case, how infirmity cleaves to the best of men; which is the aspect under which Satan appears in the Old Testament narratives. In the New Testament this disposition deepens into a positive enmity towards God and man. Is this reserve in the Old Testament merely of an æconomical character, or does it represent a fact, viz., that the state of the fallen angels admitted, as that of fallen man does, of a progression from bad to worse, until a climax was reached, at which the possessed of devils, speaking in their name, could exclaim: 'What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God?' (Matt. viii. 29). It seems to be too hastily assumed that this law of progression (*nemo repente fuit turpissimus*) applies only to a being like man, composed of body and soul, and not to a pure spirit;* so that from the first the fallen angels, with Satan at their head, were as deeply imbued with evil as ever they could be. But they were, like man, *creatures*, and, like man, created in righteousness; does the difference of their nature preclude the supposition of a growth in obliquity similar to that which Scripture supposes, and experience proves, to end, in the case of man, in a state in which the unhappy subject exclaims: 'Evil, be thou my good'? However this may be, the Satan of the New Testament is a different being from that of the Old; though it is possible that not the nature, but the *revelation* of the nature has advanced *pari passu* with the revelation of Christ and His salvation.

There is no doubt a real difficulty in conceiving how a created being can embody in himself the abstract principle of evil, that is, be absolutely evil. As Augustine frequently reminds us,† evil

* Twisten, Dog. ii. 335. The question is not whether the sin of the angels was not more heinous than that of man, for it was; nor whether they are recoverable, for Scripture reveals no Saviour for them; but whether their moral state was on their fall what it will have become when the everlasting fire receives them at the final judgment (Matt. xxv. 41).

† Civ. Dei, lib. xii. c. 3; lib. xiv. c. 11.

in a created nature is something rather privative than positive: the nature is in itself good, and never can be absolutely transformed into its opposite. Hence, when Satan is introduced on the scene by poets, when he appears as an actual creation, the impression conveyed is that of a vicious and mocking man, as in the Mephistopheles of Goethe; an exaggerated Voltaire. The Satan of Milton is not without qualities which, in their way, command respect; or at all events do not occasion loathing. It seems that if the abstract principle of evil were to become actually existent, it would not be easy to avoid the dualism of the Manichees. Relatively to his agents, viz. evil men, Satan may be considered as absolutely evil; but we cannot say that he is so relatively to God.

The other objections seem of less weight. The fall of a righteous being presupposes, it is urged, that he was already fallen, for how otherwise could sin gain an admittance? The objection equally applies to man's fall; and in both cases it may be replied, that the character did not produce the act, but the free volition in the wrong direction produced the character—according to the law that the first sinful act draws after it an endless series of consequences. How can we reconcile Satan's intellectual perspicacity with his continued resistance to God? In the same way in which we reconcile, in the case of evil men, vast abilities with moral blindness and what Scripture calls folly. These men display wonderful sagacity in the pursuit of their own selfish ends; but of wisdom, in the true sense of the word, a comprehensive view of what is best for themselves and others, they show themselves destitute. If Satan possessed such wisdom, he would undoubtedly abandon his active resistance, and prefer inactivity; he would repent if repentance is possible to him. If he perseveres in his antagonism, it is simply because of his lack of true perspicacity. But a kingdom of evil spirits, it is urged, could not hold together; unless, we reply, there exists a bond of union which for a time at least is powerful enough to suppress individual obliquity. But such a bond does exist, viz., a common enmity towards God and His people, and it is sufficient to produce union as long as the conflict goes on. History supplies many such instances of a temporary combination amongst men, who but for the sinister tie that unites them would exterminate each other, or attempt to do so. What the state of Satan's kingdom may become, when at the consummation of all things there will remain no place for his opposition to Christ, and therefore no object superior to the gratification of individual license, is another question.

The sacred history, as has been observed, discloses at the

coming of Christ a greatly increased activity of Satan and his angels; as is particularly to be seen in the instances of demoniacal possession in the Gospels, of which the Old Testament furnishes few or no examples. Demoniacal possession is divided into spiritual and corporeal; the former consisting in a moral obliquity so great and so universal as to suggest the idea of an actual indwelling of Satan in the soul.* Thus Satan is said to have entered into Judas (John xiii. 27), and to dwell in the swept and garnished chambers (Luke xi. 26). But in the absence of more direct Scripture evidence, it is hardly safe to press such passages to a more definite meaning than that—not without their own consent—some men seem to be specially under the influence of the evil one, and special instruments of his designs. Bodily possession stands on firmer ground; it seems to have the letter of Scripture in its favour, and to be clearly recognised not only by the Apostles, but by Christ Himself (Matt. x. 8; xii. 28), and by Christ when explaining the matter to the inner circle of His followers (*ibid.* xvii. 19-21). The cases in the Gospels have peculiar features: on the one side they are allied to the forms of ordinary disease (epilepsy, dumbness and deafness, madness, even bodily weakness (Luke xiii. 11), and the beneficent action of Christ is described as a ‘cure,’ and ‘healing’ (Matt. xii. 22; Acts x. 38). On the other, they are ascribed to a supernatural origin, either to Satan, or more frequently to one or more of his subordinate angels (*δαιμόνια*); and the cure consists in these being ‘cast out.’ Shall we say that they were really nothing but ordinary diseases, and that our Lord spoke in the language of the time without intending to endorse its accuracy? The subject is too serious, too closely connected with religion, to warrant such a supposition; and when we recollect the crimes which the perversion of the doctrine gave rise to in after ages, when it was believed that men and women could hold commerce with Satan for illicit purposes, it becomes impossible to believe that He to whom the future must have been known could have sanctioned an error so fruitful in evil consequences, if it had no foundation in fact. It is commonly held that the unhappy subjects of this possession brought the calamity on themselves by indulgence in sin, especially sins of the flesh;† this is possible, but the only instance of healing in

* ‘Forma (obsessionis spiritualis) consistit tum in propinquiore substantiæ Diaboli ad animam impij adessentia (Luc. xi. 24-6), tum in efficaci et ad quævis flagitia propellente *ἐνεργείᾳ*’ (Quenstedt, i. c. 11, thes. 48).

† ‘Causa promerens est peccatum, et quidem vel originale cum primis suis motibus, ut in piis: vel originale et actuale proæreticum simul, ut in impiis. Absque peccato enim nulla Satanæ in hominem competere posset potestas’ (Quenstedt, i. c. ii. thes. 53). This, no doubt, is true in a general sense; but the question is, whether demoniacal possession can be referred to special sins.

which our Lord insinuates that the sufferer's sin had been the cause of his malady, does not belong to this class (John v. 14). And in another instance He warns His disciples against hasty judgments of this kind (John ix. 3). The opinion, however, may find some support from 1 Cor. v. 5, in which the Apostle speaks of delivering certain offenders 'unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh;' which seems something quite different from ordinary excommunication. The demoniacs of the New Testament were sinners, no doubt, but rather objects of pity than specimens of matured impiety;* they were not possessed of Satan in the same sense in which Judas was, and therefore were not beyond the reach of the Saviour's healing power. They were fearful examples of the power of Satan, not only over the souls but the bodies of men; but great caution is needed in every age of the Church, lest the revealed fact be confounded with semblances of it, which may belong to the sphere of nature; as appears from some chapters of early Church history, and from the curious catalogues of the signs of possession to be found in some of the older theologians.† We have reason to believe that since the coming of Christ this terrible malady has entirely or almost disappeared—at all events from within the pale of the Christian Church.

§ 37. *The Fall of Man.*

Sin, according to Scripture, is no necessary factor in the education of the human race, for it came into the world through a hostile agency. How this happened is described in the third chapter of the Book of Genesis.

The narrative opens with the temptation of man, or, as perhaps it should rather be called, his trial.‡ It is not necessary to enter at length into the questions that have been raised respecting its details. Whether they are to be understood literally, or, as even orthodox theologians have held, they are merely the symbolical

* The *πονηρός* is never the same as the *δαμονιζόμενος*.

† 'Signa obsessionis corporalis propria sunt, (1) linguarum exoticarum seu peregrinarum, artium item et disciplinarum, quas obsessi nunquam antea didicerunt, nec liberati amplius novunt, scientia; (2) rerum abditarum atque alibi in remotissimis regionibus gestarum, item futurarum, notitia et indicatio; (3) robur plusquam humanum, seu præternaturalis potentia; (4) sine organorum dispositione, avicularum, ovium, boum, etc., vocum exacta representatio. His adde, (5) sermonis impuritatem; (6) gestuum deformitatem; (7) horrendam vociferationem; (8) Dei blasphemationem et proximi cavillationem; (9) tum in corpus ipsum, tum in spectatores sævitiam et ferociam' (Quenstedt, i. c. 11, thes. 56). To which Hollaz adds: 'Gravis vexatio intus in visceribus et partibus corporis, ventrisque intumescencia' (p. i. c. 4, q. 32).

‡ A trial may demand only a painful sacrifice (as e.g. the trial of Abraham's faith); with the word *temptation* we usually connect the idea of sin.

clothing of a real fact,* is of no more moment to the Christian than the issue of the geological speculations which have clustered round the account of creation. It is enough for us to learn that though there was something in unfallen man which rendered it possible for him to sin, this was roused into activity by an appeal from without; nor does Scripture leave it doubtful from whom the solicitation proceeded. If the original narrative does not expressly say that it was Satan, this omission is supplied in the New Testament. Apoc. xii. 9 is express to the point. 2 Cor. xi. 3, compared with v. 14 of the same chapter, makes it clear whom S. Paul understood by the serpent. By the majority of commentators our Lord's words in John viii. 44 are referred to the temptation of Adam.† The tempter was a spirit already fallen, and the mystery of the origin of sin dates from a period anterior to the creation of man.

It seems to have been formerly a question of some interest, what the sinful affection was in our first parents which led to the actual transgression. Bellarmine, after Augustine, devotes two long chapters to prove that it was pride, in the prospect of becoming as gods, knowing good and evil;‡ the Protestant theologians (Calvin, Luther, etc.) prefer to think it was unbelief (of the Divine warning, 'In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die'); apparently because this supposition better corresponds to what may be called the opposite pole, the doctrine of justification by faith. The question is immaterial. The real source of the primal transgression must be sought deeper; in the

* 'The Mosaic hamartigeny (to adopt a term of Prudentius) we hold to be true, but not literal' (Nitzsch, *Syst. der Christl. Lehre*, s. 106, an. 1). The author, however, in s. 216 of the same book, points out the important distinction between symbols of an idea and symbols of facts. So Martensen, 'In the Mosaic account of the Fall we have a combination of history and sacred symbolism, a pictorial representation of a real fact' (*Dog.* s. 79). These writers do not seem to have given due weight to the circumstance that from Adam to Moses but few links of tradition were needed. The earlier theologians adopt a strictly literal interpretation, but differ as to the mode of the Satanic agency; some holding that the serpent was a natural one possessed by Satan (J. Gerhard, loc. x. c. i.; Quenstedt, p. ii. c. 2, thes. 16), others that Satan assumed this shape *pro tempore*, and such as the good angels (seraphim) were accustomed to appear in when they visited our first parents, which would account for Eve's showing no alarm at his approach. (See 2 Cor. xi. 14. The weighty arguments in favour of this view may be seen in Cotta's note to Gerhard, *l. c.*). Philo, and after him Origen, allegorised the whole; the serpent, according to the former, symbolising carnal pleasure; according to the latter, the man signifying reason, the woman appetite. This obviously evacuates the record of historical value, and imperils the doctrine of original sin.

† 'He was a murderer from the beginning.' Some commentators of note, however, such as Nitzsch and Lücke, understand the allusion to be to the murder of Abel.

‡ De Amiss. Grat. l. iii. cc. 4, 5.

usurpation by the selfish principle of that place which supreme love to God was intended to, and did actually hitherto, occupy.* Once the true centre of man's being was displaced, the whole periphery shifted itself; and both pride and unbelief were only symptoms of the inner disorganisation that had taken place. The senses became avenues of illicit desire ('when the woman saw that the tree was pleasant to the eye,' etc.); doubts of God's goodness entered the heart; impatience to snatch an advantage which would doubtless have come in its due time prevailed; and—the sin was consummated.

'Earth felt the wound; and Nature from her seat
Sighing, through all her works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost———'

The consequences of the first transgression are described in the narrative with sufficient distinctness. Shame and fear took possession of breasts which had hitherto been strangers to these emotions. 'They knew that they were naked;' they became conscious of the loss of the original righteousness in which they had been created, and conscious of the result, in the emancipation of sensual desire from the control of reason and of the will; which led them to place a covering over bodily organs now no longer obedient to these higher faculties.† The Divine beneficence, recognising the propriety of the sentiment, exchanged the poor original contrivance for a more complete and enduring investiture.‡ And with shame was conjoined fear; fear of the gracious Being whose approach had hitherto been the harbinger of holy and happy fellowship: 'Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden.' In other words, the slumbering faculty of conscience, in this case accusing, awoke into energy; that Divine faculty which assents to the law of God while protesting against the law of sin in the

* Though Augustine considers pride the proximate cause of the fall, he does not forget to point out its deeper root. 'Malæ voluntatis (primorum hominum) initium quod potuit esse nisi superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est. Quid est autem superbia nisi perversæ celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsitudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhærere principio, sibi quodammodo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit cum sibi nimis placet' (De Civ. Dei, lib. xiv. c. 13).

† 'Qua gratia remota, ut pœna reciproca inobedientia plecteretur, exstitit in motu corporis quædam impudens novitas, unde esset indecens nuditas; et fecit attentos, reddiditque confusos' (Aug. De C. D. lib. xiv. c. 17).

‡ 'Unto Adam and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skins, and clothed them (Gen. iii. 21). In this short and memorable passage, we read an instance, and I think a most affecting one, of the Divine wisdom and philanthropy; interposing by the dictation and provision of a more durable clothing, to veil the nakedness, and cherish the modesty, of our fallen nature, by sin made sensible to shame' (Davison, Prim. Sac., p. 24).

members (Rom. vii. 22, 23), and is the last to resign its authority, until finally stifled by continuance in sin. And so Adam came to the knowledge of good and evil by the bitter experience of an irreconcilable strife between the two in his inner man. And then followed the sentence. It has been subject of comment that there is no express allusion in it either to the corruption of our nature through the Fall, or to the eternal penalty of sin; but as regards the former, our first parents were already conscious of it, and as regards the latter, the poison and the antidote (Gen. iii. 15) are in such close juxtaposition that the latter already seems to efface the former by its superior efficacy.* It is temporal penalties which appear on the surface; on the woman the pains of childbearing, on the man incessant toil for his living, on both temporal death. The full meaning of this last penalty of sin was reserved for future revelations to disclose: here it is merely the dissolution of the body into its original dust that is specified. The penalty was not inflicted at once; and therefore the commination in ch. ii. 17 must be understood to mean an inevitable subjection to death. The frame of man, sharing in the disorganisation of his superior part, began to cherish in itself the seeds of its dissolution, and, however in those early ages postponed, the event came at last to all. From this law of a sinful nature, which he inherits, even the believer in Christ is not exempt, unless he be one of those who shall be alive when Christ comes again: 'the body is dead' (or subject to death) 'because of sin' (Rom. viii. 10); but since, in his case, death in its other and deeper significations has no existence, the dissolution of the body is but the mode of transition to a higher condition of humanity than Adam, even had he stood, would have enjoyed.

Great, however, as was the sin of Adam, as compared with that of his posterity—inasmuch as it was committed under no existing evil propensity (*in tanta non peccandi facilitate*, Aug.)—it was very different from that of the fallen angels. They sinned of their own proper motion, our first parents through an evil influence from without; their revolt was directly against God, a revolt of spirit against Spirit; man fell through an intermediate process—by listening to the deceiver, and through the attractions of sense. The very feelings of shame and fear which our first parents experienced proved that their nature was not wholly and hopelessly depraved, that a point of affinity between them and Divine grace still existed. Hence the Redeemer could lay hold on the seed of Abraham, to succour and to save, while with

* 'For if by one man's offence death reigned by one, much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ' (Rom. v. 17).

the fallen angels He had no concern (Heb. ii. 16). A pious tradition makes the two first trophies of His saving power the very pair by whom sin entered into the world.*

Speculation, as might be expected, has been busy with the question why, if its fearful consequences were foreseen as they must have been, the fall of man was permitted? If it was foreseen that he would fall, why was the tempter allowed to assail him? or why was not strength given to resist the temptation? But these difficulties equally apply to the earlier entrance of sin into creation; and they have been met, as far as they can be, in a previous section (§ 24). The origin of evil is inexplicable; but considered as *sin*, Scripture is express that God neither willed it nor needed it for the manifestation of His glory.† If He elicited good out of evil, that does not diminish the guilt of the evil. Prevent it by an exercise of Almighty power He could not, without annihilating the free-will with which it pleased Him to endow the reasonable creature. And there was such ‘a facility of standing’ in our first parents, as compared with us, that the blame of the catastrophe must be laid exclusively at their door.‡

§ 38. *Prevalence of Actual Sin.*

The history of mankind, from the fall of Adam, is, as it is given in Scripture, emphatically the history of a sinful race. So prominent is this characteristic that it almost seems as if it was the main object of the writers to inculcate the lesson. Commencing with the fratricide of Cain, the antediluvian narrative terminates with such an excess of wickedness as could only be purged by the destruction, with a few exceptions, of the existing population of the world (Gen. vi.). Restored under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix.), mankind again commenced its downward career, and only the confusion of languages put a stop to a presumptuous attempt, like that of the Titans of profane

* See the authorities in Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat. l. iii. c. 12; especially Augustine: ‘De illo quidem patre humani generis, quodd eum ibidem (Christus ad inferna descendens) solverit, Ecclesia fere tota consentit’ (Epist. ad Euod. 99).

† ‘Felix culpa, etc. Lapsus est homo, quia Deus ita expedire censuerat: certum tamen est non aliter censuisse, nisi quia videbat nominis sui gloriam inde merito illustrari’ (Calvin, Inst. lib. iii. c. 23-8). Both unauthorised applications of a general truth.

‡ ‘Si quid in hac dispensatione Dei occurrat quod facile a nobis percipi non possit, meminerimus Dei vias non esse vias nostras, et sobrie nobis esse hic sapiendum ne scrutantes Majestatem opprimamur a gloria. Sufficiat duo ista arcte tenere, lapsum illum funestissimum non sine Dei providentia contigisse; sed ad ejus causalitatem eam nihil contulisse, solum hominem ex Diaboli tentatione motum veram et propriam ejus causam fuisse’ (Turretin, lib. ix. q. 7).

mythology, to wrest the sceptre of supremacy from the Creator (Gen. xi.). Idolatry began to prevail to such an extent that the first actual step towards the accomplishment of the primeval prophecy was to sever the progenitor of the chosen people from the associations of home and kindred with which he was surrounded (Gen. xii.). Whole communities became notorious for hideous vices (Gen. xix.). The passage of the Israelites to the land of Canaan was marked at every stage by transgression. The moral state of the peoples then occupying Canaan was such that a sentence of extirpation, never, however, fully carried out, was necessary to prevent, as far as might be, their contaminating the new settlers, far removed as the latter were from perfection. The history of the chosen people for centuries is a record of anarchy and crime, together with repeated lapses into the impure and idolatrous worship of the surrounding nations. The constant theme of the prophets is the sin of their own people. The sins which the prophets denounced were exchanged, in our Lord's time, for others less gross in appearance, but not less dangerous in their spiritual effect. The picture which S. Paul presents of the heathen world as it then existed is drawn in the darkest colours (Rom. i.) ; and his statements are confirmed by contemporary evidence of profane authors. No topic is more frequent in classical poetry than the corruption of later ages as compared with the (supposed) pristine sanctity of manners. Ancient philosophers deplore the untractableness of the material on which they had to work. Such is the account of Scripture, and such the confession of heathendom, as regards the moral condition of humanity.

The same lesson is taught us in Scripture in a more indirect manner. Hardly one even of the eminent characters whose biographies it contains—Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David, Peter, etc.—but breaks down in some point or other ; and although in a few instances, such as those of Joseph and Daniel, no failure is expressly mentioned, it can hardly be doubted that they came under the same law of imperfection. The Christian expiation for sin is declared to have been for the whole of mankind, who therefore must be supposed, without exception, to be implicated in transgression. The change from the natural to the Christian state is never represented otherwise than as a change from darkness to light, from the power of Satan unto God (Acts xxvi. 18) ; with the Christian old things have passed away, and all things have become new (2 Cor. v. 17) ; he has emerged from a state of death in (actual) trespasses and sins to one in which the spiritual life is predominant (Ephes. ii. 1-3). In short, the sombre background of the edifice of redemption is nothing short of this :

‘There is none righteous, no, not one : there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God : they are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable, there is none that doeth good, no, not one’ (Rom. iii. 10-12).

Does experience confirm these statements? or has the condition of humanity changed since the Scriptures were written? The history of the world, ever since the introduction of Christianity, is its condemnation.* No one sees Christian nations fully leavened with the influence of Christianity; no one finds in modern heathenism other than a transcript of S. Paul’s experience. What is more, no one of mature age *expects* of human nature more than the most moderate attainments of virtue: the child confides implicitly, the youth is more wary, the man of experience, in his dealings with others, fences himself round with every expedient of precaution. The Christian himself is the first to disclaim perfection, and to set it down to blind self-ignorance or Pharisaical pride if anyone, even the holiest of men, should venture to say that he has no sin (1 John i. 8). Nor can this verdict be retracted in favour of the unconscious age of infancy. Relatively to us the babe is called innocent; but this amounts merely to the negative assertion that we do not know what is passing in its mind, there being a physical incapability of such manifestation. The moment this incapacity begins to disappear the alleged innocence also disappears; sinful passions make their appearance, which too clearly point to an ominous development should circumstances favour it; the child, according to his faculties and opportunities, is a reproduction of what his parents are. But it is not necessary to dwell further on a fact which is not denied, however it may be explained away or extenuated. The Pantheist, while divesting sin of its proper character, and making it an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, does not contest its existence under the notion of a temporary discord in the great harmony into which he resolves it. The Pelagian still less denies the fact, and only differs from the Church as regards the source to which he traces it. What this source is forms the subject of the following section.

§ 39. *Original Sin as the Root of Actual.*

As every effect is supposed to have a cause, the actual sinfulness of man leads the mind beyond the outward phenomenon, and suggests the inquiry, ‘Whence can it proceed?’† The most

* ‘Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht’ (Goethe).

† It has been objected to this argument from cause to effect, that it makes original sin to have existed anterior even to Adam’s sin, and to be coeval with man’s creation (Mozley on Pred., c. iii.). There is no doubt that previously to

elementary lessons of moral philosophy teach us that the essence of virtue or vice is to be sought, not in the mere act, but in what lies underneath it. If the tree is known by its fruits, the fruits also presuppose a tree. If it be replied, then, that it arises 'from the imitation of Adam' (the Pelagian theory), several difficulties at once occur. How can it arise from the imitation of Adam in the case of those who never heard of Adam, or read the story of the Fall; that is, the vast majority of mankind? who yet, as we have seen, are in no way superior to those who possess this knowledge. If it be ascribed to the bad example of parents or of society, how did this bad example itself come into existence? In the case of those who enjoy the light of revelation, and believe that sin marred the perfection of the universe before Adam was created, why should not the imitation ascend higher, until it reaches Satan himself? Moreover, these latter possess another standard to frame themselves by, one of absolute sinlessness, and exhibited too in our nature; why should not the imitation frame itself on this model as well as on that of Adam? Why should it be uniformly of one character? If it be replied again that every man is endowed with free-will, and that it is of the essence of free-will to be able to choose, and that the first step determines the future path, this no doubt is in a certain sense true. To fix the moment when the first deliberate act of sin takes place may be impossible; the child himself is probably never aware of it: but whenever it does occur, it is a momentous epoch in the moral history of the individual. The will has consented, and the moral state can never again be as if this act had not taken place. It may truly be said that in every depraved life a subordinate and relative fall of the man has preceded the formation of the habit. But if the will is really free, or in a state of equilibrium, how comes it that the choice is invariable? Why does not the will assert its freedom, in some instances at least, so as to resist temptation, and commence a career of holy obedience, which might issue in complete confirmation in holiness; as would have been the case with Adam had he stood? If, further, it be urged, with Schleiermacher,* that the explanation lies in the fact that, by the very conditions of infancy, our sensual nature steals a march upon our spiritual, which advantage is always afterwards main-

Adam's actual sin, there must have occurred in him an *inner* fall from God, and this, not the eating of the apple, is what is transmitted to his posterity. Whether it is to be called 'original sin' or not is a question of words. But certainly it did not exist in man at his creation; it was the result of a subsequent act of free-will. Adam's actual sin had a cause as ours has; but in him the cause was an act of choice, in us it is born with us. See Coleridge, 'Aids to Reflection,' aph. 12.

* Glaubenslehre, § 67.

tained; we may ask how it is that when our spiritual nature comes to its maturity, it does not, as the stronger, assert its supremacy, and subjugate its weaker companion in turn? We are thus led to the conclusion that the actual sinfulness of mankind is but the visible symptom of a defect or depravation of nature, which is not any one sin, but the root of all sin; a constant quantity to be taken account of amidst the varieties of outward transgression; a preponderating inclination in one direction, impeding all effort in the other; not belonging to the original nature of man, but another nature in the sense in which we call habit a second nature; attaching itself to what is in itself good, but so interwoven with it as not to admit of perfect separation; and this is that 'corruption of the nature of every man' (Art. ix.) to which the Church has given the name of original sin.*

Such a depravation of nature is clearly recognised in Scripture. When it is said in Gen. viii. 21, that 'the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth,' it is implied that the existence of the evil is coeval with the existence of 'the heart;' i.e., man's nature. David in Ps. li. 5 professes, not that his mother contracted sinfulness in the act of conception and birth (an idea, as J. Müller remarks, wholly foreign to Jewish ideas†), but that he himself from the moment of his conception was affected with sin. The new birth which our Lord pronounces necessary to entrance into the kingdom of heaven (John iii. 3) seems to involve far more than merely renunciation of actual sins. S. Paul alludes to a kind of sin which was latent in him, and was only roused into activity, so that he became conscious of it, by being confronted with an external command (Rom. vii. 8). To the same effect are his statements respecting the opposition between the 'flesh' and the 'Spirit' (Gal. v. 17; Rom. viii. 9); for by 'the flesh' is meant not the material part of man as distinguished from the immaterial, but human nature in its unregenerate state, 'the *phronema sarkos*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, which is not subject to the law of God' (Art. ix.). The children of Christian parents, apart from the privileges which, as having been born within the pale of the Church, they enjoy, are pronounced by S. Paul to be of themselves unclean (*ἀνόμαστα*); nor is there any

* Original sin may bear a twofold sense; either as distinguished from 'actual sins of men' (Art. ii.), or as connected with Adam's sin. In this part of the present section it is used in the former, in the latter part in the other sense. 'Dicitur originale (peccatum), et quidem non ratione originis mundi aut hominis, sed (1) quia ab Adamo, radice et principio generis humani derivatum; (2) quia cum origine Adamigenarum conjunctum; (3) quia origo et fons est peccatorum actualium' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. 3, q. 12).

† Lehre von der Sünde, ii. 378.

point of time specified at which this disqualification commences (1 Cor. vii. 14).^{*} Of himself and his fellow-converts from Judaism the same Apostle declares that, whatever advantages they may have enjoyed as Israelites (Rom. ix. 4), they were 'by nature children of wrath,' equally with Gentile believers (Ephes. ii. 3); of which the plain meaning is that by nature, and before the outbreaks of actual sin, there was something in them which God could not look upon without displeasure.

There is still a point to be noticed which of itself seems decisive. If death is the penalty of sin (Gen. ii. 17; Rom. v. 12), sin must be presumed present wherever the reign of death is found. On this ground S. Paul infers the existence of sin 'from Adam to Moses, even over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression;' that is, to whom no positive command had been given as a test of obedience; viz., because death prevailed during the interval. Breach of such a command could not be imputed (Rom. v. 13) where none such was given; nevertheless, sin was there because death was there. It cannot indeed be said that the Apostle had specially in view the case of infants, but such an extension of his argument is quite justifiable. Death reigns over infants, but death in Scripture bears the character not merely of a natural calamity or defect, but of a penal appointment: infants therefore must, in some way or other, be implicated in sin: but since they are incapable of transgressing a positive command, and indeed of actual transgression at all, the only sin they can suffer for is one common to them with the race, a vitiosity of nature which is prior to actual sin.

The testimony of Scripture thus confirms the conclusion to which we are led on grounds of reason, that, underneath the variety of sins which meet the eye, there exists in all men a natural propensity to sin, which is sure to bear its fruit—to some extent even where its power is broken by the operation of Divine grace. It is impossible otherwise to explain the fact that in no recorded instance, save that of Him whose birth was supernatural, is a human life found to have been exempt from actual sin.

Another exception is indeed claimed by the Church of Rome—that of the Virgin Mary. The history of the doctrine of the immaculate conception is soon told. At an early period vague notions prevailed respecting the prerogatives of the mother of our Lord, whom no Christian, any more than Scripture itself, hesitates to call 'blessed among women' (Luke i. 42); and an impulse was given in this direction by the ecclesiastical sanction

^{*} It is doubtful whether it is the children of Christian parents in general, or those of the mixed marriages specially mentioned in the passage, of whom the Apostle speaks. But either way, the argument stands. See Olshausen *in loc.*

of the epithet θεοτόκος, as against the Nestorians. But if the Virgin was 'the mother of God,' can she be conceived of as affected with original sin? If so, might not the taint be derived from the mother, as it would have been from an earthly father? or, in other words, to ensure our Lord's perfect sinlessness, was it not necessary to maintain, in the case of the Virgin, an antecedent exemption from this taint? The reasoning had an air of plausibility, and fell in with the general tendency of the age; but it remained for a long time unsanctioned by the ecclesiastical authorities. When, about the year 1140, the canons of Lyons instituted a festival in honour of the immaculate conception, they drew upon themselves for this innovation the severe censure of Bernhard of Clairvaux. The dogma gradually, however, gathered strength, and became important enough to divide the opinions of the two great orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans; the former maintaining, the latter denying it. The Franciscans could appeal to Duns Scotus, the Dominicans to Thomas Aquinas, as favouring their views respectively. The question led to so much dissension in the Church that in 1477 Sixtus IV. issued a Bull, in which he aimed at a compromise: he sanctioned the festival, and condemned those who called the doctrine heretical, but he forbore to pronounce an authoritative decision, and so far left the question open. The dissension, however, continued, and reached such a pitch that Leo X. contemplated taking steps to have the matter finally settled, when the troubles of the Reformation broke out, and united all parties in the Romish Church against the common foe. This state of things accounts for the hesitation of the Council of Trent, as described by Sarpi and Pallavicini, to promulgate any positive decree on the subject; and indeed the Fathers themselves were divided in opinion.* The hesitation is reflected in the actual decisions of the Council.† It is well known that the Pontificate of Pius IX. distinguished itself by a final decision, and the Immaculate Conception is now an article of faith in the Church of Rome.

It need hardly be observed that the doctrine has no foundation in Scripture. The impression which the latter leaves on the mind is that Mary was not without actual infirmity (Luke ii. 48; John ii. 4), which is incompatible with the notion of her being

* See Sarpi, i. p. 313 (Courayer's translation). Pallavicini, lib. vii. c. 7: 'Eo demum res devenit ut quamvis plerique conceptam sine labe virginem existimarent, plerique tamen satius duxerunt nihil oppositæ sententiæ detrahendum esse.'

† 'Declarat synodus non esse suæ intentionis comprehendere in hoc decreto, ubi de peccato originali agitur, beatam et immaculatam Virginem Mariam' (Sess. v. 5).

free from original sin.* S. Paul makes no exception in her favour when he declares that all, save ONE, have sinned (Rom. v. 12). Moreover, if her conception was immaculate, it seems that that of her parents must have been so too, and their parents in turn; and so on till we arrive at Adam, which subverts the received doctrine of original sin altogether. It has been already seen that there is no necessity for the dogma in order to secure the perfect sinlessness of Christ. In the practical system of the Romish Church, however, it has an appropriate, it may be said a necessary, place. In that system the intercession of Christ in His priestly office has given place to the intercession of the Virgin; it is to her that the worshipper is really directed to secure the acceptance of his prayers; it is through her intervention that spiritual blessings are expected. But the instinctive feeling of the heart is that whoever discharges this office—not typically, as the Jewish High Priest, but in reality and truth—must be without sin; whoever appears before God for us, in the court of heaven, cannot need supplication for himself. This feeling Scripture satisfies by revealing its appropriate object: ‘Such an High Priest became us who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners’ (Heb. vii. 26): when His functions are transferred to another, the latter naturally becomes invested with His prerogatives.

§ 40. *Original Sin as the Transmission of Guilt—Pelagian Controversy.*

But how does this inherent tendency in man’s nature come into existence? Why is it found in all men? The explanation which Scripture gives, so far as it gives any, is that it is a transmitted evil, transmitted from father to son in the way of natural propagation; Adam after, and in consequence of, his fall, being the first link in the chain, the head and source of the universal depravation. And so we affirm that ‘it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam’ (Art. ix.).

The passages which add this element to our previous knowledge are not numerous; but they are sufficiently plain. When Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness and after his

* Hence T. Aquinas makes the Virgin free from actual sin, whether mortal or venial: ‘Fatendum est eam nec mortale, nec veniale, peccatum unquam commississe’ (P. iii. q. 27, art. 4). His theory is that the Virgin, being sanctified in the womb, was exempt from the *stain* of original sin, but not from its guilt; and therefore needed the sacrifice of Christ to remove the latter. The *fomes* remained in her, but restrained as to its exercise, until her conception of Christ; when even the *fomes* was removed (*ibid.* aa. 1 and 3). Thomas therefore teaches an essential distinction between the Virgin and Christ, as regards this point, and so saves the exclusive prerogative of the Redeemer.

image (Gen. v. 3), the idea of propagation from father to son is prominent; and of what character the likeness propagated was we may infer from the circumstance that before Adam fell he had no son at all, and even from the form of expression; not in the image of God (chap. i. 27), but in his own image he begat Seth. David traces his inherent sinfulness to his having been born of human parents (Ps. li. 5). But the principal passage is Rom. v. 12: 'By one man sin entered into the world.' This can hardly mean merely that Adam was the first of human beings to sin, but rather that through him the noxious element found entrance into a world hitherto free from it; and having thus entered, it affected all his posterity; the proof of which is that death, the penalty of sin, 'passed upon all men,' whether actual sinners or not. If the effect were produced simply by the imitation of Adam, it would apply only to actual sinners, since they alone are capable of such imitation; and then death should have been confined to them. Since the fact is otherwise, as the case of infants proves, some other connection with Adam must be understood; and none other is conceivable but that of natural descent; which, in fact, embraces every individual of the human race, the infant of a day old as well as the adult. To the same effect are our Lord's words, John iii. 6: 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh;' that is, the unregenerate nature comes into being through natural birth. An indirect proof, but of a cogent character, is furnished by the miracle of the Incarnation: if Christ alone was to be without sin and yet born of woman, this could only be effected by interrupting the chain of propagation from an earthly father. More ought not to be extracted from these passages than they contain, but, on the other hand, not less. Taken by themselves they do not explain the precise nature of the taint transmitted; nor whether the soul, the proper subject of sin, is the vehicle of transmission, or the body alone; nor do they affirm that all men being in Adam were parties to his sin; nor that the guilt of it is imputed to mankind: but they do imply that we are what we are by reason of our natural descent from Adam, or, in other words, that the depravation of our nature is hereditary.

As soon, however, as Christian speculation directed itself to this subject it was confronted with great difficulties. Can the corrupt tendency which we inherit from Adam be called sin in any proper sense of the word? If guilt is to be connected with sin, it seems essential that it should be voluntary, the result of an act of the will; but here this element seems wanting. Without his own consent an individual is born into the world, and finds himself impeded in his ascent heavenwards by a natural infirmity; and he is told that this is in itself sinful, and 'deserv-

ing of God's wrath and condemnation' (Art. ix.). Is it not rather a misfortune, like being born blind, or lame? * and does it not rather palliate, than the reverse, the actual sin which necessarily follows from it; as congenital blindness or lameness is a valid excuse for omissions of duty which would be culpable if the organs or limbs were in a sound condition? And this indeed is the mystery of original sin.

The Eastern Church, to whose taste theological questions, in the strict sense of the word, were more congenial, aimed at little preciseness of language on this subject. The general tendency of its teaching was to extenuate the effects of the Fall, and to make man the arbiter of his own destiny; a partial truth, indeed, everywhere presupposed in Scripture, but when exclusively dwelt upon liable to lead to error. It is not surprising then to find expressions in many of the most distinguished Fathers of that Church, such as Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, and even Athanasius himself, which bear a Pelagian aspect, though it would be unjust to ascribe to them any deliberate approval of Pelagianism as a system. † Origen attenuated the whole doctrine of an inherited taint from Adam by his theory of the pre-existence of souls, which, according to him, were already sinful before they came into the world. J. Damascenus, in his systematic treatise, 'De Fide Orthodoxa,' avoids the subject altogether. It was to the Western Church that Providence assigned the task of supplying this omission; but even in it the doctrine only gradually assumed a definite shape. Tertullian, to whom we owe the phrase *vitium originis*, speaks of a 'corruption of nature' which is 'another nature'; ‡ yet the well-known passage of this author, dissuading from infant baptism, § contrasts strongly with Augustine's doctrine, one of whose principal arguments for original sin is founded upon this practice. On the whole, however, the great writers of the Latin Church deliver a clear testimony on the real deterioration of man's nature, and its connection with the Fall. Augustine, in his work against Julian the Pelagian, was able to produce a long series of eminent Fathers—Irenæus, Cyprian, Ambrose, Hilary—of whose meaning there could be no doubt, and by whom he was himself anticipated in many of his favourite arguments. Whether he was equally suc-

* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν ἀσχοῦς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν (Arist. Ethic. iii. c. 5).

† Hagenbach, D. G. s. 109. 'Many holy persons,' says Athanasius, 'have been pure from all sin': the statement is probably founded on such passages as Luke i. 15; which however do not warrant it.

‡ De Anim. c. 41.

§ 'Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum?' (De Bap. c. xviii.).

cessful in proving Chrysostom and Gregory to be on his side may admit of doubt.* Things were in this state—the doctrine substantially held, but not yet reduced to form—when Pelagius, or Morgan, a native of Britain, and Cælestius, his disciple, about A.D. 404, put forth a series of propositions in which is contained the system known by the name of Pelagianism. According to Augustine they were as follows: that Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had fallen or not; that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not the human race; that the Law is a means of salvation as well as the Gospel; that before the coming of Christ there existed men without sin; that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall; that neither through the death and sin of Adam does the race die, nor through the resurrection of Christ does it rise again.† These opinions were condemned in several Councils (Carthage, Milevis, Ephesus); but no authoritative statements, such as those relating to the Godhead or the Person of Christ, were promulgated on the subject. But soon afterwards the controversy called Augustine into the field; that mighty champion of Divine truth, whose influence is to this day felt throughout the Christian Church, and to whom the Reformed Churches in particular look back as their spiritual progenitor.

Pelagianism was rather a tendency than a distinct heresy, and in fact it did not issue in any formal schism. It is simply the Christianity of human nature, or that reconstruction of the Gospel scheme which approves itself to natural reason and superficial worldly observation; hence its constant reappearance in the Church, and its affinity with the Arminian and Unitarian systems. All that was mysterious and inexplicable in the actual state of man, and in the statements of Scripture respecting it, was eliminated; and nothing remained but what was trite, and met the eye, or what flattered the pride of the human heart. Of the propositions above stated, the second, fifth, and sixth were obviously directed against the Church-doctrine that in Adam mankind, in some sense, fell, and that infants are born with a corruption of nature which is the source of actual sin, and which renders them objects of God's displeasure. And from the remarks previously made it will be seen that these are precisely the features of the doctrine which are difficult to explain or defend.

The merits of Augustine as an opponent of these pernicious tenets—for pernicious they were, notwithstanding their apparent solicitude for the moral attributes of Deity—may be briefly summed up; he exposes, with admirable force, their contrariety to Scripture, but seems less successful in reconciling his own

* Cont. Jul. ll. i. ii.

† De Gest. Pel. c. 23.

explanations with our natural notions of equity. He insists upon the texts cited in the foregoing section, and especially on 2 Cor. v. 14 (from which it is doubtful whether he could extract the meaning he wishes);* but when the Pelagian asks him to explain how sin can be properly ascribed to those (infants) who neither could actually sin, nor will to sin,† he is obliged to fall back either upon a mystery,‡ or upon the explanation that the voluntariness of *Adam's* sin supplies the lack of that element in original sin;§ which is evidently in itself not a satisfactory explanation. The fact of an original deterioration of nature, not fully removed even in the regenerate, he rightly infers from Rom. vii. 14-25,|| but still fails to connect the idea of *guilt* with it. And his whole argument from the existence of 'concupiscence,'¶ dominant in the natural, kept under but not extinct in the regenerate man, seems to labour under a defect. S. Paul affirms in that passage that sin was at one time 'dead' in him (verse 8), a mere latent potentiality, and this is properly original sin: the 'lust' or 'concupiscence' of which he proceeds to speak, and which he traces to the provocative operation of the law (verse 7), seems another thing, rather the effect of original sin than that sin itself. A slumbering concupiscence hardly conveys an intelligible meaning, any more than in philosophy a quiescent force. Augustine argues, with truth, that what even the regenerate have to struggle against must be sinful; that it did not, and could not, exist in Paradise; with less discrimination perhaps, that the particular form of it which he has in view cannot now be disjoined from the commanded, and in itself holy, act of procreation; ** in

* 'Ει εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον: 'Christ died for all (believers), therefore all die for Him, die to the world and self' (Olshausen *in loc.*). But Augustine understands it of bodily death, and argues that since infants die, Christ must have died for them, *i.e.* taken away their (original) sin.

† 'Explica,' inquis, 'quomodo peccatum personæ illi juste possit adscribi, quæ nec voluit peccare nec potuit' (Cont. Jul. vi. c. 24).

‡ 'Delicta quis intelligit? Numquid ideo delicta non sunt? Ita et originale delictum quod in parente regenerato remittitur, et tamen transit in prolem, et manet nisi et ipsa regeneretur, quis intelligit? Numquid ideo non est delictum?' (*ibid.* c. 14).

§ 'Quod tamen (sc. peccatum originale) et ipsum a mala voluntate priorum hominum sumpsit exordium. Ita nisi voluntas mala, non est cujusquam ulla origo peccati' (*ibid.* lib. iii. c. 11). On this see J. Gerhard's remarks, loc. 10, c. 4, and Chemnitz, Exam. loc. iii. s. 1.

|| *Ibid.* l. vi. c. 70.

¶ 'Concupiscentia,' in the Augustinian sense, means one particular species of sinful lust; not, as our Article uses it, sinful desire in general.

** In his treatises on this subject, Augustine does not make it clear what kind of 'concupiscence' it is that he condemns. The natural appetite, implanted by the Creator, can hardly be condemned without verging towards Manicheism. Can Adam himself, before his fall, be supposed without such appetite? Augus-

short, that 'it hath of itself the nature of sin' (Art. ix.); but the question still remains, Is he not rather explaining a fruit of original sin than this very sin itself? Does he carry his analysis back far enough so as to reach the dark, quiescent ground of which all forms of concupiscence are but manifestations, intermediate between it and the actual sin? The great theologian, in fact, dwells almost exclusively on the positive aspect of original sin, whereas its real character is rather negative: it acts like a weight, or a drag, rather than like a stimulant; the operation of which is not felt at all in the unregenerate state, because the whole man moves under its influence, but of which the man immediately becomes conscious, as S. Paul did, when the law of the Spirit of life frees him from its uncontested mastery. He becomes conscious of it as being 'sore let and hindered' in his upward aspirations, as clogged with a weight which impedes his free motions, and causes him to fall behind in the race (Heb. xii. 1); it is a pull downwards which, like gravity, acts steadily, even when conscious concupiscence may be absent. And in proportion as it is seen in this its true nature, it becomes difficult to connect with it the idea of voluntariness, which reason seems to make an essential element of sin. A defect which belongs to the *nature* as distinguished from individuals seems removed from the ground of personality and free choice; nature and necessity are convertible terms; and it seems as if we can as little connect the idea of *guilt* with what belongs to the human race as such as we can deem a beast of prey culpable on account of the savage dispositions with which it came into the world.

It was obviously necessary, if the Pelagian was to be met effectively, that the doctrine of propagation should receive an extension of meaning, and mankind be brought into a still closer connection with the first man. And Scripture seems to warrant such an extension. For it not only declares, as we have seen, that by one man sin entered into the world, but further, that 'all men sinned' (in him, as the context seems to require);* that the 'judg-

time answers in the affirmative. He contends that in Paradise the race might and would have been propagated without it. This is a weak point in his theory; and to cover it he uses the word 'libido' to signify what he means, which word has usually the meaning of ungoverned, 'illicit,' desire. Is it that unconsciously he retained a trace of his early Manichean tendencies? It seems as if by parity of reasoning he might describe any of man's existing natural appetites as sinful, and as having first come into existence by the Fall. Sometimes, however, he speaks of a sinless 'libido,' which might be conceived of as existing in Paradise. 'Sane quod dicis, novam quandam libidinem dicis, aut forte nimis antiquam, qualis et in paradiso esse potuisset, si nemo peccasset' (Cont. Jul. lib. v. c. 4).

* Ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον: how this clause is to be understood has been, and is, subject of much controversy. It has come to be generally acknowledged

ment was by one to condemnation' (of the whole): that 'by one man's disobedience many were made sinners'; that 'in Adam all die' (Rom. v. 12, 16, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 22). It seems implied in such passages as these not merely that sin entered the world through Adam, but that when Adam sinned all mankind, in some sense, sinned in him, and thus contracted guilt. In fact they contain the rudiments of the theory of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, with which Augustine's name is especially associated, and which from him passed into the received teaching of the Western Church.* This theory he had already virtually enunciated when he attempted to secure the element of voluntariness in original sin by making Adam's will the will of the race; but, in the progress of the Pelagian controversy his language became more definite, and the theory more complete. Not that he was really the originator of it, for it is found in the writings of many of his predecessors, and he takes care to appeal to them in support of his own statements;† but in his hands it first received

that Augustine's translation of the words $\epsilon\phi' \tilde{\varphi}$ 'in whom,' viz. Adam, is inaccurate, and that their meaning is causal, 'because,' or 'inasmuch as.' But the main point is whether the Apostle speaks of actual sin only, or also of imputed. The aorist verb does not decide the question; but the context pleads for, at any rate, the joint application. Hence the early theologians supplied, without hesitation, $\epsilon\nu' \text{Αδ}\tilde{\alpha}\mu$. 'Sive enim $\epsilon\phi' \tilde{\varphi}$ accipias *causaliter* sive *relative* dictum, nihil decedet veritati. Si causaliter erit sensus; mors pertransiit in omnes homines, quia omnes peccaverunt, id est, quia Adamus humani generis parens omnium posterorum qui per carnalem generationem ex ipso descendunt personam representans peccavit' (J. Gerh. loc. x. c. 4, s. 63). Indeed if death is the concomitant only of actual sin, how could it be said that by *one man* sin, and therefore death, entered into the world?

* He thus briefly states it: 'Sic imputatur generatis parvulis injustitia primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum imputatur parvulis regeneratis justitia secundi hominis ad obtinendum regnum cœlorum' (Op. Imp. lib. i. 57).

† 'Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes: periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt' (Ambrose ad Luc. x. 30). This statement Augustine adopts as his own (Op. Imp. C. Jul. lib. iv. 104). Compare: 'In quo omnes peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt' (De Pecc. Mer. lib. i. c. 10). 'Præceptum, quo contempto atque violato, omnes ex uno homine, *tanquam in massa originis* commune illud habent peccatum' (Cont. Jul. lib. iii. c. 18). Yet Augustine seems occasionally to hesitate whether to describe the 'concupiscence,' in which he makes original sin to consist, as an evil (*i.e.* calamity) or as properly a sin. He more frequently calls it a 'malum' than a 'peccatum'; *e.g.* 'isto malo bene utuntur conjugati fideles, a cujus reatu soluti sunt munere Salvatoris' (Cont. Jul. lib. iv. c. 1). And the cause of his hesitation is obvious. If 'concupiscence,' *i.e.* the natural impulse, is in itself a sin, how can those in holy wedlock 'use it' beneficially? As a calamity they might make the best of it. Hence probably the preference for the ambiguous word 'malum.' Hence, too, his estimation of virginity *for its own sake*. 'Hoc malo bene utitur pudicitia conjugalis, melius non utitur continentia virginalis' (Cont. Jul. lib. iv. c. i. 7).

systematic treatment, and a pointed application to the existing heresy. This latter considered mankind as an aggregate of independent atoms, affecting each other only in the way of teaching or example; not as an organised whole, propagating itself along with its fundamental characteristics. Each man comes on the stage of life free to stand or fall; and though placed in a disadvantageous position from the prevalence of evil in the world, a fact which cannot be denied, not otherwise incapacitated from working out his salvation. Such a doctrine is not only inconsistent with Scripture, but with the analogy of nature. No individual, at least in the case of civilised man, comes into the world otherwise than as a member of a community, which is distinguished from other communities by laws, customs, a national life, and a national temperament of its own; in the weal or the woe of the community he necessarily bears a part; its peculiarities are stamped upon him. Races, nations, thus propagate themselves, and maintain a corporate life while individuals come and go. No branch of a tree exists independently, or derives its nature from itself; no tree is a mere collection of branches; but an organised body, with a common nature or quality, which pervades the whole. The Augustinian theory is merely the same fact applied to the spiritual condition of mankind. We were all in Adam, Augustine says, as Levi was in the loins of his father Abraham (Heb. vii. 9), and we all sinned in Adam; that is, his sin became, in some sense, ours, even as the righteousness of Christ is laid to the account of those who believe upon Him (Rom. v. 19). Not only Adam's sinful nature (the consequence of his fall), but Adam's guilt (*reatus*), is transmitted by natural propagation, or, as Augustine calls it, 'contagion,'* to his posterity. Mankind is viewed as a whole, of which Adam was both the physical head and the moral representative: if he had remained upright, the advantage would have redounded to the whole, and in like manner his fall was the fall of the whole. The actual transgression of Adam, Augustine argues, is indeed a bygone thing, but not its guilt, and the corruption of nature consequent upon it. A crime committed is past, but the effect of it may remain; and though the crime could not have been committed without an exercise of will, the effect may continue apart from, and even against, the will, as in the remorse which the criminal experiences. And, indeed, it is true that a sin once committed may perpetuate itself in many ways long after the act has become a thing of the past; as bodily

* 'Potuit autem ad alios per contagium sine voluntate transire, quod non potuit ab illo (Adamo) sine voluntate committi' (Op. Imp. lib. iv. 99).
'Aliud est perpetratio propriorum, aliud contagio alienorum peccatorum' (lib. vi. 9).

diseases, the result of a parent's sin, and even corrupt moral dispositions, often, as observation proves, become hereditary, and exist in the descendants long after the original author has passed away.*

But Augustine does not stop even here. In order effectually to connect the idea of guilt with original sin, he holds the latter to be in a real sense the penalty of sin, according to the principle, *Peccatum pœna peccati*; so that the newly-born infant not merely shares in Adam's guilt, but also in the punishment thereof;† which in Adam was the forfeiture of original righteousness, or original sin. In Adam the depravation of his nature was strictly a punishment, because he sinned voluntarily; and in his posterity it bears the same character. The idea of imputation here reaches its climax: mankind is so identified with the first man that its spiritual condition is a positive and not merely a natural penalty of the fact of connection. When, however, Augustine attempts to establish this principle (*Peccatum pœna peccati*) from Scripture, he is compelled to confine himself to cases of actual sin, in which no doubt it holds good. He refers to the Apostle's statement that because the Gentiles worshipped idols, therefore God gave them up to uncleanness (Rom. i. 24); and so the latter was both a sin itself, and also the punishment for a previous sin. Saul, he observes, was both unrighteous himself, and also a token of God's displeasure against Israel ('I gave thee a king in mine anger,' Hos. xiii. 11). Pharaoh's hardness of heart was the punishment of his previous impiety. And indeed, in the case of an adult, in whom original and actual sin are so intermingled that separation is impossible, the former may be conceived of as imbibing a quality which really belongs to the latter. Original sin, however, should never be considered apart from the case of infants, in whom its specific nature is primarily to be sought for; and to affirm that infants, as vicarious criminals, inherit it as a punishment not for their own but for Adam's sin, was needlessly to complicate the question, and to put more into the statements of Scripture on the subject than they warrant.

The use which Augustine makes of the practice of infant baptism to establish his conclusions is well known. And as against the Pelagians it was an effective *argumentum ad hominem*. For they too approved of infant baptism; and the argument was difficult to meet, Why do you baptize infants? Since they have no actual sin, it can only be for the remission of original. The

* Augustine is fond of insisting upon this fact, no doubt a most important one, in our moral constitution. 'Sic ergo peccatum, quod sine voluntate esse non potest, manere sine voluntate potest' (Op. Imp. lib. iv. 96). 'Manet nolente peccatore peccatum, quod a voluntate commissum est' (*ibid.*).

† Cont. Jul. lib. v. 3.

Pelagian replied that it was necessary to secure for them the highest measure of bliss, the vision of God;* but he failed to dislodge his adversary from his position. As a general argument, however, it will hardly bear the stress placed upon it. The point was, to prove that in a newly-born infant there is something which may be called sin; the reasoning was not valid that because the Church, on however good general grounds, adopted a modification of the original ordinance of baptism, this proved the fact, or explained the mystery; at best it was but a proof of the Church's belief on the subject. And this will appear plainer from the circumstance that Augustine argues from the accompaniments of infant baptism, common in that age but abandoned in our Church, as strongly as he does from the ordinance itself. What means, he asks the Pelagian, the 'exsufflation,' the 'exorcism,' which we perform over infants at their baptism, if not that they are thereby delivered from the powers of darkness?† To what extent infant baptism, and much more exsufflation and exorcism, can produce certain warranty of Scripture for their use, and still more for their alleged effects, so as to bear the weight laid upon them in this controversy, is a question which does not seem to have occurred to him.

It was not to be expected that Augustine's opponents would fail to charge him with Manicheism, probably with an oblique allusion to his early aberrations. If man is introduced into the world with sin, whence, asked the Pelagian, can that sin have proceeded? Not from God, for He cannot be the author of sin; not from baptized and regenerate parents, for how can an unclean thing come from a holy? it remains that it must spring from a source independent of God, an evil principle co-eternal with God. But the answer was at hand. It rests upon the principle to which Augustine, as we have seen, (§ 24) attaches so much importance, that evil has no independent existence, and is always found cleaving to something good, as the shadow to the substance. Every nature, and therefore man's nature, considered merely as such, comes from God, and is good; but to a nature good in itself evil may become attached, as in the case of Satan, and of Adam in paradise. The faculty of will is a gift of God, and therefore good; but it may become as in Satan and the unregenerate, an evil will, and bring forth corresponding fruits. In like manner, wedlock is a divine institution

* 'Etiamsi non baptizentur, promittunt (Pelagiani) eis extra regnum quidem Dei, sed tamen æternam et beatam quamdam vitam suam' (De Hær. c. 88).

† 'Verum tamen est quod antiquitus veraci fide catholica prædicatur et creditur per ecclesiam totam; quæ filios fidelium nec exorcizaret, nec exsufflaret, si non eos de potestate tenebrarum, et a principe mortis erueret?' (Cont. Jul. lib. vi. 5).

and in itself holy ; but the procreation of children affected with an original taint is an evil, which, in consequence of Adam's fall, has become connected with it : the parents transmit this evil, but they cannot transmit the gift of grace by which they themselves are regenerate, for such gift is not transmissible. If the Pelagian argument were valid, and evil can only spring from evil as an independent substance, then children born in adultery must, by reason of their evil origin, be themselves evil ; whereas the Pelagian himself exempts them, no less than children born in holy wedlock, from original sin. Augustine triumphantly retorts the objection on his opponent, and proves that the latter rather than he himself is a promoter of Manicheism. Evil exists ; if it cannot attach itself to what is good so far as that good is a creature of God, it must spring from evil, evil which exists as an independent nature ; which is exactly what the Manichean wishes to see admitted.*

This may be the appropriate place to notice Augustine's judgment respecting infants who die in infancy. Since they bear the guilt of Adam's sin, and also derive from Adam an inherent corruption of nature, these disqualifications for the kingdom of heaven must be removed ; and they can only be removed by baptism. Baptized infants then dying in infancy are certainly saved, but if they die unbaptized, it goes hard with them. Admitted into the kingdom of heaven they cannot be ; the most we can hope for is that their punishment will be comparatively light.† Such was the force of theory on a subject on which it is impossible to frame a theory ; for Scripture is comparatively silent on the case of infants ; how far the work of Christ affects them ; what their regeneration is, if the word may be applied to them, and by what means it is effected ; whether they will rise from the dead as infants, and other like questions which may be raised. The humanity of later ages allowed natural feeling to prevail over theory, and piously believed all infants who die in infancy, whether baptized or not, to be safe in the bosom of their Father and their God. It is to be noted, too, that though the Traducianist hypothesis evidently falls in better with his views, Augustine refrains from making use of it,‡ deterred probably by

* 'Nihil aliud est malum, nisi privatio boni. Quærent a nobis, unde sit malum ? Respondemus, Ex bono, sed non summo et incommutabili bono. Ex bonis igitur inferioribus et mutabilibus orta sunt mala. Quæ mala licet intelligamus non esse naturas, sed vitia naturarum ; tamen simul intelligimus ea nisi ex aliquibus et in aliquibus naturis esse non posse ; nec aliquid esse malum nisi a bonitate defectum' (Cont. Jul. lib. i. 9, 8).

† 'Quis dubitaverit parvulos non baptizatos, qui solum habent originale peccatum, nec ullis propriis aggravantur in damnatione omnium levissima futuros ?' (Cont. Jul. lib. v. 11).

‡ Cont. Jul. v. 15.

the difficulties on either side of the question ; on the one (Traducianism), of conceiving how an immaterial substance can be propagated, on the other (Creationism), of conceiving how God could create a soul pure, and then consign it to a defiled receptacle, sure to impart a taint to it.*

Pelagianism, vanquished in argument, held its ground as a tendency, and the hierarchical spirit of the middle ages, as in later times, instinctively leant towards it in preference to the Augustinian system. It was rather, however, as regards the nature of original sin and its extent that Augustine's teaching was departed from, than on the point of imputation ; which continued, with some modifications, to be the received doctrine. Anselm professes himself unable to understand how the sin of Adam can be so propagated as to render infants as liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves.† His own theory is as follows : Adam sinned, in one point of view, as a person, in another as man (*i.e.*, as human nature, which at that time existed in him alone) ; but since Adam and humanity could not be separated, the sin of the person necessarily affected the nature.‡ This nature is what Adam transmitted to his posterity, and transmitted it such as his sin had made it ; burdened with a debt which it could not pay, robbed of the righteousness with which God had originally invested it ; and in every one of his descendants this impaired nature makes *the persons sinners*.§ Yet not in the same degree sinners as Adam was, for the latter sinned both as human nature, and as a person, while infants (newly born), sin only so far as they possess the nature ; in confirmation of which view he cites, according to his interpretation of it, Rom. v. 14 ('them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression'). The fiction of infants having the actual eating of the apple imputed to them (for Adam's human nature as distinguished from himself did not eat it) is thus avoided, and it is their own mutilated or depraved nature that shuts them out from the kingdom of heaven. The point on which he is not quite distinct is whether the defective nature in itself makes them sinners, or only because it necessarily (if they live) leads to actual sin. But probably the former is his meaning.||

* See § 34.

† De Concept. Vir. c. xxii.

‡ 'Quod egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat quod dicebatur Adam, natura quod homo ; fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam' (De Concept. Vir. c. xxiii.)

§ 'Quia natura subsistit in personis, et personæ non sunt sine natura, facit natura personas infantium peccatrices' (*ibid.*).

|| His language on this point is not quite clear. 'Natura,' he says, 'agens facta omnes personas quas ipsa de se precreat eadē egestate peccatrices et

The works of this great theologian on this as on other points exercised a vast influence on his successors. Accordingly his view is substantially reproduced by T. Aquinas. 'All men,' he says, 'who are born of Adam may be considered as one man, so far forth as the nature which they inherit from their first parent is one: as in civil matters all the men who belong to a community are considered as one body, and the whole community as one man. So the many men derived from Adam are, as it were, members of one body. In the human body a crime which the hand perpetrates is not ascribed to the hand alone, but to the man of whom the hand is but a single member. Original sin, in like manner, is not the sin of this or that person, except so far forth as he inherits a nature from Adam, and therefore it is called a sin of nature, as *e.g.* in Ephes. ii. 3 ("We were by nature children of wrath").'* The bold realism by which the *nature* of man abstracted from the person is made both by Anselm and Thomas susceptible of guilt is apparent; but so is the sagacity by which the weak point of the Augustinian theory is evaded, or concealed.

The Protestant Confessions, with one exception,† content themselves with simply tracing the depravation of human nature to Adam's fall, and dwell principally on the nature and extent of that depravation; as might be expected, for this latter was the real point of debate between the Reformers and their opponents. Our own Article (ix.) is an example of this reserve. We learn from Sarpi‡ that at the Council of Trent lively disputes arose on the question; and particularly that Ambrose Catharinus delivered a long address in which he stated his objections to the decisions about to be promulgated, and propounded a theory of his own. Concupiscence and the privation of original righteousness, he contended, were in Adam rather the consequences of original sin than that sin itself; and that only which was sin in Adam can

injustas facit;' and again: 'Magnum est distantia inter peccatum Adæ et peccatum eorum (infantium), quia ille propriâ voluntate peccavit, illi naturali necessitate' (De Concept. Vir. c. xxiii.). This may mean either that infants, if they live, necessarily become actual sinners; or that they are so at once by the mere fact of birth.

* Prima Secundæ, q. lxxxi. art. 1.

† 'Non possumus proin, salvâ cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere iis qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei representasse, ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀπέσως imputari negant' (ἀπέσως means the actual eating of the apple), 'et sub imputationis mediatæ et consequentis nomine' (that is, that through Adam's fall the nature only became sinful) 'non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hereditariæ corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt' (Form. Consen. Helv.).

‡ Histoire, &c., lib. ii. 65.

be sin in us. How, then, do we derive sin from Adam? A federal compact had been entered into between him as the head of the human race and God, by which his obedience was to be the obedience, and his transgression the transgression, of the whole; and when he fell the whole consequently became involved in guilt. Original sin, therefore, consists merely in imputation. But this solution obviously fails: for the question at once occurs, Was Adam commissioned by his posterity to enter into this contract? Was their consent previously obtained to it? If not, it is difficult to see how the breach of it should involve them in guilt. Nevertheless, Catharinus's theory only represents the general tendency of Romanism, which is to limit the corruption of our nature as much as possible to a mere imputation. Yet the assembled Fathers hesitated to endorse it, Scripture and the main current of ecclesiastical tradition being in their way. The decree, as finally settled,* admitted that original sin is not only such by imputation, but is something inherent, a *fomes*, or material, from which actual sin proceeds. And this appears to be the received doctrine of the Romish theologians.†

What then, on the whole, is the result of these controversial discussions? Pretty much, it must be confessed, to leave the matter where Scripture leaves it; a mystery, which, though it may not be denied or concealed, remains such in spite of all attempts to explain it. The doctrine of imputation, in some sense, appears to be taught in Scripture; and even they who contend against it as supposed to be commonly held are obliged to invent a substitute of their own. Thus Jeremy Taylor, who in his treatise on this subject perilously approaches the Tridentine teaching, after setting forth strongly the difficulties in the way of supposing that infants (dying in infancy) are condemned to perdition for a sin which they did not consent to, devotes a chapter to prove that 'Adam's sin is in us no more than an imputed sin.'‡ In what sense? 'His sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us, because we were born of him, and consequently put

* 'Inest unicuique proprium. Manere in baptizatis concupiscentiam, vel fomitem, synodus fatetur' (Sess. v. 3, 5).

† 'Si peccatum pro actione cum lege pugnante accipitur, peccatum originale est prima Adami inobedientia, ab ipso Adamo commissum, non ut erat singularis persona, sed ut personam totius generis humani gerebat. Si vero peccatum accipitur pro eo quod residet in homine post actionem, et unde idem homo non peccans sed peccator nominatur, peccatum originale est carentia doni iustitiæ originalis sive habitualis aversio, et obliquitas voluntatis, quæ et macula mentem Deo aversam reddens appellari potest' (Bellarm. De amiss. grat. lib. v. c. 17).

‡ Further Explic. § 2.

into the same natural state where he was left after his sin.' But this is no imputation at all, but, as Taylor remarks, a law of God's natural government, viz., that children often suffer for the faults of their parents, while no one would think of calling them guilty of those faults. The children of a spendthrift father do not enjoy the temporal advantages they otherwise might have done; this is to them a misfortune; but can their father's sin be said, in any proper sense, to be imputed to them? Not unless some further and deeper connection is established between them and their father, which is the very thing which Scripture does seem to establish between Adam and mankind. In short, are not imputation and guilt correlative terms? The difficulty does not seem removed by Taylor's modification of the doctrine; perhaps is irremovable by any such expedient. Anselm is a safer guide; and if his theory is accepted it may serve to explain, not indeed the mystery, but such statements on the subject as that of Art. ix., that what is in every infant by reason of his descent from Adam is 'deserving of God's wrath and damnation.' Is it not, in fact, the nature and not the person that is regarded in all such statements? Sin may be considered abstractedly from the person in whom it resides: in its own nature it is ἀμαρτία, or a missing of the mark, and ἀνομία, or contrariety to the Divine law. In whomsoever, therefore, it is found, even as a latent potentiality, it must *in itself* be an object of God's displeasure; but it does not follow that the person must be so, still less that the sentence on sin will in such a case be actually inflicted. The *fomes*, or tendency, which if the infant lives will assuredly give birth to actual sin, cannot in God's sight be a thing indifferent; but as it is only an objective guiltiness (to which the will has not consented, because the subject is incapable of will), it may be covered from God's sight by an objective atonement (not appropriated by an act of will); so that the infant himself, if he dies as an infant, is not and never has been, an object of God's wrath. But when the personality, as in adults, becomes developed, the case is different. The inherited taint inevitably produces its fruits; in the language of Anselm, the nature corrupts the person; it is no longer possible to distinguish between original and actual sin; '*Non inviti*,' says Augustine, '*tales sumus*;' and the whole man is guilty. By the work of regeneration this acquiescence of the fettered will is broken up, and the man becomes conscious of the law of sin in his members (Rom. vii. 23), and successfully resists it; it still remains, however, as a perpetual drag upon him, and will do so until redemption is complete. His consciousness of this tendency is not merely that of misfortune but of culpability, and he himself assents to the verdict of Scripture that even before

original sin could issue in actual it was, in itself, properly sin (Rom. vii. 7-11). And yet it may fairly be maintained that in no case does original sin, considered in and by itself, carry with it the penalty of eternal condemnation.

That all difficulties thus disappear would be too much to affirm; and it is not surprising to find a theologian like J. Müller, dissatisfied with the traditionary explanations, resorting to others of his own. It may be doubted, however, whether the one he has chosen will find general acceptance. He can account for the combination of a natural, and therefore so far necessary, evil tendency in man with the sense of guilt on account of it—both of them facts which Scripture and experience establish—only on the hypothesis of a voluntary fall of souls before they came into their present state of existence.* Such a fall, he contends, and the faint recollection of it as a voluntary one—according to the Platonic notion that all knowledge is recollection—are sufficient to account for the facts. The speculation is ingenious; but as Scripture is silent on any such pre-existent fall, it is but a speculation. It is better to confess our inability to explain or reconcile things which we are obliged to admit than to indulge in theories which merely float in the air.

§ 41. *Original Sin as the Corruption of Nature—Pelagian Controversy.*

The *extent* of the depravation of man's nature through the Fall is a different question from that respecting the mode of its transmission or the guiltiness attaching to it; and it was the one which occupied by far the larger space in the controversy on the subject between the Reformers and their opponents. It has been already observed that the tendency of the Eastern Church was to take a mild view of man's present condition; and even Augustine, in controversy with the Pelagians, insisted rather upon the fact of original sin than upon the degree in which it affects our nature. The Pelagians held, as we have seen, that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall, and that by the Law salvation may be obtained as well as by the Gospel; in other words, that there is no real depravation of nature in man as he is. Augustine could not prove the existence of original sin without at the same time impugning these tenets; but his line of argument did not lead him to make them a subject of special examination; and whether as a consequence of this, or from the prevailing tendency of the Christianity of the middle ages, they survived, in a modified form, their author; and one of the first

* Lehre der Sünde, ii. c. 4.

tasks of Luther and his coadjutors was to rescue the truth on this point from the Pelagian glosses of the schoolmen, and to bring the doctrine of the Church into harmony with Scripture and experience.

It became an admitted doctrine of the schools, contrary to that of Augustine, that the original righteousness of Adam in Paradise consisted in certain supernatural gifts of grace, which were added to his essential nature, and which might be withdrawn, leaving that nature in no worse a position than it was when created.* This doctrine appears in its least objectionable form in T. Aquinas, who so closely connects the superadded gift with the creation of man, that they can only be separated in idea, and thus secures to himself the power of making original sin something more than a mere imputation.† But Duns Scotus, his rival, adopted it without reserve; in which, indeed, he could plead the authority of Anselm, who reduces the notion of original sin to a mere privative one.‡ The question came under discussion at the Council of Trent; and the Dominicans and Franciscans, as was usually the case, took opposite sides.§ The former relied on Thomas, the latter on Anselm; and the decree ultimately agreed upon seems of the nature of a compromise between the two. Original sin is declared to have passed, in some sense, from Adam to his posterity; but it is also declared to be not merely forgiven but eradicated in and by baptism, and that the ‘concupiscence,’ which is admitted to remain in the baptized, is not properly sin, but is called so because it proceeds from, and leads to, sin.|| What is it then in the unbaptized? The Council is prudently silent on this point; for it is evident that a thing which is not sin in the baptized, and yet is common to them and the unbaptized, cannot be sin even in the latter; which, in truth, is the doctrine of Bellarmine, who does not scruple to affirm that ‘the state of man after the Fall differs from that of Adam *in puris naturalibus* (i.e. as created) only as deprivation differs from

* See § 32.

† ‘Originale peccatum est habitus, non quidem sicut scientia, sed sicut quædam inordinata naturæ dispositio et languor consequens originalis justitiæ privationem’ (Prima Sec. q. lxxxii. art. 1). ‘Materialiter (originale peccatum est) aliarum animæ virium ad bonum commutabile inordinata conversio’ (*ibid.* art. 3).

‡ ‘Hoc peccatum, quod originale dico, aliud intelligere nequeo in eisdem infantibus nisi ipsam, quam supra posui, factam per inobedientiam Adæ justitiæ debitæ nuditatem’ (De Concept. Vir. c. xxvii.).

§ Sarpi, lib. ii. 64.

|| ‘Contrary to Augustine’s doctrine, that original sin is remitted in baptism, ‘Non ut non sit sed ut non imputetur’ (De Nup. i. 25). How the Council could define a thing which is both the effect and the cause of sin not to be in itself sin, or sinful, is not easy to perceive.

nakedness ; and that human nature is no worse, if original guilt be put out of view, nor does it labour under greater ignorance and infirmity, than when first created, and before the addition of the supernatural gift.* The utmost that can be allowed is that it suffers from a certain 'languor,' or debility, which, however, does not interfere with its power of meriting a bestowal of grace (grace of congruity). This was the doctrine, with its consequences in the practical system of the Church, which the Reformers found commonly accepted, and which led to the strong counter-statements which we find in the Protestant Confessions. Man, as in the Pelagian system, became practically his own Saviour ; the statements of Scripture respecting the radical nature of the disease were set aside, or explained away ; superficial distinctions were drawn between venial and mortal sin, while the deep root of all sin lay undisturbed ; and, as a consequence, the necessity of the atoning work of Christ was proportionably impaired, or its application made dependent on the interposition of the Church in her sacramental ordinances. For it is evident that if man can save himself, the work of Christ assumes a casual character ; *i.e.* it may be necessary to one and not to another ; it is not necessary to the race.

The Confession of Augsburg declares that 'since the Fall, all men are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence ; and that this defect is truly sin, and issues in eternal death in the case of those who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy Spirit.'† The Papal confutation replied that to be without fear and trust in God is a description that applies only to actual sin ; which drew from Melancthon the further explanation that it is the innate power to love God, and not merely the act, which is denied to the natural man ;‡ and that concupiscence forms part of the definition because when man is unable to rise to communion with God, he necessarily concentrates his affections on lower objects, himself and the world.§ Since original righteousness was natural to man and not an additional gift of grace, to be deprived of it necessarily involved a change, which the word 'corruption' was chosen to describe. This word properly means not annihilation but alteration ; a deterioration of the form in which a nature reaches its ideal. In the present case it means that though the substance of man remains the same, his nature, through the Fall, has lost its

* De Grat. prim. hom. c. v.

† Art. ii.

‡ 'Potentiam seu dona efficiendi timorem et fiduciam erga Deum adimimus propagatis secundum carnalem naturam' (Apol. Conf. c. i.).

§ It will be seen that 'concupiscence' with the Reformers is a word of far wider signification than with Augustine.

original form, and became, in fact, another nature. And the property of this other nature is to be ignorant of God, to be averted from Him, to place self on the throne which God ought to occupy, to act, when it becomes active, in opposition to His holy law; in short, to be in itself sinful, which is what the doctrine of Rome persistently denies. And it is evident from what has already been remarked (§ 39) that nothing short of this view of man's unregenerate state satisfies the statements of Scripture respecting it. The natural and the spiritual man; the flesh and the Spirit; the first Adam and his seed and the second Adam and his seed; are contrasts which pervade the whole teaching of S. Paul, and to express which the ideas of 'debility,' or partial deterioration, are inadequate. The nature of man itself needs to be re-formed, its corruption to be reversed; which is what Scripture means by the new birth, or the new creation. And thus are to be understood the strong expressions which occur in some of the Protestant Confessions. 'Even if man,' says the 'Lutheran Formula Concordiæ,' 'should never think, speak, or do anything wrong, nevertheless his nature and person are sinful; that is, infected, tainted, and totally corrupt before God, with original sin, which, like a spiritual leprosy, lurks in the deepest recesses of the heart.'* They represent the reaction from that type of doctrine which would make original sin to consist merely in the imputation of Adam's transgression, or in the deprivation of a super-added righteousness (*carētia justitiæ originalis*). And no doubt the pendulum in its swing may have gone somewhat too far in the opposite direction.

They are certainly not to be understood, as Möhler would understand them, viz., as implying either that human nature has lost one of its essential faculties, the capability of knowing God, a positive quality of evil taking its place; or that original sin has become of the essence of human nature.† The word 'faculty' may be used in a twofold sense, to signify either capacity or power; the brute has no capacity for religion, man in his worst estate has; but the capacity may be in abeyance. Fallen man is still a reasonable creature, possesses conscience, retains, in some sense, the image of God (§ 32); nothing essential to human nature has been lost by the Fall. What is wanting is the proper direction of his faculties; and every one of them suffers from this perversion. Like the word 'faculty,' the word 'integrity' admits of a double sense; it may mean either that the sum-total of the parts is complete, or that each of the parts is in its normal condition. It is in the latter sense, not the former, that the Protestant doctrine of original sin denies the integrity of human nature.

* Sol. Decl. c. i.

† Symbolik, s. 6.

And thus is to be understood the *quam longissime* of our Art. ix. Man is gone from original righteousness as far as he possibly can consistently with his remaining, in all essential points, man. The spiritual leprosy has infected all his faculties, but destroyed none; sin is an inseparable accident, but still an accident, of his nature. The Protestant Churches had occasion to insist upon this, for, in truth, some of their teachers had spoken incautiously on the subject. Flacius, about A.D. 1560, had maintained against Strigel and others that original sin has become of the substance of man, and in his 'Clavis Scripturæ,' a work otherwise of great merit, he openly defended this proposition.* The question had been long ago fully discussed by Augustine, and determined as only it can be, that all evil, even in the devil, presupposes an originally good nature of which it is the depravation; that it is a fault (*vitium*) not an essence, an accident not a substance; and that fallen man is still, as regards the essential constituents of human nature, what he was when created. If sin has actually become the substance of man, how can man expect a future state of bliss wherein sin shall no longer exist; that is, wherein he shall exist deprived of a part of his essence? From such a doctrine the Lutheran Church took care to dissociate itself. 'Although,' says the Form. Conc., 'in our present state we cannot visibly separate between our nature in itself and original sin in itself, yet the nature or substance of fallen man, the man himself in whom original sin dwells, and this sin, are not one and the same thing; just as in a leper the man and his leprosy are distinct things. A distinction must be observed between our nature, as it is created and preserved by God, and the original sin which is an accident of it.†' It remarks, very justly, that the opposite opinion interferes with the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation; for if sin is of the essence of our nature, Christ either did not assume that nature, inasmuch as He had no sin, or if He did He must have had sin; either alternative leading to error. But while this error is repudiated, all the Protestant Churches maintain, as against Rome, that original sin—the *fomes* as the Council of Trent calls it—is not merely privative in its nature, but positively evil; issuing, unless regenerating grace destroys its dominion, in an alienation from God which is not the less real even where it does not exhibit itself in open violations of the Divine law.

This may be an appropriate place to consider what is the full

* 'Assero primarium peccatum originale esse substantiam . . . non aliter ac si dulcissima ac sincerissima quæpiam massa venenatissimo fermento infecta in ejusdem fermenti molem penitus substantialiterque immutata ac transformatâ esset.' See Planck, Geschichte der Prot. Theo. b. v. c. 4.

† Sol. Decl. i. 33.

import of the sentence pronounced upon Adam in Gen. iii. It has already been observed (§ 37) that, on the surface, the narrative seems only to speak of the death of the body (including the temporal inflictions which culminate in it); but this is far from exhausting the meaning of the word 'death,' as it is applied in the later Scriptures. In the Old Testament it signifies very commonly *Scheol*, or the place of departed spirits, which even to the pious Hebrew conveyed the idea of desolateness and inactivity; a shadowy existence, not unlike that which Homer assigns to his heroes after their departure from this life (Ps. vi. 5; Is. xxxviii. 18). In the New Testament it is used in a spiritual sense, to denote the state of the unregenerate man; as when the Apostle reminds the Ephesians and Colossians that they were 'once dead in sins' (Ephes. ii. 1; Col. ii. 13); or, in the parable, the returning prodigal is represented as having been, in his unrepentant state, dead (Luke xv. 24). And this meaning is to be distinguished from that which the word bears in several passages of the Apocalypse; in which 'the second death' closes this dispensation, in the final condemnation of the wicked. Now what is the idea which the expression 'spiritual death' suggests? Not merely that this state is the consequence, or punishment, of sin; but that in itself it is a state loathsome, and without power of self-recovery.* Sin is the death of the soul, and so it must have been in Adam's case, but for the regenerating grace which the Church piously believes to have been immediately vouchsafed to our first parents. And what was the result of sin in him we must suppose is transmitted to those 'naturally engendered of his offspring;' so that they too, antecedently to the new birth, are dead in sin. What description could have been chosen more calculated to convey to us the fearful depravation of nature, and the spiritual helplessness of the natural man, consequent on Adam's sin. The nature is not merely 'wounded,'† or debilitated, but in such a condition that it naturally engenders corruption; and it must remain in this condition, separated from the source of spiritual life as in natural death the soul is separated from the body, unless the quickening word of Divine power approaches, and the dead hear the voice of the Son of God, and hearing live (John v. 25).‡ Yet this language of Scripture must not be

* Hence, in the typical dispensation, the legal uncleanness of anyone who should touch a dead body (Numb. xix. 11).

† 'Omnes vires animæ remanent quodammodo destitutæ proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem: et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturæ dicitur' (T. Aquinas, *Prima Secundæ*, q. lxxxv. art. 3).

‡ The Council of Trent does seem to admit sin to be 'the death of the soul' ('peccatum, quod mors animæ est,' Sess. v. 2); but whether it is Adam's imputed sin, or the soul's own sin, is not explained. Most probably it is the former that is meant.

pressed to its (apparently) logical conclusions, without taking into account other statements which modify, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, restrict its sphere. If unregenerate man is dead in sins, it may be argued, he must be supposed incapable of moral virtue, of either approving it in others, or striving after it himself; but to maintain this seems inconsistent with the facts of history, and the common judgment of mankind. Whence sprang the heroic deeds and sentiments of an Aristides, a Camillus, or a Scipio? whence the moral judgments and efforts of philosophers like Plato, or of practical reformers like Socrates? Whence, in short, the natural tendency of man to coalesce into communities which can only subsist as long as outward crime is restrained, and which, according to the ancient conception of a state, ought to be schools of virtue? These facts seem to prove not only that sin has not become of the essence of man, but that the corruption of his nature is by no means total.

Of the difficulty connected with the state of the virtuous heathen, a twofold explanation may be given. One is, that their good qualities, or the comparative absence of bad ones, did, in fact, proceed from an operation of Divine grace, but not saving grace; grace sufficient to restrain the outbreaks of sin, and to foster the moral virtues necessary to man's temporal well-being. Every good and perfect gift, we are told, natural therefore as well as spiritual, comes from above (James i. 17); and there is a divine light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John i. 9).^{*} Or it may be said that these virtues are the remains (*reliquiæ*) of the Divine image impressed upon Adam and not quite obliterated by the Fall; by reason of which man still has natural perceptions of right and wrong, and approves of what is right, though he may fail to practise it (*video meliora*, etc.). Practically they come to the same thing, viz., that there is a sphere of moral action and even sentiment which belongs even to fallen man, and in which he can display qualities which, in themselves, are deserving of admiration. This sphere is described in the Protestant Confessions as that of *res civiles*, or *justitia civilis*;† that is, though of Divine appointment, and so far good, it is of the earth earthy, and is different in *kind* from the spiritual. The State, no less than the Church, is an ordinance of God (Rom. xiii.); and by repressing crime, and giving scope to the moral virtues

^{*} 'Ego fateor quæ in Camillo fuerunt speciosæ dotes, et Dei fuisse dona, et jure commendabiles videre, si in se æstimentur' (Calvin, Inst. ii. 3).

† 'Docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam, et deligendas res rationi subjectas' (Conf. Aug. xviii.). 'Constituuntur a theologis nostris duo hemisphæria circa quæ voluntas hominis versatur, inferius et superius. Illud priores (res civiles), hoc posteriores (res spirituales) complectitur' (Quenstedt, p. ii. c. 3, thes. 7).

and affections, of which the heathen proved themselves not destitute, it was, and is, in a real sense, though not in the same sense as the Mosaic law, a schoolmaster to lead to higher things. There was a dispensation of heathendom as well as of revealed religion; and God never wholly severed the connection between Himself and man. And the difference between a Camillus and a Catiline was, in this lower sphere, immense. But none of these virtuous faculties, or instincts, or achievements, could, or did, raise man to the higher element of the spiritual life, love to God and true holiness. They were all vitiated in this point of view by self-love, or the desire of human approbation; they were not, in the specific sense of the words, the fruit of the Holy Spirit; they were *splendida vitia*, as they have been not inaptly termed.* The tree, Augustine says, bears corresponding fruits: a corrupt tree (the unregenerate heart) may indeed produce the wild fruit of morality, but not the divine fruit of grace.† The natural man possesses the *capacity* of knowing God—otherwise he would be incapable of redemption—and therefore moral faculties and instincts; and one natural man may be superior to another in moral perception and practice: but none of these things affects the whole condition of the natural man as such in reference to God; which, until regenerating grace transforms it, remains so far totally corrupt. Scripture by no means ignores the differences that exist on the lower level of moral disposition; of some of the Pharisees and Scribes Christ says that they would neither enter the kingdom of heaven themselves nor permit others to do so (Matt. xxiii. 13), and of another Scribe that he was not far from the kingdom of God (Mark xii. 34); yet all were equally outside the kingdom. In short, the natural moral faculties are active only in reference to the things of this world; they are dead in reference to the life of God in Christ. It is in a sense thus restricted that the statements of Scripture, and of the Protestant Confessions, on this point are to be taken; but in this restricted sense they only affirm what experience amply proves.

So deeply has original sin struck its roots in human nature that it continues to exist, and in its proper quality, even in the regenerate (Art. ix.). This is one of the principal points of

* 'Quantum ad virtutes quæ inani specie nos decipiunt, in foro quidem politico et in communi hominum fama habebunt laudem; apud celeste vero tribunal nullius erunt pretii ad justitiam exsequendam' (Calv. Inst. ii. 3). See also 'Homily on Good Works, p. i. : 'If a heathen man clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do such other like works; yet because he doth them not in faith, for the honour and love of God, they be but dead, vain, and fruitless works to Him.'

† Cont. Jul. lib. iv. 22. 'Nullo modo homines sunt steriliter boni: sed qui boni non sunt possunt esse alii minus, alii magis boni' (*ibid.*).

difference between the Romish and the Protestant doctrine on this topic. The Council of Trent, as we have seen, declares that original sin is not merely forgiven, but extirpated in baptism; so that what remains in the baptized has not the nature of sin. The 'concupiscence' which, it is admitted, does remain is nothing but what Adam was affected with before the Fall, when it was restrained by the bridle of superadded grace; this restraining power is now replaced by the grace of baptism, and concupiscence is either brought under a necessary law of nature, or it is reduced to a mere deterioration of nature;* nay, it may assume a salutary character as supplying material for the exercise of virtue. How then does it come from sin? as the Council asserts. It is not easy to see. What Adam, still upright, possessed, if transmitted by natural propagation, can hardly be transmitted sin; nor can it well be regarded as the punishment of Adam's sin when it belongs to the constitution of human nature, and existed before actual sin. Nor is it less difficult to see why it should lead to sin, as the Council also admits. Let it be granted that as in Adam so in us it supplies the *fomes*, or material, out of which, in the absence of restraining grace, sin may spring; still as in Adam it was kept in check by such grace, so it is in us by the restored gift in baptism. Such are the difficulties in which the Council involved itself in its attempts to transfer the seat of sin from the affections to the outward manifestation, and yet to avoid coming into open collision with Scripture and Christian feeling.

The Protestant Confessions, our own among the number, hold not only that concupiscence remains in the regenerate, but that in them not less than in the unregenerate it has the nature of sin. In the unregenerate it is not removed either as regards its guilt or its dominion; and such a state is nothing but what Scripture describes under the terms, 'the carnal mind,' 'the flesh,' the 'old man,' the 'natural man.' In the regenerate the guilt is wholly removed through the merits of Christ, and the dominion broken, but the evil still remains, though no longer as the ruling principle; the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit is experienced even by the Christian, and draws forth from him the daily prayer for forgiveness (Matt. vi. 12); the fallen nature is in process of being healed, but the complete cure is not to be expected in this life. It was the great merit of Augustine to have established this truth, against the Pelagians of his day, on irre-

* This relative deterioration of nature, of which concupiscence is the symptom, is not denied by Bellarmine: only he denies that it is, in itself, sin. 'Non est quæstio inter nos et adversarios, sine humana natura graviter depravata per Adæ peccatum. Id enim libenter fatemur' (De amiss. grat. lib. v. 5).

fragable evidence of Scripture ; and of the Reformation to have recovered it primarily from Scripture, but also from the writings of the great Father, against the Pelagian tendencies of the schoolmen. There is indeed some little ambiguity in Augustine's language on the subject, and it may seem doubtful in sundry passages whether he considers concupiscence merely as a penalty of Adam's sin (*malum pœnæ*), or as sinful in itself (*malum culpæ*); but on the whole his meaning, as the subject unfolds itself to him, becomes clear. 'The concupiscence of the flesh,' he says, 'against which the good Spirit strives' (therefore in the regenerate), 'is sin, because it involves rebellion against the law of the mind ; it is also the punishment of sin, because it was the fruit of one man's disobedience ; and it is the cause of sin, in case it meets with no resistance.'* Still more distinctly, referring to his statement that though the guilt of concupiscence is remitted in baptism the thing itself remains,† 'You seem,' he says, 'to suppose me to have meant that the nature of concupiscence is in the baptized so changed that it is no longer culpable (*soluta reatu quo ipsa rea est*), whereas my meaning was that it no longer renders the person culpable ; as in the case of homicide if you should hear that it was remitted you would not infer that the crime itself had been pronounced no crime, but that the person who had committed it was absolved.'‡ That is, concupiscence even in the regenerate is sin, because its nature is to be contrary to the Divine law ; but it does not, when resisted, affect the condition of the believer in the sight of God as a justified man. And this is precisely the doctrine of the Protestant Churches.

The great passage of Scripture on which Augustine and his followers relied' was Rom. vii. 14-25. S. Paul therein, from his own experience, describes most graphically the conflict which goes on in the regenerate man. 'I am,' he says, 'so far as I am not wholly regenerate, carnal, sold under sin ; my actual attainments fall short of my aim, and too often I do what I hate. I approve of the requirements of the law as holy, just, and good ; I delight in it after the inward man, but though to will is present with me, how to render perfect obedience I find not, for in me, that is my flesh, or carnal nature not yet wholly crucified with Christ, dwells no good thing. I am conscious of a law, or tendency, in my members, or flesh, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to itself, so that I am compelled to cry out, Oh, wretched man, who shall deliver me from this body of death ? I thank God, that though helpless in myself, I am delivered through the grace of Christ ; delivered not

* Cont. Jul. lib. v. 3.

† De Nup. i. 25.

‡ Cont. Jul. lib. vi. 17.

from the existence but from the dominion of the tyrant. It is therefore no longer I, the redeemed man, that do it, but the sin that dwells in me; it is this and not my emancipated will that produces the disorder. Nor does the conflict interfere with my position forensically in the sight of God. So far as I am flesh, indeed, I serve the law of sin, but with the mind, the inner man, I serve the law of God; and walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, there is no condemnation to me who am in Christ Jesus' (Rom. viii. 1). This interpretation of the passage being assumed to be the correct one (and there were few dissentient opinions on the subject in the early Church), it expresses the whole of what the Reformers contended for in their controversial statements as against Rome.*

§ 42. *Freedom of the Will—Pelagian Controversy.*

From the extent of human corruption as described in the Protestant Confessions naturally follows the impossibility of man's passing from a state of nature to a state of grace by his own inherent strength, and apart from Divine assistance. One of the tenets of Pelagius, as Augustine tells us, was 'that that cannot be called free-will which is not self-sufficient (*i.e.*, self-determining), since each man is able to do, or to abstain from doing, what he pleases; and that our victory (in the spiritual conflict) is not from Divine help, but from the exercise of free-will.'† Pelagius did not deny that grace in some sense is necessary to a spiritual change, but Augustine charges him, and justly, with equivocation in the use of the word. By 'grace' Pelagius understood every natural gift of God, *e.g.* free-will itself, and every external aid vouchsafed, such as the precepts of the Divine law; only not a supernatural influence, operating on the heart to sway its affec-

* It is a hopeful sign that Augustine's interpretation of this famous passage, so long considered as untenable, has been revived by commentators of some note, such as Philippi, Delitzsch (Psych. v. 6), Thomasius, and Von Hoffmann. The history of its exegesis would fill a volume: a sketch of it may be found in Tholück's 'Commentary.' It was no superficial study of it that led to Augustine's final judgment: 'Ego prius eum aliter intellexeram, vel potius non intellexeram: quod mea quædam illius temporis etiam scripta testantur. Non mihi enim videbatur Apostolus de se ipso dicere potuisse, *ego autem carnalis sum*, cum esset spiritualis: et quod captivus duceretur sub lege peccati quæ in membris erat ejus. Ego enim putabam ista dici non posse nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnalis concupiscentia subjugatos . . . Sed postea melioribus et intelligentioribus cessi, vel potius ipsi, quod fatendum est, veritati, ut viderem in illis Apostoli verbis gemitum esse sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium' (Cont. Jul. vi. 23).

† De Gest. Pel. c. 65.

tions.* As a corollary, the exercise of free-will in a right direction constituted a claim on the Divine assistance, and, as the schoolmen afterwards taught, grace *de congruo* was its due reward.†

The answer of Augustine was substantially the same as that which has been given by Edwards and others, viz., that Pelagius confounded the faculty of will with its power to act independently of any determining cause. Fallen man has the faculty of will, as he has other moral and intellectual faculties; and if he is free from external compulsion, since he does not act (like irrational agents) from inward necessity, as, *e.g.*, the plant grows by the necessity of its nature, he must will what he pleases to do. In this sense everyone possesses free-will. But this does not determine the question whether it is in his power to direct his will so that it shall embrace whatever objects may be presented to it; for example, spiritual objects as contrasted with those of an inferior order. If he serves sin he does it willingly—*non inviti tales sumus*; and if he serves God he does it willingly: but has he the power to do the one or the other, as he pleases? Augustine replies in the negative: ‘Which of us maintains that through the sin of the first man free-will has disappeared from the human race? Liberty, indeed, has disappeared through sin, but that which belonged to Paradise, viz., the liberty of possessing perfect righteousness and with it immortality; on which account human nature needs Divine grace, according to the Lord’s saying, “If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be truly free,” that is, to live holily. For free-will is so far from being in abeyance in the sinner that the essence of his sin consists in his sinning voluntarily, and with a pleasure in it. It is by free-will that men refuse the yoke of righteousness; by the grace of the Saviour alone they become free from that of sin. Since men, unless made sons of God, do not live a holy life, how can Pelagius ascribe to free-will what is not given except by the grace of God, as S. John says, “As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become sons of God”? If they reply that they received Him by free-will, and then, as a reward, had the privilege of adoption conferred on them, let them say what else to receive Him is but

* ‘*Nam gratiam Dei et adiutorium, quo adjuvamus ad non peccandum, aut in natura et libero ponit arbitrio, aut in lege atque doctrina; ut, vid, cum adjuvat Deus hominem ut declinet a malo et faciat bonum, revelando et ostendendo quid fieri debeat, adjuvare creditur; non etiam co-operando et dilectionem inspirando, ut id quod faciendum esse cognoverit faciat*’ (De Grat. Christi. c. 3).

† ‘*Dicunt, Etsi non datur (gratia) secundum merita honorum operum, quia per ipsam bene operamur, tamen secundum merita bonæ voluntatis datur*’ (De grat. et lib. arb. c. 27).

to believe on Him, and what else is to believe on Him but to come to Him; and then let them ponder Christ's words, "No man can come to Me except the Father draw him." He surely is drawn to Christ to whom it is given to believe on Him; whence it follows that to receive the privilege of adoption, to receive Christ, to come to Him, and to believe on Him, are simultaneous; and since to believe on Him is a gift of grace, adoption is so too. Free-will, therefore, cannot merit the privilege, because there is no freedom for good, where the Deliverer has not made free; but in the other case free-will does operate, the sinner indulging his sin with a deceptive feeling of pleasure."* In this passage, which may serve as a specimen of the numerous similar ones in his anti-Pelagian treatises, Augustine, as will be seen, draws a distinction between the abstract faculty of will, which he allows not to be extinct in fallen man, and the agent who wills; and the direction in which the agent wills is determined by the presence, or the absence, of a previous gift of grace, or, in other words, by the answer to the question whether he is regenerate or not. The unregenerate man is in a state of slavery as regards the *objects* of his will, and though he sins willingly, he enjoys no real freedom, which he first attains when he comes under the regenerating power of the Holy Ghost. His meaning will be clearly seen from another passage from the book 'De Gratia Christi': 'Pelagius holds that we have a possibility implanted in us by God which, like a fruitful root, may develop itself in either direction, and at the will of the possessor issue either in the blossoms of virtue or the thorns of vice. He does not perceive that in *making one and the same thing* the root both of good and evil, he teaches contrary to evangelical truth. For the Lord says that a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit. Whence, if the two trees, the good and the evil, are two men, a good and an evil one, what is a good man but a man of good will, that is, a tree of good root, and an evil man but a man of evil will, that is, a tree of evil root? But he becomes a good tree when he receives the grace of God, and an evil tree when he makes himself evil by falling away from the supreme good.'† In other words, antecedently to any discussion respecting the nature or the freedom of the will, a prior question has to be determined, viz., What is the *man himself*, a πνευματικός or a ψυχικός? If the latter, however freely he may appear to act, he is an evil tree which can bear nothing but evil fruit; his carnal nature, as a *whole*, is still dominant, and as long as it is so his will acts accord-

* 'Contra duas,' etc. (lib. i. cc. 5, 6). 'Must the will,' asks Hooker, 'cease to be itself because the grace of God helpeth it?'—(that is, not as preventing, but as co-operating, grace (E. P., b. v. app. 1, Keble's edit.).

† De Grat. Christ. 19, 20.

ingly, and they that are thus in the flesh cannot please God (Rom. viii. 8).

The Pelagian doctrine was not more offensive to Christian instinct, and destructive of true piety and indeed true morals, than it was opposed to the plain statements of Scripture. In reference to the 'superior hemisphere,' *i.e.* the spiritual duties of loving and serving God, the intellect of man, in his natural state, is said to be darkened (Rom. i. 21 ; Ephes. iv. 18), nay, to be darkness itself (Ephes. v. 8) ; his mind is blinded by the god of this world (2 Cor. iv. 4) ; to the natural man the things of the Spirit are foolishness ; he can neither receive nor know them (1 Cor. ii. 14) ; of himself and his brother ministers S. Paul declares that what they did know on these matters was to be ascribed exclusively to Divine teaching (2 Cor. iii. 5). The will likewise of the natural man, as a motive power, is described as spiritually inoperative. The heart is stony (Ezek. xxxvi. 26) ; the unregenerate man is a slave of sin (Rom. vi. 17), and the reason is because the carnal mind is not and cannot be subject to the law of God (Rom. viii. 7) ; no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him (John vi. 44) ; the natural man is dead in sins (Ephes. ii. 1). As long as this state prevails, how can the will co-operate with God in the work of regeneration ? Such passages as Phil. ii. 12 cannot be adduced on the other side ; for the question relates not to co-operating, but to preventing grace. All admit that the regenerate man, by virtue of the grace he has received, may, and does, co-operate in the working out of his salvation, but how came he to receive the first impulse in a right direction ? Scripture and experience declare that no man, by the exercise of his own unaided powers, can liberate the will from its thralldom, much less deserve, *de congruo*, the gift of regenerating grace.

Yet it must be confessed that triumphantly as Augustine refutes his opponent on this point, his own system hardly assigns due weight to other statements of Scripture which seem to imply the existence of some spiritual power in fallen man. He notices, as every candid controversialist must, the numerous passages in which invitations, exhortations, warnings, promises, are addressed to sinners, as if they had the power to comply with them, and as if the blame of their non-compliance must rest on themselves. 'Why will ye die, O house of Israel?' (Ezek. xviii. 31) ; 'Ye will not come to me that ye might have life' (John v. 40). His explanation is correct as far as it goes, but not exhaustive. He observes that such passages are 'pædagogical,' *i.e.* are intended to convince the sinner of his helplessness, and by the exhibition of the Divine requirements to suggest what he ought to pray for ;

just as S. Paul describes the Law of Moses as a 'schoolmaster' to lead men to Christ, from its effect in awakening a sense of sin and the need of a Saviour. 'By the law of works God says, Do what I command. But the law commands in order that faith may know how to act; that is, that he to whom the commands are addressed, if he has no power, may know what to seek; but if he has power, and obeys, may know through whose gift it is that he has power.' 'Free-will avails nothing except for sinning, if the way of truth is not revealed;* and even when man's duty and proper aim are set before him, no action follows unless the truth becomes loved; and that it does so is the fruit not of free-will, but of the Holy Spirit who is given to us.†' 'The Pelagians think that there is some weight in their objection, "God would not command what He knows is not in man's power to accomplish"; but let them consider that these precepts, though we cannot fulfil them, teach us what we ought to seek from Him.‡' 'The Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. iii. 12), enjoins charity; blames them for their want of it; prays that they may abound in it. Learn, O man, by the command what thou oughtest to have; by the reproof that it is thine own fault that thou hast it not; by the prayer whence thou mayest receive it.§ But is nothing more than this to be inferred from the passages in question? They seem evidently to imply a measure of responsibility on man's part, at least when favoured with Divine revelation, for the choice he makes when the issues of life and death are plainly proposed to him.

We thus stand face to face with the great problem which, since Augustine's time, has never ceased to occupy the minds of thoughtful inquirers, and which seems no nearer its solution than it was a thousand years ago. How are we to reconcile the doctrine of grace as plainly taught in Scripture with what seems equally plainly taught, the power of man to shape his spiritual

* That is, if the individual is outside the pale of the visible Church, with no means of grace presented to him. Augustine's reasonings generally presuppose the enjoyment of external spiritual privileges, and yet plainly imply that in his opinion these may consist with a practically unregenerate state. Indeed in one passage we may fancy it is Calvin who speaks. He introduces some (apparently) nominal Christians who excused their sins on the plea of their not having received grace, and replies: 'Let such persons consider that, if they are not yet regenerate, still they have original sin, which came in through man's free-will, and which in a sense is also their own: let therefore the guilty taint be reproved, in order that a desire for regeneration may be awakened. But if a regenerate and justified man relapses into sin, surely he cannot say he has not received grace' (De corrept. et grat. c. 6).

† De Spirit. et Lit. cc. 3, 5.

‡ De grat. et lib. arb. 15.

§ De Corrept. c. 3.

destinies? Or, to put the question in another form, why is it that exhortations, invitations, etc., can be addressed to fallen man which we consider it would be improper and useless to address to the fallen angels?

The older theologians attempt an alleviation of the difficulty by a distinction between a passive and an active receptivity in reference to the Divine admonitions and invitations.* By the former is meant what man can receive or do irrespectively of Divine aid. Thus he could not be addressed at all as Scripture addresses him if he were not a reasonable being, possessing understanding and conscience; he is not a stone nor a brute; the bare materials of human nature are still his, and it is on them that regenerating grace operates. An essential element of human nature has not, as Möhler charges Protestants with teaching, by the Fall been extinguished.† Nor, again, can it be denied that, as regards the ‘inferior hemisphere,’ or the sphere of morality as distinguished from that of religion, he possesses a power to do what natural conscience dictates, and to abstain from what it condemns; though even this power exists only in a debilitated form, and is much impeded by sinful passions. Moreover, Scripture implies a power in man to *resist* the appeals of Divine grace though not to yield to them; he can keep the heart shut though he cannot open it.‡ For he lies under no disability as regards sin, and is himself a free agent here as well as has the will free; which is not the case as regards the love and fear of God. Scripture everywhere recognises a difference in the hearers of the Word, according as some suffer themselves to be drawn by grace—*trahit Deus sed trahit volentem*—while some refuse the voice of the charmer charm he never so wisely. Some are ‘of the truth,’ exhibit a candour and docility which predispose them to ‘hear the voice of Christ’ (John xviii. 37); others are of such an opposite spirit that they would even prevent inquirers from entering

* ‘Si intelligitur *capacitas activa*, ἐπιτηδεύουσις, ac vis quædam ἐνεργητικῇ, negamus talem *ικανότητα* in homine superesse; si vero per eam intelligitur *capacitas passiva*, qua voluntas hominis subjectum παθητικὸν divinæ gratiæ constituitur, concedimus talem receptivitatem adhuc superesse’ (J. Gerh. loc. xii. c. 4, s. 39). That is, according to the old saying, ‘Patimur gratiam.’ This ‘*capacitas passiva*’ is the ‘*aptitudo*’ of T. Aquinas: ‘*homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum; et hæc aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quæ est communis omnibus hominibus*’ (Prima. quæst. xciii. art. 4).

† Symbolik, s. 6. He seems not to have remembered that by the ‘image of God,’ in which man was created, Protestants understand ‘original righteousness,’ not the mere reasonable capacity of religion, which no doubt remains even in fallen man.

‡ Such passages as Rev. iii. 20 must be understood under reference to the general tenour of Scripture.

the kingdom (Matt. xxiii. 13). The soil on which the good seed falls varies in quality (Matt. xiii. 3-8), and there are characters which 'are not far from the kingdom of God' (Mark xii. 34), which certainly cannot be said of all sinners.* Religion seems to root itself in some natures more easily than in others. To what is the difference to be ascribed? Some would reply that it springs from a prevenient act of grace, which is the source of these favourable dispositions themselves. This may be so; but it is important to note that in many of the cases in Scripture the better disposed were equally with the less outside the kingdom of God though no doubt some of them were farther from it than others. In the visible Church, as in heathendom, these moral differences may exist in a high degree without passing the boundary which separates nature and grace. They do, however, prove that the reaction of natural conscience against hereditary corruption never ceases until conscience itself is seared with a hot iron, and that grace has a natural ally even in fallen man; which the preacher may reckon on as more or less active. The death of the soul is, after all, a sleep from which there may be an awakening (Ephes. v. 14). And perhaps this constitutes the essential distinction between fallen man and the fallen angels, as regards capacity of recovery. Until that sin, whatever it may be, by which the sinner places himself beyond the reach of mercy (Matt. xii. 32) is committed, the *capacity* for redemption, involving the religious faculty, the moral sense, and whatever else distinguishes man from brutes and devils, exists in every man, and it is in his power either to cherish or to extinguish it. He may attend the means of grace and hear the Word, he may keep himself from fleshly lusts which war against the soul (1 Peter ii. 11), and so far assume a favourable attitude towards the summons to repent and believe; but this is neither regeneration nor a co-efficient in the bringing about thereof: what is produced on this ground is but the wild fruit of nature until the creative power of grace sublimates it into another nature. It is, in the language of Augustine, the *adjutorium sine quo* the work of grace is not effected—the necessary material on which it works, but not the *adjutorium quo* it is effected;† the condition of the result but not the result itself. The radical change may still be wanting. There may be a great difference between a Socrates or a Marcus Aurelius and a Nero, as regards *justitia civilis*, and it must neither be denied nor undervalued; but it is only a relative one, and sinks into nothing when compared with that between the natural and the spiritual man.

* Still stronger is the expression in Matt. xi. 12: 'The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.'

† See De Corrept. 34.

And this is proved by the facility with which natural virtue may, and often does, pass into dispositions alien to Christianity. Patriotism becomes a narrow hatred and jealousy of other nations, generosity exhibits itself at the expense of justice. Above all, the stoical virtue of a Cato almost invariably terminates in self-complacency, a temper the furthest removed of all from that of the Christian. The taint of self-esteem infects all these *splendida vitia*, and renders them worthless as *religious* acts. Nor can unaided nature expel the taint, or, as Augustine says, make the tree good. It is only the regenerate man that is a real worker with God, and even he not as on a co-ordinate level, or as an independent source of good. The receptivity of the natural man is a reality, not a name; God deals with the unconverted as *persons*, reasonable, reflecting, morally endowed persons; but the receptivity itself needs to be quickened and purified by grace before it can fully discharge its function. And this is the fact which Pelagian tendencies in every age deny, or overlook. Particular acts of will Pelagius was willing to admit might need Divine assistance to perfect them; but that the carnal nature itself, the 'old man' of S. Paul (Rom. vi. 6), must be exchanged for a new one he persistently denied.

The decisions of the Council of Trent on this subject cannot be acquitted of the charge of ambiguity; as Sarpi insinuates not unintended, in order that all parties might be satisfied.* It anathematises those who hold that grace is only given to make holiness and eternal life *easier* of attainment, as if free-will without grace could achieve the same result but with greater difficulty; those, too, who maintain that without the help of the Holy Spirit man can believe, repent, or love, so as to receive the gift of justification;† with all which Protestants fully agree. 'If anyone,' it proceeds, 'shall say that free-will, when moved by God, does not co-operate with such motions in disposing and preparing man for the gift of justification, and that it cannot refuse assent to them if it will, but, like an inanimate object, is merely passive in the work; or if anyone shall say that free-will was lost by the Fall, and is extinct, or is only a name without reality, let him be anathema.‡' Certainly it cannot be said that the Fall has annihilated the faculty of will, for everyone's consciousness tells him the contrary; nor can the work of conversion take place without involving an exercise of the active principles of our nature, such as, fear, desire, hope, etc. But the question is whether man, apart from preventing grace, as he certainly has the capacity of religion, has also the power of evoking from himself an appetency towards

* Histoire, lib. ii. 80.

† Sess. vi., Canons, 1-3.

‡ *Ibid.* 4, 5.

God, which, as it were, reaches forth its hand to God, to be laid hold of by Him and drawn up to higher things? If this is what the Council means by the co-operation of free-will with the Divine solicitations (and it must be suspected that this is its meaning), it approaches the Pelagian, or semi-Pelagian, error long ago exposed by Augustine. Such an appetency itself, that Father would say, is the fruit of grace, and no man has a desire to co-operate with God until God gives the will; that is, breaks the chain of a sinful nature. 'Without our co-operation God produces in us a will towards good, but when we do will, and will to act, He co-operates with us.'* Human nature, that is, left to itself, cannot will to turn to God, or make any advances in that direction; if it does so, this is owing to a prevenient act of grace which gives the power to do what is commanded (*dat quod jubet*). The Protestant Confessions may and do recognise in the natural man a reaction of the original nature against its corruption, which is more or less active under the means of grace; and even in the heathen a feeling of the discrepancy between what they are and what they ought to be.† But in *itself* this is not religion; it is merely the protest of conscience against the dominant tendency; and as in the visible Church so amongst the heathen, if ever this protest passed into the higher sphere of a new nature—and that there may be and have been saved even amongst the heathen no one is concerned to deny—it was the product not of unaided nature but of Divine grace. It is obvious that as regards this point there is no real distinction between the doctrine of Augustine and that of Calvin in subsequent times.

The same question gave rise to what has been called the Synergistic controversy in the Lutheran Church, and is substantially that at issue between the Calvinists and Arminians of a later age. Melancthon appears, in his later years, to have modified his views, or at least his statements, on the inability of the natural man, and, in contrast with the strong expressions of Luther in his treatise 'De Servo Arbitrio,' to have taught that man had an independent power of meeting the approaches of Divine grace; that is, bridging over, to some extent, the interval between the natural and the spiritual man. A school of Philippists, as they were called after Melancthon, sprang up after his death, advo-

* 'Ut velimus sine nobis operatur, cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum co-operatur' (De grat. et lib. arb. 33). 'Ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus co-operatur perficiens' (*ibid.*). Certum est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille facit ut velimus bonum' (*ibid.* 32). 'Per hanc (gratiam) fit ut sit homo bonæ voluntatis qui prius fuit malæ voluntatis' (*ibid.* 31).

† 'Quemadmodum est videre in philosophis, qui et ipsi conati honeste vivere, tamen id non potuerunt' (Conf. Aug. xx.).

cating this view; and a lively controversy arose between its adherents (Pfeffinger, Strigel, etc.), and the more rigid interpreters of the Augsburg Confession. The latter obtained the ascendancy, and procured the promulgation of a confession of faith, called the *Formula Concordiæ*, A.D. 1579, which was largely subscribed by the Lutheran Churches, though not universally, and is the fullest and clearest exposition of the later orthodox Lutheran faith. What this was on the question of free-will may be judged from the following extracts: 'We condemn the doctrine of the Synergists, who pretend that human nature in reference to spiritual things is only grievously wounded, but not quite dead. And that, although free-will is too feeble to initiate conversion to God, or obey the law, yet if the Holy Spirit through the preaching of the Gospel offers us His grace, remission of sins, and eternal life, then the human will can by its own power, however enfeebled, meet God, and prepare itself for the reception of grace. We believe that in man's nature since the Fall, and prior to regeneration, not even a spark of spiritual power remains, by which he can prepare himself for Divine grace, or contribute anything to his own conversion, and that his will is only free to do what is displeasing to God. Before he experiences the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit man can do no more towards procuring them than if he were a stock or a stone. Nay, he is worse than a stock or a stone, because he can, and does, despise and resist the Divine commands.*' In other words, he is *capable* of regeneration, which a stone is not, nor yet a brute, nor the fallen angels; but the first movement towards it must come, not from himself, but from above; which, as we have seen, is precisely the doctrine of Augustine. So unfounded is the notion sometimes, as it appears, entertained† that the Lutheran doctrine on this subject is milder than that of the Churches supposed to have been under Calvin's influence. The contrary is the fact. Although there is no substantial difference between the two great Reformers in their view of fallen human nature, yet Calvin's statements on the subject are by no means so sweeping as those of Luther, and the Helvetic Confession of 1566 even contains expressions which seem directed against certain modes of speaking familiar to the German Protestants. It admits that the faculties of understanding and will still exist in man, so that he is very far from being a stone or a stock; and contents itself with affirming that these faculties have been so impaired since the Fall that they are no longer capable of what they were previously to that

* Form. Conc. Solid. Decl. c. ii.

† Laurence, B. Lectures, lect. v.

event.* And our own Confession is equally moderate in its statements. It adopts the Augustinian doctrine that 'works done before the inspiration of Christ'—the *splendida vitia* of the early Father—do not deserve grace *de congruo* (Art. xiii.); nay, 'have the nature of sin,' as not springing from the right motive, not being the genuine fruit of the new nature which comes through grace. They are not done as 'God hath willed and commanded them to be done,' with a single eye to His glory, but either from the mere promptings of the moral nature not extinct in man, or for selfish ends, or from a stoic temper of self-sufficiency; they are defective, in scholastic language, *quoad substantiam actus*, in the form, if not the material of the act. What Augustine and the Reformers meant is that antecedently to *individual* differences in relation to the hearing and reception of the Word, which may be great and manifold, there is a disability which belongs not to each man as an individual with a history of his own, but to human nature as such, and which can be removed only by our being transplanted from the wild olive into the new stock. This fundamental truth of Scripture being secured, both Augustine and his successors might have safely admitted more than they have done as regards the power of natural conscience, and the moral differences of hearers of the Word; things plainly implied in many parts of Scripture (Matt. xiii. 12; Acts vii. 51), and matters of daily experience. With the latter the pressing necessity of the time was to erect a barrier, as far as might be, against the rampant Pelagianism of the dominant Church, which threatened to reduce the Gospel to little more than a system of natural religion:† to future ages they left the task of attempting to harmonise the statements of Scripture on the subject.

Besides its dogmatical bearings, this subject has, as is well known, largely attracted the attention of the philosophical inquirer. According to Milton these discussions date from a remote antiquity.‡ Whatever corrections Calvin's own system may

* Considerandum est qualis fuerit homo post lapsum. Non sublatus est quidem homini intellectus, non erepta ei voluntas, et prorsus in lapidem vel truncum esse commutatus; ceterum illa ita sunt immutata et imminuta in hominibus ut non possint amplius quod potuerunt ante lapsum' (Conf. Helv. c. ix.).

† 'Si quis dixerit opera omnia, quæ ante justificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint, verè esse peccata, vel odium Dei mereri, aut *quanto vehementius* quis nititur se disponere ad gratiam tanto eum gravius peccare; anathema sit' (Conc. Trid. sess. vi. 7). No Protestant Confession, it may be observed, affirms the latter.

‡ 'Others apart sat, on a hill retired,
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.'

Paradise Lost, ii.

demand, Calvinism as compared with Arminianism has no need, on philosophical ground, to shrink from the contest. The principal point at issue, viz., whether the will is self-determining, or comes under the general law of causality—or, in other words, whether the will is ever in a state of equilibrium between opposite objects, so that contingency is essential to its real freedom—has been subjected to the keen analysis of Jonathan Edwards,* and the Arminian tenet exposed in all its inconsistency. If the word ‘will’ is used for the faculty of volition, to ask whether contingency attaches to it is to ask whether a man chooses to do what he does choose to do, or whether in the act of choosing a certain course of action he can choose another the opposite thereof. If will is used, as it probably is in this connection, for the agent willing, then it conveys no very exalted idea of a man that when good and evil are placed before him he is supposed to have no bias or tendency one way or the other, so that it is impossible to predict with any certainty what he will do or not do under given circumstances; that his actions are the sport of chance, and himself ‘like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed’ (James i. 6). It would follow, too, that men could not be pronounced either virtuous or vicious on account of settled dispositions of character; whereas in common opinion and language these are the very things that enhance their virtue or vice. We do not think the less of a man of whom we say that, in our opinion, it is impossible that he should commit an unjust or a mean action; nor do we mean to extenuate a man’s viciousness when we say that it is just what we should have expected of him; that he could not, according to his nature, have acted otherwise. On the contrary, it is the presumed *nature* prompting the action that determines our estimate; and in proportion to the certainty we feel that they will act in one way or the other is the praise or blame which we attach to men. That is, a *moral* necessity is the condition of a perfectly virtuous state. We believe that the elect angels now, and the saints in future glory, will be incapable of sinning; but that surely does not interfere with the perfect freedom of their service. Or to ascend higher still, it is morally impossible that God can act otherwise than with perfect holiness and wisdom; but He is not the less absolutely free. As of old in the Pelagian, so in the Arminian scheme, it is not remembered that prior to, and as it were behind, the will is *the nature*; and that according as the nature is, the will, by a moral necessity, exerts itself: free in sinning if it is that of the old nature we derive from Adam; free in holiness if it is that of the new one derived from Christ. And thus, though in strict propriety of language

* ‘Inquiry into Freedom of the Will.’

inability means a want of *power* to do what we have the *will* to do, and refers primarily to physical restraint or defect, yet when applied to fallen man it means the absence or inefficiency of the will itself, or moral inability consequent on the depravation of nature through the Fall; the result of which is that man 'cannot turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God.'

It may be observed further that contingency and a self-determining power are inconsistent with each other. If a state of indifference towards objects is what constitutes freedom of the will, and therefore the virtue of an action, it is obvious that that state should never be exchanged for a state of determination, whether self-caused or not; if any act eventually follows, it must, if it is to possess moral worth, be divested of all semblance of determination. And equally improper must it be to employ threatenings, promises, etc., for these can only produce their effect by putting the will out of a state of equilibrium, and inducing it to determine itself.

If it be said that these objections only prove that the Arminian scheme involves self-contradiction while they leave the difficulties on the other side untouched, this no doubt is to some extent true. What is called Calvinism has also its own difficulties, and perhaps insoluble in our present state of knowledge. Either system, carried out to its logical consequences, lands us in conclusions which it is not easy to reconcile with the language of Scripture, in its apparently plain meaning. But the most unsatisfactory of all methods of adjustment is to explain away or attenuate passages which, if they do not imply the necessity of prevenient grace to sway the will by rectifying the nature, must be dismissed as having no certain meaning at all.

The subject of the preceding sections is of vital moment as regards our apprehensions of the nature and object of Christianity. No one who considers the tendencies of modern thought can fail to see that the question of the corruption of human nature lies at the root of the divergencies of opinion and statement which we meet with in the controversial discussions of the day. And it is equally evident that to extenuate, to ignore, or to deny the effects of the Fall, as they have been usually understood in the Church, is a prominent feature of certain aspects of Christianity which have attracted notice of late. Sometimes it is assumed that man has only to be placed under a system of external discipline, whether it be the natural providential history of the world, or a special dispensation like the Law of Moses, in order to reach the ideal of his nature; and further that the moral gains of one age are taken up by another as the basis of still further

improvement, until at length by a natural development the race attains 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Ephes. iv. 13);* on which hypothesis there ought, at this advanced period, to be little or no sin, at least in such nations as have enjoyed this spiritual education. The birth-taint which every man in every age, according to Scripture, brings with him into the world, and with no decreasing intensity of virulence, and which is as much proof now as ever it was against all engines of assault but one, is here ignored as a factor to be taken into account. Sometimes the example of Christ and the moral precepts of the Gospel are extolled as the wheat, while its mysterious doctrines are the chaff; as if example and instruction are all that man needs to enable him to emerge from the ruins of the Fall. Sometimes, at the opposite pole, the radical change which is admitted as necessary is described as a magical effect, not necessarily involving or leading to any *moral* renovation of the heart; a gift indeed of grace, but neutral in character and result, which may or may not consist with an habitually sinful state. Under the former system man never did need a new creation; under the latter, a member of the visible Church does not need it because, whatever be his moral condition, he once received it for good. Under either system Pelagianism finds a natural footing. Under either aspect Christianity sinks from being a Divine method of redemption from fearful evils to a system either of mere naturalism or of crass supernaturalism. And under either system, in different measure—much more it must be admitted under the former than under the latter—the atoning work of the Redeemer suffers a depreciation, and becomes obscured. The Person and work of this Redeemer will next engage our attention.

* 'Essays and Reviews:' Essay i., 'On the Education of the World.'

PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST.

‘The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man’s nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance : so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man’ (Art. ii.). ‘As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also it is to be believed that He went down into hell’ (Art. iii.). ‘Christ did rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man’s nature ; wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until He return to judge all men at the last day’ (Art. iv.). ‘Christ, in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us, sin only except, from which he was clearly void, both in His flesh and His spirit ; sin, as S. John saith, was not in Him’ (Art. xv.). ‘Item docent quod Verbum, hoc est, Filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam in utero beatæ Mariæ Virginis, ut sint duæ naturæ, divina et humana, in unitate personæ inseparabiliter conjunctæ’ (Conf. Aug. iii.). ‘Agnosimus ergo in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo duas naturas vel substantias, divinam et humanam, et has ita dicimus conjunctas et unitas esse ut absorptæ aut confusæ aut immixtæ non sint ; sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus, in una persona unitæ vel conjunctæ, ita ut unum Christum Dominum non duos veneremur : unum, inquam, verum Deum et hominem, juxta divinam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto’ (Conf. Helv. xi.). ‘Who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile His Father to us, and to be a sacrifice not only for original guilt, but also for actual sins of men’ (Art. ii.). ‘Vere passus, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus, ut reconciliaret nobis Patrem, et hostia esset non tantum pro culpa originis, sed etiam pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis’ (Conf. Aug. iii.). ‘Qui, ut solus est Mediator, Intercessor, Hostia, idemque et Pontifex, Dominusque et Rex noster, ita hunc solum agnoscimus, et toto corde credimus redemptionem, expiationem, protectionem’ (Conf. Helv., A.D. 1536, xi.). ‘Quid deinde valet nomen Christi ? Hoc epitheto melius etiamnum exprimitur ejus officium. Significat enim unctum esse a Patre in Regem, Sacerdotem, ac Prophetam’ (Cat. Genev.).

PART I.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

§ 43. *Incarnation of the Logos.*

It is not necessary here to recapitulate the arguments by which the Deity of the Son is established.* But the Word became

* § 25.

flesh (John i. 14) ; forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also himself took part of the same (Heb. ii. 14) ; He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh (Rom. i. 3), made of a woman (Gal. iv. 4) ; so truly that if any confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh he is a deceiver and an antichrist (2 John, 7) ; in a word, in the Person of Jesus Christ the Son of God became incarnate.

The idea of an incarnation is not foreign to the history of religion. Communion with the Deity, which is the essence of all religion, leads to the conception of union with Him, which, accordingly, appears under various guise in many of the forms of religion which preceded Christianity. Sometimes, as in the Nirvana of Buddhism, under the notion of final absorption into the Deity ; sometimes, as in the Greek mythology, under that of the Apotheosis of heroes and sages, who after death were supposed to be promoted to the ranks of the gods. The second person of the Hindoo trimurti, Vischnu, assumes many material forms, and among them (as Krishna) that of humanity. The distinctions, however, between the forms which this vague instinct assumed in heathenism, and the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, are great. Either, as in Hindooism, the incarnation is not permanent, Krishna on his return to heaven laying aside his humanity, and the Nirvana extinguishing humanity altogether ; or, as in the West, it is not God that stoops to man, but man that is exalted to God.

It may seem as if the Old Testament not only did not reveal a proper incarnation (the mere Theophanies are not such), but rather, in its ritual and prophetic teaching, insists upon the barrier which sin had raised between fallen man and his Creator. And consistently with its ethical and pædagogical character it could not do otherwise. The ancient Hebrew was perpetually reminded that only by a special interposition of Jehovah could this barrier be removed. But in reality the Mosaic dispensation supplied the true basis of the idea of an Incarnation, in that it was a religion of revelation to prepare the way for redemption. Under it God entered into covenant with the chosen people, made Himself their tutelary God and their King, gave them an elaborate ritual, and a moral law which is the transcript of His own moral nature ; and placed on record, through the instrumentality of the Jewish lawgiver, the primitive history of the human race and of the Divine communications which had from time to time been made to it. Thenceforward, in the history of Israel and in prophecy, the designs of God towards fallen man become more and more unfolded, until the prophetic voice, having fulfilled its office, ceases, and a period of silent expectation ensues. All this

is something very different from the revelation of God in nature, in which, though reason may discern the footsteps of Deity (Rom. i. 19), the Deity Himself retires from view behind the laws which He has impressed on matter: here, on the contrary, we have God revealing Himself in history, under type and prophecy, by signs and wonders, through appointed organs; manifesting Himself to man as the latter was capable of receiving it, and becoming in a sense incarnate before the incarnation itself. But only in a fragmentary and imperfect manner—*πολυμέρως καὶ πολυτρόπως* (Heb. i. 1)—not by the union of Himself with man in the person of a Redeemer. This consummation, however, was thus foreshadowed, and when it did arrive it was seen to be nothing but what the prophetic intimations had been long preparing the way for. In the person of Christ all previous manifestations of God are summed as in an epitome; the scattered rays are here concentrated in a focus; and for this reason we can expect no further, or more complete, revelation of God (John i. 18). It may be observed that it was only on theocratical ground that the true conception of an Incarnation could take root and grow up. Philosophical Judaism never attained to it. The Wisdom of the Apocryphal books, and the Logos of Philo, are nothing but personifications of a Divine attribute or emanation; not the personal indwelling of God in man. Matter is with Philo, as with the Gnostic sects, the source of evil, and to attain the end of his being man must be unclothed of his body. To such a habit of thought it was quite repugnant that God should condescend to assume a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.*

In the prologue of S. John's Gospel (i. 3), as in other passages of Scripture (Heb. i. 2), the Logos appears as a Mediator between God, in His abstract essence, and creation: through Him the worlds were made. And it is the same Logos that communed with the Patriarchs, led the Israelites through the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 4), spoke through the prophets (1 Peter i. 11), and presided over the fortunes of the nation; so that when the final crisis was at hand, He could say of Jerusalem, 'How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not' (Matt. xxiii. 37). We can see how fitting it was that the Mediator between fallen man and God should be the same who had been Mediator in a lower sense; that the Alpha should be the Omega (Rev. i. 8); the actual creator of nature its actual restorer (Rom. viii. 21); the first Adam have for his counterpart the second man, the Lord from heaven (1 Cor. xv. 47).

Was the first Adam, or the second, the prototype of humanity?

* On Philo's theories, see Dorner, *Ent. Gesch.*, P. i. pp. 21, etc.

The latter opinion has been held by some who by the 'image of God' in which Adam is said to have been created (Gen. i. 26), understand the foreseen Incarnation of the second Person of the Holy Trinity. The question is involved in a more general one, viz., would the Incarnation have taken place if man had not sinned? Was it a necessary factor in the consummation of man's destiny, or a remedy for the effects of the Fall? If regarded in the latter light, it is urged, it assumes the character of a mere contingent provision, for sin itself cannot, except on the supralapsarian hypothesis,* be supposed a necessary element in the Divine counsels. We should be compelled, too, to believe that the entrance of sin into the world procured for man a greater blessing than could have been attained without it; according to the old saying, '*O felix culpa quæ talem et tantum meruit habere redemptorem!*' And when the purposes of redemption are accomplished, why should not the Incarnate Son revert to His previous condition, and become once more a λόγος ἄσαρκος, on the principle that *cessante causâ cessat effectus*? which, however, is not the orthodox belief. These considerations have led some distinguished writers to the conclusion, *Etiam si homo non peccasset Deus tamen incarnatus fuisset, licet non crucifixus.*†

The contrary opinion, however, has prevailed,‡ and, as it should seem, on good grounds. Scripture seldom, if ever, assigns any other ground for the Incarnation than to carry out the purposes of redemption; though it may be thought to extend the benefits thereof to other orders of creatures than man (Ephes. i. 10; Col. i. 20). But independently of this, the theory itself is of suspicious tendency. If Christ, irrespectively of redemption, is to be considered as the ideal Man, the head of humanity, the 'King of men' as the phrase sometimes runs, there seems a danger of the distinction between nature and grace becoming obliterated, and a door being opened for the doctrine of the restitution of all men. Adam, as he was created, was the head of unfallen humanity, and if he had continued in his uprightness, would doubtless both himself have advanced in holiness, and propagated a race of sinless beings, to whose spiritual progress no limits can be assigned. But would humanity thus unfallen ever have attained the perfection which humanity *restored* does in Christ? According to Scripture,

* Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. 7. So Schleiermacher, though from another point of view, maintains that the original plan of the world comprised the necessity of sin for the sake of redemption (Glaubenslehre, s. 81).

† Martensen, Dog. ss. 89, 131.

‡ 'Quamquam Deus peccato non existente potuerit incarnari; convenientius tamen dicitur quod si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus non fuisset, cum in sacra Scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur' (Thos. Aquin. p. iii. q. 1, art. 3).

Christ, the second Adam, is the head of *redeemed* humanity (Ephes. i. 22), and the gifts of regeneration and resurrection in the likeness of His glorified body are described as the fruit of His sufferings unto death, and of His subsequent exaltation. And we cannot suppose that these blessings are not in their nature superior to what would have, under any circumstances, accrued to man through an incarnation, even if man had never fallen, and Christ had never suffered and risen again. Regeneration is something more than creation, and the future glory of the saints a higher condition than that of Paradise.* The body, in short, of which Christ the Redeemer is the Head is not humanity in general, but the Church which He purchased with His own blood (Acts xx. 28).

§ 44. *Twofold State (humiliationis et exaltationis).*

Whatever view may be taken of the question just mentioned, when Christ is considered as a Redeemer, His incarnation assumes a special character. For as a Redeemer He must be made in the likeness of *sinful* flesh (Rom. viii. 3), though without sin, and identify Himself with all the conditions of human existence as it is. He must be born of woman, be subject to the innocent infirmities of our nature, to suffering, temptation, and death; and, further, He must be born in a particular nation, be 'of the seed of David,' and, as a Jew, submit to the ordinances of the law (Gal. iv. 4). Only by thus 'taking hold'† of fallen humanity in the points in which it contrasts with humanity before the Fall, could He be its Redeemer, according to the maxim, What is not assumed cannot be healed.‡ He not only emptied Himself by becoming incarnate (Phil. ii. 7), but His human nature was in the form of a servant, and it was not until He had become obedient to the death of the cross, after a life of suffering, that God exalted Him and gave Him a name above every name (*ibid.* 8, 9).

Thus the doctrine of the twofold state, which occupies so large a space in later Protestant theology, though comparatively unnoticed by the earlier writers, has Scriptural foundation, and indeed suggests itself to the most cursory reader of Scripture. Briefly, it expresses the distinction between our Lord's life upon earth and His present life at the right hand of God; the former was one of humiliation, the latter is one of glory. It is usual, in describing each state, to assign to them respectively certain events—on the one hand, conception, birth, suffering, and death; on the other, resurrection, descent into hell, ascension; but it has

* See preceding section.

† According to one rendering of ἐπιλαμβάνεται (Heb. ii. 16).

‡ Τὸ ἀπόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.

not been sufficiently noted that the true ground of the distinction is the change which it implies in the human nature of the Saviour. The body of Christ before His resurrection was similar in all essential points to ours, subject to natural infirmities and sustained by the usual means; the body with which He rose was, as S. Paul calls it, a spiritual and glorified body,* whatever may be the precise conception we form of it (1 Cor. xv. 44; Phil. iii. 21), and as such exempt from the defects incident to the 'body of our humiliation.' The topic is concerned exclusively with what took place after the incarnation, and has nothing to do with the exinanition, or kenosis, of the Logos in assuming human nature; which is a point that must be considered by itself. Christ, the incarnate Logos, as He appears in the sacred history, advanced from that portion of His mediatorial work which consisted in suffering and death to that portion of it which consists in the application of His merits and the exercise of priestly and royal functions; in the execution of which latter He is in a state of glory as compared with the preceding humiliation. But it is a mediatorial office which He is still discharging, and does not this imply, even at present, a certain exinanition of the Logos? and that this is to last until the number of the elect is accomplished? This, certainly, may be thought implied in the remarkable passage 1 Cor. xv. 28; from which, however, on account of its great obscurity, no positive conclusion can be hastily drawn. The humiliation therefore of the incarnate Logos must not be confounded with His exinanition; the latter is an act of the Holy Trinity terminating, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son, the former belongs to the man Christ Jesus. And the resurrection, or, as the Lutherans hold, the descent into hell, forms the point of transition from the one state of the mediator Christ to the other; the radical distinction, however, being the exchange of an earthly for a glorified spiritual body.

(Status Humiliationis.)

§ 45. *Born of a Woman—Growth in Wisdom and Stature.*

The birth of Christ, including His conception in the womb,† was in the way of nature. He did not, as the Valentinians held,

* That is, essentially so, though the spiritual transformation may not have been complete till the Ascension. See § 49.

† 'Thou shalt conceive in thy womb' (Luke i. 31). The word 'conception' properly belongs to the mother. As used in the Apostles' Creed, 'conceived of the Holy Ghost,' it denotes merely a mysterious operation of the Holy Spirit. 'As He was so made of the substance of the Virgin, so was He not made of the substance of the Holy Ghost, whose essence cannot at all be

merely pass through the Virgin like water through a canal. And as His birth was natural, so was His human nature a real one, and not the phantom of the Docetics. The Word of life incarnate could be seen and handled (1 John i. 1); could suffer hunger, thirst, and weariness (Luke iv.; John iv. 6); His flesh could be torn with stripes and pierced by the nails and the spear; and He could die on the cross. His soul could experience joy and sorrow (Luke x. 21; Matt. xxvi. 38); He loved and was grieved (Mark x. 21; iii. 5); He could reason out of the Scriptures, and refute the cavils of the Pharisees and Sadducees (Matt. xxii. 15-46). He passed too through the ordinary stages of growth and development, both bodily and mental. So Scripture declares, in the very few notices it contains of His private life. As an unconscious babe He lay in the manger; He grew, like other children, in stature as in wisdom (Luke ii. 52); at twelve years of age He astonished the doctors of the law with His precocious remarks (*ibid.* 46). With the exception of His visit to the temple, Scripture passes over in silence the interval between His birth and His public appearance; and we can only conjecture that He lived with His parents, and, as tradition runs, followed his reputed father's occupation. It was, no doubt, so appointed, in order that no place might be left for the legends which usually attach themselves to the infancy and childhood of remarkable men; and of which the Apocryphal Gospels are full. From the insipid and grotesque incidents with which these productions abound we may gather what the Canonical writers would probably have indulged in had they not written under a special Divine superintendence. Scripture draws a holy veil over the life of our Lord, until the time came for His manifestation in Israel. Another reason may be given for this reticence, viz., that the Saviour's own consciousness of His mission advanced by gradual stages, and was not fully possessed by Him until He received the unction of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 16). If Christ's manhood was a reality, and subject to the ordinary laws of humanity, it could hardly be otherwise than that the knowledge of His Divine origin, and of His appointed work, should keep pace with the expansion of His human intelligence, which, as we know, is dependent on the growth of the animal frame. As a

made. And because the Holy Ghost did not beget Him by any communication of His essence, therefore He is not the father of Him, though He were conceived of the Holy Ghost. And if at any time I have said Christ was begotten by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, if the ancients speak as if he generated the Son, it is not to be understood as if the Spirit did perform any proper act of generation, such as is the foundation of paternity' (Pearson on Creed, art. iii.).

babe He lay unconscious in the manger, like other babes ; as a child the only visible distinction between Him and other children must have been His freedom from childish faults ; at the age of twelve the consciousness of a peculiar relation to the Father begins to appear, ' Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business ? ' (Luke ii. 49). But not sufficiently distinct, any more than His mental faculties were mature, for His public ministry ; and accordingly He passes again into retirement until he had attained the fulness of manhood. During these years, no doubt, the ceremonial law and prophecy, both pointing to Himself, and now illuminated by the power of the indwelling Logos, were His study ; so that when He began to teach publicly it excited surprise that ' this man should know letters, having never learned ' (John vii. 15). When His recognition of Himself as the Messiah was at length complete, but not until then, He emerged from the privacy of the home at Nazareth. Thus did the Logos submit to the conditions of ordinary human development, permitting, so to speak, the human nature a certain power over Himself, to limit the full exhibition of the Divine glory in accordance with natural laws. Nor did the process stop with His baptism at Jordan. It was not, *e.g.*, until the close of His ministry that the necessity and imminence of His death appear to have become distinctly perceived, and were foretold to His disciples (Matt. xvi. 21). Every natural stage of humanity, in short, infancy, childhood, youth, and manhood, was hallowed by the Saviour's Himself passing through it ; and under the same law of natural progress to which we are subjected.*

§ 46. *Tempted, yet without Sin.*

Christ not only grew in wisdom and stature like other men, but underwent the ordinary process of discipline by which virtue is matured and attains its due reward ; He grew ethically as well as physically and intellectually. He rendered meritorious obedience, and *earned* the crown by enduring the cross (Heb. xii. 2). The τελείωσις of which the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks (v. 9) implies a previous state of relative imperfection : what can this be in One whom we believe to have been sinless ? It must be considered as negative, not positive ; as analogous to the imperfection of the first Adam before he underwent his trial. Virtue, to prove itself such, must be tried ; and the severer the trial the greater the result if resistance to sin is successful. The second

* ' Omnes venit per semetipsum salvere. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus sanctificans infantes, in parvulis parvulus sanctificans parvulos, in juvenibus juvenis exemplum fiens ' (Iren. Cont. Hær. ii. 22).

Adam, like the first, must pass through the furnace. He must be tempted and overcome the temptation, endure sufferings which culminated in death, 'learn obedience by the things which He suffered' (Heb. v. 8), and so become 'perfect' (Heb. ii. 10) in a different sense from that in which He was before. He attained the perfection of a proved and triumphant virtue as distinguished from a state of untried innocence. And thus He became fitted, from His own personal experience, to be 'a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God.'

The sufferings which our Lord underwent from sympathy with the condition of fallen man ('In all their affliction He was afflicted,' Is. lxiii. 9) must be distinguished from those which He encountered in the exercise of His mission, and, so to speak, brought upon Himself. These latter are what properly formed His probation. And they may be classed under the two heads of direct temptation to evil, and indirect temptation to forsake the path of duty. With the former the Saviour came into conflict immediately after the anointing of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iv. 1). As with the first so with the second Adam, the prince of this world enters the lists in person. Recognising the exalted dignity and the mission of his opponent, he presents to Him the threefold temptation of unbelief, of spiritual presumption, and of a carnal fulfilment of Messianic prophecy (Matt. iv. 1-11). Nor did these assaults end here, for it is said that the devil departed from Him only for a season (Luke iv. 13). The other class of temptations were lifelong, and were a necessary incident of His mission. His teaching produced a great ferment in men's minds, and compelled them to take a part: He was set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel (Luke ii. 34). This naturally produced enmity against Himself, not only on the part of those, the Scribes and Pharisees, whose religious unsoundness He unmasked, but also of those who, like Herod or Pilate, looked upon truth in religion or in anything else as a phantom of the brain (John xviii. 38). History abundantly proves that in professed religious indifference there is latent an element of hostility which only needs an occasion to become openly virulent. Even harmless enthusiasts, if they seemed likely to produce popular disturbances, would not be likely to find favour with the Roman government. Exposed to the bitter hostility of the Jewish religious leaders, to the fickleness of the multitude, and to the contempt of men in power—tried with the waywardness and ignorance of his immediate followers, and the foreseen treachery of one of them—the Saviour pursued the path marked out for Him; until the last impending catastrophe presented itself in its proximity and its appalling features to His mind. Must we not suppose that the

temptation daily presented itself to Him to abandon the task He had undertaken; or can we wonder if the struggle at the last was almost more than His human nature could bear? (Luke xxii. 44). It would be idle to contend that the Saviour was not in both ways tempted, that He did not really experience solicitations to sin. He must have done so if He was capable of appeals through the senses and the understanding, and if He felt a natural shrinking from pain and death; and how otherwise could He have been a man like unto us? But whether we are to consider this liability to temptation as affecting His sinlessness depends upon the view we take of the proper seat of sin. The essence of sin lies in the consent of the will to what conscience pronounces wrong, and if this consent is withheld, felt solicitations, *coming from without*, do not of themselves partake of the nature of sin. Our first parents could not avoid seeing the fruit, and hearing the arguments of the tempter; perhaps experiencing a momentary inclination to disobedience; but had the will been sufficiently strong in its union with the Divine will to repel the temptation at once, they would not have fallen. So it actually was in our Lord's case. Relief from bodily hunger, reliance on Divine protection, even temporal dignity, are not in themselves improper objects of desire: whether they become so depends on the circumstances under which they present themselves to the mind. In our Lord's temptation they would have been sinful, both as suggested by Satan, and as inconsistent with the Divine plan of a suffering and crucified Messiah. A momentary attraction towards these things may have been felt by Him, but it was instantly repelled through the power of the indwelling Logos. In like manner the prospect of an ignominious death must have been unspeakably painful, and the temptation to decline it equally strong; but not the less perfect was His submission to the Divine will: 'if it be possible,' expresses the conflict; 'not My will, but Thine be done,' the victory (Matt. xxvi. 39).

Liability, then, to temptation is not in itself sinful; and it was indispensable to the attainment of that moral perfection (*τελειώσις*) by which the Saviour merited His crown of glory. In pouring out His soul 'with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him' (Heb. v. 7), He learned what it was to be tempted, and so gained a fellow-feeling with those that are tempted, as well as furnished a real example to them. But though the outworks were assaulted, the citadel itself remained intact. In each moment of trial the Divine will in unity with the human asserted its supremacy; and the *potuit non peccare* of the first Adam came, in the case of the second, to be eventually exchanged for the *non potuit peccare*.

But can we feel sure that, under these temptations, Christ was actually without sin? Such is the faith of the Church; but is it well founded? The question is of vital moment, for however He might still be an example, a Redeemer from sin He could not be if He had sins of His own to atone for. A moral elevation never before attained by man the unbeliever is willing to concede to Him, but to the Christian a sinless Saviour can alone be a real one. The Gospel history furnishes ample materials for our arriving at a conclusion on this momentous question. The testimony of enemies naturally first claims our attention. No charge against the moral character of Jesus was ever substantiated by them. The witnesses suborned could not agree (Mark xiv. 56); Pilate appealed to the people to say what evil He had done, but received no reply (Matt. xxvii. 23); Pilate himself was convinced of His innocence (*ibid.* 24). The thief on the cross bore similar testimony (Luke xxiii. 41). The impression produced by Him on those who for nearly three years had been in constant intercourse with Him comes next to be considered; and here the confession of Judas the traitor that he had betrayed 'the innocent blood' (Matt. xxvii. 4) carries peculiar weight. Had this man been able to allege any obliquity of aim or conduct in his Master, he would doubtless have pleaded it as a palliation of his crime, but he was unable to do so. The disciple most intimate with Him declares that in Him was no sin (1 John iii. 5). Another describes Him as the Holy One and the Just (Acts iii. 14), as the Lamb of God 'without blemish and without spot' (1 Peter i. 19). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces Him 'holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners' (Heb. vii. 26, 27). And such, surely, is the impression which every unprejudiced reader of the Gospels receives. The character of Christ, as portrayed in them, stands alone in the annals of history. It is not merely that He propounded a pure system of morals; He was Himself the living transcript of it, a perfect example of what He taught. Where else shall we find such a union of majesty and humility, of hatred of sin and love to the sinner, of strength of purpose and boundless tenderness, of patience under suffering and active benevolence, of patriotism and the widest human sympathies? In the greatest saints of the Old Testament, even in the most eminent of Christ's Apostles, we find an alloy of human infirmity; not so in Christ Himself. For the first time in history we behold in its perfection that combination of morality and religion which constitutes *holiness*; a term which has no proper counterpart in heathen antiquity.*

* This topic is fully discussed in Ullmann's beautiful work, 'Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu,' Zweiter Abschnitt.

But it may be objected that the contemporaries of Christ could see only His outer life, and only a fragment of that, the greater part having been passed in obscurity; His sinlessness in the sight of God, and before He appeared in public, may yet admit of question. With respect to the former point, His inner purity, His own testimony is of the greatest moment. If bystanders could not read His heart, He Himself must be supposed acquainted with it. It is to be observed then that Christ, while reproving sin in all its forms, and insisting upon the duty and the efficacy of confession of sin, is never found confessing His own sins, or praying for forgiveness. In the prayer which He taught His disciples, and which contains a petition for forgiveness, He does not rank Himself with them: 'After this manner pray ye.' He challenges His enemies to lay any sin to His charge (John viii. 46); and this is not to be understood merely of the outward act, but of sin in the abstract (*ἀμαρτία*), the sinful impulse.* But no even ordinarily religious man, who knew himself to be a sinner, would claim a prerogative which to claim would in that case be itself a sin (1 John i. 8), or argue gross spiritual blindness. His coming to John's baptism has been alleged as a proof that, like other Jews, He needed repentance; but in truth the narrative points the other way. To say nothing of the Baptist's indirect testimony to His having no sin to repent of ('Comest Thou to me?')—a testimony doubly valuable as coming from one who had probably been intimate with Jesus from His childhood—Jesus in His reply does not ground His request on the consciousness of sin, but on the duty of complying with divinely appointed ordinances (Matt. iii. 15). Made under the law, He was circumcised, though the symbol in His case lost its proper meaning; and similarly He submitted to John's baptism, which to Him was only the inauguration of His public ministry (Matt. iii. 16). With respect to the other point, our ignorance of His previous life, it is enough to remark that moral perfection such as that which the Gospels exhibit could not, without a special miracle, appear all of a sudden, and *per saltum*. Each stage of advancement presupposes a former one, and the final result is always founded upon a previous history. As is the seed sown, such is the harvest. And if it be further urged that Christ may have attained the moral eminence which all ascribe to Him as He appears in the Gospels in the same way as ordinary men, viz., through inward conflict, sometimes overcome by sin, but on the whole overcoming, until the measure of holiness of which He was capable was attained, we reply that, apart altogether from original sin, one actual sin consented to leaves indelible traces behind it: the wound may be healed, but

* See Lücke's Commentary on this passage.

the scar remains. No man who, even for a moment, consents to an act of sin, inward or outward, can be the same man as he was before ; and hence in the case of ordinary Christians sinlessness in this life is impossible. If Christ had not been without sin in His private life He could not have been what He was in His public.

Christ, it is said, Himself disclaims the title of good (‘Why callest thou Me good ? Mark x. 18). But the meaning of His reply depends upon that of the inquirer in his use of the word ‘good ;’ and nothing is plainer than that the ruler used it without any true perception of what it implies, in a superficial manner, and as a mere compliment ; corresponding to his imperfect apprehension of his own sinfulness. In *that* sense our Lord refused the epithet, intimating further that if it was to be applied to Him at all, it must be so in the highest sense, even as it is applicable to God ; which far from implying a consciousness of sin rather implies the reverse.*

The result of the inquiry is that if Jesus was not sinless, He not only fell below the saints of the Old Covenant, a David or a Daniel, and even heathen sages, in self-knowledge and humility, but instead of being what He claimed to be, the Light of the World, the way, the truth, and the life, born to bear witness to the truth (John xviii. 37), in short an infallible teacher and guide, He must be pronounced a blind leader of the blind, even if we acquit Him of conscious deception. In short, the Christ of the Gospels must either be what they describe Him to be, or forfeit all claims to our attention.

There seems to be no escape from this dilemma except in impugning the historical value of the Gospels, which accordingly is what the mythical theory of Strauss and his followers attempts to do. The enthusiasm of the first converts, we are told, threw a halo round the central personage, and invested Him with ideal qualities which had only a scanty basis of fact. But what can be more preposterous than to suppose that on Jewish soil and in the age of Christ a mythical system could have arisen ? Myth is intimately connected with polytheism, and the religion of Moses, monotheistic and severely ethical, could never have been favourable to such growths. And in the age of Christ, when prophecy and inspired song had long ceased, and in place of them the didactic service of the synagogue had arisen, presided over by Rabbis whose literary activity was confined to the interpretation of the sacred books, and under the chilling pressure of a foreign

* The approved reading in S. Matthew removes all difficulty : but there is no reason to question the authenticity of S. Mark’s and S. Luke’s version. See Alford on Matt. xix. 16.

yoke, what place was there for mythical formations? The early legends of Rome might as well be supposed to have arisen in the age of Livy or Tacitus. But further, nothing that we know of the culture or moral elevation of the Apostles, or the first converts, leads us to suppose that they could have imagined a character so original, and so consistent with itself throughout, as that of Christ; that is, drawn it from their own unaided resources. This would be as great a miracle as the sinlessness of Christ itself. In short, if the Gospel history be rejected, the appearance of such a character on the stage of life is simply inexplicable. But the Gospel history gives us more information on the subject than merely a narrative of Christ's ministry.

§ 47. *Miraculous Conception.*

The sinlessness claimed for Christ seems incompatible with the doctrine of original sin, according to which every man naturally born, engendered of the offspring of Adam, comes into the world with sinful tendencies, which are sure in some form or other to manifest themselves. Hence, it is argued, such perfection as is attainable by man cannot be exemplified in an individual; it is the property of the race. The objection certainly would be fatal, if Scripture did not give such an account of Christ's birth as renders His sinlessness, far from being an inexplicable phenomenon, the natural result of the circumstances of the case. The miraculous conception removes all difficulty.

The title 'Second Adam,' which in Scripture is applied to our Lord, implies not only His headship as regards the Church, but a peculiarity of origin as regards Himself. As the first Adam came into existence by a direct exercise of miraculous power, while his descendants are propagated by a natural law, so we naturally expect something analogous in the case of the second Adam. But this was not only appropriate; it was necessary. For if the effects of sin were to be reversed in the new spiritual creation, it is evident that He who was to be the first link of the series must Himself be free from the common taint; and this could not be the case, except by a miracle, had He come into the world in the ordinary way. That which is born of the flesh is, and must remain, flesh (John iii. 6). It was necessary, therefore, that as regards the person of the Redeemer an interruption should take place of the law of nature, and that though born of woman He should Himself inherit no original taint of sin.

For a human being to come into the world without sin requires that his birth should be, in whatever sense, supernatural.* This

* So much as this is granted by Schleiermacher himself (*Glaubenslehre*, s. 97, 2).

end, however, might, as a celebrated theologian (Schleiermacher) suggests, have been attained, even if Christ had had an earthly father, by a miraculous agency on the embryo in the womb, purging it from the taint of original sin. But this suggestion, which is thrown out in order to dispense with the doctrine of the Church that the Second Person of the Holy Trinity became incarnate in Christ, is precluded by the expressed statement of Scripture that Christ had no earthly father, that, as prophecy had intimated, a virgin conceived and brought forth a son (Matt. i. 18, 23). There is no reason to call in question the authenticity of the narrative—substantially the same in S. Matt. and S. Luke;* and the information was no doubt furnished by the Virgin herself, who survived the Ascension for some time. And its dogmatical import is obvious. If an embryo had been formed in Mary's womb in the usual manner, previously to the union of the Logos with it, there would have been in existence potentially, if not actually, a human person with whom the Logos formed a union, which would lead to Nestorianism, or the doctrine of two persons in Christ; whereas the doctrine of the Church is that the Logos took not an existing man but human nature in the abstract into union with Himself.† It may be, as the theologian above mentioned adds, that the mere absence of earthly paternity is 'insufficient' of itself to establish the Incarnation of the Logos, but at any rate it leaves room for it, which his hypothesis does not; and the question is simply, What does Scripture teach on the subject? It tells us, then, that a Divine overshadowing Power took the place of earthly paternity;‡ in consequence of which the Word became flesh. This is a very different thing from the mere fact of a sinless man appearing in the world, begotten as well as born like other men. Nor is the objection valid that the absence of earthly paternity does not, after all, secure the desired end, since original sin must be sup-

* It has been objected that neither by Christ nor by the Apostles is allusion made to these events. But all the passages in which our Lord describes Himself, and the Apostles describe Him, as sent into the world from the Father, presuppose them. Especially is the miraculous agency of Christ in His public life a natural result of this unseen miracle of miracles; it is in accordance with the mode of His birth. Nor can we suppose the Apostle's expression 'born of a woman' (Gal. iv. 4) to be without emphasis.

† Οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάτη καθ' ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἠνῶθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἀλλ' ἐνοικήσας τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς ἁγίας Παρθένου, ἀπεριγράφτως ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσει ἐκ τῶν ἀγνῶν τῆς Ἀειπαρθένου αἱμάτων, σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ ὑπεστήσατο, ἀπαρχὴν προσλαβόμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου φυράματος, αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος γενόμενος τῇ σάρκι ὑπόστασις (J. Damasc. De F. O. lib. iii. c. 2).

‡ Luke i. 35. Πνεῦμα ἅγιον in this passage probably means, not the third person of the Holy Trinity, but, as in Rom. i. 4, the Divine nature itself, considered as holy and the source of all holiness.

posed to descend from the mother as well as the father; and therefore, to complete the theory, we must hold the immaculate conception of the Virgin, and of her ancestors up to Adam.* For in this case the mother was merely passive, merely supplied the necessary materials for an Incarnation; and the object of the miraculous conception was that these materials should be purged of all taint of sin, so as to form a fit temple for the indwelling of Deity.† But on other grounds also, viz., that the Word who assumed flesh could not be begotten in time, only be born of woman, and that paternity cannot be predicated of the operation, whatever it was, of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb,‡ the idea of generation must be dissociated from the birth of Christ. Thus do the miraculous conception and the sinlessness of Christ furnish support, the one to the other; and though it might seem as if the former were of minor importance, for a sinless being in the midst of sinful humanity would itself be a miracle, leading to conclusions beyond itself; yet when the explanation is added it is seen to be an adequate one. On the other hand, if any admixture of actual sin could have been discovered in our Lord, it would have been of little moment that the mode of the Incarnation had been revealed; the foundation would be not merely without a superstructure, but out of harmony with the actual one.

(Status Exaltationis.)

§ 48. *Descent into Hell.*

The clause on this subject in the Apostles' Creed is not, as is well known, found in the earlier forms thereof, and appears to have been first admitted about A.D. 400. From its being placed between Christ's burial and His resurrection, there can be little doubt that in the Creed it means the temporary sojourn of our Saviour's soul in Hades, or the intermediate state. To this effect is the Article of Edward VI.: 'The body of Christ lay in the grave until His resurrection: but His spirit, which He gave up, was with the spirits which were detained in prison, or in hell, and preached unto them, as the place of S. Peter testifieth.' And by most of our writers no other descent seems to be understood. § There is no doubt that the soul of Christ, when He expired on

* Schleiermacher, *l. c.*

† See J. Damasc. in the passage above quoted. 'Idem Spiritus singularissima præsencia et virtute Mariam semper virginem ad concipiendum mundi Salvatorem facundam reddidit, semen prolificum ex castis ejus sanguinibus elicit, ab omni adhærente peccato purgavit, ipsi que Mariæ virtutem præbuit quâ conciperet ipsum Dei Filium' (Quenstedt, p. iii. c. 3).

‡ See the note from Pearson, p. 225.

Pearson, Art. v. See also Horsley's sermon on the subject.

the cross, did pass into hell ; *i.e.*, not the final place of torment, but Scheol, or the intermediate state of the Old Testament. If such passages as Ephes. iv. 9 are of doubtful meaning, this cannot be said of S. Peter's exposition of Ps. xvi. 10 (Acts ii. 31) ; if Christ's soul was not left in hell, it must have gone thither. And with this agree our Lord's words to the thief on the cross, 'To-day thou shalt be with Me in paradise' (Luke xxiii. 43), or that division of Scheol which is assigned to the spirits of the just. Thus having submitted to death, He was made like unto His brethren in this point also, and fulfilled the ordinary law of humanity, viz., that they on whom death passes are not at once transferred to their final destiny, but await in an intermediate state Christ's second coming. And it is supposed that the fact was made an Article of the Creed against the Apollinarian heresy which denied that our Lord had a proper human soul.

It is open, however, to doubt whether this descent can properly form a part of our present subject, which is concerned with the twofold state through which Christ, in His whole proper person, passed to His final glory. The soul of Christ, though never separated from the Logos, can hardly be said to be Christ Himself while apart from His body. We must inquire then whether in Scripture any other descent is spoken of or implied. And this appears to be the case. In truth, the two famous passages 1 Pet. iii. 19 and iv. 6 seem to have been too hastily applied, as in the Article of Edward VI., to the Article in the Creed, whereas they may well bear a different meaning. It is not as in Acts ii. 31, the separate state of souls, but the resurrection of Christ, that the Apostle is principally referring to. The Saviour, he tells us, was put to death 'in the flesh' (in the body of His humiliation), but 'quickened in spirit' (in a spiritual body) ;* in which 'He went and preached to the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, in the days of Noah.' The passage, in its obvious meaning, seems to refer to some migration of Christ subsequent to His resurrection, but whether at the moment of that event and before He came forth from the tomb, or at some other time during His forty days' sojourn on earth, is not specified. A common interpretation of the passage makes it mean merely that the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ, inspired Noah to preach to the antediluvians while the ark was a preparing. Noah, no doubt, was 'a preacher of righteousness' (2 Pet. ii. 5), but it is not easy

* The τῷ before πνεύματι is rejected by the best editors ; and besides, it is not the usage of Scripture to ascribe the resurrection of Christ to the Holy Spirit, but (occasionally) to Himself (John ii. 19), most commonly to the Father. The contrast will be seen in the original, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι.

to see what connection the death and resurrection of Christ have with Noah's warnings. But there are grammatical objections also to this interpretation. The word 'went' of our English version is not in the original a mere expletive, but a principal term and significant: *πορευθεῖς*, having set forth on His journey, He preached, etc.: and the word 'sometime' (*ποτὶ*) is, as our version has it, connected with 'disobedient,' not with 'preached.' On the whole, the passage seems to allude to an event which took place at the moment of, or after the resurrection, and which, therefore, is not identical with the descent into hell of the Creed.

The object for which Christ is said to have thus appeared in Scheol was to preach to the antediluvian sinners, who in the days of Noah gave no heed to the patriarch's warnings. We can hardly suppose that our Lord visited them merely to confirm their sentence of condemnation; and indeed the word used (*ἐκήρυξεν*) does not usually bear that meaning. If we may apply the passage, 1 Peter iv. 6, to the same event, it declares that 'the Gospel was preached' (*ἐὐηγγελίσθη*) to the dead. But why to the antediluvians more than others? This the real difficulty of the passage hardly admits of a satisfactory solution. If they were penitents at the eleventh hour, it may have been to assure them of forgiveness; if they were not penitents, it may have been to offer them forgiveness on repentance. Perhaps to the Apostle's mind the human race presented itself under two great divisions, those who lived before the flood and those who lived after it. When the world was re peopled by the descendants of Noah, they were placed under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix. 15). The antediluvian sinners thus seemed to lie under a disadvantage as compared with their successors: to rectify the inequality by announcing to them the greater mercies of the Christian covenant may seem not inconsistent with the Divine justice and goodness.

If this exposition of the passage be allowed, it may lead to a modification of the doctrine that the redeeming power of Christ is absolutely confined to this life, not only in reference to those who have enjoyed and misused spiritual advantages, but also in reference to the countless multitudes who, through no fault of their own, have lived and died without ever having had an opportunity of hearing of the Saviour. Dogmatical statements are on such a question out of place; but any hints of Scripture that under other conditions of existence a work of probation may still be going on, and the inequalities of this life rectified, are not to be summarily set aside. If one visit of the Saviour to the abodes of the dead is recorded, there seems no reason why it should be considered a solitary instance, and not rather a specimen; at any rate, what occurred once may have occurred, and may occur, again.

If the foregoing view of the descent into hell is correct, the Lutheran theologians are in the right in making it the first stage in the state of exaltation,* whereas the Reformed usually reckon it to that of humiliation. In fact, if the event took place at the moment of His resuscitation, the body in which He visited Scheol must have been a glorified one; a change which, as we have seen, marks the passing from one state to the other. But the doctrine of the Lutherans that He went thither in order to triumph over Satan rests on no warranty of Scripture.

§ 49. *Resurrection, Ascension, Session at the Right Hand of God.*

The resurrection of Christ is as well attested as any fact of history. The testimony is the more valuable, inasmuch as it is that of persons who, instead of being predisposed to imagine or believe the fact, showed great reluctance to receive it even when the clearest proofs were offered (Mark xvi. 11; Luke xxiv. 36-46). It was delivered publicly before those who had condemned Christ as an impostor, and who therefore had the strongest interest in disproving, if possible, the alleged fact; but the report which they induced the guard to circulate sufficiently shows the embarrassment under which they laboured. It is true that He showed Himself, during the forty days He remained on earth, only to chosen witnesses, and not in public. But there were good reasons for this. The Jewish people had already been favoured with the strongest evidence of Christ's mission in the miracles which He wrought, and the doctrines He taught, and they had rejected it. What probability was there that if He had appeared in public they would have believed on Him? One more trial indeed, but of a different kind, was vouchsafed to the obdurate race, when the Apostles appealed to the outpouring of the Holy Spirit in proof of the Messiahship of Jesus; and the reception they gave this also proved plainly that neither would they have been persuaded had they seen one risen from the dead. Meanwhile the sin of man was made the means of advancing the designs of heaven. The sufferings of the early Christians at the hands of their unbelieving countrymen added weight to their profession; the final severance of Christianity from Judaism by

* 'Ad initium status exaltationis referendus est descensus ad inferos. Quo Christus non quidem luctam aliquam difficilem aut cruentam dubiamve cum Satana subiit; verum illi jam superato per passionem et mortem victoris ac triumphatoris instar apparuit, et secundum animam et corpus præsens diabolo et inferis omnibus se tanquam dominum summa majestate pollentem exhibuit. Tempus descensus, etsi non satis clare constet, non tamen audemus momento resurrectionis e morte ad vitam anteponeere; juxta ea quæ modo vidimus ex 1 Pet. iii. 18, ubi Christus non solum *θανατωθεὶς* verum etiam *ζωοποιηθεὶς*, adeoque, postquam recepit vitam ex morte, abiisse ad inferos dicitur' (Baier, *Compendium*, p. iii. c. 2, s. 2).

the destruction of Jerusalem launched the former on its own independent career; and the dispersion of the ancient people of God forms a standing confirmation of prophecy. But what our Article principally insists on is that our Lord, when He rose, did so with 'body, flesh, and bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature' (Art. iv.).

The materials which we possess for forming a conception of the risen Saviour's body are scanty, and not easy of adjustment. All the accounts convey the impression that He rose not only with a real, but with the same body which had been laid in the grave. With a real body, for on His first appearance to His disciples He set at rest their doubts as to His being a spirit by tangible proof of His possessing 'flesh and bones' (Luke xxiv. 39-43). With the same body, for He showed them the print of the nails and of the spear (John xx. 27). Yet it is also evident that the resurrection-body possessed a dominion over space and matter which did not previously belong to it, or which Jesus did not choose to exercise. He passed through closed doors (John xx. 19), and though He partook of food it does not appear that He was compelled to do so by the necessities of nature. The miracle of the Ascension was an infringement of the law of gravity. The resurrection-body, in short, was not a natural, but a spiritual one (1 Cor. xv. 44). Was this change accomplished at once in all its perfection when He rose; or did it advance by gradual stages until the time when He was taken up? The latter supposition seems the more probable. The Saviour rose with an essentially glorified body; but this is not inconsistent with His having passed from one degree of glory to another until, the process being complete, He ascended to heaven.

Thither, at the end of forty days, He passed, in the presence of credible witnesses (Acts i. 9). The language plainly implies a visible ascent, a passing from one locality to another; which seems inconsistent with the Lutheran doctrine of a continuing bodily presence on earth.* The Ascension would be thus reduced to a disappearance from the eye of sense. It is true that 'the right hand of God is everywhere,' but to argue from this that it betokens no special locality or state would be similar to arguing that because God is omnipresent, there is no special presence of His in the Church, or in heaven. Ascension from earth to heaven is of course scientifically inaccurate; but what is meant is that our Lord passed into that state where the glory of God is specially revealed without intervening cloud of sin or sorrow. There He

* Non tamen nimium scrutanda ascensio, aut juxta modum naturalem ita definienda ut negetur corporis in cœlum elati præsentia in terris' (Baier, Comp. p. iii. c. 2, s. 2).

is 'at the right hand of God,' another figurative expression, denoting the possession of the highest dignity and power. Not omnipotence as an abstract Divine attribute, but the same attribute attempered and qualified, and finding its exercise, not in the kingdom of nature, but in that of grace, or in the former so far as the interests of the latter demand (Matt. xxviii. 18).

We are not to suppose that the two states thus described are separated from each other by a rigid line of demarcation, all on one side being humiliation, all on the other exaltation. The description only applies to the prevailing character of each. Even during His earthly life, gleams of His essential glory occasionally shone through the veil. At His word, or by virtue from Him, bodily disease and defect disappeared; He who had not where to lay His head and subsisted on charity fed thousands; He who to the common eye was 'the carpenter, the son of Mary,' appeared in glory on the mount; He who was to be put to death raised others to life. And on the other hand it may, as has been observed, be a question whether a kenosis, or self-limitation, of the Logos does not even now to some extent continue, although as Head of the Church, and in His mediatorial capacity, the Saviour has laid aside all traces of imperfection.

§ 50. *Council of Chalcedon.*

The elements, so far as Scripture furnishes them, of the great problem are now before us. They are, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and the Holy Ghost, His Incarnation in time, His real manhood, His sinlessness, and His Ascension to heaven in a real but glorified body. Christ is God and Christ is man; this is the substance of the Christian faith, and perhaps in this state of being we shall never know much more. But, as in the case of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, heresies soon made their appearance on the subject, and these gave rise to controversies and Councils which occupy a large space in Church history.

The statements of the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, which is understood to have fixed the orthodox doctrine on the Person of Christ, are as follows: 'We acknowledge one and the same Christ to be perfect God and perfect man; of the same substance with the Father as regards His Godhead, and of the same substance with us as regards His manhood—in all things like unto us, sin only excepted: begotten of the Father from everlasting, but in the last days born of the Virgin (τῆς θεοτόκου): subsisting in (al. of) two natures, without confusion, conversion, division, or

separation (ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως): the distinction between the natures not being destroyed by the union, but each preserving its own properties, and both culminating in one Person and Hypostasis (ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασις): one and the same Christ, not divided into two Persons.' To the same effect is the language of the Athanasian Creed: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ is God and man, God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; man of the substance of His mother, born in the world: perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting: who although He be God and man is not two, but one Christ: one not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God: one altogether not by confusion of substance but by unity of Person: for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.' Such definitions as these are obviously the result of protracted theological controversy.

At the Council of Nice the Church finally severed itself not only from the Ebionite theories* which, under various forms, taught that Jesus of Nazareth was a mere man, the natural son of Joseph and Mary, but from the Arian heresy which denied His eternal Godhead. The homoousios of the Nicene Creed secured the proper Deity of Christ. His proper manhood had been sufficiently declared in the Apostles' Creed. But the further questions respecting the mode of union of the two natures in One Person, and of their relation to the Person, had been left in the undetermined state in which, for the most part, they are found in the writings of the early Fathers. These questions now came to the front. How could a unity of Person be secured with a duality of natures? How could a singleness of nature be made consistent with the doctrine that the Word became flesh?

Early in the fourth-century Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea, a man of piety and ability, and highly esteemed even by those who differed from him, propounded the theory which bears his name, and which has not by any means received the attention which it deserves. Apollinaris was a strong opponent of Arius, but each, from different points of view, arrived at a similar conclusion. Arius appears to have held that the human nature of Christ consisted merely of His body, with which the Word entered into union, so that He had no human soul.† And to this He was driven by the exigency of his position. For since the Logos of Arius was a created being, and the soul of Christ, if He had one, must also have been created, the absurdity would arise of

* A good account of these will be found in Dörner's work 'On the Person of Christ,' i. 296, etc.

† Pearson on Creed, note 1 on Art. iii. Under the term 'soul' Arius understood what the trichotomists would call 'soul and spirit.'

two created intelligences in one Person, a thing which is inconceivable. But if the manhood of Christ consists merely of a body, this difficulty is evaded. Apollinaris borrowed a part of his antagonist's theory, but with the view of effectually guarding against his conclusions. He assumed the trichotomic view of man's nature, according to which he is composed of body, soul, and spirit,* and allowing Christ the possession of an animal soul, he made the Logos take the place of the spirit, or rational faculty.† His motive was to obviate the Arian conception of Christ by investing the rational nature with the attribute of unchangeableness, and consequent sinlessness. And no doubt his theory does this effectually. But it stands or falls with the validity of the trichotomic division. And independently of this, a body with a mere sensitive soul is not a man: such a being is incapable of temptation, and of moral and intellectual development. The problem, in fact, was simplified by ignoring one of its main factors. After some years of controversy, Apollinarianism was condemned at the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, and its author deposed from his bishopric. Nevertheless, the theory, however indefensible as it came from its author, remained as a leaven in the Church, reappearing in another form in the Eutychian and Monophysite controversies. Had Apollinaris perceived that the object he had in view, viz., the *non potuit peccare* of the Saviour, might have been attained without robbing the human soul of its rational faculty, inasmuch as this faculty, the *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* of man's nature, has in itself an affinity with the Logos, he would probably have occupied a more important place in the history of this dogma than he does.‡

About A.D. 428 Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, a Syrian by birth and a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, took occasion to side with one of his presbyters, Anastasius by name, who in his discourses had condemned the use of the word *Θεοτόκος* as applied to the Virgin Mary. To Nestorius this term seemed to imply that the Virgin had given birth to Deity, thereby introducing into Christianity an idea proper to heathen mythology: in his opinion *Χριστοτόκος* was the fitting word to use. He found a vehement opponent in Cyril of Alexandria, and painful recriminations ensued. Cyril assembled a Council at Alexandria A.D. 430, and anathematised Nestorius. Nestorius retorted by anathematizing Cyril. The Emperor, in the hope of allaying the strife, summoned a general Council at Ephesus A.D. 431; which, pre-

* See § 31.

† Apollinaris appears not to have been the first to broach this theory. It is attributed to Justin Martyr. See Hagenbach, D. G. s. 66.

‡ See Dorner, i. p. 1074.

sided over by Cyril, and in the absence of the Syrian bishops, condemned Nestorius and deposed him. The sentence was carried into effect, and Nestorius ended his days in exile. There is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact views of this unfortunate prelate ; for we have to rely on the statements of opponents, who not unfrequently attributed to him what were merely their own inferences from his teaching. Thus he was accused of holding a duality of Persons in Christ, whereas he constantly disavowed any such doctrine, and even, towards the close of the contest, expressed his willingness to admit the term Θεοτόκος if accompanied with suitable explanations. But whatever may have been the private views of its author, the essence of Nestorianism as a system consists in holding that the Logos, in becoming incarnate, united Himself to an existing human being ; which necessarily leads to a double personality. The Word did not assume a man into union with Himself, but became man ; the incarnation and the existence of the human factor were coincident in time. The Logos did not either find a man, or create one, and then as a secondary act unite Himself to this man ; but in the very act of incarnation a man came into being who was both Divine and human. Apart from this particular controversy, the schools of Antioch and Alexandria did really represent different tendencies. The former insisted especially on the reality of the manhood, and its likeness to ours ; the latter on the Godhead and the distinction between Christ and us. The teaching of the former might issue in a double personality, that of the latter in Monophysitism. Had Nestorius asked himself what he meant by the word Χριστοτόκος, which he wished to substitute for Θεοτόκος, he might have seen that either the change was needless, or that the word Χρίστος with him signified the manhood alone, not the whole Person, which it properly denotes. On the same principle he ascribed the sufferings of Christ to the manhood alone, excluding the Logos from all participation therein. He cannot, therefore, be acquitted of making, as Cyril remarks, the union a mere juncture (συνάφεια) of natures, otherwise wholly distinct, an inhabitation of the Logos in humanity, not a true incarnation. Against such a mechanical union Cyril maintains a 'physical' one (ένωσις φυσική) ; i.e. that in the act of incarnation the Logos so assumed the complex of predicates which constitute a human nature as that they cannot be applied to the manhood without at the same time being applied to the Godhead ; which, of course, effectually precludes a double personality. Yet it may be doubted whether Cyril's own doctrine advances beyond making the humanity a complex of predicates, or a mere ὄργανον of the Logos, without a will of its own and a relatively independent mental and moral

history. The complex of predicates is held together only by the Logos, who forms the true personality and bond of union. His favourite illustrations are physical; as the mixture of water and wine, or a piece of red-hot iron; which latter, as Dorner remarks,* makes for the Nestorian as much as for the Alexandrian doctrine, since, though the fire and the metal are in union, the qualities of the one are not imparted to the other. The difficulties on either side probably led the Council to hesitate to endorse the anathema of Cyril, or to frame a new Creed; and on the arrival of John of Antioch with his attendant bishops, a formulary of a milder type which he had brought with him was proposed, which both Cyril and the Syrian bishops subscribed, though Nestorius was left out of the compromise. In this formulary the title Θεοτόκος was retained; Christ was pronounced to be 'perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul, and with a body begotten of the Father according to his Godhead, and of the Virgin Mary according to his manhood: as regards the former, of the same substance with the Father; as regards the latter, of the same substance with us: for of the two natures a union took place.†' Notwithstanding the condemnation of Nestorius, his followers multiplied and formed independent churches in the East, some of which still exist. It was, as Dorner observes, the first schism which the Church proved herself unable to overcome; and this because she did not fully assimilate into her own system the element of truth which the doctrine contained, viz., the proper personality of the human nature.‡

Each party continuing to propagate its views, the dispute broke out afresh, and from the opposite quarter. Eutyches, the head of a monastery in Constantinople, was charged with teaching that after the incarnation there was but one nature in Christ. This might, as in Cyril's writings, be capable of a good interpretation; but Eutyches proceeded to explain the union of the two natures in a manner which was a virtual revival of Apollinarianism. He does not seem to have held, as is commonly supposed, that the human nature was absorbed into the Divine; or that from the union of the two a third nature, neither the one nor the other, proceeded; but that the human nature became so altered in its qualities as to be no longer our nature,§ that is, not a true human

* ii. 80.

† *Διὸ γὰρ φύσεων ἑνωσις γέγονεν.* The Council evidently shrank from a more definite statement.

‡ ii. 86.

§ Dorner, ii. 104. At the Synod held at Constantinople, Eutyches maintained τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν οὐκ εἶναι ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν (Mansi. a. vi. 741). Our nature, and not a different one, is glorified in the person of the ascended Saviour.

nature. He was condemned at a particular Synod held under Flavian, Patriarch of Constantinople, and deposed. His cause, however, was warmly taken up by Dioscurus, the successor of Cyril, a man of violent and unscrupulous temper, who persuaded the Emperor to allow a Synod to be convened at Ephesus A.D. 449, which from the proceedings of Dioscurus at it has received the name of the 'Robber-Synod.*' This Synod reversed the condemnation of Eutyches. The passions of the contending parties rose to such a pitch that had it not been for the influence of Leo the Great of Rome the Eastern Church would probably have been rent in twain. That sagacious prelate, who had allowed himself not unwillingly to be appealed to by Flavian, persuaded the Emperor Marcian to summon another Synod at Chalcedon, which formed the fourth General Council. He had previously addressed to Flavian an epistle in which, with admirable dialectical and rhetorical skill, he expounded his views of the Person of Christ. When the Council assembled, Leo's epistle was publicly read and received with acclamation;† Dioscurus was deposed; and the celebrated Confession of Faith which derives its name from the Council was promulgated.

It would be neither pleasant nor profitable to attempt to unravel at length the tangled web of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies; the last of importance which on this subject agitated the ancient Church, and, like the Nestorian, led to a permanent schism. The Alexandrian school adhered to the traditions of Cyril, and Monophysitism had struck its roots deep in many other Churches of the East. Peter, Patriarch of Antioch, surnamed Fullo, from his original occupation, took occasion from the sanction of the epithet Θεοτόκος by the Council of Ephesus to endeavour to introduce its counterpart 'God was crucified for us' into the Trisagion of the Church.‡ Hence arose a controversy which, under the name of Theopaschitism, continued for some years. The more moderate Monophysites contented themselves with maintaining that after the union the natures could be distinguished only in thought (ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ), since, in fact, they coalesced into one nature, which however is not a simple, but a compound

* Dioscurus filled the Church with monks and soldiers. Flavian's adherents were grievously mishandled, and compelled to subscribe whatever was put before them; while Flavian himself was beaten, deposed, and banished to Epipas, where he died shortly afterwards.

† The bishops exclaimed on hearing the epistle: 'This is the faith of the Apostles. Peter has spoken through Leo. Leo and Cyril teach the same. Anathema to him who believes otherwise.'

‡ The original Trisagion was from Is. vi. 3. The form afterwards in use was: 'Holy God, Holy Strong One, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us.' Peter Fullo added, 'Who was crucified for us.' See J. Damasc. De F. O. lib. iii. 10.

one.* But, in truth, it was rather the practical tendencies of Monophysitism than its theoretical errors which led to its final rejection. The Council of Chalcedon had insisted upon the duplicity of the natures; the Monophysites seemed to disavow its authority; this was one ground of contention. The other, a more legitimate one, was that, at least in its extreme form, Monophysitism did really obscure the humanity of Christ to such an extent as to imperil its reality: the 'one nature' of Dioscurus and his followers was the Divine nature with a semblance of humanity attached to it. After vain attempts by the Emperors Zeno and Justinian I. to find a middle ground on which both parties could meet, the more decided Monophysites separated themselves, choosing as their leader a monk named Jacob Baradaeus. This remarkable man, after procuring for himself episcopal consecration, travelled through the East in the garb of a beggar, ordaining Monophysite bishops and presbyters, and founding Churches; and at his death left the sect in a flourishing condition in Syria and Mesopotamia. From him they received the name of Jacobites. The favour which the Saracen invaders naturally showed to the Monophysite tenets widened the breach between them and the Church; and independent Churches, still existing, were founded in Egypt, Abyssinia, and Armenia. Those of the two former countries acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Alexandria; the Armenian Church is entirely independent.

The controversy, under the form of Monotheletism, broke out again in the seventh century. Sophronius, a monk of Alexandria, taking exception to the phrase 'one energy' (*μία ἐνέργεια*), as applied to the miracles of Christ, signalled his accession to the patriarchate of Jerusalem by a confession of faith in which he strenuously maintained a duplicity of energy,† corresponding to the duplicity of the natures. Cyrus of Alexandria, his opponent, had the matter referred to Honorius of Rome, who counselled the avoiding altogether of the terms in debate, but incidentally remarked that the real point in dispute was not whether there was a singleness of energy, but whether there was a singleness of will in Christ. He himself inclined to the latter opinion. This gave rise to the Monothelite controversy, which ran through the usual stages of theological rancour. Scripture appears plainly to ascribe two wills to Christ ('not My will, but Thine be done'); but the Monothelites were ready with

* The terms employed were *μία φύσις σύνθετος*, or *φύσις διττή*. See Dorner, ii. 165.

† Thus in the miracle of walking on the water, the human energy moved Christ's body, the divine kept Him from sinking.

a reply which is used by J. Damasc. himself in another connection,* viz., that Christ in such passages did not speak in His own person but in ours, by way of instruction and example. After the death of Honorius mutual excommunications and depositions took place, until at length Constantinus Pogonatus summoned a Council at Constantinople A.D. 680 (the sixth general one), at which, after the reading of an epistle from Pope Agathon, it was determined that as there are two natures in Christ so there are two wills, not opposed to each other, but the human subject to and always in harmony with the Divine. Monothelitism, thus condemned, lingered for a time in the Syrian sect of the Maronites, but it died away in the Church.†

There is no more uninviting chapter of Church history, in its external aspects, than that which relates to this controversy. The rancour of the disputants, their mutual anathemas, the unconcealed rivalry of the Sees of Rome and Constantinople, the political influences at work, leave a painful impression on the mind of the student, who on reading the account of some of the proceedings feels how true the statement is that even General Councils are 'an assembly of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God' (Art. xxi.). These reflections, however, will probably give place to others when the matter is considered on its own merits, and apart from the infirmities of the human agents. The questions at issue were really of vital importance, which cannot be said of all ecclesiastical movements; and the decisions ultimately arrived at display a sobriety of judgment and a consistency with Scripture which lead to the conviction that in forming them the Church at large enjoyed the promised presence and assistance of her Divine Head (Matt. xviii. 20; xxviii. 20). It is important, however, to note the character of these decisions. They were negative rather than positive, repellent of error rather than explanatory of the truth. There were not two Persons in Christ, there was not one nature, nor one will and energy; the union took place without change, admixture, etc. The Church laid down certain landmarks, or, to vary the image, buoys, beyond which it was not safe for speculation to venture; but wisely forbore to attempt a positive explanation of the mystery. Within the channel marked out varieties of exposition are admissible; but they probably will only issue in

* 'How could Christ need prayer,' he asks, 'when He was the Logos Himself? God cannot pray to God.' The answer is τὸ ἡμέτερον οἰκείουμενος πρόσωπον, καὶ τυπῶν ἐν εαυτῷ τὸ ἡμέτερον (De F. O. lib. iii. 24).

† Honorius necessarily came under the condemnation of the Council; an embarrassing circumstance to Papal writers. It was attempted to save the Papal infallibility by distinguishing between private opinions and official decisions. To the former the Monothelitism of Honorius is assigned.

disappointment. For, in truth, the problem of the incarnation, like the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, is beset with difficulties which the finite mind of man seems incapable of grappling with. We see here, emphatically, through a glass darkly. Of what use, then, it may be asked, to pursue the subject further? The answer is that an acquaintance with such failures is next in importance to an acquaintance with the truth; by discovering the inevitable limits of human thought it may at any rate beget a spirit of modesty and charity. Moreover, an important branch of theological speculation, even if it be deemed antiquated, which however is by no means the case here, can never be without interest. Other points, too, of great practical import are intimately connected with the view we take of the Person of Christ; *e.g.* the doctrine of the real presence cannot be severed from that of the ubiquity of the Person. Even then if it be true that all existing theories on the subject break down somewhere, some account of the principal ones may be both interesting and instructive. Such an account it is proposed to give in what follows, though with the brevity imposed by our limits. An attentive reader of the history of the dogma will probably perceive that it involves three main questions: 1. That relating to the kenosis, or exinanition, of the Logos. 2. That relating to the hypostatical union. 3. That relating to the perichoresis, or interpenetration of the natures.

§ 51. *Kenosis, or Exinanition, of the Logos.*

This point did not specially engage the attention of the early Church, which was occupied rather with the notions to be formed of the Person of Christ *after* the incarnation. It came into greater prominence in the disputes between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in the seventeenth century; and in more recent times, but principally in Germany, it has drawn to itself the attention of many distinguished theologians.

S. Paul tells us (Phil. ii. 7) that Christ when He was in the form of God thought it not a thing to be snatched at or retained to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation (ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν); and on the meaning of these last words the controversy mainly turns. By the Lutheran theologians they are understood of the Logos incarnate, and of the earthly life of Christ. Being by virtue of the communication of Divine properties to the manhood, which took place from the moment of the conception,* in

* ‘Momentum communicationis istius quoad possessionem donorum istorum divinarum idem est quod conceptionis et unionis personalis’ (Quenstedt, De P. C. s. i. th. 77). Compare Hollaz, De P. C. q. 57; Form. Con. p. ii. c. 8, 26).

the form of God, He yet laid aside His native dignity, and took upon Him the form of a servant; *i.e.*, as it is explained, while retaining the *possession* of the Divine attributes (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) He forbore the *use* of them, hid them as it were under a veil, and only occasionally permitted glimpses of them to appear.* But the difficulties connected with this interpretation are very great. It imposes on us the belief that Christ as a babe in the womb possessed omniscience without using it, which seems a contradiction, and exercised omnipotence while unconscious, as man, of His own personality. Thus an air of unreality becomes attached to the manhood in that stage, and the same, to some extent, may be said of all the subsequent stages till the ascension. Moreover, deliberately to renounce the exercise of powers latently possessed implies a conscious act of will; and the difficulty recurs, how are we to conceive Christ as a babe exerting such an act of will? There seems, further, no room left for a real human development, for the Logos from the first absorbs the manhood into Himself, and the latter becomes a mere instrument, a Theophany, a dramatic representation. In short, the theory is plainly of Docetic tendency. But a still more formidable difficulty remains. The conception in the womb is itself assigned to the kenosis;† but if so, where is the manhood which laid aside its inherent majesty? It must be one antecedent to the conception, *i.e.* it must be a pre-existent manhood, sharer of the Divine glory and attributes, which it abdicated in order to enter the Virgin's womb. And thus, in its natural result, the Lutheran doctrine seems to lead to the notion of a double manhood, one before time, the other in it.

The preference then must be given to the interpretation generally adopted by the Reformed theologians, according to which the words 'being in the form of God' refer to the Logos *ἄσαρκος*, or the second Person of the Holy Trinity before He became man; and the passage will then be to the effect that the Logos submitted to a self-limitation whereby it became possible for Him to enter into union with the manhood, without annihilating its natural properties, or interfering with its relatively independent development. In other words, the act of incarnation itself, and irrespectively of the subsequent humiliations endured by the

* 'Distinguiamus inter donorum divinorum communicationem et plenariam communicatorum istorum donorum usurpationem: illa facta est statim in primo incarnationis momento, hæc vero demum secuta est in gloriosa Christi exaltatione' (Quenstedt, De P. C. s. ii. q. 10).

† 'Ad exanitionem Christi pertinent sequentes actus (1) conceptio, (2) natiuitas, (3) circumcisio, (4) educatio, (5) inter homines conversatio, (6) passio, (7) mors, (8) sepultura' (Hollaz, De P. C. iii. s. 1, c. 3, q. 118).

Saviour, was a kenosis. What conception are we to form of this?

There appear to be only two ways in which we can imagine such a kenosis to have taken place. We may suppose that the Logos, in order to adapt Himself to the state of the embryo in the womb and the babe in the manger, a state devoid of self-consciousness, suspended for the time His own Divine self-consciousness, gradually recovering it as the babe grew according to the ordinary laws of humanity; a theory which has been maintained by distinguished names abroad.* By a free act of omnipotence and unbounded love, the Logos extinguished for the time being His personality, and became unconscious in the unconscious infant, partially conscious in the child, fully so in the man. The first objection to this hypothesis is that it seems inconsistent with the ἀρρίπτως of the Council of Chalcedon, and tends to a temporary eclipse of the Holy Trinity; the personality of the second Person, which cannot really be separated from His nature, suffering *pro tempore* an extinction. Moreover, instead of the Logos being Himself the active animating principle of the incarnation (which is the doctrine of the Church), He here becomes a mere impersonal nature on a level with the impersonal embryo;† and in order to obtain such an active principle presiding over the union of the natures, the Holy Ghost takes the place of the Logos. This latter, indeed, is a characteristic of the Reformed theology as compared with the Lutheran. It is plain that the union of two unconscious natures, neither of them exercising the functions of a true personality, seems hardly to come up to the idea of the incarnation, as it is represented in Scripture. But if this theory is rejected, the only other conceivable mode of self-limitation is that which leaves the Logos in full possession of His active personality, but supposes that the fulness of the Divine nature was not at once communicated to the human, but gradually, according to the receptivity of the latter.‡ That is, the union was not, as the Lutheran divines teach, complete from the first, but was itself a *process*, involving successive acts; a continual efflux of the Divine nature into the human, not an act perfected at once. The union kept pace with the growth of the manhood; being different in the babe from what it was in the man, and in the earthly life from what it is in the heavenly, and in the present heavenly life from what it will be when the time spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. 28 arrives. The Logos *intra carnem* was never during

* Thomasius and his followers.

† The embryo is called ἄγιον, in the neuter gender (Luke i. 35). Compare τὸ γεννηθῆν, Matt. i. 20. See Martensen, Dog. s. 132.

‡ The theory of Dorner and others. See Dorner, Theil, ii. 1272.

the earthly life present in His fulness as He is *extra carnem*; not because He had abdicated His essential Godhead, but because He had not communicated it to the manhood in all its fulness, nor could do so until the manhood was *capax infiniti*.* There was a kenosis therefore of the Logos, so far as the man Christ Jesus was concerned, but none of His own essential nature. The knowledge, *e.g.*, which Christ possessed was Divine; not merely such a knowledge as Christians also possess, but Divine through the indwelling of the Logos: it was a knowledge *sui generis*, and absolutely free from error: but it was not omniscience as an attribute of Deity. The Logos exercised, so to speak, a measure of self-restraint in communicating this and the other Divine attributes, in tender condescension to the weakness for the time being of the human factor. And thus Christ could and did say, 'My Father is greater than I,' as well as 'I and the Father are one' (John xiv. 28, x. 30); He could be, and was, ignorant of the day when the end should come (Mark xiii. 32). This notion of the kenosis certainly avoids the difficulties connected with the former, but it involves one of its own hardly less formidable. It involves the idea of a *double consciousness* in the Logos, viz., that belonging to Himself as a Divine Person and that belonging to Him as incarnate in Christ, which plainly, according to the theory, are not, or at least were not for a time, coincident. And is such a double consciousness consistent with the unity of the Person, or rather of the personality, of Christ? In truth this is a difficulty which meets us, more or less, in every attempt to explain the mystery. Even if we suppose that this duality of consciousness is now at an end, the human nature having become capable of receiving the Godhead in all its fulness, must it not have existed during the state of humiliation?

§ 52. *Hypostatical Union* (ένωσις ύποστατική—*unio personalis*).

The doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon is that the Divine and the human natures are united in one Person, viz., the Person of the Logos; hence the term *Unio personalis*. This union is distinguished from several other kinds. It is not, says Hollaz, *notionalis sive rationis*, as when genus and difference make the species; not *respectivè* (σχετική), as when two friends are said to have one soul; not accidental, of which whiteness and sweetness in milk, honey and water in mead (κατά σύγχρασιν), two beams in juxtaposition

* This capacity, according to Dorner and those of his way of thinking, was actually attained at the Ascension: so that Christ's human nature is now fully partaker of the Divine attributes (Theil, ii. 1200-64). Dorner alleges the possibility of death, or the separation of soul and body, as a proof that the hypostatical union was not, during our Lord's earthly sojourn, complete.

(κατὰ παράστασιν), the matter and grace of the sacraments, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the faithful, are examples; not *essential*, as when two imperfect substances go to make one nature, *e.g.*, the soul and body in man, whereas in Christ two perfect natures are in union; but altogether singular and wonderful, a union of natures but not a natural one, a personal one, but not of persons. It is called perichoristica, *i.e.*, intimate and most perfect, denoting a mutual interpretation of the things united. He adds, very properly, that such a union can only be of substances in themselves, *i.e.*, abstractedly, diverse in nature.* J. Damasc. mentions other kinds of union not to be confounded with this;—κατὰ ταυτοβουλίαν as when there is a unity of will between two persons, καθ' ὁμοτιμίαν as when God is said to have exalted the man Christ Jesus to like honour with Himself, καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν merely nominal, and κατ' εὐδοκίαν of good-will.† The Council attempted no positive explanation of the manner in which the union of the natures in the Person took place.

The technical words employed in these discussions, 'Nature,' and 'Person,' labour under an ambiguity which has led to much fruitless controversy. By the expression 'human nature,' we commonly understand the logical abstraction which is gained by comparing individuals, setting aside their accidental differences, and fixing our attention on the common notion that remains. Thus from a comparison of John, Thomas, etc., we arrive at certain predicates which belong to the whole species, as, *e.g.*, animality, rationality; and the complex of these we call human nature. Now it will easily be seen that this notion does not apply to the Divine nature. First, because in the Divine being there is no distinction between essence and attributes; God's mercy is God regarded as merciful, God's omnipotence God regarded as Almighty; and in fact, the category of substance as distinguished from attributes cannot be applied to the Divine being, or if applied must be understood in a sense different from what it bears in reference to the creature. And, secondly, because we have no plurality of Gods, from which to abstract the nature of God, as we have in the case of man; and it is on this ground that Schleiermacher objects to the use of the word 'nature' in this connection, as reducing the Christian idea of God to that of heathenism.‡ A comparison of Jupiter, Neptune, Minerva, etc., would furnish a mythological notion of the Divine nature, but such a Divine nature would not be what we mean by the words because these personages were not real Gods. By the Divine

* P. iii. s. i. c. 3, q. 30. Compare J. Damasc. De F. O. lib. iii. c. 3.

† De F. O. lib. iii. c. 3.

‡ Glaubenslehre, s. 96.

nature in Christ then must be understood not a complex of Divine predicates, but God Himself in the Person of the Logos, not an abstraction but a personal Being. No more can the human nature in Christ be thus described. For such abstractions have no existence outside our minds, unless we make them Platonic essences. If we pronounce the human nature in Christ an abstraction, it was not an individual one, but the nature of the whole race; *i.e.*, all men were in Christ in a certain sense; a doctrine which has, in fact, been revived in our day.* But in truth the common nature of man can exist *really* only in an individual man. If, after the process of abstraction, we wish to restore it to actual existence, it must be in the person of John or Thomas. Therefore the Logos must be held to have assumed not indeed *a* man but still *a* human nature; the totality of our nature but individualised in His person. And this is what the Council means by affirming that Christ is a 'perfect man,' for a complex of predicates, without will and intelligence, and a central Ego, would not be such. By the two natures then we must understand *concrete* natures, God Himself subsisting in an individual man.

Then with respect to the word 'Person,' which the Council distinguishes from the 'natures,' when it declares that two natures are combined in one Person, we may ask, What is the Person of the Logos apart from His nature, *i.e.* the Divine essence? A mere mode of subsistence in the Godhead; not what we usually mean by the word, *viz.*, an individual with an independent will, and real subsistence.† God the Son is God with the personal property of filiation, which is a mere relation in which He stands to the Father. What we mean by personality belongs to the One God, the common 'substance' or essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not to the immanent relations of the Holy Trinity

* Dorner (ii. 185, note) attributes this theory to J. Damasc., but, as it should seem, without sufficient reason. It is true J. Damasc. says, 'Our nature has risen from the dead, and ascended and sat down at the right hand of God;' but he adds, 'not that all men as persons have ascended,' etc., but that 'the whole of our nature' has done so in Christ. And in the same chapter, 'we say that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to the whole human nature;' but he adds, 'For the Logos omitted nothing of our nature which He had originally implanted in it, but assumed the whole, body and a reasonable soul, together with their respective properties' (De F. O. lib. iii. c. 6). He seems to mean nothing more than that every essential constituent of our nature was assumed by the Logos. It is one thing to say this, and another that He assumed the whole human race in its essence. Compare T. Aquinas: 'Dicendum quod Verbum Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam *in universali*, sed *in atomo*, id est, in individuo, sicut Damascenus dicit: alioquin opereretur quoddam cuiuslibet homini conveniret esse Dei Verbum, sicut convenit Christo,' (p. iii. q. 2, art. 2).

† See § 27.

considered by themselves ; just as in the case of an earthly father personality belongs to him as a man, not to his paternity, or the relation in which he stands towards his son. Hence it will be seen that such a question as T. Aquinas has proposed, whether the union took place in the Person, or in the natures,* has no proper meaning.

The trinitarian hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos, without the connotation of His nature, *i.e.* the Godhead itself, does not seem capable of assuming a human nature. The union was effected neither in the Person alone, nor in the nature alone, but in both ; *i.e.*, the incarnation was the work of the Holy Trinity so far as it was God who became flesh, but it terminated, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son ; in which latter sense it cannot be said that the Father, or the Holy Ghost, became incarnate. Does it not seem to follow that if the Person of the Son is severed from His nature, while the two natures are to be considered as abstractions, not living realities, little place is left for a true personal subject, a thinking and willing agent, in the incarnate Logos ?

These remarks may serve to point out the difficulties that beset the subject. The question the Church had to deal with was this ; the true meaning of the words 'Person' and 'nature,' as used in this connection, being borne in mind, how were the natures to be brought into union so as to form the One Christ as He appears on the page of Scripture ? The illustration of the Athanasian Creed, from the compound nature of man, is not to the point. The soul, the animating principle of the body, and which corresponds to the Divine nature in Christ, is not, like the Godhead, a complete nature in itself, but only a part of man's nature ; whereas the Divine nature is no part of any other, it exists *a se*, in the plenitude of its personality and attributes. Shall we suppose the two natures so to combine as to form a mixed one ? But then Christ is neither God nor man, but a *tertium quid*. Shall we suppose a process of absorption to take place ? But if the human nature is absorbed in the Divine, Christ has no real manhood ; if the Divine in the human, He has no real Godhead, to say nothing of the impropriety of ascribing a change to what is absolutely unchangeable. If, as we have seen, the natures are not mere abstractions, and this Scylla is to be avoided, how are we to keep clear of the Charybdis of a double personality in Christ ? If the natures are supposed to be united in the Person (*unio personalis*), which is in fact the received mode of explanation, is a Trinitarian Person, in its proper meaning, capable of such a function ? But it may be well to let one of the orthodox

* Sum. Theol. p. iii. q. 2, art. 2.

writers of the Church, a standard authority both in the East and West, John of Damascus, speak for himself in his attempt to frame a consistent theory.

In his treatise on the Incarnation this writer, after speaking of the miraculous conception, thus proceeds: The Logos was not united to a human body already in existence, but dwelling in the womb of the Virgin while in his own person uncircumscribed he formed the subsistence (*ὑπεστήσατο*) of a body and a rational soul, the Logos Himself becoming the hypostasis of the human nature: so that there was simultaneously flesh—the flesh of the Logos—and flesh animated by a soul.* Wherefore we do not say that man was deified, but that God became man; for God perfect in nature became man perfect in nature, yet without coalescing into one. If this latter were maintained Christ would be of the same substance neither with the Father, whose nature is simple, nor yet with His mother, whose nature was not compounded of Deity and humanity. The errors of heretics proceed from their confounding the nature with the hypostasis. When we speak of one nature of man, we mean that which is common to many hypostases (*i.e.* persons), viz. having a body and soul, each hypostasis possessing these two natures (or substances). But as regards our Lord, since there never was, or can be, more than one Christ, there can be no such thing as a common Christ-nature, a *Χριστοσύνης*; but we have one Hypostasis in two perfect natures, the Hypostasis being on this account a compound one (*σύνθετος*). As in the Holy Trinity the subsistence of three Persons does not affect the unity of the Godhead, nor is the Unity of the Godhead inconsistent with the subsistence of the three Persons, so a duplicity of natures is not inconsistent with the one Christ, *for they are united in the Person* (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*). We do not affirm that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to all the persons of humanity,† but that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to the whole nature of the manhood, *ὅλος ὅλῳ*. The peculiar property of the Person of Christ, that wherein He differs from the Father and the Holy Ghost, from His mother and from us, is that He is at the same time God and man. By the terms 'perfect God' and 'perfect man' we signify the fulness and completeness of the natures; in saying 'wholly God' and 'wholly man' we signify the individual singularity of the Person. In the Holy Trinity the proper phrase is not *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, but *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*; but as regards the Person of Christ it is *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, not *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*.‡ The following is of importance: 'Although

* Ἄμα σὰρξ, ἅμα Θεοῦ Λόγον σὰρξ, ἅμα σὰρξ ἐμψυχος (De F. O. lib. iii. c. 2).

† See note p. 253.

‡ De F. O. lib. iii. cc. 2-8.

no nature is without an hypostasis, or essence without a person in whom it inheres, it does not follow that natures united to each other in an hypostasis should have each its own hypostasis; for they can unite into one hypostasis, both having one and the same. The hypostasis of the Logos, being that of both natures, occasions the human nature neither to be without an hypostasis nor yet to have one of its own; both natures possess it in its totality, without division or separation. The human nature was not made an hypostasis alongside the hypostasis of the Logos, but subsisting in the latter it may be called ἐνυπόστατος, *i.e.* owing its hypostasis to another, whereas ἀνυπόστατος would mean that it has no hypostasis at all, neither one of its own nor a borrowed one.*

The substance of this exposition is that the prime movement towards the incarnation came from the Logos, *i.e.* God under the hypostatical character of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, not from the manhood; the former being the active, the latter the passive agent: that the two natures even after the union remain distinct: that there is, however, but one Christ, the unity of the Christ being secured by the union of the natures in the hypostasis of the Logos. Thus far it is merely an expansion of the statements of the Council of Chalcedon, and no doubt fairly represents the accepted doctrine of the Church. But when it is examined carefully, and with a view to its inner consistency, it is less satisfactory. The natures remain distinct, *i.e.* as the writer explains it, Deity is not humanity, nor humanity Deity: this indeed is self-evident; but is he not attaching to the word 'nature' that self-same abstract sense which, as we have seen, is quite inapplicable to the Divine nature, *i.e.* making it a complex of predicates instead of God Himself in His full personality? Deity (Θεότης) did not unite itself to humanity, but the Logos became man in the actual man Christ Jesus. The natures in the abstract sense appear in Christ as living realities; God, not Deity; an individual man, not humanity. But if this be so, how can the natures thus understood be said to remain distinct after the union? Do they not rather seem to unite so as to form the one God-man, as He actually appears on the sacred page? It seems as if the ἀρρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως, etc., of the Council refer not so much to the *result* of the union as to the *mode* in which it was effected; it was not effected by conversion, fusion, etc., but by the hypostatical assumption. But this does not determine what view of Christ's Person we are to take *after* the assumption; and if even then we are to consider the natures, in their proper sense, as distinct, it is not easy to see how we are to avoid the notion of a mere juxtaposition of the Logos and the

* De F. O. iii. c. 9.

man Christ, the *συνάρηα* which Cyril contends against, whereas S. John says that the Logos became flesh. This is one difficulty that meets us. And another is connected with the Damascene's statement that the human nature has no proper hypostasis, or personality, of its own; that of the Logos fulfilling this function. But a humanity without a central ego, the source of will and determination, seems a mutilated one; it seems at best but a mere instrument, or *ὑργανον*, of the Logos. That is not the conception we form of the Christ of the Gospels. According to this theory we seem to have in Christ a human nature defective in the property of personality, on the summit of which, to supply the defect, is placed the Divine personality of the Logos; apart from which common bond of union the natures would have a tendency to fly asunder. But a human nature distinct from the Divine, and in order to keep it in union therewith, deprived of its own independent hypostasis, which is replaced by a Divine hypostasis, is a conception certainly not without its peculiar difficulties. And these were felt, and attempts made to obviate them. The assumption was made that personality did not in fact appertain to the perfection of a human nature. T. Aquinas supposes an opponent to urge that the human nature in Christ cannot be supposed of less dignity than ours; and that to a perfect humanity it certainly does appertain to possess a proper personality, *i.e.* whenever the nature becomes individualised, as it did in Christ. His reply does not seem very satisfactory. Personality, he says, only belongs to the perfection of a thing in so far as it belongs to its perfection to subsist by itself. But this condition disappears if it subsists in another more exalted than itself; which is the case as regards the human nature in Christ. The absence of its own personality is compensated by that of the Logos; it gains by the loss. The human nature in Christ is more excellent than ours, just as the sensitive soul, which is common to man and the brute, is more excellent in the former by reason of its conjunction with an intelligent nature.* But the question relates not to the excellence of what a thing is joined to, but to the perfection of the thing itself which is joined; and the illustration does not determine whether an individualised human nature without a personality of its own can be considered a perfect one. Another illustration which Aquinas uses betrays the weakness of his position. Not every individual substance, he says, is a person, but only that which subsists by itself; the

* Sum. Theol. p. iii. q. 2, art. 2. So Turretin: 'Carentia propriæ personalitatis veritati et perfectioni humanæ naturæ non derogat. Quia veritatem naturæ humanæ ex materia, forma, et proprietatibus essentialibus, non ex personalitate, metimur' (loc. xiii. 26).

hand of Socrates, *e.g.*, though an individual substance, is not a person, because it subsists only in something more perfect than itself, viz. Socrates.* If the human nature bears only the same relation to the Person which the hand of a man does to the man, it plainly occupies a very subordinate position in our conception of Christ. In later times, after the Adoptianist controversy, the theory was fully carried out, and the general doctrine of Church writers was that the manhood in Christ is impersonal. What J. Damasc. means by a 'compound hypostasis' is not quite clear. If it is only that the hypostasis of Christ is that of both natures, it is but repeating what he had already said; if that the human nature had, after all, a personality of its own, but that it was, in some sense, united to that of the Logos, the union of a Divine and a human personality into a compound one seems as difficult of comprehension as the union of a Divine and human nature into a compound nature.†

The same line of reasoning is pursued in reference to the duplicity of wills in Christ, and occasions the same difficulty. Against the Monothelites J. Damasc. remarks‡ that the faculty of will is a property not of the person but of the nature. What we possess without learning it belongs to the nature, but we all possess the faculty of willing without learning it. Man was created in the image of God, who is absolutely free, and therefore he must have a will. If will were a matter of the person and not of the nature there would be three wills in the Holy Trinity, for there are three Persons; but inasmuch as there is but one Divine will, it must belong to the nature (*i.e.* the common essence) of the Godhead. But since in Christ there is confessedly a duplicity of natures, it follows that there is also in Him a duplicity of wills. Scripture attributes a real human will to Christ. And the same may be said of the 'energies' of Christ, which are twofold, corresponding to the natures.§ It will be seen that throughout this reasoning the 'nature' is not regarded as an abstraction, such as Deity or humanity, which as such can have no will, but as individualised in a person; and then arises the question, How are the wills to be held in union so as that the unity of the Person shall not be

* S. T. iii. q. 2, art. 4.

† J. Gerhard's explanation of the σύνθετος ὑπόστασις is as follows: 'Dicitur hypostasis σύνθετος non quod in se ac per se alterationem quandam et simplicitatis suæ excidentiam passa fuerit composita, sed quia post incarnationem est duarum naturarum hypostasis, cum antea solius divinæ naturæ hypostasis fuerit' (loc. iv. s. 121). So T. Aquinas: 'Etsi persona Christi ex se sit simplex, ut subsistens tamen in duabus naturis composita esse censenda est' (S. T. p. iii. q. 2, art. 4). Both explanations leave the difficulty unsolved.

‡ De F. O. iii. cc. 13, 14.

§ *Ibid.* cc. 231, 236.

impaired? The answer is, as before, that the wills are held together in the hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos. 'It is impossible to combine two wills into a compound one, any more than two natures: what name could we give it? It would neither be Divine nor human.* But how can the person of the Logos, a mere relation, operate apart from His nature, which is the real source of His will? And if under His Person we include His nature, is not the whole tantamount to saying that the will of the Logos holds the will of the manhood in union? which, whether it be true or not, seems inconsistent with what J. Damasc. elsewhere says respecting the independence of Christ's human will.† For the Divine will holding the human one in union must plainly be the dominant principle, and the human will can only exercise itself so far as that of the Logos permits. And thus it seems deprived of the characteristic of a really free will, viz., self-originating power. The Logos makes use of the human will much as the soul makes use of the body.‡

It cannot be disguised that the general effect of the theory that the Trinitarian Person is the bond of union between the natures and the wills otherwise distinct, is to leave the natures without a real union and to assign an undue preponderance to the Divine aspect of the Redeemer's person. And since the mediatorial office of Christ as our High Priest rests on the truth of His human nature (Heb. ii. 17), it cannot be matter of surprise that there should have been a tendency in mediæval Christianity to lose sight of the Saviour as our advocate with the Father, and to set up other mediators in His place. It may be doubted, too, whether such a manhood is capable of ethical development. Could Christ be really tempted, resist the temptation, submit His will to that of the Father, learn obedience by what He suffered, become perfect through suffering, earn His crown of glory as a reward—all which Scripture attributes to Him—without a human personality, the seat of self-determining energy? Or could He be an example and an encouragement to us? The Councils and theologians have negatively guarded the essentials of the faith, but it can hardly be said that they have given us the full portraiture of God manifest in the flesh. The difference of the natures *in the abstract* it is no doubt essential to maintain, but

* De F. O. iii. c. 229.

† Ὁμοούσιος ὢν καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτεξουσίως θέλει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ὡς ἄνθρωπος (De F. O. iii. c. 13).

‡ Ὁργανον γὰρ ἡ σὰρξ τῆς Θεότητος ἐχορημάτισεν. Ἐνεργεῖ ἑκάτερα φύσις, τοῦ μὲν Λόγου κατεργαζομένου ὑπὲρ ἑστί τοῦ Λόγου διὰ τὴν αἰθεντίαν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τῆς Θεότητος, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀρχικά καὶ βασιλικά· τοῦ δὲ σώματος πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ ἐνωθέντος αὐτῷ Λόγου (De F. O. iii. c. 235).

what we want to realise is the unity of the Person including the natures, the Person of the one Christ, God and man.

Perhaps the point of departure has been taken too much from physical analogies, such as the soul and body, or the heated iron, which after all explain nothing; and too little from the descriptions which Scripture gives of the Christian life. In Scripture the nature of God and the nature of man do not repel each other, like the opposite poles of a magnet, but rather have a mutual affinity. Man was created in the image of God, and God from the beginning was actuated by a *φιλανθρωπία* (Tit. iii. 4). The union restored between fallen man and God, in and through Christ, is ethical rather than physical. But very strong expressions are used concerning it. 'I live,' says S. Paul, 'yet not I, but Christ liveth in me' (Gal. ii. xx.); 'Christ is our life' (Col. iii. 4); 'he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit' (1 Cor. vi. 17). The Holy Spirit bears witness with their spirits that Christians are sons of God (Rom. viii. 14-16). Prayer is the voice of the Spirit Himself in their hearts (*ibid.* 26). Yet Paul's individuality stands out distinct on the inspired page, and is not interfered with by the presence of Christ in him. He lived with the consciousness of perfect freedom, and yet his human life was continually taken up into the life of God. Here is a union of God and man entirely removed from physical conceptions, and yet surely not the less real. And it may aid us in our attempts to explain the incarnation, so far as it can be explained. Christ stands out on the inspired page as a man like ourselves, with a human will, and human energies; tempted, resisting, suffering, victorious; but His human will, though real, yet being free from any taint of sin, was evermore, and immediately in each crisis, taken up into perfect union with that of the indwelling Logos. From one point of view He is altogether Divine, and from another He is altogether human; and this probably is the mode in which most simple-minded Christians receive the mystery.*

§ 53. *Personal Propositions. Communication of the Attributes* (Propositiones personales. Perichoresis. Communicatio idiomatum).

The natures, however abstractedly distinct, cannot be supposed to be in mere juxtaposition, united by a Divine hypostasis which like a ring contains them within its circumference. A communion between them of some sort there must be. Leo had attempted to satisfy this requirement by his well-known Canon, 'Each nature acts according to its own properties, but with the participation of

* Probably what Leo had in his mind when he wrote, 'Totus in suis, totus in nostris' (Epist. ad Flav.).

the other;* *e.g.*, Christ walked on the lake by virtue of His human nature to which alone walking belongs, but that He did not sink was owing to the participation of the Divine nature in the act. But even this left the natures too far apart, and it was felt necessary to bring them into some closer relation. The explanation of J. Damasc. is as follows :

‘The Logos made human properties His own, inasmuch as what belongs to His flesh belongs to Him, and imparts to His flesh (*i.e.* His human nature) Divine properties ; according to the method of mutual communication (*ἀντιδοσις*), and by virtue of the interpretation of the natures (*παραλήψεις*).† Thus the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified (1 Cor. ii. 8), although His Divine nature could not suffer ; and the Son of Man is said to be in heaven while upon earth in his human nature. For it was one and the same that was Lord of glory and Son of Man. And we acknowledge that to the same Person both the miracles and the sufferings belong ; though by virtue of one nature (*κατ’ ἑλλο*) He performed the miracles, and by virtue of the other endured the sufferings. When we contemplate the natures we call them Deity and humanity ;‡ but the one compound hypostasis we sometimes name Christ, *i.e.* both God and man, or God incarnate ; sometimes, from one of its parts, God only or the Son of God, and man only or the Son of Man. When we speak of the Deity (*i.e.* in the abstract) we do not attribute to it human properties ; we cannot say it was created, or capable of suffering : nor, again, do we attribute to the humanity (in the abstract) Divine attributes, *e.g.* to have been uncreated. But when we speak of the Person we attribute both the one and the other to Him : Christ died, Christ is in heaven (while upon earth) ; this Man is uncreated, and uncircumcised, etc. This is what we mean by antidosis ; either nature imparting to the other its own properties, by virtue of the unity of the Person and the Perichoresis.’§ He speaks also of a certain deification (*θεώσις*) of the human nature, through its union with the Divine ; which he explains as being ‘enriched with Divine energies ;’ as, *e.g.*, in the miracles, it did not perform them by virtue of its own properties, but through its union with the Logos

* ‘Agit utraque forma (= natura), cum alterius communione, quod proprium est (Epist. ad Flav.).’

† This word ‘perichoresis’ is the same as was used to signify the oneness of nature (‘substance’ of the Athanasian Creed) in the three Persons of the Holy Trinity ; and is thence transferred by J. Damasc. to the union of the natures in Christ.

‡ It will be seen that by ‘nature’ J. Damasc. here means an abstraction, not a nature vivified by personality ; but elsewhere he seems to use the word in the latter sense.

§ De F. O. lib. iii. cc. 3, 4.

in His hypostasis, the Logos exerting His Divine power through the human nature.* But this adds little to what he had previously said concerning the antidosis and the perichoresis.

It may be doubted whether in all this J. Damasc. arrives at any real perichoresis of the natures. At least, the examples he gives are merely those which were afterwards called 'Personal propositions,' from their belonging rather to the Person which holds the natures in union than to the natures themselves. They are defined to be propositions in which the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other; *e.g.* This Man is God, God is this man, the son of Mary is the Son of the Highest, etc.† As long as we view the natures in connection with the hypostasis this mode of speaking is allowable; just as, though theology is not medicine, the same man may be said to be both a theologian and a physician. But it is only in connection with the hypostasis that the propositions hold good. And thus the antidosis of J. Damasc., whatever he may mean by perichoresis which he does not explain, seems a merely nominal one, and rests on the unity of the hypostasis which serves for both natures, not on the union of the natures. These still remain repellent of each other; and we are confronted with the old difficulty, how with natures thus repellent a Divine-human personality is to be conceived?

T. Aquinas does little more than reproduce the reasoning of his predecessor. 'Since the Person,' he says, 'of the Son of God, which is correctly expressed by the Word "Deus," is the sustaining principle (*suppositum*) of the human nature which the word "Homo" in the concrete denotes, it is plain that this proposition, *Deus est homo*, is true and proper, not only on account of the truth of the terms, but on account of the truth of the predication.'‡ That is, in reference to this particular Man, the proposition holds

* De F. O. lib. iii. c. 17. He extends this deification to the human will in Christ, from its union with the 'Divine and omnipotent' will of the Logos. But can a human will deified by union with an Omnipotent will be said to remain a human will in any proper sense?

† 'Prædicationes personales sunt in quibus concretum unius naturæ de concreto alterius naturæ modo singulari et inusitato prædicatur, ut exprimitur duarum naturarum unio, earumque in unitate personæ communio' (Hollaz, p. iii. s. 1, c. 3, q. 34).

‡ De Incarn. q. xvi. art. 1. The truth of the terms, *i.e.* the same Christ is truly God and truly man, therefore God is man; the truth of the predication, *i.e.* man may be truly predicated of God. This may be the place to notice an ambiguity in the use of the word 'hypostasis' or 'persona,' which J. Damasc. not unfrequently falls into. Sometimes he uses it, as T. Aquinas does here, to signify the *suppositum*, or sustaining principle (ἐπόσταςς), of the human nature; that the human nature has the ground of its subsistence in the Logos. At other times he seems to mean by it the central ego, the personality, of an individual; that is, of the Logos, so far as He can be considered an individual. The former sense may be consistent with a true ego, or personality, of the human nature, hardly the latter.

good, *Deus est homo* ; but, as he explains afterwards,* the natures in the abstract, Deity and humanity, exclude each other.

The question concerning the adoration of Christ is treated in the same way by both writers. 'In what hypostasis,' asks J. Damasc., 'dost thou worship the Son of God? One incarnate nature in the hypostasis of the Logos; worshipped with one worship since the Person (πρόσωπον), though of two natures, is One.†' So T. Aquinas.‡ In other words, the human nature in the abstract is not an object of adoration, but the whole Person is; and this person is man as well as God; so that we may say, not that humanity but that this Man is to be worshipped.

Shortly after the Reformation the differences between the Reformed and the Lutheran branches of the Protestant Church brought the question of the union of the natures into prominence. Luther taught that Christ in His glorified body is present in the consecrated elements; Zwingli, and the Swiss churches in general, allowed only a spiritual presence. Among the arguments employed by the latter against the Lutherans a principal one was that ubiquity must thus be ascribed to the human nature, and this re-opened the whole controversy respecting the communion of the natures. The Reformed Confessions touch lightly on the subject. We do not hold, says the Helv. Confession 1566, that the Divine nature in Christ suffered, or that Christ according to His human nature is omnipresent. For the body of Christ, though glorified, has not laid aside its properties, or become absorbed in the Divine nature.§ So the Heidelberg Catechism: 'Christ is true God and true man; therefore according to the human nature he is not on earth, but according to His Deity, majesty, grace, and Spirit, He is never absent from us.¶' The Lutheran Confessions are more distinct. We teach, says the 'Formula Concordiæ,' that though each nature retains its essential properties, so that, *e.g.*, to be omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., are not properties of human nature essentially, and to be circumscribed, to suffer, to die, etc., are not properties of the Divine nature essentially (that is, that the one nature is not formally changed into the other), yet on account of the hypostatical union that of the natures is much more than a mere nominal one,¶ otherwise it would be impossible to say, This man is God. After the incarnation the human nature belongs to the Person not less than the Divine;

* De Incarn. q. xvi. art. 5.

† De Hymn. Tris. q. 5.

‡ De Inc. q. xxv. art. 1.

§ Augusti, Lib. Symb. Eccl. Ref. p. 27.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 549.

¶ The antidosis of J. Damasc., and ἀλλόωσις of Zwingli, against which Luther inveighs so vehemently.

therefore wherever Christ is, there He must be in His human nature. But in His Divine nature He is omnipresent; unless, therefore we rend the Person asunder so must He be in His human nature. Yet this does not mean that the human nature is *locally* expanded, so as to fill all places in heaven and earth; this cannot be said even of the Divine nature. That the humanity is not receptive of Divine properties cannot be proved: does not Christ Himself say, 'All power is given unto Me,' etc., and 'Where two or three are gathered, etc., there am I'? If the union of the natures were merely nominal, of what value would the atonement be? Whereas it was the participation of the Divine nature in Christ's sufferings that rendered them efficacious to take away sin?*

Here then is a difference of no small moment amongst Protestants themselves. On the Lutheran side it may be said, 'You admit that the Person of the Logos constitutes that of the manhood; does, then, the nature pass with the Person or not? If it does, the Divine attributes must, sooner or later, pass with it, for in God the attributes cannot be *in re* separated from the nature. If it does not, the Person of the Logos apart from His nature is, as already explained, a mere relation. Nor must we argue to the capacities of human nature from the actual condition of man born in sin and subject to death, but from human nature as it appears in the second Adam, and in its glorified state: of *this* manhood, though not of our present empirical one, it may be true that *Finitum capax infiniti est.*' Had the Lutherans stopped here, it might not have been so easy to dislodge them from their position. But they took up other ground hardly tenable, *e.g.* that the communication of the properties was complete from the moment of the incarnation, so that the babe Christ even in the womb was omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. Only He forbore the *use* of these attributes. It has already been observed how in the crucial instance of omniscience this theory *must* be modified, the possession and the use being here inseparable.† The Logos, in short, according to the Lutherans, is not and cannot, be *extra carnem*. Wherever He is, there is also the manhood which is now inseparable from the Person. And in order to make this consistent with the nature of a real body, which must, if it become visible, be circumscribed in space, they invented the curious notion of an 'illocal' presence (*illocalis præsentia*); *i.e.* a presence which, like the Divine omnipresence, is disconnected from the ideas of space and visibility.‡ When Christ, *e.g.*, shall

* Francke, Lib. Symb. Eccl. Luth. pp. 51, 187.

† See p. 249.

‡ 'Caro Christi non est omnipræsens præsentia physica et extensiva, sed hyperphysica, divina, et *illocali*, quæ ipsi non formaliter et per se sed participative et per unionis personalis gratiam competit' (Hollaz, p. iii. s. 1, c. 3, q. 58).

appear at the last day, it will be a *manifestation* in space of the illocal Presence, and as such come under the laws which govern a visible and tangible body.* Thus they hoped to obviate the absurd idea, attempted to be fastened on them by their opponents, of Christ's body filling all space; which, even if it were conceivable, would be a very different thing from the Divine attribute of ubiquity. If Christ becomes visible in space, it can only be as He was visible to the Apostles after His resurrection, viz., in a circumscribed body like ours.

The doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* was worked out by the Lutheran divines with scholastic precision. It is defined to be not merely *Verbalis* or *Intellectualis* (as when genus communicates its properties to the species), but *Realis* (i.e. between two substances really distinct); nor, again, *exaequativa* (i.e. the difference of the natures *per se*, or essentially, remains); nor *multiplicativa* (as when a man communicates, according to the traducian theory, his soul to his son); nor *transfusiva* (as when wine is poured from one vessel into another, leaving the former empty); but *συνδυαστική*, i.e. between two natures perfectly and intimately united; yet not *commixtiva* (i.e. the properties of the natures are not commingled); nor *essentialis* (as between the three Persons of the Holy Trinity); but *personalis et supernaturalis*. There are three kinds of it. The first, when the properties either of the Divine or the human nature are attributed to the whole Person; e.g. Christ is begotten of the Father from everlasting, Christ was born of the Virgin Mary (*genus idiomaticum*). The second, when the Son of God is said to have communicated the properties of His Divine nature to the human, really and truly, to be possessed and used in common (*genus majesticum*). The third, when in the work of Christ (atonement, etc.) either nature is said to operate according to its own properties but to a common result (*genus Apotelesmaticum*, *θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*); e.g. when Christ is said to have died for sin, the dying properly belongs to the human nature, but the efficacy of the sacrifice is derived from the Divine; and they both combine to the result, viz. satisfaction for sin, and are ascribed to the one concrete Person, Christ.†

It was the *genus majesticum* to which the Reformed theologians principally took exception, and not without reason. They argued that no created being, which the human nature of Christ was admitted to be, however exalted and glorified, could be receptive of the infinite Being in all His fulness, that *finitum* never can be

* 'Adventus Christi ad iudicium non erit localis transitus de loco aliquo superiori in locum aliquem inferiorem, sed *visibilis apparentia* in certo aliquo loco' Hollaz, *ibid*.

† Hollaz, p. iii. s. i. c. 3, q. 38; Baier, comp. p. iii. c. 2, s. 1.

capax infiniti. The Logos, therefore, in the Person of Christ must be supposed to be, more or less, in a state of self-limitation. That if some Divine attributes, *e.g.* Omnipresence, were communicated, all must have been, for we cannot, except in thought, separate one class from another: and consequently eternity must be predicated of the incarnation, which yet we know, as a fact, took place in time.* That a real antidosis implies a communication of human properties to the Divine nature as well as of Divine to the human, which yet is incompatible with just views of the Divine nature, which, being infinite, can admit of no additions.†

It will be seen that the Reformed type of doctrine is formed rather on the lines of the Council of Chalcedon and J. Damas-cenus, while the Lutheran aims at bringing the natures into union in themselves, and not merely through the connecting link of the Person. And in order to secure some real communion between the natures, the Swiss theologians were compelled to introduce the Holy Ghost between the Logos and His human nature. What the *communicatio idiomatum* is in the Lutheran theology the excellent gifts of the Holy Ghost are in the Reformed. Such are, the power of working miracles, a knowledge far transcending ours, a *relative* independence of the ordinary laws of humanity, such as passing through closed doors, vanishing out of sight, etc.; which, however, are to be carefully distinguished from the Divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, or omnipresence. The possession of these gifts was not denied by the Lutherans, but they asked whether the singularity of Christ's Person could be secured by the impartation of spiritual gifts which, at least as regards their ordinary manifestations, are the property of every good man. The result

* To this the Lutherans replied by making a distinction between the attributes, according as they were 'quiescent' or 'active': the former were not communicable, the latter were. 'Idiomata divina quiescentia (*e.g.* eternity) de assumpta Christi carne non immediate prædicantur. At propria divina ἐνεργητικά (*e.g.* omnipotence) per operationem ad extra se exserunt, adeo que ad usurpationem communicari possunt. Inde fit ut de carne Christi immediate prædicentur: *v. g.* humana Christi natura est omnipotens, vivifica, omnisciens, etc, quum omnipotentia, etc., exserant se in et per carnem Christi. Attributa autem ἐνεργητά licet de assumpta Christi carne non prædicentur immediate (neque enim caro Christi dicitur æterna, etc.), prædicari tamen de eadem possunt *mediate*, mediante attributo operativo: *v. g.* Christi hominis potentia est infinita, immensa, et æterna' (Hollaz, p. iii. s. i. c. 3, q. 52). It will be seen that what they really needed to fill up the gap in their system was a pre-existent manhood of Christ.

† To this the answer was that the Logos was the active, independent agent in the incarnation, the human nature the dependent and receptive; that therefore it does not follow that because the latter was exalted the former should have suffered debasement or limitation; just as the soul, while it communicates sensitive life to the body, does not receive in turn from the body materiality with its affections.

of the controversy may be briefly summed up: that neither type of doctrine succeeds in giving us a fully adequate representation of what we want—a Divine-human personality, a Theanthropus, one Christ both God and man.*

PART II.

THE WORK OF CHRIST.

§ 54. *The Threefold Office.*

THE Person of Christ is the foundation of His work, but the work itself consists in the restoration of the normal relations between man and God. As such it is properly described as a mediatorial work. The word 'Mediator' is used in the New Testament in a twofold sense—that of a peacemaker between two parties at variance (1 Tim. ii. 5), and that of the founder of a religious polity, as when the Mosaic dispensation is said to have been given by the hand of a Mediator (Gal. iii. 19); and in both it is applicable to Christ. He came to effect a reconciliation between man and God separated by sin, and to establish a new spiritual polity, of which Himself should be the Head, and His Church the visible manifestation (Heb. xii. 24; Phil. iii. 20). Everything connected with this mediatorial work belongs neither to the one nature nor to the other singly, but to both in conjunction, or to the Person of the Redeemer. And it is described under a threefold aspect, as consisting of prophetic, sacerdotal, and kingly functions; a division which, though assailed by some modern writers,† is of ancient date, and is founded not only on express statements of the New Testament,‡ but on the typical appointments of the Old, in which the offices of prophet, priest, and king formed the main pillars of the institution. Since part of the ceremony by which persons were set apart to these offices was anointing with oil, the title Messiah, or Christ, was applied to

* The great difficulty which the Reformed theology, in its various forms, has to contend with is the double consciousness which it seems to necessitate, according as we view the Logos 'in carne,' and 'extra carnem.' This difficulty is by no means removed by Ebrard's rather hasty assertions (Dog. Band. ii. c. 2), or even by Martensen's otherwise interesting and instructive remarks' (Dog. ss. 135, 177-9).

† Ernesti and others.

‡ Prophet, Acts iii. 22; Priest, Heb. iv. 14; King, 1 Cor. xv. 25.

the Saviour ; the antitype being the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Ghost and with power (Acts x. 38), which event formed the point of transition from His private to His public life (Matt. iii. 16). Although these offices must not be exclusively assigned to particular periods of the life of Christ, as if, *e.g.*, the work of atonement did not commence until the close ; indeed the typical ones were, in the later times of the Jewish commonwealth, sometimes found united in the same person at the same time ;* yet in their main features they naturally fall into the order which they usually occupy in works on theology.

§ 55. *Prophetical Office.*

Although Christ does not give Himself the name of prophet, yet He is so called in the New Testament ; and this in accordance with ancient prophecy itself (Deut. xviii. 15). And if His kingdom was to be founded, not, as that of Mahomet, on physical force, nor, as the Mosaic dispensation, on a typical and ceremonial law with its visible priesthood, nor yet on a magical effect of external ordinances, but on free conviction and the obedience of faith—if it was to be in its essence ‘righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost’ (Rom. xiv. 17)—it must rely on the spiritual weapons of instruction and persuasion. By these methods Christ must win His way to the conscience, unfold the nature of true religion, sever from connection with Himself and His religion superstitious or merely political accretions, gain for Himself the title of teacher (ὁ διδάσκαλος) ; all which in fact formed also the main functions of the Jewish prophet.

The prophetic ministry of Christ has been divided into immediate and mediate ; or that which He exercised on earth in His own Person, and that which He continues to exercise through human ministers. But since the latter is rather the office of the Holy Ghost, to whom also the inspiration of Holy Scripture is properly ascribed, it seems better to consider the prophetical office as commencing with the baptism in Jordan and ending with the Ascension. As regards the New Testament gift of prophecy, it is manifestly part of the dispensation of the Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 10). The matter of Christ’s teaching corresponded to the well-known division of ancient prophecy into didactic and predictive matter. To expound the meaning and comprehensiveness of the moral law ; to insist on its superiority to ceremonial enactments ; to expose the immoral casuistry by which its spirit had been superseded—this formed a large part of Christ’s teaching, as it had done that of the ancient prophets.

* *E.g.* John Hyrcanus, Joseph ; De B. J. lib. i. c. 2.

Thus, far from destroying, He fulfilled (Matt. v. 17) and promulgated not a new law, but the meaning of the old. But there is, withal, a marked peculiarity in the *manner* of His teaching. While the prophets disclaim an independent mission, and speak of themselves as mere interpreters (*πρόφῆται*), and unworthy, too, of the office (Is. vi. 5), Christ taught with authority, and from Himself; He spake what He knew, and testified what He had seen (John iii. 11). The predictive element, though not wanting, occupies a subordinate place; and necessarily so, for He who was the subject of ancient prophecy had come, and type and prediction had given place to the reality. It was not to a future Messiah, but to Himself, as the way, the truth, and the life, that He directed the minds of His disciples. His predictions relate chiefly to the establishment and progress of His Kingdom on earth, and partake, like ancient prophecy, rather of the character of intuition than of specific vaticination. The curtain of time, as in the Apocalypse, when lifted, discloses the fortunes of the Church under symbolical representations, which refuse to be tied to the literal interpretation. Or He speaks in parables, which contain in themselves a germinant fulfilment, by no means as yet exhausted. And as Christ is the fulfilment, so He is the end of prophecy. We expect no essential additions to revelation; even inspired Apostles only expanded the germs found in His discourses. The prophetic gift in the Church is confined to exposition; and he who professes either to improve, or to add to, what Christ has delivered occupies a place outside the pale of Christianity.

Although it is not stated of all the prophets of the Old Testament that they performed miracles as an evidence of their mission, it was a usual accompaniment of the prophetic function. And in our Lord's case this sign was very conspicuous. But His miracles, like His teaching, had a character of their own. They were not merely marvels, but works of beneficence, and of an eminently symbolical character; having their counterpart in the miracles of Divine grace, and naturally leading the mind from the cure of bodily ailment to that of spiritual. They were performed, too, without effort; He spake the word and it was done, as if all nature confessed its Lord, and bowed to His will. Miraculous powers of a similar kind continued in the Church for some time after the Ascension, but gradually disappeared as the new faith consolidated itself. Miracles are the proper accompaniments of the introduction of a religion, but are out of place in its progress. Christianity promulgated under miraculous attestation, and furnished with an inspired standard, is left to work out its history and its problems under the ordinary operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

§ 56. *Sacerdotal Office.*

The sacerdotal office naturally follows the prophetic, for conviction of sin, which the prophets especially aimed at producing is the first step towards a hearty reception of the atonement provided in the Gospel. It has been matter of debate whether Christ was a Priest while upon earth, or first exercised the office after the Ascension. The doubt seems to have arisen from the circumstance that to slay the victim was not on common occasions a necessary part of the priest's office under the old covenant (Lev. iv. 29), and the offering Himself as a sacrifice for sin was the main work of Christ in His state of humiliation. But the doubt will disappear if it is remembered that in Scripture it is the sin-offering on the great day of atonement, with which that of Christ is almost exclusively compared, and on that day the High Priest not only carried the blood into the most holy place, but himself slew the sin-offering (Lev. xvi.). This part of the High Priest's office our Lord did unquestionably perform while on earth, what followed in the Jewish ritual being appropriated to Him in His glorified state. His priesthood, then, is one and undivided, but partly fulfilled on earth, partly in heaven. And it is usually considered under the two heads, corresponding to the functions of the Levitical High Priest, of offering atonement for sin, and making intercession for His people.

The Levitical ritual first claims our notice. If indeed the judgment of a modern writer, that 'Jewish sacrifices rather show us what the sacrifice of Christ was not than what it was,'* is correct, the subject could have no interest for us. This, however, is not the view which Scripture gives of them, and especially that great Epistle in which the subject is formally discussed. The ceremonial law, we learn from the Epistle to the Hebrews, was both symbolical and prophetic. As a system of symbol, or as Warburton calls it, 'representation by action,'† it conveyed present lessons of instruction. The devout worshipper was constantly reminded of the Divine holiness, his own sinfulness, and the need of atonement. But a mere symbol may terminate in itself, without prospective reference; and though suitable to the infancy of religion it naturally gives place, later on, to a more spiritual mode of instruction. But Scripture describes this ritual as typical also (Heb. x.), ordained with reference to a more perfect dispensation in which it was to find its fulfilment; it was a prophetic symbol. And this more particularly as regards its ordinances of sacrifice and priesthood. Its use, therefore, towards an understanding of the atoning work of Christ must be very great.

* Jowett, *Com.* vol. ii. 479.† *Div. Leg.* bk. iv. s. 4.

The rite of sacrifice appears in all nations as the earliest mode of Divine worship, and in Scripture is represented as coeval with the human race (Gen. iv. 4). Whether it was of human origin, dictated by the natural feelings of sinful man, or of express Divine appointment, may be doubtful;* in the Mosaic law, at any rate, it receives Divine sanction, and appears under a new aspect. It is in the ritual of the great day of atonement that the distinguishing features of the Mosaic institute are found concentrated. On this occasion, when atonement was made for the nation in its corporate capacity, the High Priest as the representative of the priesthood, and through it of the whole people (for all Israel was in one sense 'a kingdom of priests,' Exod. xix. 6), alone entered the holy of holies with the blood of the sacrifices which he had offered, and which he sprinkled on the mercy-seat, thus symbolically covering, or removing from God's sight, the sins of the people. The sin-offering for the people contained special features. It consisted of two goats, one of which was offered in sacrifice, and the other, after the imposition of the hands of the High Priest, was sent away alive into the wilderness, laden, as it is described (Levit. xvi. 22), with the iniquities of the children of Israel. Of this expressive transaction the following seem to be the leading ideas. In the first place, a power of expiation. To no sacrifices previously mentioned in Scripture—not to that of Abel (Gen. iv. 4), nor to that of Noah (Gen. viii. 20), nor to that of Abraham (Gen. xv. 9)—is this efficacy attached. In the Mosaic sacrifices generally, and especially in this one, it is the declared object of the institution. 'On that day the priest shall make an atonement for you to cleanse you, that ye may be clean from all your sins before the Lord' (Levit. xvi. 30): the blood sprinkled on the mercy-seat covered or removed from the eye of God the impurity which rendered the people, and even the vessels of the tabernacle, unfit for His service. Secondly, the atonement was the appointment of God Himself. Not only was the declared expiatory power, but the whole ritual of the institution, in its minutest details, matter of revelation; so that no room was left for the unauthorised suggestions even of real piety, and the worshipper was reminded that the covering of sin was a mystery which reposed in the bosom of God. He could not entertain the idea of propitiating an offended Deity, though the LXX. usually render the Hebrew word by *ἱλάσσομαι* or its derivative *ἱλασμός*; for the ritual represented Jehovah as taking the initiative, and Himself devising means whereby the barrier which intercepted the

* Spencer, Warburton, and Davison incline to the human origin: the Fathers generally take the same side. Magee and Faber take the other view. Outram (*De Sac.*) leaves the question undetermined.

exercise of His mercy might be removed. Thirdly, the atonement was effected through suffering, viz., the death of the victim. That is, it was founded not merely on the announcement of the willingness of Jehovah to pardon on repentance, but on an expiatory act which He was pleased to accept; and expiation always involves the idea of suffering, and moreover of suffering as the punishment of sin. It has been argued indeed that not the death, but the blood of the victim possessed the atoning virtue;* and it is true that the sprinkling of the blood was the culminating point of the whole transaction. But the blood was obtained only in one way, viz., through the death of the victim, and the two acts cannot be severed from each other. The true view seems to be, that the expiation of sin was effected by the death, the covering of sin by the application of the blood, or as it is termed 'the life' (the life being in the blood); which blood, or life, was no longer unclean, but fit to be presented to Jehovah.† Fourthly, the ceremony exhibited a vicarious element. The sinner, excluded from theocratical privileges and condemned by the moral law, was permitted to substitute for himself an animal sacrifice, by which he recovered his theocratical standing. And the details are not less significant. In all cases of the sin-offering the offerer (or the priest) was to lay his hand on the head of the victim, which forthwith became unclean because identified with the sinner, and as such was slain. That is, a spotless victim, spotless physically, and morally so far as an animal is incapable of guilt, took the place of the sinner, and that spotless life presented at the mercy-seat availed to hide sin from the eye of God.

In most of the religions of antiquity we find priests as well as sacrifices, and both sprang from the same feeling, that of an existing barrier between sinful man and God, which called for a mediator if communication was to be restored. And in order to confer permanency and dignity on the order, the principle of caste was commonly adopted; that is, the priestly function was attached to a certain tribe, or family, and passed from father to son irrespectively of moral or intellectual qualifications. Such was the Jewish priesthood, though in this instance the tenure was subject to revocation in case of moral delinquency (1 Sam. iii.). At the head of the order stood the High Priest. On his breast the names of the twelve tribes were borne; he only

* Bähr, *Symb. des Mos. Cult.* p. 200.

† No more were the bodies of the victims, which were ordered to be burnt without the camp, unclean. It has been commonly supposed that they were; but Bähr has conclusively proved that they were burnt because they were clean (ii. p. 397). The priests, as themselves offerers on this day, and not merely mediators, were excluded from partaking of the flesh, which in the case of ordinary sin-offerings they ate; and lest the (now) holy flesh should see corruption, it was burnt without the camp in a clean place (Levit. iv. 12).

could enter the most holy place on their behalf; and yet he was one of themselves, encompassed with the same infirmities, and capable of feeling 'compassion for the ignorant and those out of the way' (Heb. v. 2).

Such are the impressions which any unprejudiced reader would gather from a study of the Levitical ritual. And the question now is, Is the teaching of the New Testament accordant therewith, or of an opposite character? The statements of Christ Himself first demand attention. We are not, of course, to expect any systematic exposition of His atoning work when the atonement itself was not effected; this was reserved for the fuller revelation vouchsafed to His chosen ministers. In our Lord's discourses the atonement is either presupposed (as in the Lord's prayer); or it is implied in casual sayings; or it is veiled under parable and allegory. Yet His teaching contains the germ of what was afterwards more fully explained. He describes Himself as the good shepherd who gives his life for the sheep (John x. 15); as having come to give His life a ransom (λύτρον = כֶּפֶר) for many (Matt. xx. 28); as about to be lifted up (on the cross) in order to accomplish a spiritual deliverance analogous to the temporal wrought by the brazen serpent (John iii. 14). And above all, on the most solemn occasion conceivable, the last supper with His disciples, He compares the import of His death with that of the expiatory sacrifices of the Mosaic covenant: 'This is My blood which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins' (Matt. xxvi. 28).

The Book of Acts does not add much to our information on the point before us. Not so with the Epistles. S. Paul, after having proved the whole world under sin, declares that redemption from this state is by Jesus Christ, whom God hath openly proposed as a sin-offering, or propitiation;* thus vindicating His righteousness, which had seemed to be somewhat obscured by the passing over, without due retribution, of the sins of the ancient world. And again, that One died for all, *i.e.* vicariously, and in Him all died (2 Cor. v. 14);† that God was in Christ reconciling

* This seems the correct meaning of the word ἱλαστήριον in this passage (Rom. iii. 25). The LXX. translate the word כֶּפֶר, the covering of the ark, by ἱλαστήριον; whence many commentators render the latter word in the above passage of Rom. by 'a sin-covering,' or 'coverer' (Calv. Olsh.) But the covering of the ark was not in itself a means of propitiation; it became so when the blood (=the life) was sprinkled on it.

† The Revised Version gives the correct translation of this passage, the sense of which is not brought out by that of the Authorised one: 'Then were all dead.' Whether it means that all Christians die to sin and self, or to the law and its condemnation, when Christ died, in either case the death of Christ is spoken of as vicarious, or representative.

the world to Himself, *i.e.* removing the impediment that existed to the exhibition of His mercy, and this by making Him who knew no sin not a sin-offering, nor a sinner, but a partaker of the very element of sin itself *in its penalty* (*ibid.* 21). Christ is said to have purchased us out of the curse of the law, as slaves regained their liberty by payment of a ransom, by becoming a curse for us (Gal. iii. 13). In corresponding language S. Peter affirms that 'Christ bare our sins in His own body on the tree,' and that with His precious blood we are redeemed (1 Pet. i. 18; ii. 24). Nor does S. John teach otherwise when he writes that the blood of Christ cleanseth (καθαρίζει, the proper term for legal cleansing, see Heb. ix. 14), from all sin (1 John i. 7; iv. 10).

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a formal treatise on the subject, designed to show that the type must disappear now that the Antitype is come. The Levitical sacrifices could never take away sin, but Christ in the end of the world has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself (Heb. ix. 26). The Levitical priests came and went, but Christ is a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek, that mysterious personage who appears suddenly on the page of history, without notice of his birth or his death, or the register of his family. He entered into the Holy of holies above with His own blood, having obtained eternal redemption for us, and to appear for us in the presence of God (chaps. vii. ix.). The perfection of His sacrifice forbids its being ever repeated, for by one offering He has perfected for ever them that are sanctified, or cleansed (Heb. x. 14).

With this plainly-declared correspondence between the type and the Antitype, it is impossible to suppose that the language of the New Testament was framed merely in accommodation to Jewish habits of thought. The contrary is evident, that the work of Christ was the original plan in the Divine mind, and the Jewish ritual was framed as a preparation for it. If the Apostles, from their natural associations, wrote erroneously on this subject, the grave question arises, why was it ordered that Christianity should spring from a Jewish stock, and not from some religion free from such misleading associations? Why were the first heralds of Christianity almost necessitated to give a false portraiture of it? This is a difficulty which the Socinian has to meet, and it does not appear how it can be met. On this hypothesis, too, neither can the Divine origin of the Jewish dispensation, nor the inspiration of the writers of the New Testament, be maintained.

§ 57. *Continuation—Theory of Anselm.*

Unlike the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, that of the atoning work of Christ did not form a prominent

subject of controversy in the ancient Church: whence it arises that the three Creeds only declare in general terms that Christ suffered and was crucified for us. Nor do the early Fathers enter very deeply into the subject. The first speculations on it are connected with the Scriptural figures under which the atonement is described as the payment of a price, or a ransom. 'To whom, it was asked, 'was the price paid?' A common answer was, 'To the devil;' who through the Fall had acquired rights over man which he could not, without an equivalent, be fairly called on to surrender. This curious theory was afterwards modified to signify, not payment to the devil, but still, as if he had some equitable claim, the overcoming of him by a crafty device. By Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory the Great the human nature of Christ is compared to a bait concealing the hook of the Divine nature, which the devil swallowed, but to his own destruction.* Thus was he overreached in his subtlety. It does not seem to have occurred to them that such a notion seems making the end justify the means, and that to allow the devil independent rights, which by some means must be satisfied, is to sanction a kind of Manichee or Gnostic dualism. Yet this notion held its place for a long time both in the Eastern and the Western Churches. 'Since the enemy,' says J. Damascenus, 'had tempted man by promising him equality with God, he in turn is tempted by the presentation of the flesh (of Christ). It was only just that whereas man was overcome by the tyrant, the latter should be overcome by man, and that not by mere force (but on grounds of equity) man should be rescued from the power of death.† In the eleventh century the treatise of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, entitled 'Cur Deus Homo?' appeared, and formed an epoch in the history of the dogma.

This great theologian, whose theory became the accepted one in the Western Church, introduces his pupil as professing himself unable to understand why an Omnipotent God should, in order to restore fallen man, have assumed our nature with its natural infirmities, and died on the cross as a malefactor. If it be said, to redeem us from sin, from wrath, and from the power of Satan, why could not all this have been effected by a simple fiat of the Almighty? Among men, to attain an end through toil and suffering which might have been attained directly, is deemed inconsistent with wisdom. To remove these doubts it must be proved

* 'In hamo incarnationis captus est' (Orat. Cat. quoted by Hagenbach, i. p. 318). So also Rufinus: 'Ut divina filii virtus velut hamus quidam habitu humane carnis obiectus . . . principem mundi invitare possit ad agonem' (*ibid.*).

† De F. O. iii. 1; comp. c. 27.

that the end could be attained in no other way. And this is the problem which Anselm proposes to himself.

He sets out with rejecting, in the person of the inquirer, the notion that anything is due to the devil (L. i. c. vii.); a sentiment which in his own person he emphatically repeats at the end of the treatise.* God, he continues, claims from man perfect obedience; sin consists in not rendering it, *i.e.* in robbing God of His due, and dishonouring Him. The sinner, therefore, is a debtor, and a contumelious one; and it would be inconsistent with the attribute of Justice to cancel the debt without satisfaction: it must either be paid in full, or the penalty for non-payment be inflicted (c. xi.). The alternative is demanded by the moral order of the universe (c. xii.). The mercy of God cannot be exhibited at the expense of His holiness. The question then is, Who is to pay the debt? For that a restoration of man, to some extent, at least, is intended we may infer from the improbability that the end of his creation should be wholly frustrated, and especially from the consideration that the elect are intended to fill up the gap which sin made in the ranks of the angels.† If it be pleaded that the debt may be paid by repentance and good works, the answer is that we owe these to God already; but how is *past* sin to be atoned for? (c. xx.). The greatness of sin must be estimated not by the mere act, but by the circumstances under which, and the Person against whom, it is committed (cc. xxi. xxii.). To render an adequate satisfaction it would be necessary that man, as he allowed himself to be overcome by Satan, should overcome Satan in turn; and further should undo the damage he brought upon the race by working out a means of justification and life for the elect: neither of which, from his inherent weakness, he can do (cc. xxii. xxiii.). This inability is no excuse, for man brought it on himself (c. xxiv.). The case then would be hopeless if Christ be put out of view. But matters assume another aspect, in the Scripture doctrine of redemption. It has been shown that man's debt never can be paid except by one who can render to God something greater than everything else except God; and He who can do this must be God. But it must be rendered by man also, for it was man that sinned. Therefore it must be rendered by One who is both God and man. And such is Christ. The

* 'Diabolo nec Deus aliquod debebat nisi pœnam, nec homo nisi vicem, ut ab illo victus illum revinceret; sed quidquid ab illo exigebatur, hoc Deo debebat non diabolo' (p. ii. c. 19).

† This singular speculation seems a favourite one with Anselm. He discusses at some length the question whether the number of the angels was originally incomplete, or rendered so subsequently by the defection of Satan and his followers' (cc. xvii. xviii.).

Redeemer, being miraculously conceived, though born of woman, was without sin; and therefore not naturally liable to death. But He voluntarily underwent death for our sakes, and thereby rendered to God the 'something' which is of greater value than everything else except God. The value of the death is to be measured by the preciousness of the life, than which nothing was more precious. God could not justly demand a life from Christ; therefore the free-will offering in our stead redounds to our advantage. In Christ man is sinless, overcomes Satan, is obedient unto death, gives up his spotless life to God; here is what we have been seeking for—full satisfaction for sin. For the sinless sufferer justly claims a reward for what He thus, in obedience to the will of God, undeservedly underwent, and the reward which He receives is the salvation of the elect (L. ii.).

Such in substance is the argument of the 'Cur Deus Homo?' and such in substance must be every theory on the subject which aims at being Scriptural. Not that any theory can be pronounced quite satisfactory, for the atonement is one of those subjects which human reason must ever fail fully to fathom. The key-note of Anselm's doctrine is the idea of 'satisfaction,' and against the idea expressed by this word it is that Socinian and rationalist objections are principally directed. The word itself does not occur in Scripture, and appears to have been first used by Tertullian, and not in connection with the work of Christ;* but the terms 'ransom,' 'price,' 'redemption,' and the like, involve the idea, and cannot be supposed to have been adopted without reason. When a slave was bought out of captivity, the price paid was a satisfaction to the owner for his loss; when sin, in consequence of what Christ did and suffered, was remitted, satisfaction may be said to have been made to Divine justice. All such terms are analogical: they do not pretend to explain the mystery as it is *in itself*, but so far as it can be explained *to us*, by figures with which we are familiar. No price, or ransom, was really paid to God, but something analogous to what we understand by such a transaction took place when Christ died. In like manner anger finds no place in God, but He is said to view sin in a manner analogous to what we feel when we receive an injury or insult; and He is propitiated as we should be if due reparation were made. If the deep things of God, which only the Spirit of God knows as they are (1 Cor. ii. 11), are to be in some measure brought down to our comprehension it can only be by analogical language, which, however, differs from merely figurative in that it expresses *facts* in the Divine economy.

* De Pœn. cc. 5-10. The 'satisfaction' of Tertullian is what the sinner himself (by penitence, etc.) renders.

The real point at issue is, Does the Atonement involve a change in *God's* attitude towards man, or merely in man's attitude towards God? God is love, and immutability is part of our conception of Him; but the idea of the Divine wrath against sin does not necessarily trench upon these Scriptural representations. For wrath in this connection is but holy love; love sorrowing and indignant at the perverted relation between the creature and his Creator; love not resting until the true relation is restored. A God indifferent to moral obliquity and the misery it produces would indeed be an ominous conception; disguised as it might be under the mask of pure mercy or benevolence, it would in reality differ little from that of a malignant Deity. A parent who feels indignant against the sin of a child, and shows it, does not the less love the child in so feeling and acting. Now the whole tenour of Scripture is to the effect that through the vicarious sacrifice of Christ a change was wrought in God Himself of this nature, that whereas previously He could not, consistently with the perfection of His attributes, grant forgiveness on repentance, now He can. The blood of the sin-offering, covering the sin of Israel, symbolically represented this change, the blood of Christ effects the reality. God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, *i.e.* expiating its sin (2 Cor. v. 19); and not until this was done could there be any preaching of an atonement or invitation to men to be reconciled to God (*ibid.* v. 20). What men needed to be told was not that they should repent and turn to God, but that if they did so, God could be just and yet forgive. Here, too, the language is analogical. How the Atonement could have affected the mind of God towards man is a profound mystery; but we know thus much, that if an offender against us has expiated his offence by great suffering, this is a consideration which changes wrath into pity, and paves the way for our favourably receiving his overtures of reconciliation. It was the sufferings of the prodigal son no less than his repentance that moved the father to grant forgiveness. Something analogous to this Scripture declares to have been produced in the attitude of God towards man by the sacrifice of Christ. It is true that redemption, in its full sense, involves the sinner's also being reconciled to God; but the accepted expiation of the Redeemer, 'while we were yet sinners' (Rom. v. 8), is the necessary condition of Christ's saving work in us. This is substantially what Anselm means by the term 'satisfaction,' and the figure of a debt which has been paid. And surely it is nothing more than the doctrine of the Apostle when he declares that the 'handwriting of ordinances that was against us,' *i.e.* the law with its demands, was taken out of the way, being nailed to the cross, nailed in token of the debt's having been cancelled (Col. ii. 14).

In the case of the believer, the eye of God cannot rest on the requirements of the law without at the same time resting on the cross, which is the evidence of their having been satisfied.

In Anselm's mode of stating the argument, no doubt imperfections may be perceived, which, however, do not impair the essential solidity of the structure. He is careful, for example, to impress upon us that to the Divine honour, so far as it relates to God Himself, nothing can be added, and nothing taken from it (c. xv.). When the creature refuses obedience, he does what in him lies to dishonour God, but the sin and shame of the action terminates with the sinner himself. But if God never can be dishonoured in *Himself*, how, it may be asked, can we speak of a debt as being due to Him? The answer is not given by Anselm, but it is obvious. It is due to God not merely as a Person, but as the Author and Upholder of the moral order of the universe, as a Lawgiver and a Judge. The distinction holds good in common life. A crime committed may not and does not dishonour the magistrate as a man, but it does dishonour the law of which he is the visible representative, and the penalty may be considered a debt due to him under this particular point of view.* It has been objected, too, that his reasoning wears too much of a commercial, or forensic, aspect, and does not assign sufficient prominence to the Divine love which prompted the sacrifice of the Son. But the treatise was intended to be an answer to the particular question, *Cur Deus homo?* or why was the Incarnation necessary? and the author must be judged accordingly. Yet it is a real defect that, in examining wherein the value of Christ's work consists, he does not sufficiently insist on its *ethical* aspect, as the work of One who earned by obedience a crown for Himself and the salvation of His Church. It is true that he points out that, unlike the legal sacrifices in which the victim was not a free agent, Christ was under no compulsion to suffer and die (c. ix.): He might have called down more than twelve legions of angels to rescue Him (Matt. xxvi. 53): He offered Himself, a willing sacrifice, to God (Heb. ix. 14). But the interval between the Saviour's birth and His death is passed over in silence, as if the life of Christ had little or no bearing on the work of atonement, whereas by S. Paul His obedience up to the culminating point of His death is made an important element (Phil. ii. 8). It may have been on account of these defects that Anselm's doctrine was

* 'Quorum (adversariorum) hoc est προῶτον ψεῦδος, peccatum ut simplex debitum et Deum merum creditorem esse hic spectandum, qui pro arbitrio possit vel penam exigere vel remittere sine satisfactione. Cum certum sit hic Deum induere σχέσιν iudicis et rectoris mundi, qui jus maiestatis sustinet, et se custodem et vindicem legum profitetur (Turret. loc. xiv. q. 10, s. 9).

far from being at once accepted by the Church, and indeed seems to have made but little impression on his contemporaries and immediate successors. Abelard opposed it, and made the essence of the Atonement to consist in its moral effect, the love of God therein exhibited drawing forth our love towards Him; in which he was followed by Peter Lombard and others. Duns Scotus denied that the value of Christ's sacrifice was infinite, as having been offered only by the human nature; consequently the debt was not fully paid, but God *accepted* it as an equivalent; thus anticipating the theory of Grotius in after times, commonly called that of *Acceptilatio*, a legal term signifying the creditor's giving a discharge for the whole on receiving part of his debt. But T. Aquinas, after expressing hesitation on some points, accepts the theory of Anselm as a whole, and from his authority, as well as from its intrinsic merits, it gradually prevailed, and forms the basis of the theology of the Reformation on this subject.*

The question debated by the older theologians, and commonly answered by them in the affirmative,† whether Christ suffered exactly what we should have had to suffer but for His interference, *e.g.* the pains of hell, is an instance both of the influence and of the abuse of the theory of Anselm. It was occasioned by the absence of the ethical element from this theory, and which is its great defect. A mere debt is satisfied by being paid, no matter by whom or from what motives; but the value of Christ's sacrifice depends upon other considerations than that of the *lex talionis*. Scripture gives no countenance to the doctrine. The consciousness of guilt which forms a necessary ingredient of the pains of hell could not in the case of Christ exist. The exclamation on the cross, 'My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' so much insisted on, does not bear out the inference; for the very form of it, 'My God,' proves that whatever anguish the soul of Jesus at that moment experienced, total separation from God did

* On Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Duns Scotus, see Hagenbach, D. G. t. ii. s. 184. 'Passio Christi non solum sufficiens sed superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis propter passionis generalitatem, et vite depositæ dignitatem, et denique propter charitatis magnitudinem' (T. Aquinas, S. T. p. iii. q. 48, art. ii.). The point on which Aquinas seems to hesitate is, whether God could have redeemed man otherwise than by the sacrifice of Christ; *i.e.* whether the latter was necessary. He prefers to hold with Augustine (De Trin. xiii. 10) that it was the most *suitable* method (*ibid.* q. 46, art. 2, 3).

† 'Quod justitiæ ejus (Dei) rigor postulabat id etiam Christus in satisfactione sustinuit, adeo ut ipsas etiam infernales penas senserit, licet non in inferno et in æternum' (Quenstedt, iii. thes. 39). The limited duration of the pains of hell was supposed to be compensated by the dignity of the Person: 'Si non fuit pœna infinita quoad durationem, fuit tamen talis æquivalenter quoad valorem, propter personæ patientis infinitam dignitatem' (Turret. loc. xiv. q. 9).

not form part of it. If what we had to suffer was literally exacted from Christ, and in our stead, why should most Christians be still subject even to temporal death? Quantitative measurements are not applicable to this case.

§ 58. *Continuation. Active and Passive Obedience.*

According to Anselm, Christ might seem to have been born only that He might die. There is no doubt, indeed, that Scripture speaks of His death as the special act by which expiation was made for sin. Had His expiatory sufferings stopped short of this, He would not have drained the cup which His Father had given Him to drink. But previously to it He had lived above thirty years in the world, partly in private and partly in the exercise of His public ministry; and the question might, and did, arise, whether a connection existed between that spotless life and the work of atonement? We need, it has been argued, a vicarious fulfilling of the law as well as a suffering of the penalty, and Christ rendered the former for us as well as endured the latter. By His death we obtain pardon, by His righteousness eternal life. A king may pardon a rebel, but it does not follow that the latter should be reinstated in more than his former position of favour and dignity. The father in the parable not only forgave his repentant son, but put a new robe on him, a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet.

It may be questioned whether, as commonly stated, this doctrine is either Scriptural or safe. Scripture nowhere treats of the *atonement* work of Christ under two distinct heads of suffering and righteousness, with two distinct benefits resulting therefrom; but rather of one great act by which sin was expiated. But neither does it seem safe. Redemption, in its full meaning, implies deliverance from the power as well as the penalty of sin; and to maintain that Christ's work was vicarious for us in the former sense might lead to dangerous practical consequences. At least, the statement needs to be carefully guarded. It may possibly be so by discriminating between the mere sinlessness and the sinless sufferings of the Redeemer. To be a sufficient sacrifice for sin the second Adam must be without sin, which was secured by the miraculous conception, and the personal union; but this sinlessness may be conceived of as not necessarily involving suffering. Nay, its natural tendency must have been to exempt from suffering: if a sinless being suffers, it must be an accidental circumstance, the consequence of some position or office which he voluntarily assumes. The spotless obedience of Christ then entered into the atonement only so far forth as it brought suffering

upon Him ; which in this sinful world it could not fail to do. Even in the comparative paradise of the holy family, and during the private life of the Saviour, contact with fallen beings must have been a daily burden to Him ; but it was not until He appeared in public that He felt the full weight of it. In his healing of the sick the Evangelist sees a fulfilment of the prophecy that He bore our griefs and carried our sorrows, no doubt because of His intense sympathy with the miseries of man's present state (Matt. viii. 16, 17) ; and to this was soon added the virulent opposition of those whom His teaching irritated, ending in the scourging by Pilate, the crown of thorns, and the death of the cross. What rendered these sufferings of infinite value in the eye of God was the dignity of the sufferer, His perfect submission, and His absolute sinlessness ; but the expiatory effect belonged to the sufferings themselves, not to the circumstances which rendered them altogether peculiar. And thus though the whole life of Christ must be reckoned to His atoning work, and not any particular scene or act as the agony in the garden or the crucifixion, yet primarily it was as a life of unmerited suffering, as one of passive obedience, that it merited the power of expiation.

Is, then, the imputation of the active obedience, the righteousness of Christ, an unscriptural idea ? By no means. Only it belongs not to the article of atonement, but to that of justification ; it is the privilege of the Church, not of the world. To have Christ's righteousness imputed to us, or what is equivalent in sense, to be counted righteous for His sake, is far more than a mere expiation for sin : it involves the gifts of repentance, of faith, of adoption into the family of God, it corresponds to the robe and the ring with which the prodigal son was invested as tokens of reinstatement in his former privileges. So far as it is not our own but counted to us it is vicarious, but not in the sense of being wrought for us irrespectively of our actual condition, as the atonement was wrought for us. Christ's righteousness is imputed only to those in whose hearts He dwells by faith. And hence the remark is not without foundation that between the forgiveness of sin and the imputation of righteousness there is no real distinction. Undoubtedly to him whose transgression is forgiven the Lord imputes not iniquity (Ps. xxxii. 1, 2), but then forgiveness of sin is more than atonement for it. Forgiveness implies the actual conversion of the sinner, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit assuring him of his adoption (Rom. viii. 15), the process of sanctification begun. It is merely a question of words whether we say that such a person has received forgiveness of sin or has the righteousness of Christ imputed to him ; the thing

meant is the same. But we cannot say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to those who have no vital union with Christ, or make this privilege co-extensive with atonement or expiation. To do so would indeed be to open the door to Antinomian tendencies. It seems hardly correct therefore to apportion the satisfaction, in Anselm's sense of the word, between Christ's active obedience to the law and His passive obedience in suffering the penalty. He 'died for our sins'—this is one thing; He 'rose again for our justification' (Rom. iv. 25)—this is another. 'If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by His life' (*ibid.* v. 10).

§ 59. *Continuation. Extent of the Atonement.*

This question is not by any means so simple as is commonly supposed. Numerous passages of Scripture can be cited in which what is called, though not very accurately, universal redemption appears to be plainly taught. Thus the Baptist bare witness to Christ that He is the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world (John i. 29); God is said to have so loved the world as to have sent His Son that through Him it might be saved (*ibid.* iii. 17); to have been in Christ reconciling the world to Himself (2 Cor. v. 19); to will that all men should be saved by coming to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii. 4); Christ gives His flesh for the life of the world (John vi. 51); it was appointed that by the grace of God He should taste death for every man (Heb. ii. 9); One died for all (2 Cor. v. 14). At first such passages seem decisive of the point at issue. On a more careful examination, however, they will not appear so clear.

That *some* limitation must be imposed on their meaning is obvious. If they are to be taken as literally asserting that Christ purchased the salvation of all men, the doctrine of universal restitution seems to follow; for, it may be argued, how can He be conceived as failing to receive the reward for which He paid the price? But further; the advocates of what is called particular redemption allege that the passages are all perfectly susceptible of a limited interpretation. It is argued that they need mean no more than that, in contrast to the Jewish religion which was intended only for one nation, God under the Gospel dispensation proposed to Himself to gather a church out of all nations, kindreds, people, and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), 'the other sheep not of this fold' of whom Christ speaks in John x. 16. That they sometimes contain their own limitation; as in John iii. 16 the

'world' is explained by the clause immediately following, 'who-soever believeth on Him,' viz., out of the world; in 1 Tim. ii. 2, the mention of 'kings and those in authority' makes it probable that by 'all men' the Apostle meant of every class; and in 2 Cor. v. 14, 'one died for all' must be understood by reference to the next words, 'all died,' which do not apply to the whole world but only to those who by union with Christ in His death die to sin, i.e., to true believers. That it is customary with the Apostle to use the word 'all' when the context proves it cannot be taken literally. Thus he says, 'As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive' (1 Cor. xv. 22); and again, 'As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life' (Rom. v. 18); in both which passages the context proves that it is believers in Christ whom he has in view. That where this mode of explanation fails, we must compare passages, and not enforce a construction on one which we cannot possibly apply to another. Thus if Heb. ii. 9, 'That He should taste death for every man,' is cited, 1 Cor. xii. 7 must not be overlooked, in which S. Paul says that 'the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal,' which plainly means to every believer. Such are the arguments used in favour of the doctrine of particular redemption, as that term is understood by writers on the subject.*

The impression, however, after all remains, that the passages in question cannot be fully explained on this hypothesis, and that Scripture does seem to connect benefits with Christ's death which extend beyond the salvation of His elect, and affect the race. If the holy angels are interested in it (Col. i. 20; Ephes. iii. 15), why not mankind as a whole? Perhaps some ambiguity has arisen from the use of the word 'redemption' in this connection. There is no doubt that this word, as used in Scripture, signifies salvation in all its fulness, and, like the words 'elect' and 'saints,' belongs to the Church, not to the world.† To be redeemed by Christ is to be delivered from the captivity of sin and Satan, to

* See Owen's very able treatise, 'The Death of Death in the Death of Christ,' vol. x., Johnston and Hunter's edition. If it were urged that in the typical dispensation the covering blood was applied to all Israel, the answer might be that this makes rather for 'particular redemption,' since Israel, the elect nation, was a type not of the world but of the Church, the heavenly Jerusalem (Gal. iv. 26; Heb. xii. 23).

† When S. Paul declares of himself and his fellow-Christians that they had 'redemption through His' (Christ's) 'blood, even the forgiveness of sins' (Ephes. i. 7), can he be supposed to speak merely of a benefit which equally appertained to Herod, Pontius Pilate, or Judas Iscariot?

be made a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven. And the question is, had Christ in dying for sin no special reference to, or foresight of, His Church to be redeemed, as compared with the whole race of mankind? It is difficult to think so. In dying for His Church He not only procured for it the general blessing of Atonement, but also all other spiritual blessings necessary to its salvation, *e.g.* effectual calling, forgiveness, and adoption (Art. xvii.). He earned for Himself by His death the right and the power to send the Holy Spirit, without whose efficacious influence, even if the prison-doors should be thrown open, the paralysed inmates, who have learned to love their prison rather than liberty, would not and could not come forth, and the Saviour might be left without a Church, the reward of His sufferings and death. In this sense, the term 'particular redemption' only expresses an unquestionable truth; redemption in its fulness must be particular. And in fact, the statement does not occur in Scripture that Christ died for the sins of the world. The Arminian doctrine that the effect of the Atonement is merely that God was thereby enabled to *offer* to man a new covenant, viz., salvation on believing, is only half the truth, for it ignores what the Redeemer purchased for His *Church*, the mystical body of all faithful people, or true believers. But if for the word 'redemption' we substitute 'atonement,' or 'expiation,' this doctrine does contain a fragment of truth, which is overlooked by its opponents. For if redemption is particular, it does not follow that atonement or expiation for sin should not be a universal benefit. And this distinction, in truth, seems the only method of reconciling the various statements of Scripture on the subject. The death of Christ placed mankind as a whole in a new and favourable position as regards God, though by many this position may never be realised or made their own; it was a propitiation not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2). A public advantage was thereby secured, which however may become a savour of death unto death or of life unto life according as it is used (2 Cor. ii. 16). And is not this substantially the meaning of the assertors of particular redemption when they admit, as they do, the *sufficiency* of the Atonement for the sins of the world, or ten thousand worlds?*. And on that sufficiency ground the right and the duty of ministers or mission-

* As, for instance, Bellarmine, who will not be supposed a partial witness: 'Illæ promissiones quæ absolutæ reperiuntur in Scripturis testantur sufficientiam pretii nostri, id est, meritorum Christi. Fuit enim Christi passio, quoad sufficientiam, propitiatio pro peccatis, non solum nostris sed etiam totius mundi' (De Justif. lib. i. c. xi.).

aries to proclaim to all men that if they repent and believe they will be saved? This proclamation could not be made if there had not been effected by the death of Christ a general expiation for our fallen race. And thus the combatants may not be in reality so much at variance as they had supposed. The most extreme Calvinist may grant that there is room for all if they will come in; the most extreme Arminian must grant that redemption, in its full Scriptural meaning, is not the privilege of all men. And thus, too, some light may be thrown on the vexed question respecting the state of the heathen. How can redemption be described as universal when it has never even been made known to countless millions? Redemption cannot under any circumstances be described as universal; but if the death of Christ placed the race in a new relation towards God, it may, in some manner unknown to us, benefit those who never heard of Him. And it were unduly to limit the most High to suppose that He has no other means of bringing men to Himself than by *explicit* faith in a preached Gospel.

It has been questioned whether the intercession of Christ, as distinguished from His oblation of Himself, does not belong rather to the regal than to the sacerdotal office.* Formally, no doubt, it is part of the latter, and a sublime instance of it, though anticipatory, as it could not otherwise be, occurs in John xvii., while the Saviour was yet on earth. Yet, as it consists in virtually presenting His finished atonement before God, in His glorified state, it seems to be more appropriately considered in connection with the assumption of the regal office, the exercise of which more especially belongs to that state.

§ 60. *Regal Office.*

Under the typical dispensation there were kings, as well as prophets and priests, and prophecy pointed not only to a suffering, but to a conquering and triumphant Messiah. God in His secret counsels had set His King upon His holy hill of Zion (Ps. ii. 6); a King was to reign and prosper in whose days Judah was to be saved and Israel dwell safely (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6); David (who had long before been gathered to his fathers) should be Prince over God's people for ever (Ezek. xxxvii. 25). Whatever might be the primary application of these prophecies, the image of a righteous theocratical King, as it presented itself to the mind of the seer, was too lofty to be satisfied even by the splendour of Solomon's kingdom; and the faith of the pious Jew, especially in the later

* Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, ss. 104, 105; Martensen, s. 169.

times of national decadence, must have been sustained by the hope of a further fulfilment.

Christ did not decline the title of King when it was applied to Him in irony (John xviii. 37), and only explained that His kingdom was not of this world. Even in the state of humiliation He exercised royal functions. He called unto Him whom He would, and they came (Mark iii. 13); and as it was the office of the Jewish King to represent and maintain the unity of the body politic, so Christ, before He ascended, laid the foundations of the visible Church, choosing Apostles, ordaining outward tokens of Church-membership (Matt. xxviii. 19; xxvi. 27-9), conferring powers for the exercise of discipline (Matt. xviii. 15-19), and promising His presence with such societies to the end of time. But with His ascension the plenary exercise of the regal office commenced. It must not be confounded with the dominion which, as the Logos, He exercises over all creatures: the power which is now given unto Him in heaven and in earth is for mediatorial purposes, and dates from the ascension. But as Mediator He reigns and must reign until all enemies shall be put under His feet (1 Cor. xv. 25). Against sin, the world, and Satan, He wages incessant warfare; not with the carnal weapons of temporal power, but with the spiritual ones befitting such a religion, and day by day His kingdom extends its boundaries. In His Church He reigns by His Word and His Spirit, gathering in His elect from age to age, and conducting them to the end when He shall present them to Himself a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle (Ephes. v. 27). At the end He will resign His mediatorial sceptre as being no longer needed (1 Cor. xv. 28); the present means of grace will be superseded by His immediate presence (Rev. xxi. 22); but the union of God and man, by virtue of which He is the Head of His Church, will remain indissoluble throughout eternity.

The intercession of Christ may properly be considered under this head because it is not a mere deprecation on behalf of His people, but an efficacious pleading of His finished and accepted sacrifice. Hence it is that, in S. Paul's view, the resurrection, which was a necessary condition of the ascension, is of vital moment (1 Cor. xv. 17). Had Christ merely died for our sins, what warrant should we have that the atonement was accepted, or that those sins, as well as 'the accuser of the brethren,' might not rise up against us in the court of heaven, and demand satisfaction? But the Saviour appears perpetually before God for us, opposing the virtue of His sacrifice to the accusations of the law and Satan, and claiming the just recompense of what He suffered on our behalf. And with Him the Father is always well pleased.

Regarding Him in this capacity, the challenge of the Church throughout the ages is, 'Who is He that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us' (Rom. viii. 34).

THE END.

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CORRECTIONS.

PAGE	
29, last line, for 'John xx. 25,' read 'John xx. 30.'	
73, note †, for 'Clarke,' read 'Clark.'	
94, note §, for 's. 9,' read 's. 11.'	
112, note †, for 'loc. viii. s. 87,' read 'loc. vii. c. 8.'	
122, line 6 from top, for 'ab,' read 'ad'	
159, note , for 'ibid.,' read 'ibid. c. 8.'	

PAGE	
164, note , for 'i. 121,' read '§ 50.'	
183, note †, for 's. 109,' read '§ 108.'	
235, note †, for 'p. iii. c. 3,' read 'p. iii. c. 3, Memb. th. 12.'	
263, note †, for 'De Hymn. Tris.,' read 'De Sanct. Trin.'	
280, note *, for 'Lambord,' read 'Lombard.'	

ADDITIONS TO THE NOTES, ETC.

PAGE	
3, note *, add Schenkel, Dog. i. § 2.	
29, note *, add Twesten, l. c.	
36, note †, add Gerh. loc. ii. § 2.	
48, note *, add Bellarm. De V. D. iv. c. 7.	
67, note †, add Mill, Logic. i. 389.	
80, note †, add McCosh, Div. gov. App. i.	
86, note †, add Twesten, Dog. ii. 14.	
83, note *, add do. 46.	
87, note *, after 'quæst. xx.' add Gerh. loc. iii. § 112.	
87, after 'Hildebert,' add quoted by Gerh. l. iii. § 110.	
87, note †, add quoted by Gerh. l. iii. § 116.	
88, note †, after 'th. 15,' add De Wette, Lehrbuch der Prot. Dog. § 40a.	
90, note †, add Gerh. l. iii. § 133.	
121, note †, add Ebrard, Dog. i. § 126.	
125, note §, add Twest. ii. 246, to whom the author is indebted for this remark.	
126, note §, after 'light,' add Twest. l. c.	
127, note †, after 'Max. iii. 14,' add Hampden B. L. 150.	
144, note †, add Hagenbach, § 38.	
153, note †, add Schenkel, Dog. ii. 147.	

PAGE	
153, note , add Gerh. l. ix. § 126.	
153, notes †, §, add Hagenbach, § 106.	
161, notes †, †, add Twest. ii. 318.	
162, note *, add do. 321.	
163, note †, add do. 337.	
170, note *, add As Nitzsch somewhere remarks.	
181, note *, add Hagenbach, § 178.	
183, note †, after 'all sin,' add Hag. l. c. It is doubtful whether Hagenbach has correctly understood Athan. The latter says that even in such men <i>ἀμαρτία</i> and <i>φθορά</i> remained.	
183, note †, add Hag., § 63.	
206, note *, after 'Hoffmann,' add referred to by Delitzsch, l. c.	
208, note †, add quoted also by Mozley, Præd. 159.	
244, note §, add Ebrard, Dog. § 367.	
260, line 3 from top, add As Nitzsch remarks, Syst. § 131.	
267, note †, add As Nitzsch remarks, § 132**.	
275, note *, add Hagenbach has given the sense, not the words, of Greg. Nys.	
277, note *, add Hagenbach, § 68, 5.	

Occasionally in the text, and in many of the notes, for historical references, and illustrative passages, the author has been indebted to secondary authorities of acknowledged reputation. The above list comprises all, or nearly so, of such cases omitted to be specified in the respective notes. He has taken pains, and in most instances has been able, to verify their accuracy. To J. Gerhard, Nitzsch (System etc.); Twesten (Dog.), and Hagenbach (Lehrbuch der D. G.), in particular, he acknowledges himself indebted for many valuable remarks and references.

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